

# **Over Nine Billion Ways To Butcher Concepts And The Names Of Your Little Gods Too!**

**Debriefing Dossiers, Passwords, De-Programming, & Fatal Strategies: Post-Neoism,  
Nihilism, 'Pataphysics & Deconstruction**

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Ah ha,

With this text we were initially looking to provide these fragmented disembodied lexia of texts as not simply “research” for contributions to the new edition of the Too Cool series with entries in a new Re:Action on the “occult postmodernism”, but to explore the proverbial rabbit holes on how all of this interplays on the Too Cool “series” as a part of Neoism, including in regards ‘transmedia games’ specifically as ‘Unidentified Non-Narrative Objects’ a part of these ‘Zero-Sum Game No Shows’ while giving examples from how these interlink to our prior released (transmedia game) texts and how one can operate transmedially. All of this with an emphasis on ‘pata-’ over ‘meta-’.

It has come to include dossiers on Stewart Home, Istvan Kantor, Florian Cramer, tENTATIVELY a cONVENIENCE, Jean Baudrillard, Jacques Derrida, Jean-François Lyotard, Douglas Hofstadter, Andrew Hugill, John Cage, Marcel Duchamp, Arthur & Marilouise Kroker, Francois Laruelle, the #TheGame23 and more...

If there are 100 billion neurons in the brain, here’s to cutting through everyone of them, synaptic firing or otherwise. Here are some opening texts to assist in a further deconstruction of “magic/k” by way of ‘Pataphysics...

We have nothing to do, and we are doing it.

## Post-Neoism & Avant-Bardism

This remains a *dérive* through various intertextual detours. In alternate version of “Preface: Of Impossible Revolution- Poppin-Off Mondo Neoism” from the upcoming “Neoism - 40 Years Of POP-UP Revolution” we caution, “Although a surface reading of those Neoists like Stewart Home’s “tonality” as mere post-Marxist polemics would still be far too reductive and reactionary (despite seemingly even with these “writers” seeming behest of goading the “readers” to accept such a “tone” at “face-value”).” This remains due to the deconstruction of hermeneutics played out by the avant-barde.

### Writing And [N]Deference: A Detour

“The use of polemical positions in avant-bard texts is intended to undermine the credibility of all forms of 'critical' 'commentary', since by these means it is perhaps possible to describe what cannot be declared (aporia). The avant-bard gives its dreams as dreams and it is up to the reader to discover whether Silent Bards reason better when they are asleep, or whether these nightmares are but a fiction and all along the afro-celtic social 'body' was wide awake. When bringing forth monsters, social theorists tend to simultaneously cage them by constructing 'critical' commentaries that lag behind the premises from which they set out. It might (not) be useful to relate this to 'the question of the preface'. Critical 'commentaries' are the twins of fiction, the supplement already presupposed by the novel and oral 'tradition'. For the avant-bard, the notion of 'differance' is flawed, by substituting 'a' for 'e' in differ(a)(e)nace to signify the letter as supplement, one merely displaces the problem of the supplement. Is not omega the supplement of alpha in differance? Does not this self-referentiality, this endless regression, lead us to suppose that all text tends towards the fictional (aporia)? That said, the crudeness of such readings recalls Korzbski's 'General Semantics' in the mono-dimensionality of the violence it enacts against (in the name of) deconstruction. This is 'absolutely' typical of the way theory functions within avant-bard 'fictions'. Is this 'satire' 'instrumentalised' as 'depletion' but simultaneously overflowing itself? If this is so, avant-bard discourse might be treated as science-fiction despite the fact that it is singularly lacking in the tropes that are usually taken as constituting the genre. We refuse to oppose Baudrillard's theory-fiction with fictive-theory.”

(#9)

As we'll see the following troll-esq(ue) mock critical commentary on hyperreality, deconstruction and postmodernity are humorously warped as a challenge which mocks while doubling by evoking in a way a (avant barde/Neoist Alliance) “initiation” ritual within the context of an (anti-meta-)hermeneutics. Emphasized by many of the accusations farcically lobbed at Baudrillard where passages from “Symbolic Exchange And Death” are cited, “criticized” de-contextually often omitting passages (as we'll see) from the text that often directly “border” the quotes cited which undermine a serious reading of (the) avant barde (as) “criticism”, like the following, “...in creating a hierarchy of oppression in which the dead suffer the worst discrimination, Baudrillard opens the door to other forms of bigotry.”

(#9)

For instance Baudrillard's work already plays out an overt expansion of the deconstruction of texts from Hegel, Rousseau, Bataille and Kojève.

“Baudrillard's rhetorical use of the term 'the West' is both totalising and ultimately meaningless. The 'critical' tradition Baudrillard is working within has from at least the time of Rousseau and Hegel been producing a discourse that anticipates the concerns of Symbolic Exchange And Death. Indeed. Baudrillard's musings about death draw fairly explicitly on both Bataille and Kojève's readings of Hegel. Even more problematic in view of the attempt in Symbolic Exchange and Death to counterpose the 'primitive' and the 'modern' is Baudrillard's apparent ignorance of the ongoing and widespread use of ceremonies of initiation - such as those found in freemasonry and contemporary witches covens - that involve ritual enactments of death and rebirth. These rites generally involve blindfolding followed by the revelation of light to symbolise rebirth. It is not unusual for candidates to be placed in a coffin or to suffer mock execution. Pursuits of this type have been popular among wide swathes of the population in Europe and North American for several hundred years.”

(#9)

Again this hyperreal notion of the 'primitive' is one as a 'primal scene of nullity', not a facile regional/ethno-racial bigoted notion, but paradoxes that play out under various proxy facades, not only the pataphysically imaginary distinction between 'West' and 'primitive' as ersatz binary. “Baudrillard's argument is ridiculous since sacrifice is, in part, a mediation on domestication. A theory of sacrifice must begin with the domesticated animal and the sociocultural process of domestication itself. Sacrifice and initiation stand in an inverse relation to each other; where there are elaborate initiatory rituals, sacrifice is relatively undeveloped and vice versa. The idea that sacrifice is a primitive practice rests on an agrarian mythologisation of the hunt. Sacrifice is primarily a practice of pastoralist societies. Hunter gatherers tend instead towards practices of initiation. The ongoing rise in initiatory practices - in for example, Orange Lodges or modernising religious organisations such as the Jesuits - over recent centuries is a corollary of the 'modern' nomadism that accompanies industrialisation. Baudrillard's schema is erroneous, the growth of cities and mass transportation systems might even be claimed as 'the return at a higher level' of nomadic ways of life and death. However, the establishment of a real human community has yet to be achieved and one step towards this must necessarily be the reintegration of the dead into the sexual practices of the living. At the same time we must struggle against ancestor worship, which can be every bit as repressive as the denial of death.”

(#9)

The crossroads of the specters are multifold when it comes to the deconstruction of metaphysics that the avant garde perpetrates by confronting the meeting of the Modernist philosophies of the avant garde with the magical of the occult with their myriad of onto-theologies and semiotic webs.

“The classical avant-garde in the form of Futurism, Dadaism and Surrealism emerged at the precise moment Aleister Crowley was reworking the Golden Dawn's remarkable synthesis of occult traditions, to create 'High Magick' as we know it today. Just as the avant-garde fakes its modernity, so Druidry fakes its antiquity. There is no evidence to suggest that contemporary pagan and esoteric 'traditions' pre-date the Renaissance. The avant-garde and the occult are two sides of the same coin. This state of affairs is left unreconciled, but at a higher level of disunity, in avant-bardism. In the ancient Celtic fables 'geis' was the prohibited thing; with the

Christianisation of the Grail legends it is necessary to add a 't,' the letter that represents the cross, to 'geis.' It is by this means that we arrive at 'Geist,' a concept that is absolutely crucial to the Hegelian system of philosophy. 'Geist' is German for both mind and spirit. It should go without saying that the average 'occultist' is a jerk who 'studies' the 'metaphysics' of magic/k precisely because s/he finds the works of Kant, Hegel and Marx too difficult to master. Readers who have not been initiated into the ranks of the Neoist Alliance, or its higher orders, may feel that they are being treated like fools, but then this is a thoroughly natural state of affairs given that the widow's son in the Grail romances is merely one among many representatives of this archetypal figure. The fool achieves wisdom through the ongoing process of becoming, that is to say in 'his' quest for the Grail. As the people of the Grail, the Celts are not a 'race' but proof, as if it were needed, that miscegenation is the creative principle at work in evolution."

(#2)

In the contribution, "Alchemical Insurrection", to Re:Action #2 Home propounds the avant garde as an "Afro-Celtic" (e.g. retro-historical mirage for anti-state/anti-ethno-demarcation imaginary solutions) to the alchemical interlink between the "twin phantoms" of the occult and avant-garde surrounding the dissolution of the State/the 'social'/culture in regards the Neoist Alliance. "Naturally, this entails the dissolution of those cultural forms that structure this society. Aside from ongoing and unrelenting attacks upon the discourse of philosophy, two of our most immediate targets are those twin phantoms known as the avant-garde and the occult. While occultists spend a great deal of time faking the antiquity of the activities in which they are engaged, the avant-garde's insistence on the element of innovation within its creations leads to a spurious denial of its historic roots. In this sense, the avant-garde and the occult are two sides of the same coin, they are the positive and negative poles which generate that multifarious enigma known as contemporary society. Since the avant-garde makes itself visible through manifestos, it must be banished. Correspondingly, the occult as a collection of hidden doctrines, must be realised (i.e. manifested) if it is to be simultaneously suppressed. The false Hegelianisation of Dada and Surrealism by the Situationist International has long obscured the necessity of this procedure. Since the avant-garde is undesirable, we will vanquish it by uniting it with its polar opposite. By bringing together the avant-garde and the occult (in its Celtic-Druidic form) under the rubric of the avant-bard, the Neoist Alliance is dissolving both these phenomena, and simultaneously destroying the false community engendered by capitalist social relations, a 'social' form predicated on the spectacular opposition of these twin modes of occultural invocation. Since the Neoist Alliance takes the rhetoric of its opponents and re-orders this verbiage as a means of dissolving ideology, it inevitably follows that certain passive bores believe us to be involved in the occult. Nothing could be further from the truth since, as we have already pointed out, to realise the occult is to abolish it."

(#3)

Clearly with Home as a manifestation of Neoism there are rabbit holes abound intertextually linking various language games together and "groups"/individuals/multividuals. No less than in the collection "Mind Invaders" with it's litany of Post-Neoist/Neoist "adjacent" "groups" from the era contributing which presages/anticipates a lot of recent Post-Neoist activities from which deploy/plunder including the evolution of contemporary Accelerationism as we can see already

highlighted by the group Decadent Action of which we play on and plunder for the text “Travels In Neolon”.

“Decadent Action are a High Street anarchist—guerrilla organisation whose main aim is to destroy the capitalist system by a leisurely campaign of good living and overspending. We plan to achieve our aims by making capitalism fall on its own sword. If you neglect and ignore capitalism it will not go away, but feed it to excess for long enough and it will eventually burst. We use the simple economic principles of supply and demand with their intrinsic link to inflation to establish the correctness of our theories. The state must control these factors to run the economy efficiently; throw in the wild card of massive irrational overspending on seemingly random luxury goods and the government is unable to take control. This will lead to hyperinflation and large-scale social unrest, in turn leading to the collapse of the monetary system and disintegration of the state apparatus. So how can you get involved in this conspiracy to overthrow the government without making too much effort or getting your hands dirty? Well, the answer is to spend, spend, spend! Get money, spend it; it's as simple as that.”  
(p.1, Home et. al.)

This includes how psychogeography, like the actions of the London Psychogeographical Association aligned with the proclamations on the dissolution of the State by Generation Positive,

“[...] we are suggesting a move towards a healthy society free of all oppression and exploitation, a classless society.”  
(p.38, Home et. al.)

The Television Magick described in the contribution by Thee Temple Ov Psychick Youth not only emphasizes their “industrial music”, Burroughs inspired, expansion on the cut-up technique, while also opening up the link between TOPY and (Post-)Neoism with all the magical/alchemy parallels, but they also have been incorporated into our various transmedia texts since they involve cut-ups/assemblages of all varieties.

“Television Cut-Ups Camouflage, if you have access to cable or satellite (i.e. many stations), try flicking rapidly through all the channels. The cut-up produced will often appear to be following your train of thought, as if it is trying to keep up with you by feeding back symbols: association blocks creating a bridge between your thoughts and the flow of imagery. TV-watching often becomes emotionally intense during this procedure. (Also, putting only the soundtrack of TV, without the visuals, through a stereo can provide valuable insights into the camouflage of control. We are starting to tape specific commercials and parts of programmes that may be psychically stimulating, one way or another... A VCR is helpful to fast-forward and review and edit all the way around. If you can, get several screens and put on each the most warped, weirded-out images you can find or get on video, and then zone out on all the stimuli. The weirder the better. The addition of music equally as bizarre only adds to the experience. Television and video are ideally suited for the cut-up method, incorporating as they do the milieux of both sound and visuals. It is interesting to interchange the audio and visual portions of two or more different programmes and watch the conflicting messages you are then exposed to. Which sense do you assign more validity to? Cut-ups of video can be of great use in ritual, too. If something is desired, you can record various images of it from television. When you have 'captured' enough

raw images, proceed to cut them up, splicing the images together randomly, either with the original soundtracks, random soundtracks from other raw footage, or with a special soundtrack of your own devising. This could also be randomly cut in with footage of yourself attaining your desire, either symbolically or as working towards your goal. I find it very important to include images of myself, as this serves to personalise the video and to take the power latent in the technology away from the big corporations and consecrate it to Me. By flicking the channels around, one often gets an impression of synchronicity; that the audio signals one receives are, in some sense, interrelated with one's actions and/or feelings in Real Time. This feeling is further heightened when multiple televisions are used, with the television image coming from one screen and the audio from another IV, image darkened and tuned to another channel. Most people utilise their televisions in a very rigid, linear way. They tune in one specific channel and watch passively. But if one begins to view the TV as a mirror, useful for both scrying (astral) and divinatory ('fortune-telling') purposes, one will find that much of the 'bad-vibe' associated with television is dissipated, can even be turned around to become a potent shamanically, cut-up TV is decontrolled TV, is big business castrated of its control patterns; the patterns through which we as viewers/consumers are manipulated. Through the break up of these patterns, we are able to free the airwaves of their inherent objectivity, and reclaim them as subjective reflections of our own thoughts."

(p.105-106, Home et. al.)

Again more syzygy on the magical, occult, and avant-garde are explored in this collection, in this case in regards conspiracies and conspiratorial groups like the Masons.

"However, only the Neoist Alliance trinity of Marx, Christ and Satan united in struggle accurately embodies the religious world view of the coming centuries. Since the avant-garde of this century is a highly advanced outgrowth of post-Masonic culture, it has never sought recognition from the deeply conservative United Grand Lodge. Nevertheless, the covert connections between so called 'antiart' and the Brotherhood are on open display to anyone with the ability to read the relevant signs. Dadaism was launched under the aegis of a club called the Cabaret Voltaire. As both a Mason and one of the chief architects of the French revolution, Voltaire's name has often been used in the titles of Lodges affiliated to continental Grand Orient Masonry. Similarly, the fact that two leading members of the Lettriste Movement, Isidore Isou and Maurice Lemaitre, were introduced to each other by Louis Pauwels — co-author of the notorious Morning of the Magicians — is a matter of public knowledge. Likewise, Isou's adopted name can be read etymologically as Jesus Jesus, while Lettrisme itself is actually an advanced form of Qabalah whose real purpose is hidden from the profane under the guise of an 'art' movement. [...] Once Masonry is realised and suppressed, social disintegration will be re-established at a higher level. From this time forth, religion, in realising itself, will celebrate in feast its inability to reconcile darkness and light. The spontaneous appearance of division in unity and unity in division makes it unnecessary for the Lion to lie down with the Lamb. Humanity is the Devil, mean and corrupt, a liar blinded by her own deceptions and so out will come the tricolour cockades and ribbons, decorating everything that is without consequence. Religion will separate itself from beauty too! Jacques de Molay, thou art avenged."

(p.113-115, Home et. al.)



But again as the text included by the Workshop for a Non-Linear Alliance implies, that all of these “magical” problematics of metaphysics are deconstructed by their pataphysical underpinnings which are emphasized by the Oulipollian-esq constraints of their experimental dérives.

“It possessed no particular psychogeographical characteristics at the time of its discovery, primarily because of the exigencies of the constructed dérive then being undertaken. [...] “It had long been acknowledged amongst the fluctuating body of WNLA drift participants that encounters with coincidence were one of the more potent, if least understood, reasons for the empowerment of any given dérive. An analytical examination of how coincidence operated upon the navigational patterns of the dériving individual had often been suggested, but no one had ever been able to draft even the slightest hint of a coherent text. The general consensus that finally was that those specific coincidences to have played an important role in any given moment or situation of note should be alluded to for the time being only through factual narrative description. The sole exception being the decidedly pataphysical Third Law of Coincidence, drafted in the heat of the moment the day before the conclusion of the events now being retold. The Third Law of Coincidence, briefly stated, argues that: ‘All coincident moments will be indicative of a notable concurrence of events, suggestive of possessing a resemblant causal interconnection irrespective of whether this is imaginary or actual.’ It should come as no surprise to discover that, following the events of the previous thirty-six hours, our dérive protagonist had now all but abandoned the investigations being conducted in response to the Driftnet and had set out in search of what to all intents must have appeared the impossible. Upon reflection I suppose the tone of my narrative must have already prepared the reader for the discovery made that evening. The navigator in question was by now using every available technique he possessed in order to locate playing cards, and in such circumstances their discovery must become more likely. It took another full day — the remnants of yesterday being interrupted by persistent reflection — but for the card discovered to be the anxiously sought after five of diamonds is the type of event that the gestating Third Law of Coincidence now thrives upon for its verification.”

(p.155-156, Home et. al.)

In this way the pataphysics of these dérives, uncertainty and found objects all intersect hyperrealistically.

“(It must be remembered here that a dérive is never undertaken with the expectation of fulfilling its original premise, but rather of experiencing its natural evolution — of drifting away from the moment of departure in anticipation of the unknown quality of the point of arrival.) [...] there lay within this episode the beginnings of a quite remarkable game of Urban Poker [...] The cards would naturally have to be the genuine ‘unsolicited object’ (in Breton’s sense of the word). [...]”

(p.157-158, Home et. al.)

In Home’s recent work we can see how to deconstruct these specters of Modernity with their Metanarratives that still perpetuate and permeate the various so-called “post-postmodern” “movements” like Metamodernity.

“Spectres of Modernism is an installation of protest art banners emblazoned with slogans dreamt up by leading artists and writers...” to “...oppose the new development and draw

attention to the failure of neo-liberal economics in Britain's cities; its legacies of social cleansing, housing crisis, and damage to modernist architectural heritage, as well as the art-washing of urban devastation. [...] The entire installation has been designed by Fraser Muggeridge Studio to appear as a colourful, high impact collage of architecture and text.“  
(Home et. al. 2020)

With the recent “Denizen Of The Dead“ Home and co include a series of sigils which turn the text into a “living spell” of social protest, or what we might claim as pataphorical hypersigil, doubling as both accursed specter and meta-ghost story collection.

“Spell Series created by the w.o.n.d.e.r. coven.

Twelve symbols plus one interjected throughout the book. Each individual symbol of this living spell was contributed by one member of the coven. Combined in the correct order they are the lock and key of one complete spell designated to transform the neoliberal project and overdevelopment as represented by Clarendon Court.

[...]

Thus Denizen of the Dead functions as a showcase for a variety of aesthetic approaches to the haunted house story while simultaneously taking on the mantle of social protest.“  
(Home et. al. 2020)

In an also recent interview on his latest novel “She’s My Witch” we have Home’s elliptic commentary on the occult postmodern by comparing rituals of witches, (occult) psychogeographers and surrealists.

“Returning to the witches I know, they might ask me to participate in a ritual, since often more than one person is required and not just in the many forms of sex magic - although there are solo forms of that too - they practice. Unsurprisingly among witches who are open with me about their beliefs there are often spontaneous manifestations of their creed. Sometimes I’ll be walking down the street with a witch and she’ll say did you just see that ghost who went past us? Or else we’ll be in a park and the witch I’m with might see a tree and say look at how twisted that trunk is, there’s a lot of energy coming up from that tree, we have to walk clockwise around it. So we’ll walk clockwise around it, spaced so that we can’t see each other because we’re each on opposite sides of the tree. This is how the witches I know behave and to a large extent how I had Maria behave in the book. It isn’t so different from the practices of other people I know, mainly men, who call themselves psychogeographers or even surrealists. Bearing that in mind, among many other things I see She’s My Witch as correcting at least some of the patriarchal and other ideological faults of Andre Breton’s novel Nadja.”  
(Home)

Home even gives us in this interview (a misleading for the sake of succinct discussion on the perpetuating complexity of his texts) aside on his interlinks to the postmodern, especially the hyperreal of Baudrillard.

“I think my writing has evolved in different ways at different times. The style I initially became known for begins with the short stories that were later anthologised alongside other stuff in the No Pity collection. These took off from British youth culture pulp fiction but with this material re-read through the prism of 20th century modernism and postmodernism, and in particular Alain

Robbe-Grillet, but refracted especially through Jean Baudrillard's postmodern theoretical writings on simulation. So whereas surrealist and nouveau roman writers incorporated elements of pulp prose into their highbrow constructions, I wanted to simulate the pulp novel by taking the type of repetition you find in the work of lowbrow genre hacks spread across many books and hundreds of thousands of words but collapse that into a single work of around sixty thousand words. This meant repeating words and phrases, particularly those associated with sex and violence - and indeed whole scenes of sex and violence - in a single book rather than across books. My intransigent use of repetition was intended to deconstruct the pulp narratives I was plundering. I wrote five novels in the third person in this style, *Pure Mania*, *Defiant Pose*, *Red London*, *Blow Job* and *Slow Death*. The middle three I consider to be a conceptual trilogy about the limitations of ideological extremism, because - among other things - such extremism is relational and not rational. These are the novels in which I wanted the ciphers who populated them to be cardboard cut-outs rather than characters. It would have been funny to carry on producing pretty much the same book almost indefinitely and infinitely but I chose not to do so. *Come Before Christ & Murder Love*, the sixth novel I wrote - the books weren't published in the order I wrote them - was narrated in a non-linear fashion and in the first person by a schizophrenic whom became a different character every time he had an orgasm. The occult and mind control elements of this book are reprised in some of my later novels including *She's My Witch*. Although characterisation wasn't important to *Come Before Christ*, neither did it feature a cardboard cut-out narrator since schizophrenia - even if it is only being simulated - produces something more complex than that."

(Home)

Again all of this talk of the occult versus the avant-garde emphasizes a parallel and interlinking by NO!art, Pop art, in regards N(e)oism, the yes/no involved in the deconstruction of presence when it comes to the demarcations of nothing played out by the distinctions between 'Art', 'anti-art' and 'non-art'. In this way the 'No Shows' of the NO!art movement are further deconstructed by the transmedia games in regards to non-events we've coined as 'Zero-Sum Game No Shows' as mentioned in "Counter-Footnotes" of "Travels In Neolon".

"Self-described as a rebellion of the underprivileged, NO!art used negation, pessimism, and anti-aesthetics to protest the "investment machines" of Abstract Expressionism and Pop art that dominated the market at the time.

[...]

MC: I'm fascinated to put that moment between 1959 and 1964 in perspective. When you look at the art in itself, what's wonderful is the echo of how it referenced New York Dada, or Nouveau réalisme. It plays within an aesthetic that we would find in Pop (by the use of imagery from everyday and popular culture), but also negates it by either playing with the word "no" or putting it in a larger context. When I started looking into the work of NO!art, the use of the word "no" struck me. How can one be anti-art? What does it mean to be anti-art? All the references that you bring, like Ben Morea or Henry Flynt, echo(es) to NO!art. Boris Lurie had been working for more than ten years by then, and Sam Goodman was an Abstract Expressionist with a very strong career, yet when they found each other, Lurie, Goodman, and Fisher put everything aside and worked under that umbrella term, NO!art, vividly and with great energy for three or four years. Here you have a certain use of the words "no" and "anti," which I find truly

fascinating. We go from “NO!art” to “empty art” to “un-art,” and we should look into that. What does it mean to declare yourself as making NO!art? Of course, they’re shooting themselves in the foot by claiming NO!art—don’t expect not to be seen if you do NO!art! Nonetheless they were doing it in such a precise way, trying to redefine what it mean(s) to “do” NO!art.

[...]

SH: Obviously people writing about NO!art reference Warhol’s piss paintings in relation to Goodman’s Shit Sculpture. There are other associations as well. John Fischer, who was also affiliated with the group, used bread. There are pictures of a loaf of bread in a clamp, loaves of bread placed alongside bullets, all sorts of things. I’m not sure when I first saw that work, but it was certainly after I encountered the Neoist movement, which was also quite obsessed with bread. One of the tricks, which I always assumed came more from a “circus” kind of background with Neoism, was to paint rubber cement over a loaf of bread, set fire to it, and put it on your head, so you could dance around with a flaming bread hat. There was also an Anglo-French Neoist calling himself R. U. Sevol who in 1983 or 1984, while he was living in London, would go to all these different museums with a suitcase full of loaves of bread. When the staff asked him to open up the suitcase and then asked why he was carrying the loaves, he’d say it was art. It’s strange to see these resonances, since I’m assuming the people making this later bread work weren’t familiar with John Fischer’s work—I certainly wasn’t.

[...]

SH: I see the “no” as negative in a lot of anti-art in terms of dialectics, whether you want to go back to Hegel or perhaps prefer a more Marxist dialectic. If you have “no,” then you have to have “yes.” And if you have “yes” and “no,” then another world is possible.“

(Home)

In “SHAMEN OF DISCONTENT OR THE REVENGE OF THE MIRROR PEOPLE: A Detective Story In Four Acts” on “The Cardinal and the Corpse” and “The Falconer” by Sinclair and Petit we have the elaborate psychogeographical funhouse of mirrors, that although in this text/email we’ll not delve into thoroughly in all of its hyperreality (see our upcoming text “Post-End Notes: I Would Prefer Not To : Foreword/Afterwards”), we do have passages that interlink further “occult psychogeography” from those like Ian Sinclair and Alan Moore, to Home as well as other postmodern writers like Katy Acker.

“Inside the London mediascape one might hear the not quite fictional docudramas of Iain Sinclair and Chris Petit dismissed as essays in cultural incest. That is, if anybody involved with the electronic prison that is contemporary television actually deigns to mention them. Exiled to graveyard shifts on Channel 4, Sinclair and Petit’s films *The Cardinal and the Corpse*, *The Falconer* and *Asylum* have met with ongoing and studied indifference from the very people who bankrolled the projects – culminating in the failure of the commissioning editor of the last to even come and watch the finished version. Yet ironically, as Sinclair himself points out, this willful forgetting perfectly duplicates the content of the films themselves. More of an accidental collision than a trilogy, the three works blend fiction and documentary to trace, revamp and recover the directors’ heroes of the (re)forgotten – writers so obtuse that their reputations, like antimatter, defy the laws of gravity. The films are a montage of images and sounds in which Petit’s video footage is occasionally supplemented by reels of out-of-date super 8 stock. *The Cardinal and the Corpse*, which kicked off the cycle in 1992, was made with a regular TV crew

on the insistence of Channel 4. In the next two, however, loose camerawork is overlaid with Dave McKean's computer graphics. Both *The Falconer* and *Asylum* are anti-narratives about doubles and echoes. The stories run backwards, repeat, fold in on themselves and are interrupted by bursts of white noise (courtesy of Bruce Gilbert). *Asylum* piles up images and soundbites; it conjures complexity through the simple expedient of linking divergent worlds. Pseudo-surveillance footage is cut against vox pop interviews with Marina Warner, Ed Dorn, James Sallis and Michael Moorcock. The material is constantly twisted and thrown into a loop. One minute the notions of the Byronic hero and fatal woman from Mario Praz's *The Romantic Agony* are being aphoristically collapsed into the silent figure of photographer Françoise Lacroix (light bends as it approaches Lacroix; she is always and already playing herself); the next moment viewers are confronted by a dialectic of distantly related imagery drawn from American slasher movies. Throughout runs the promise that something is being tracked down: memory, perhaps, or history, or the meaning of the films themselves. We're never told. The full implications of participating in a Sinclair project are unlikely to be understood by anyone who is called upon to do so. A bizarre amalgam of a gangster and a deconstructionist, he invites representatives of the (re)forgotten to present mythological versions of themselves to Petit in his role as evil cameraman and collector of souls. The grotesque resonances recorded on film are reworked until the subjects under investigation are morphed into a state of permanent non-existence as far as recognition goes. As a result, the subculture of the re-forgotten takes on the aspect of an underworld of interconnected 'agents' (most of whom are personally acquainted with each other – hence the cultural incest tag), into which investigators are drawn and swallowed with alarming regularity. Over the years I've met nearly everyone featured in Sinclair and Petit's films. I was even called upon myself to perform a paranoid rant in *The Falconer*. Now, though, I wanted to turn investigator: to discover how far this convoluted mirror-world of life doubling art doubling life extended, and if it was possible to escape it. It wasn't. In retracing Sinclair's retracings, in recovering his recoveries and unearthing his suppressed links, I ended up chasing my own tale and investigating my own investigation."

(Home)

When Home's discussing Sinclair in regards Ballard, specifically "Crash" (a text that homage's both Jarry's "Supermale" and "The Crucifixion Considered as an Uphill Bicycle Race"), the syzygy accrues further with comments on Ballard in regards Baudrillard, who also brings up Ballard's "Crash" a few times including claiming it as the "first hyperrealist novel" in "Simulacra & Simulation" while discussing it as a "violent deconstruction" and even later commenting on Cronenberg's adaptation.

"He's more interested in reading Crash with its disturbing sexual themes as Ballard's most autobiographical work. Cronenberg is a victim, ensnared by the text, voodooed, hexed. The filmmaker is a zombie plaything of a cult novel that invades his consciousness while he struggles to adapt it for the silver screen.

[...]

Sinclair is fascinated by Ballard because the older writer is a metaphorical suicide, virtually dead. Sinclair isn't analysing Ballard's oeuvre, he's performing an autopsy on it. Ballard's tastes veer/vary from the cod literature of Jeremy Reed to the cod theory of Jean Baudrillard. Sinclair isn't scandalised by Ballard's lack of culture, the work under review is simply an exercise in

holding his contempt in check. Ballard's books are a product of his obsessions and may be treated as autobiography. For Sinclair, an exegesis of Crash becomes a simple matter of painting in the background, transposing names.”

(Home)

We can see how these referential abyme's slightly derailed structurally the BBC's Channel 4. “I tracked back to *The Cardinal and the Corpse*. Upon completion in 1992, Sinclair told me, this project immediately disappeared into a black hole of total obscurity: “The commissioning editor blanked it. He couldn't even understand the credits, so the programme was just pushed out and ignored.” *The Cardinal* was sold to Channel 4 on the back of Petit having made a successful documentary about air hostesses and the growing critical acclaim for Sinclair's work as a novelist. It was a pirate project successfully smuggled into the corporate media world thanks to assorted TV bosses wrongly imagining the programme would be a presenter-led talking head trip through heritage lowlife. Instead they got a bunch of maniacs shouting each other down and spinning off in several different directions at once. The film featured a good number of the perennially (re)forgotten, including Alan Moore, Emanuel Litvinoff, Alexander Baron, Robin Cook, John Latham and Michael Moorcock. However, the show was stolen by two used book dealers called Driffild and Stone. Naturally, trendy London media types had never heard of these unsavoury flim-flam men, and had no use for them. Sinclair and Petit had to wait six years before *The Falconer* was screened by Channel 4 in 1998. *The Falconer* was supposed to pick up from where *The Cardinal* left off, but was hijacked by a man named Peter Whitehead and the convenient backlog of images with which he blitzes anyone who shows the slightest interest in him. Depending on which version of Whitehead's life you got (and from whom), he was either an underrated underground film-maker (*Wholly Communion/Tonight Let's Make Love In London &c.*), a self-proclaimed occultist, a self-published novelist or (only slightly less plausibly) the man whose testimony led to the jailing of top pot smuggler Howard Marks. Sinclair recalls packages with fresh revisions of Whitehead's past arriving daily throughout the filmmaking process. “The material for *The Falconer* was gathered over a period of two years,” he told me, “and this was followed by a spell of intense editing which included a lot of refilming and redrafted voice-overs.” With a multiplicity of competing voices and presences, *The Falconer* became a series of minor set pieces and portraits of people hung on the utterly bogus structure of an investigation into Whitehead's auto-mythology. At one point we even see him on a TV chat-show claiming to have copulated with live falcons – at which point McKean sends a computer-animated falcon-woman in to caress the outline of his image. The innocents who appeared in *The Falconer* – including both Kathy Acker and myself – had no idea how their monologues would be doctored. Neither, apparently, did Sinclair and Petit. Allegedly, the two film-makers found out as they went along that Francoise Lacroix looked fantastic when she walked across the screen, but her voice was so quiet it didn't register on their sound equipment. My own motor-mouthed performance was supposed to represent a serious attempt at portraying a paranoid schizophrenic who believed the absurd conspiracy theories he was spouting. However, I played my semi-scripted role for laughs, and the way I let rip with ridiculous inventiveness about some sinister (and entirely fictional) occult activities of the Royal Family created a film within a film.”

(Home)

Here this transmedia prank that encapsulated these abysses of referentiality embellished by this hoax of “institutional critique” and pirate cinema are openly declared a feedback loop.

“Sinclair kept presenting me with variations on the theme of Asylum being a mirror, or double, or echo, of the lives of those implicated in it: “Nobody knows what is fiction and what is documentary fact any longer. We’ve had people making documentaries that were actually faked. Asylum caught the backlash of this by doing the opposite. Channel 4 didn’t know who Ed Dorn was. They had vaguely heard of Marina Warner. Moorcock was pretty much forgotten for them, but he began to get some publicity because of his new novel King of the City. Who or what he was, they had no idea. Channel 4 wanted proof that everything we said about Moorcock was true, when Mike’s whole life has been entirely to do with inventing versions of himself that are mythical. The commissioning editor made four separate appointments to come and see the finished film and never turned up to any of them. I simply don’t understand the kind of thinking that leads someone to commission a film without wanting to support it. However, that mind set fits very well with the paranoia of the film.” Thus while liberal pundits bleat on about postmodern culture being too knowing, the champions of the reforgotten are perhaps rather slyly suggesting that our world isn’t ironic enough. Amid the relentless onslaught of ambiguities, contradictions and omissions, the value of Asylum is easy to miss. Sinclair and Petit are shamen of discontent. Their shameless repetitions amount to a strategy of anti-provocation. They’ve diagnosed our culture’s relentless drive towards closure as a pathological trait and are administering a cure. The dense texture and unabashed referentiality of their work results in it being ignored as an affront to those who believe that dumbing down is the best way of responding to increasing market segmentation. The message of Asylum and the various works that preceded it, if they can be said to have a ‘message’ at all, may or may not be ‘sod the market’. Regardless, Sinclair and Petit’s film work can certainly be seen as radical process that won’t easily be recuperated into marketing spin. As a procedure of resistance this is considerably more sophisticated than the ‘fuck you’ attitudinising that connotes ‘cutting edge’ status in the mass media. Forget yooof TV, pseudo-realist drama, pharmaceutical fiction – for Sinclair and Petit video is a feedback loop. Memory is the big resource. There’s no beginning, there’s no end, it goes on forever...”

(Home)

As noted by Dias The Fixer, Stewart Home remains also one of the links between Neoism and Discordianism due to the other overt link The KLF.

“Bill Drummond and Jimmy Cauty, formerly of the KLF and now active as the K Foundation, upstaged the Turner Prize last year by awarding forty thousand pounds to the winner for producing the worst body of art over the previous twelve months. Without doubt, the prank succeeded in satirising the institution of art, but the K Foundation failed to explain the ways in which the winner's work was imperialist. It was therefore left to the Neoist Alliance to issue a leaflet attacking Rachel Whiteread and her 'sculpture' House. In this, I explained that Whiteread's desire to 'universalise' the meaning of the terrace she'd transformed into a concrete cast, resulted in the building being stripped of its history and the deep political implications of that history. The K Foundation publicised their prank with a series of press and television adverts. Their amply financed activities received a good deal more press coverage than the

avant-garde has generally gardened in recent years. Although stunts don't bag column inches in direct proportion to the amount of money spent on them, a prank with a publicist orchestrating the coverage is likely to do better than something executed on a shoe-string budget. Since the avant-garde wishes to get its criticisms of the institution of art across to as many people as possible, it makes sense to spend money on a press officer. I'd have hired Mick Houghton to publicise my pranks if I'd been able to afford him. Most of those criticising the KLF (see, for example, the NME letters page of 1 1112/93), hadn't grasped the mechanisms by which the culture industry operates and thus failed to understand the K Foundation's activities as a contemporary articulation of the avant-garde critique of the institution of art. What's particularly interesting about Drummond and Cauty is the way they've taken ideas from the avant-garde of the 1980s and injected them into mainstream culture. I said in a lecture at the V&A last January that the KLF would be used to validate the Neoist, Plagiarist and Art Strike movements in the same way that the historical standing of the Situationist International had been boosted by critics citing their alleged influence on the Sex Pistols. Given Drummond and Cauty's present activities as the K Foundation, the connections between them and the eighties avant-garde are much closer than the rather tenuous links made between Guy Debord and Johnny Rotten. A long term campaign to exploit this state of affairs is my avant-garde version of The Great Rock 'N' Roll Swindle' it's a prank that will hopefully overshadow the quickie stunts I was pulling last year."

(123-124, Home 1995)

The KLF not only remains a link between Neoism and Discordianism but also how these interlink via the Abolition of Art movement, Accelerationism and deconstruction.

"The campaign took a new turn with the fourth ad in the series, which consisted of the slogan 'ABANDON ALL ART NOW' in letters nearly three inches high. After this came the announcement of the K Foundation Award, a forty thousand pound prize to be given to the artist who'd produced the worst body of work in the previous twelve months. The four nominees were identical to those chosen for the prestigious Turner Prize, which awards a mere twenty thousand pounds to its winner. The next ad in the campaign carried the headline 'LET THE PEOPLE CHOOSE' and a voting form, so that the public could have its say on who was the worst artist in the world. [...] After Drummond and Cauty announced they'd burn forty thousand pounds worth of low denomination bank notes if Whiteread refused to accept them as prize money, this 'artist' took the K Foundation's cash 'under protest', claiming she was forced to do so to avoid the dosh being wasted. Whiteread either has a very low estimation of the public's intelligence or else she is just plain thick. Money is only a symbolic representation of wealth; burning it doesn't alter the sum total of resources in the world. Indeed, millions of bank notes are burnt every year because they have become worn through use. Drummond spent a good part of Turner Prize day talking to Whiteread on the 'phone and he concluded from these conversations that 'she isn't very bright'. Drummond and Cauty dealt explicitly with the symbolic nature of money in a series of 'works' they created to compliment the K Foundation Award. The Melody Maker of 4th November 1993 reported that they'd produced a series of 'art works' which consisted of money nailed to pieces of wood, and that these were to be sold for half the value of the cash they contained. The following press statement was also quoted: 'Over the years the face value will be eroded by inflation. While the artistic value (due to the works' position in the



amended History of Art) will rise and rise. The precise point at which the artistic value will overtake the face value is unknown. De-construct the work now and you double your money. Hang it on a wall and watch the face value erode, the market value fluctuate, and the artistic value soar. The choice is yours.”

(Home 1995 B)

Again The KLF as “Kopyright Liberation Front” highlight, as Home mentions, plays on the Art Strike and Plagiarist movements as well notably with all of their sampling and turntablism, but also when Home mentions their “multi-media campaign” it evokes further potentialities for transmedia game fatal strategies.

“It is the K Foundation, rather than Whiteread, who represent a vital and innovative strand within contemporary culture. Their work is simultaneously a critique and a celebration of 'consumer capitalism'. Above all, what's enjoyable is the gusto with which they attack the self-righteous bureaucrats who pretend to be the guardians of our culture. From the beginning, what struck me about their campaign was the way in which it drew on the same underground and avant-garde sources that had inspired many of the KLF's finest moments. While Drummond and Cauty have moved away from the pop industry, there is a deep sense of continuity between their earlier music based work and the recent multi-media campaign. One of the few influences on the KLF that music journalists have been able to pin down is that of Robert Anton Wilson and Robert Shea's *Illuminatus* novels. The historical material on which these books are based is part of a millenaral current that runs through western culture from the very beginning of the Christian era to the present day. These tendencies are given a more secular veneer in both communist and fascist doctrines. On the left, they are expressed in terms of 'the end of history'. The Nazi obsession with establishing 'a thousand year Reich', is a different formulation of very similar concerns. Likewise, the K Foundation's infatuation with time and its transformation is rooted in the same soil, although the branch to which Drummond and Cauty belong is that of mystical anarchism.

Springing from the same source, but to date not fully recognised as an influence on the KLF and K Foundation, is the twentieth-century tradition of avant-gardism. Movements such as the Futurists, Dadaists, Surrealists and Situationists are well known for the pranks they pulled on the cultural establishment. F. T. Marinetti paid for his First Futurist Manifesto to appear as an advertisement in *Le Figaro* of 20 February 1909. In this text, Marinetti spoke of his desire to 'destroy the museums, libraries and academies of every kind'. In other words, like the K Foundation campaign, Marinetti's Futurist advert was an attack on institutionalised art. Drummond and Cauty have been described on numerous occasions as Situationists, but to label them as such is rather misleading. Situationism is simply one of many movements that make up the twentieth-century avant-garde tradition. The K Foundation are undoubtedly an outgrowth of this tradition but their work is not explicitly Situationist. Indeed, it has much more in common with the Neoist, Plagiarist and Art Strike movements of the nineteen-eighties than with the avant-garde of the fifties and sixties.”

(Home 1995 B)

The KLF's detournement of the “pop ‘mainstream’” with marginal paradoxes further expound the feedback loops of appropriation.

“Another concern of the eighties avant-garde was with the use of multiple names as a means of raising questions about the nature of identity. By 1986, fifty different avant-garde magazine editors were calling their publications Smile, which of course caused a great deal of confusion. Even more people were using the name Karen Eliot — so that countless pictures, articles and songs, were produced by an artist who didn't actually exist! In a similar fashion, Drummond and Cauty's use of a variety of names for their musical projects made the listener question traditional notions of authorship. From 1985 onwards, propaganda began circulating amongst the avant-garde for an Art Strike, during which cultural workers would stop producing and selling any product. Drummond and Cauty's 1992 decision not to release any more records echoes these demands and provides another example of how they've taken ideas developed on 'the margins' of contemporary culture and used them to great effect within the pop 'mainstream'. Returning to the K Foundation adverts, we can see that they make perfect sense when viewed in the light of the avant-garde tradition that runs from Futurism at the beginning of this century through to groups such as the Neoists and the London Psychogeographical Association in the eighties and nineties. The ultimate meaning of the K Foundation's slogan 'ABANDON ALL ART NOW' is remarkably similar to that of 'DEMOLISH SERIOUS CULTURE', a formulation much used by the Art Strikers. As I've already said, the avant-garde has always been concerned with criticising institutionalised art.”

(Home 1995 B)

These plagiarist nesting dolls are obvious when again one recalls that Home appropriated the 'DEMOLISH SERIOUS CULTURE' slogan from the conceptualist Henry Flynt to embellish Neoism's deconstruction of 'concept art', and apparently, as Home notes, Flynt did not approve. “FLYNT: At that time I was initiating concept art. I was doing a lot of things, many of them imitative. The purpose of concept art as a genre is to unbrainwash our mathematical and logical faculties. At the same time it's bound up with aesthetic delectation. I think these two aspects are integral to concept art, it's not just an artificial pasting together of the two things, they actually change each other in the course of their interaction. From there I moved to an absolutely subjective position aesthetically, where each individual should become aware of their unformed taste. I used the term brend to signify this and thought that it would replace art. Basically, at this time, I viewed any work of art as an imposition of another person's taste and saw the individual making this imposition as a kind of dictator. I don't think there's any irony about the fact that I was beginning to dabble in political leftism at the very time I was inventing a theory in which art disappears and is replaced by a kind of absolute individualism. It's not strange if you understand what the final utopia of socialism was supposed to be. It's no different from talking about getting rid of money or the state.

[...]

HOME: To return to the point about confusion, to me that seems central to what you do. Before we started taping the conversation, you said your writing was a black hole which would suck people in and deconstruct their mode of thought.“

(Home & Flynt)

The pataphysics of all these Neoist intertextual plays are noted with a smile and a wink, or perhaps a smirk, by Home in “Assault On Culture”, where the pataphysical non-existence

documented by the College Of 'Pataphysics anticipates that of multivideals like Monty Cantsin, et. al.

"While the Lettriste Movement, and International, were undoubtedly ludicrous, most - if not all - their members, seem to have remained blissfully unaware of this. Isou, and later Bernstein, Conord, Dahou, Debord, Filion and Wolman, treated their activities with a seriousness that the objective observer can only find comical. There were, however, other groups with Utopian leanings who actively cultivated an air of ridiculousness. Typical among these is the College Of Pataphysics, which, while rarely viewed as a 'fan club', is often seen as an over-extended joke. The 'College' was neither an organised 'art' movement, nor an 'alternative' education institute, and yet many of the avant-garde's leading figures came to join it. Its members have allegedly included Boris Vian, Juan Miro, Marcel Duchamp, Eugene Ionesco, Max Ernst, Jacques Prevert, Raymond Queneau, Jean Dubuffet, Stanley Chapman and Asger Jorn.

Pataphysics was the science of imaginary solutions, which the French 'utopian' Alfred Jarry (1873-1907) 'invented' at the end of the last century.

The spirit of this 'new science' was incarnated in Jarry's famous plays "Ubu Roi", "Ubu Coco" and "Ubu Enchained", and in other works such as the novel "The Exploits and Opinions Of Dr. Faustroll, Pataphysician".

The College Of Pataphysics was, according to Simon Watson Taylor's "Apodeitic Outline" of it in the "Evergreen Review" (May/June 1960), inaugurated at a meeting on 29/12/48. The highlight of its founding was a 'harangue' by His Magnificence Dr. I. C. Sandomir. However, not all observers take such claims at face value, as Watson Taylor explained:

"The Vice-Curator-Founder of the College passed away on 10 April 1956 (vulgar style)... The dignified aspect of his death was marred only by a scandalous statement in the "Nouvelle Nouvelle Revue Française" by its editor M. Jean Paulhan. Commenting on "Cahiers" announcement of the death of Dr. Sandomir, M. Paulhan declared his sorrow at the death was tampered by the suspicion that probably Dr. Sandomir had never existed. The College was forced to act firmly against this provocative insinuation by declaring publicly that M. Paulhan was considered henceforth to be pataphysically non-existent. In furtherance of this just measure, the College printed postcards bearing the legend JEAN PAULHAN DOES NOT EXIST. These were bought eagerly by members of the college and thereafter arved in ever increasing numbers at the address of the alleged Paulhan . . ."

Thus, while the College undoubtedly did exist, caring on its theoretical activities principally through its journal the "Cahiers of the College of Pataphysics", the accounts it has given of its own history have been called into question by outside observers."

(p.22-23, Home)

### **File (t): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

"Re:Action #9", "Re:Action #2", "Re:Action #3", "Mind Invaders" (edited) [a vast collection including the prior mentioned essay "Television Magick" by Thee Temple Ov Psychick Youth], "Specters of Modernism", "Denizen Of The Dead", "Witches' Brew", "Neoism, Plagiarism and Praxis" (p.123-124), "Assault On Culture" (p.22-23), "Doctorin' Our Culture", and "Slow Death"; by Stewart Home

<https://www.stewarthomesociety.org/reaction/re09.html>

<https://www.stewarthomesociety.org/reaction/re02.htm>  
<https://www.stewarthomesociety.org/reaction/re03.html>  
<https://www.stewarthomesociety.org/luv/sinclair.htm>  
<https://spectresofmodernism.wordpress.com/>  
<http://thecommonbreath.com/witchesbrew.html>  
<http://mousse magazine.it/mathieu-copeland-stewart-home-shit-and-doom-no-art-cell-project-space-2019/>  
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<https://www.stewarthomesociety.org/klf.htm>  
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-7n74W9si1o>

## **‘Pataphysics & The Alchemy of Neoism**

In the 'Pataphysics issue of RAMPIKE which featured both the Canadian "Pataphysicians like B.P. Nichol and Neoists like Monty Cantsin (i.e. Istvan Kantor in this case). Here we find additional syzygy in the deployment of the phrases like Neoist alchemy in regards 'Pataphysics. "I'm confused for many years and I get more and more confused every day, I change the title of this writing to ALCHEMICAL PATAPHYSICS & NEOISM I propose to change Alchemical to Biosomic, Pataphysics to Dataphysics and Neoism to The Great Confusion, and then the title of this writing will be: BIOSOMIC DATAPHYSICS & THE GREAT CONFUSION I accept the above proposal and I would like to introduce myself: I am Monty Cantsin, immortal open-pop-star, poet-trans-hungarian hard-art smger, self-appointed leader of the people of the Lower East Side, initiator of Neoism.... I know that they will write a lot of books about my life and ideas and I don't want to help them at all, so I don't give you any more information about my personal history, let them to be confused, and you to be curious and excited, if you really want to know who am I then change your name to Monty Cantsin and do everything in the name of Neoism, in a few years you will have a great experience in Biosomic Dataphysics and you will understand the idea of The Great Confusion, but don't forget: THE GREAT CONFUSION was initiated long time ago when a young artist sold his painting for a few thousand \$ while another one died of hunger, but before I get into this old story let's see more about BIOSOMIC NEOISM. Marshall McLuhan perceptively saw telecommunications making the Earth into a "global village," but in reality it is the current BIOSOMIC-NEOISM (BIOlogical-SOcial-Machines) that is making the global village truly possible in a technical sense and IS endowing it with hummor, revolution, sex and intelligence, the "global village" is now AKADEMGOROD UNITED CELLS OF NEOISM also known as The Promised Land of Neoism, a place for total communication and total freedom with perpetual changes, oh yes, I would like some more, I'm hungry."

(p.24, Jirgens & Cantsin, et. al)

Not only is the biosomic a play of patamechanics, but the countering of "ART" with transmedial "APT" (Fests), where the "missing" leg (much like he clinamen's swerve of the additional 'r' in Ubu's 'merdre') plays out a pataphysical gesture for deconstructing the referentiality of 'Art' by way of Neoism. Their transaesthetic transmediation is apparent in their lack of boundaries as open situations/contexts.

"APARTMENT FESTIVALS the Dataphysics of Neoist Apartment Festivals are: 1. Organizer(s)-conspirator(s) 2. Place(s) and Dates 3. Participants-conspirators 4. Events (street actions, training kamp(f)/cantpf situations, cooking, projections, conferences, concerts, performances ... ). 5. Documents (books, video, flyers, photos, manifestos, newspaper articles ... ). These are the Dataphysics of any art festivals, so the question is what's the difference between a regular ART festival and a Neoist ART Festival????, the difference made by the missing leg of R, [...] This writing is something between lecture and poetry, daydream and performance, science and cinema, business and mythology, collage and eating, panic and silence, birth and killing, suffering and ocean, liquid paper and blue fish, THE GREAT CONFUSION is the theatre of Immortal Half Second, THE GREAT CONFUSION is the poetry of electro-scare, THE GREAT CONFUSION is the revolutionary Dictatorship of Monty Cantsin. The concept of THE GREAT CONFUSION based on the theory of Neoism: you can become a Neoist by doing everything in the name of Neoism and by calling yourself Monty Cantsin, regardless of sex, politics, religion

and any other difference, this creates confusion and makes control impossible (control means to give different nantes, numbers and jobs to people), Neoism is open to all, anybody can do it, people in the streets are great Neoists, the greatest ones.”  
(p.24-25, Jirgens & Cantsin, et. al)

Once more, from a recent interview, Istvan brings up the “the alchemy of Neoism” in regards to the “magic equation” of this “relationship to magic”.

“I’m having a very busy weekend here but I try to take some time to answer this “magic equation.” However before I would do it let me add just a couple of things to the previous one. I also called up the spirit of Blaster Al Ackerman during the Blasterthon in June 2013 in Baltimore (he died March 17, 2013), doing a similar type of Neoist incantation while also showing a video in which I captured the walking reality of Dr. Ackerman. I also proposed to Mark Bloch to do a Cavellini seance for the Cavellini100 in NYC but apparently there was no budget for my bus ticket from Toronto to NYC. In any case all these spirits are still quite alive and if people want to get in touch with them they should search through their own psychotronic transmission devices and not the internet. Well, I’m back here again to tell that I have finished a message today about my relationship to magic and then deleted it by mistake, shit, and I tried all the abracadabra and hocus pocus without success. Anyway, I’ll do it again in the morning. No I won’t wait until the morning, I can finish it now, maybe it will be a shorter version, but just as good. Magic brings up memories of childhood. I got a book of magic tricks when I was around 10 years old and I learned a bunch of them and performed them for my family and friends. The kids in school loved them. And I learned how to disrupt people’s focusing not to reveal the secret of my tricks by using counter-gestures. In later life this skill helped me to execute illegal actions in museums by taking away the attention of the guards by using deceptive manoeuvres. I never really liked the theatrical abracadabra and hocus-pocus magician oratory, you know, those words to convince the audience about the serious business of stage magic. It made me only laugh, for me it always seemed to be a poetic joke. But I actually liked incantations and prayers and explored them in my performances. And I also like the shamanistic relations Beuys developed in his art just as well as Filliou’s simple gestures of changing hats but keeping the same serious face. I also enjoyed stories about sorcerers and witches. I also employed the alchemy of Neoism, like turning blood into gold, plus my interest in body modification and sexual explorations are already enough signs to think that I am a follower of black magic and the occult philosophy of Aleister Crowley. But surprisingly enough I’m not and I never have been. Everything about him and his ideas was always too serious and religious to me, too magisterial, high-toned elitist and excessively theatrical. Though I like his motto like the sentence “Do what thou wilt” but it sounds way better to me when added with “in the name of Neoism.” Do what thou wilt in the name of Neoism!”

(Gonzalez & Cantsin)

As we’ll see, Joseph Beuys as shamanistic figure links as “applied grammarology” (Ulmer) to Duchamp’s readymades and Neoism.

“Here we are facing the ultimate concept of Joseph Beuys: everybody is an artist. He meant that we are all creators, creating our social sculpture, our society. He pushed art further than Duchamp did. But for most people this idea remained very unclear since for them the term artist

meant a painter or sculptor or anyone who makes decorative objects. To make this situation less complicated, or maybe more complicated, we just dropped the terms art and artist and I started using the terms Neoism and Neoist, therefore we ultimately got rid of the problem of art. And always made sure to tell everyone that Neoism was NOT a new art movement and it's not part of the historical Avant-garde. The term Neoist describes somebody who is not necessarily an artist, but a creative person working in any kind of field. So instead of calling someone a pizza artist, someone who makes new kind of creative, edible art, we call this person a Neoist. Or instead of calling a doctor, who heals people through a new kind of treatment, a healing artist, we use the term Neoist. "Wow, doctor, you are such a great Neoist" we compliment his/her work when we get out from the hospital. On the other hand, to be a Neoist you don't have to do something different and extraordinary, you can do the same old shit but you have to do it in the name of Neoism. So you see Neoism is also a platform to get things done. While nobody was interested in your water-colour paintings on paper when you were a landscape painter, now that you are making them in the name of Neoism and signing them Monty Cantsin you get many invitations to exhibit your otherwise meaningless water-colours. I'm of course, as you probably realized it, joking and making fun of things which is also an essential part of Neoism. When people think too traditionally and insist on old fashion ideas then creativity gets diminished, reduced to nothing. Like thinking that by exhibiting in a museum you are a great artist is one of the biggest mistakes. Museums are outmoded institutions copying each other, constructing prison or mausoleum-like buildings which usually cost them hundreds of millions if not billions of dollars. It's not very creative and not Neoist at all. Neoists usually use very little money and they can make art in the streets, and basically anywhere. This whole art and artist idea is way overrated, overblown. Art stars are the most ridiculous people, greedy and stupid. Didn't Duchamp also say it somewhere? Maybe he said it in a different way like "stupid like a painter" which is an old French insult "bête comme un peintre." All the misery in the world is caused by greed and stupidity. When I launched my Neoist slogan "Stop Misery" with a poster campaign in the streets in NYC, in 1986, I also meant "start revolting" because that's the only way to eliminate misery, greed and stupidity."

(Gonzalez & Cantsin)

This stupidity of the painter may have a lot to do with the 'hyper-paintings' that Istvan has been putting out in the past decades signed Monty Cantsin culminating in the recent Free "Art" giveaway, but the transaesthetics of Beuy's declaration of everything as readymade/"art" clearly has vast ramifications for Neoism, transmedia (games), and the deconstruction of magic and art.

"Yes, it has the potential. Mail art in the early times basically functioned as social media, it preceded the internet. The perception of art is changing. We were never so close to the concept of Joseph Beuys's that everybody is an artist and we are creating a social sculpture. Even though the world is ruled by dictatorship; people value freedom at a higher level and at a more creative level. We can catch this through the activist movements very well. Actually artists are not the leading creative people today but those who don't call themselves artists are way more creative."

(Gonzalez & Cantsin)

In a way the indefinable(s) of APT Fests anticipate the transaesthetics of transmedia games as open (con)texts/situations.

“Open-situations which permit anybody to contribute, act, react, destroy: create”  
(Gonzalez & Cantsin)

The transmedial gaming of these non-art open-text events are embellished when declaring the APT fests as the “fêtes mobiles”.

“The APT festivals are usually one week events with various activities such as conferences and performances, but the main purpose of these “friendship gatherings”, “drills”, “habitation manoeuvres” is to create a simple and comfortable situation for personal meetings between the concerned collaborators. The APT fests are NEITHER “performance-art” NOR “installation” festivals. The APT fests are the “fêtes mobiles” of the neoist-network—web.”  
(Cantsin)

### **File (X): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

In “The Neoist Book” R.U. Sevol reminds us of the pataphysics of all this when to one festival, in homage to Jarry conjured by Neoism, he brought an iron on a leash.

“Well, I remember hearing an anecdote about how Alfred Jarry went to the premiere of Ubu Roi with a lobster.”

(Cantsin, et. al)

RAMPIKE {“ALCHEMICAL PATAPHYSICS & NEOISM / BIOSOMIC DATAPHYSICS & THE GREAT CONFUSION”} (p.24), “Messenger NRP”, “WHAT IS A uh uh APARTMENT FESTIVAL??????”, “The Neoist Book”;

by Istvan Kantor

<https://scholar.uwindsor.ca/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1029&context=rampike>

<https://www.electroniccottage.org/rafael-gonzaacutetelez/messenger-nrp-neoist-research-project-chat-conversation-between-rafael-gonzalez-and-monty-cantsin-amen-may-2-27-2020#>

<https://www.electroniccottage.org/rafael-gonzaacutetelez/messenger-nrp-neoist-research-project-02>

[http://www.neoism.info/neoist\\_book.pdf](http://www.neoism.info/neoist_book.pdf)

## **Post-Neoism Post-Media: No Medium No Message**



To interlink further all these problematics together even more, let's turn to the Neoist Florian Cramer and his text "Anti-Media" where his deconstruction of media theory will allow us to play on this paradox of transmedia games in regards to Neoism.

#### "Media

From Marshall McLuhan to Friedrich Kittler, media theory has insisted on 'media' as the primal condition of all communication, art and thinking. Its similarity to anti-idealist philosophy is not coincidental; Heidegger's post-war philosophy of technology as second nature and condition of being ever since the atom bomb has been an important point of departure for this school of thought. It's somewhat ironic, in this light, that Jack Burnham's 1970 exhibition 'Software' was both one of the first concept art and one of the first media art shows. It re-solved this contradiction by insisting on the dematerialization of both contemporary art and information technology. (Similar ideas were advocated, around the same time, by art critics Lucy Lippard and Sidney Youngblood. The very notion of 'medium', however, is loaded with too much idealist legacy to lend itself for onto-technological materialism. There are two almost unrelated notions of 'media' that clash in art theory today: the notion of medium as a means of artistic expression, such as painting or sculpture, that has existed in English literature since the eighteenth century and continues to structure the study disciplines of most art academies in the world; and the notion of medium as a carrier of information that has its roots in nineteenth-century physics. The latter is closely related, as Raymond Williams notes, to the concept of the ether. The evasive concept of ether has been abandoned in modern physics. Likewise, 'medium' is hard to define. What, for example, is the medium in radio? The radio waves, or the air carrying them, or its molecules? This choice of definitions is still rather manageable because each of them relies on a narrow understanding of 'medium' as something in between a sender and a receiver. But when radio as a whole is called a 'medium', as is common even in media theory, then this differentiation is void. 'Medium' then also encompasses the sender, the receiver and even the editorial staff of a radio station. Aside from radios, TV sets and record players are also called 'media', although technically they are receivers; and electronic devices connected to the Internet are called 'media' although they are senders and receivers at once – let alone that the contents received and played back by them, such as music or video, are called 'media', too. The tumorous expansion of 'media' from something in between senders and receivers to something that includes them all perfectly exemplifies what is called a metonymic shift of meaning in literary studies: when a word, instead of referring to only one particular object, also refers to things that are close to this object (such as 'paper' referring not just to the material but to a newspaper, or to an academic essay). In McLuhan's definition of media as 'the extension of man', 'media' even grows into a synonym of any technology. The knife of Chuang Tzu's cook would be, no doubt, a medium according to this definition; a Taoist might perhaps consider cook, knife and oxen one medium to the way (Tao) pursued in the cutting. With their metonymies, terminological fogginess and mix-up of technology and editorial institution, 'medium' and 'media' become latently paranoid figures of thought – all the more when media theory glorifies them as a speaking subject that fills the void of the philosophically abandoned human subject. It's tempting to conversely abandon the notion of 'media' because of its pomp and fuzziness, but doing so, one would just swing to the opposite extreme. We can't rid ourselves of the word 'media' simply because of its wide use and great impact on contemporary culture and politics; an impact that has become even greater than that of 'art'. (For the same

pragmatic reason, Henry Flynt's philosophical debunking of 'art' doesn't solve the problem either.) A 1985 issue of SMILE – a zine that could be published by anyone, thus anticipating the shared identity of 'Anonymous' – contained an aphorism that is quoted elsewhere in this book: Anti-art is art because it has entered into a dialectical dialogue with art, re-exposing contradictions that art has tried to conceal. To think that anti-art raises everything to the level of art is quite wrong. Anti-art exists only within the boundaries of art. Outside these boundaries it exists not as anti-art but as madness, bottle-racks and urinals. A book called 'anti-media' can't help being about 'media' for the same reasons. The only difference is that 'media' lacks boundaries where 'art' – in the sense of contemporary visual art rather than art in the broadest sense – has to draw them out of its own systemic and economic necessity. In both anti-art and anti-media, a love/hate relationship is undeniably at work. And both perhaps signify twentieth-century nostalgia, since the notion of creative industries may be about to make both terms obsolete.”  
(p.12-14, Cramer)

The paleonymic detournement of the term transmedia by way of transaesthetic transmedia games as covered in “Hypermades: Hyperreality and Transmedial/textual Deconstruction” where much like the quote below everything remains a simulacrum of a medium crossing all mediums transfinitely, going beyond their own ends, where much like in Arthur Kroker there remains no medium and no message.

“Media theory itself has paranoid tendencies, first of all by its inflation of the term 'medium' to the degree that virtually everything ends up being a medium, including senders and receivers, light bulbs and guns, angels and altar bread. If everything is a medium, it is easy to conclude that we are surrounded and permeated by the media. And since McLuhan's assumption that the medium is the message, media theorists believe that the medium is the creator rather than the purveyor of a message, a tool with its own agenda.”  
(p.192, Cramer)

Here Cramer has his own notes on Neoism, pataphysics and alchemy.

“With 'fugues' and 'mixtures' on its 'organ', pataphysics institutes the music machine as the model for its poetics. In an apparently seamless way, its combinatorial art extends the Pythagorean tradition. Only apparently, however, since Pythagorean metaphysics is really just another banal commonplace assimilated by the pataphysicians. When Queneau quotes Lautréamont in the final sentence of his operating instructions – 'la poésie doit être faite par tous, non par un' – the prospect of an emancipated creativity is not understood in a romantic sense; nor is it a neo-romantic promise of 'interactivity'. Instead, it is an open invitation to transpose the trivial. Contrary to Pythagorean and neo-Pythagorean machine poetics, all macro(cosmology) and all systemic thinking is expelled from this pataphysical universality. It is no different with 'Dr. Faustroll', who, as 'Faust drôle', inherits the name of Marlowe's and Goethe's alchemists. Instead of theosophically fusing physics and metaphysics, however, he uses pataphysics, 'after-physics', to leave them behind. The second book of Jarry's 'roman néo-scientifique' defines pataphysics as a 'science of imaginary solutions', which takes the 'laws governing exceptions' as its object, instead of the laws of nature. It is a poetic science not of the general, but of the specific and eccentric: that which lies outside of the natural law.”

(p.213, Cramer)

All of this as a preamble to notes tENTATIVELY a cONVENIENCE and his 'portable booed usic busking unit', a variation of which we put together as a transmedia game strange loop Oulipolian kit for our 'Zero-Sum Game No Show' at both Neoism 40 and later at the Rivington School all of which we cover in "Travels In Neolon".

"...Neoist tENTATIVELY, a cONVENIENCE built a 'portable booed usic busking unit nuclear brain physics school lab philosopher's union member's mouthpiece blatnerphone hallucinomat' as a portable re- cording studio and performance apparatus. It contained a PXL2000 toy video camera, television, plastic toy mouths, loudspeakers, drumsticks, a basin, and four simultaneously playing audio tape decks and radios, thus functioning as a low-tech audiovisual player, cut-up mixer, and percussion and feedback instrument all in one. tENTATIVELY named it a 'busking unit', since it was equipped with an electrical power sup- 21 ply and was initially conceived for street music performances. machine's low-cost construction attests to tENTATIVELY's underground audio-visual activism, and its hardware is a sum of its pataphysical poetics: 'booed usic' (booed out user music as a parody of 'mood music'); the 'nuclear brain physics school' (where tests are obtained through subliminal messages heard on a prepared audio tape while sleeping; along with the stipulation to reproduce this audio tape for the next generation of students); the 'philosopher's union' (a union of philosophers, whose members are recorded in 'mouthpieces': grainy close-ups shots taken with an analog Fisher Price camera of mouths speaking about philosophy); the 'blatner phone' (a cassette deck refunctioned as a musical instrument)."

(p.216, Cramer)

Again Cramer anticipates the transaesthetic transmedia games deconstruction of the Gesamtkunstwerk and their archival "mediums" as lost objects in his discussion of record albums as Gesamtkunstwerk as well as post-digital publishing.

"In the 1980s and 1990s, pop music valorised the record album as Gesamtkunstwerk to such an extent that even filmic spectacles – music videos like Thriller – were secondary media, serving only to aid the sale of records. From the standpoint of semiotics and the conventional culture industry, this is an absurd situation in which a medium that is audio-visually more rich indexically represents a medium that is audio- visually more poor. (In the cinematic film, the soundtrack album is the poorer substrate or index in terms of media. Celine Dion, for example, is the Proustian cookie for Di Caprio and Winslet on the railing of the Titanic.)"

(p.138, Cramer)

It's these connections in regards to Neoism that are highlighted by transmedia campaigns of those like The KLF and Thee Temple Ov Psychick Youth with their assemblage sounds and evocations of magic by this crossing of the Gesamtkunstwerk.

"Descriptions of punk and post-punk that focus on youth culture tend to fall short, since they fail to take into account the extent to which clever avant-garde artists (Malcolm McLaren, Jamie Reid, Genesis P'Orridge, Lydia Lunch) were active participants in the scene. Structurally, the conflict situation within underground pop culture in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s is the same one at the heart of the Lebensphilosophie and Lebensreform (life reform) youth movements, radical

politics and avant-garde art at the beginning of the twentieth century (where Walter Benjamin occupied Diederichsen's role as the pop-intellectual). Both pop music and early artistic avant-gardes can thus be described in terms of aesthetic anthropology, a notion developed by the recently deceased Gert Mattenklott, who was himself aesthetically socialized within the periods in question. Taking this as a starting point, we can delve further into art history or sociology of culture. Is pop music – due to its semiotic aesthetics of connection grounded on the idea of Lebensphilosophie or aesthetic anthropology – the last Gesamtkunstwerk (total work of art)? As a short autobiographical footnote about my own aesthetic socialization: in 1982, at the age of 13, I developed the habit of secretly reading Diederichsen's articles for *Sounds* under my school desk. That same year in Hamburg (the same city as the *Sounds* editorial office) the journal *konkret* published art historian Horst Bredekamp's influential text 'Fußball als letztes Gesamtkunstwerk' (Football as the last total work of art). At that time, even *Sounds* became interested in discussing soccer in general and Hamburg's team in particular. A popular hooligan T-shirt of Rotterdam's Feyenoord club – the other football team formerly trained by Ernst Happel – just shows the word 'Rotterdam' in bold Gothic letters. The typography ascribes to both the Feyenoord Hooligan culture and the Gabber hardcore music scene, which likewise originated in Rotterdam and the circles around the Feyenoord Ultras (as can be heard on the Gabber track 'Rotterdam Hooligans' by Rotterdam Terror Corps). The German Gothic typography would also provoke people of Dutch origin, however, since the city centre was almost entirely obliterated in 1940 by the Wehrmacht in one day of bombing.

This goes to show that both football culture and pop music can be extremely loaded referential systems and aesthetic, political forms of identification. Often the reduction and simplicity of the sign (such as the Rotterdam lettering) has a reciprocal correspondence with the complexity of evocations conjured by its references. Several questions come up here: How does this relate to the romanticist programmes of the Gesamtkunstwerk? Are these general characteristics of popular or folk culture? Is there a difference between popular and folk culture? And, finally, is an 'aesthetics of connection' a general feature of all cultures and cultural phenomena – such as religion, meals, sexuality, burial rituals? Perhaps the decisive difference when it comes to pop music is that it still originates from the system of art and thus from aesthetics in the narrower sense. Measured against romanticist and post-romanticist aesthetics from Schelling to Hegel and from Nietzsche to Adorno, pop music is the bastard child of the musical Gesamtkunstwerk – a Gesamtkunstwerk in opposition with its inventor: certainly Dionysian, but not high culture in the Wagnerian sense; a manifestation of aesthetic resistance, yet industrially reified. What is it that distinguishes the aesthetics of connection in pop music from the early romanticist concept of universal poetry, which, according to Friedrich Schlegel's 116th *Athenaeum* Fragment, also embraces 'the kiss that the poetizing child breathes forth in artless song'? The tricky dialectic of this demand lies in the call to abolish both entertainment and serious culture while at the same time securing these by drawing a distinction between art and the artless; using romantic irony to call attention to this border (for example, in Tieck's *Gestiefeltem Kater* [Puss in Boots]). This is the way in which the popular first comes to be. Popular music in Germany is born as a concept with *Des Knaben Wunderhorn* (The Boys Magic Horn) and becomes a political construction through philology and poetic inventions such as Heine's *Loreley*."

(p.134-135, Cramer)

We can find the pataphysics of behind the Post-Neoist activities that involve hacking/hacktivism and cyber-accelerationism in the nihilistic deconstruction of recursive logic in Gorgias' strange loops/paradoxes with Cramer's assistance.

"What is then a hack? Just as the term 'hacker' describes various kinds of people who handle systems in unconventional ways, 'hack' describes this very activity itself, be it as a trick or deception, as an efficacious, but conceptually unclean intervention (like a 'patch' or a 'bugfix'), or as a solution that is at once ingeniously simple and elegant, absorbing an abundance of issues in the densest possible form. Since, as a 'hack', Ulysses' wooden horse in fact did not exist outside the medium of language and as an artistic product of Homer's epic, it comes as no surprise that the theory of the art of language and oration was likewise the first to put down a theory of the 'hack'. It is telling that, 250 years after Homer, it chose the same topic of the Trojan War for this purpose. One of the two still known orations of Gorgias of Leontini, who brought the art of rhetoric from Sicily to Greece in the fifth century BC, is the 'Encomium of Helen'. By acquitting the person who was guilty of the Trojan War and thus refuting the historical common sense with seemingly striking arguments, the speech is a demo programme for the power of persuasion. Gorgias's actual hack is his use of recursion: Helena, he argues, might have been persuaded to act the way she did, with language being too powerful for humans to easily resist it: Their persuasions by means of fictions are innumerable; for if everyone had recollection of the past, knowledge of the present, and fore knowledge of the future, the power of speech would not be so great. But as it is, when men can neither remember the past nor observe the present nor prophesy the future, deception is easy; so that most men offer opinion as advice to the soul. But opinion, being unreliable, Persuasion is used here as an argument to persuade the audience. Thus the power of language becomes a self-fulfilling prophecy, a claim embedding its own performative proof. This hack has its philosophical implication that truth is a mere effect, generated by speech, manipulations, art. In his posthumous fragment 'On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense', classical philologist Friedrich Nietzsche argues: What, then, is truth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and anthropomorphisms – in short, a sum of human relations which have been enhanced, transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: truths are illusions about which one has forgotten that this is what they are; metaphors which are worn out and without sensuous power; coins which have lost their pictures and now. But Gorgias's oration demonstrates more than that. Coupling rhetorical persuasion with recursive logic, it extends over the limits of its discipline. Not accidentally, recursive loops – that is, procedures which proceed themselves – are a legal part of all programming languages and play a central role in such attempts at mathematical aesthetics as Douglas R. Hofstadter's book *Gödel Escher Bach*. Likewise, the 'jargon file' contains entries on 'recursion', which is simply a cross-reference to itself, on 'recursive acronyms' and 'tail recursion'. A hack therefore combines elegance of logical construction with the rhetorical force of what Latin rhetoricians first called 'stupor', a force that itself cannot be described in purely logical and mathematical terms. In the Renaissance, 'stupor' became a crucial term for the rhetoric and poetics of 'acumen', that is, a wit driven by 'ingenium'. While seventeenth-century theory still conceived of 'ingenium' as engineering, something that, like all rhetoric, could be taught by instruction, 100 years later the term mutated into the romanticist 'genius', which could no longer be learned, but was a gift of nature. What happens then if hackers became the new role model of the artist? Does it mean to return to an

aesthetics of artistic genius not only in theory, but also in praxis given the cults among prominent hackers like Richard Stallman or crackers like Kevin Mitnick – despite all efforts of modern art and art theory to overcome this thought pattern? Or does it, on the contrary, mean to disenchant the artistic genius and redefine it in the sober terms of technical ingenuity?”  
(p.221-223, Cramer)

### **File (Ø): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

“Anti-Media” (p.12-14, 134-135,138,192, 213-216, 221-223);  
by Florian Cramer  
[https://monoskop.org/images/f/f9/Cramer\\_Florian\\_Anti-Media\\_Ephemera\\_on\\_Speculative\\_Arts\\_2013.pdf](https://monoskop.org/images/f/f9/Cramer_Florian_Anti-Media_Ephemera_on_Speculative_Arts_2013.pdf)

## **Neoism Without Neoism: A Mere Note... On PNT & De-Composition**

With “A Mere Outline...” tENT covers a lot of these bases with explanations of his various examples in indefinable open-context experiments/de-compositions many of which were featured at APT Fests. As mentioned in our archived “interview” with tENT (which was also a part of this series of ‘Zero-Sum Game No Shows’) , these were all incorporated into all of our transmedia game experiments and event texts.

“Extroverted behavior of a calculatedly complex & politically/socially theoretically backed nature has constituted a significant part of my activities throughout most of my life. To many people, such behaviour is so-called “performance art”. Not wishing to be “pigeon-holed”, thus enabling entities perceiving my actions to superimpose their stereotypes to oversimplify me, I’ve been substantially occupied with public self-contextualization resistant to previously existing categories. Failing that, I’ve often opted in favor of unpopular categories to attempt to give an “edge” to my activities - hence, I’ve preferred being labeled “criminally insane”, for example, to being an “artist”. Since much of my life has centered around manifesting my imagination with “bizarre” appearance & behavior in everyday life, I’ve frequently encountered people trying to explain me. As such, I’ve been called “Hippie”, “Jesus”, “Charlie Manson”, “Faggot”, “Weirdo”, “Hare Krishna”, “Punk”, “Clown”, “Satanist”, “Cult Leader”, & “Skinhead” - to name some of the main ones that I’ve heard most often - “Weirdo” & “Clown” being, perhaps, the 2 most accurate. Given that even many of my friends find it difficult to even adjust to calling me “tENTATIVELY, a cONVENIENCE”, it can accurately be said that my struggle for self-definition has a long way to go. Terms that I’ve used to describe some of my activities are...”

(tENT)

Although we’ll not account for most of the pataphysical mathematics (discusses by Bök) i.e. ‘patamathematics’ of tENT’s “Paradigm Shift Knuckle Sandwich and Other Examples of PNT (Perverse Number Theory)”, that’ll have to wait till at least our upcoming text “XXX / Bowling Up The Wrong Tree”, but discussion of PNT remains crucial to deconstructing Hofstadter’s meta-logical interpretations of strange loops pataphysically. tENT pataphrasically interlinks PNT to GEB by way of pataphors. As embellished by the paradoxical disseminatory ambiguity in GEB of the ‘~’ (the tilde) where Hofstadter’s “usage” involves negation (e.g. ~G, i.e. Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem is false [which Hofstadter alleges doesn’t actually negate Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem for being a problem for the axiomatics of Number Theory]) this is played up by the tilde also signifying “about” or “approximately” it’s this pataphysical antinomy beyond truth and falsity that tENT plays on with the patamathematics of PNT while intertextually playing on his film, “A Double Negative Is Not A Positive”. All of this for tENT to show pataphysically how “Anything is Anything”.

“Pataphor = a term coined by Pablo Lopez, “is as far beyond a metaphor as a metaphor is beyond non-figurative language” - ie: “pataphors essentially describe two degrees of separation from reality” - Wikipedia

pataphrase = to quote from a parenthetical insert on page 46 of this bk: “(The pataphrase has created a world where even the chessboard no longer exists, including the characters who lived in the original Wikipedia example’s world. almost entirely abandoning the original context in favor of creating a faux logic in order to tie together elements referred to from GEB while simultaneously being ~GEB. This is classic PNT insofar as it will go to just about any length in

order to make an abstruse joke. &, yes, it, too, is "bowling up the wrong tree" because the ball is now in the other sports pataphor - to isomorphize further.)" [...]

Perverse Number Theory = a form of Number Theory in wch all truths taken to be obvious are subverted for the sake of seeing what happens next - read this entire bk for the long definition" (p.339-340, tENT)

Eventually hinging on the pataphrastically isomorphic space of the pataphors that he later interlinks to a neologism he coins through reverse engineering what he calls 'Riemannian after-space', in a way pataphysically beyond the hypothetical mathematically metaphysical space conjured from projective geometry of the 'extended complex plane' of complex numbers known as a Riemann sphere that interlinks zero, infinity, 1, -1, i, and -i (imaginary numbers).

"Riemannian after-space = a fictional concept defined in this bk as "a Riemannian after-space is a space produced in spacetime as a result of any 'topology change' that can be represented as having a boundary between the after-space & its predecessor(s) & that can be visualized as a Voronoi Diagram"

(p.347, tENT)

tENT eloquently examines how all this number crunching gets us to non-events.

"Brouwer considered numbers to be not only "mental entities" but to arise out of the "sensation of time". I do not take time to be open to "sensation" but the "now indeterminate" status of "future events" (or more appropriately 'non-events'!) likewise requires the rejection of the view that for \*any\* "future tense statement" either it or its negation is now true. Predetermined events (if any) are perhaps another matter."

(p.222, tENT)

In an interview on the SubGenius, tENT expounds Neoism's interlink with the 'new' and deconstruction of 'Art'.

"I was enthusiastically trying to create something 'new' at the time. This was of very little interest to most of my friends who were quite satisfied w/ the traditional & uninventive security of already established cultural norms. As such, I was seeking allies closer to my own spirit. In the 1970s, I'd already conceived of the idea of creating a 'movement' whose primary purpose was to create the illusion that it existed - w/o having it exist otherwise. While this wasn't really Neoism's purpose at the time, it's slightly possible that such a potential seemed somehow intrinsic to it. Also, a small group of us in BalTimOre (John Ellsberry (Richard's brother), Richard, Larkin Little, Bob Dorsey, & Myself) had been using the collective identity of "David A. Bannister" since around 1977 or 1978 so the Monty Cantsin collective identity was an immediate point in common. Otherwise, I wanted to MAKE THINGS HAPPEN on an international scale & Neoism was a good context for this. As I recall, Monty/Istvan & I were in agreement that Neoism WASN'T an "art movement" & that its importance was much more as a tool for fucking up dominant philosophical & political paradigms (although we probably didn't express it quite that way at the time). This was (& still is) extremely important to me & insured our compatibility."

(tENT & Mckeen)



As both Home and tENT are quick to point out, as well as Mckeeon and Dias The Fixer wantonly/wantonly inquire about, tENT remains an exemplary interlink between the “occult postmodern” activities of the Church of the Subgenius and Neoism.

“We’re trying to get slack & defeat the conspiracy. In the meantime, Neoism IS the conspiracy (or at least one of them).”

(tENT & Mckeeon)

All linking back to PNT’s transmedial paradoxes (like the pataphysical deconstruction of the Russel paradox) that detourne reality aka “undermine ‘reality’ maintenance traps”.

“I do what I do to attempt to give our social world a PARADIGM SHIFT KNUCKLE SANDWICH. To undermine 'reality' maintenance traps. To combat the mass's tendency toward over-simplistic thinking. To conduct class playfare. To live according to my imagination. To attempt to fully realize my personal potential. To combat social injustice.”

(tENT & Mckeeon)

In the controversial to be published text which was tENT’s submitted yet rejected, by Istvan without our say (but mere indifference), contribution to the Neoism 40 collection (which we’ll instead include in our upcoming “Ex-Communiques”) “Neoism is as Neoism doesn’t” tENT recommends, to look elsewhere for Neoism other than Neoism, so we shall...

“How does Neoism work “in today’s techno-glitterotarian society?” By being everywhere where Neoism isn’t. It’s long since ceased to work by using a collective identity, by using plagiarism. Neoism doesn’t even disguise itself as Neoism anymore, it’s ceased to be Neoism in defense of itself. If you find someone declaring themselves to be a Neoist & doing everything in the name of Neoism you can be sure that they are only a distraction [...]”

(tENT)

### **File (⊗): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

“A Mere Outline...”, “Paradigm Shift Knuckle Sandwich and Other Examples of PNT (Perverse Number Theory)” (p.222, 339-340, 347), “Neoism, the Krononautic Organism, & the Church of the SubGenius”, “Neoism is as Neoism doesn’t”;

by tENTATIVELY a cONVENIENCE

[https://www.thing.de/projekte/7:9%23/tent\\_mere\\_outline.html](https://www.thing.de/projekte/7:9%23/tent_mere_outline.html)

<http://idioideo.pleintekst.nl/InterviewMckeeown.html>

## **Non-Events & Hyperreal Transmedial Terrorism: Zhuang-Zi’s Butcher & Lichtenberg’s Knife**

We're eternally rerunning on Baudrillard and hyperreality to retrace these interlinking intertextual strange loops, much like this quote involving transaesthetics that already anticipates a hyperreal transfinite non-conceptual paleonymic spin on transmedia.

"Whereas, if the rate of reality is falling everyday, this is because the medium itself has passed into life, has become the ordinary ritual of transparency."

(p.27-28, Baudrillard 1996)

Again this hyperreal transmedia connects overtly to the farcical avant garde take on Baudrillard's ignorance of rituals, whereas the ritual is that of extermination, the hyperreal.

"A spatio-dynamic fascination, just like 'total theatre', set up 'according to a hyperbolic, circular apparatus turning around a cylindrical spindle'. No more scenes, no more cuts, no more gaze', the end of the spectacle and the spectacular, towards the total, fusional, tactile and aesthetic (and no longer the aesthetic) etc., environment. We can only think of Artaud's total theatre, his Theatre of Cruelty, of which this spatio-dynamic simulation is the abject, black-humour cancanure. Here cruelty is replaced by minimum and maximum 'stimulus thresholds', by the invention of 'perceptual codes calculated on the basis of saturation thresholds'. Even the good old 'catharsis' of the classical theatre Of the passions has today become a homeopathy by means of simulation. The end of the spectacle brings with it the collapse of reality into hyperrealism, the meticulous reduplication of the real, preferably through another reproductive medium such as advertising or photography. Through reproduction from one medium into another the real becomes volatile, it becomes the allegory of death, but it also draws strength from its own destruction, becoming the real for its own sake, a fetishism of the lost object which is no longer the object of representation, but the ecstasy of denegation and its own ritual of extermination: the hyperreal."

(p.71-72, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

Baudrillard anticipates and counters Hofstadter's meta-logical take on strange loops in a similar way to tENT, while also playing out with the following quote all that we've touched on in regards transmedia games so far, as well as touching on the quandaries of censorship which has also come up in the Art Strike journal YAWN. Baudrillard cites the "several possible modalities of this vertigo of realistic simulation" that of the "detailed deconstruction of the real" into the flattened/linear seriality of "part-objects", the "abyssal vision" of splitting and doubling of objects taken initially as a "critical metalanguage" of the "dialectics of the mirror" whereas instead it turns to reflecting nothing only an exhaustive imploding seriality of infinite refraction, the "proper serial form" of Andy Warhol where the contiguity of the same is at a "zero degree flexion and reflexion", and where "pure machinality is doubtless only a paradoxical limit" that's an all-encompassing "stabilized form of the code" a "general formula" constituted by "binarity and digitality" (what Lyotard labels the 'metaconverting zero'). These serial abyssal strange loops of mise en abymes are highlighted our transmedia game version of the hyperreal hyper-event(s) of initiation mentioned in "Symbolic Exchange And Death" that further deconstructed the parameters of tENT's "Generic As-Beenisms" from "A Mere Outline..." taken beyond its ends to the hyperreal transfinite nth degree with its 24hr recording from a deterritorialized Post-Neoist APT Fest in an undisclosed location (perhaps Akademagorod), a portion of which is captured in the archival footage posted on YouTube untitled, "The Hyper-Event of Initiation" (2014).

"The very definition of the real is that of which it is possible to provide an equivalent reproduction. It is a contemporary of science, which postulates that a process can be reproduced exactly within given conditions, with an industrial rationality which postulates a universal system of equivalences (classical representation is not equivalence but transcription, interpretation and commentary). At the end of this process of reproducibility, the real is not only that which can be reproduced, but that which is always already reproduced: the hyperreal. So are we then at the end of the real and the end of art due to a total mutual reabsorption? No, since at the level of simulacra, hyperrealism is the apex of both art and the real, by means of a mutual exchange of the privileges and prejudices that found them. The hyperreal is beyond representation (cf. Jean-François Lyotard, 'Esquisse d'une économie de l'hyperréalisme', *L'Art vivant*, 36, 1973) only because it is entirely within simulation, in which the barriers of representation rotate crazily, an Implosive madness which, far from being ex-centric, keeps its gaze fixed on the centre, on its own abyssal repetition. Analogous to the effect of an internal distance from the dream, allowing us to say that we are dreaming, hyperrealism is only the play of censorship and the perpetuation of dream, becoming an integral part of a coded reality that it perpetuates and in fact, hyperrealism must be interpreted in inverse manner: today reality itself is hyperrealist. The secret of surrealism was that the most everyday reality could become surreal, but only at privileged instants which again arose out of art and the imaginary. Today everyday, political, social, historical, economic, etc., reality has already incorporated the hyperrealist dimension of simulation so that we are now living entirely within the 'aesthetic' hallucination of reality. The old slogan 'reality is stranger than fiction', which still corresponded to the surrealist stage in the aestheticisation of life, has been outrun, since there is no longer any fiction that life can possibly confront, even as its conqueror. Reality has passed completely into the game of reality. Radical disaffection, the cool and cybernetic stage, replaces the hot, phantasmatic phase. The consummate enjoyment [jouissance] of the signs of guilt, despair, violence and death are replacing guilt, anxiety and even death in the total euphoria of simulation. This euphoria aims to abolish cause and effect, origin and end, and replace them with reduplication. Every closed system protects itself in this way from the referential and the anxiety of the referential, as well as from all metalanguage that the system wards off by operating its own metalanguage, that is, by duplicating itself as its own critique. In simulation, the metalinguistic illusion reduplicates and completes the referential illusion (the pathetic hallucination of the sign and the pathetic hallucination of the real). 'It's a circus', 'it's a theatre', 'it's a movie'; all these old adages are ancient naturalist denunciations. This is no longer what is at issue. What is at issue this time is turning the real into a satellite, putting an undefinable reality with no common measure into orbit with the phantasma that on illustrated it. This satellisation has subsequently been materialised as the two-room-kitchen-shower which we really have sent into orbit, to the 'spatial power' you could say, with the latest lunar module. The everyday aspect of the terrestrial environment raised to the rank of cosmic value, an absolute decor, hypostatized in space. This is the end metaphysics and the beginning of the era of hyperreality. Of spatial transcendence of the banality of the two-room apartment by a cool mechanic figuration in hyperrealism tells us only one thing, however: this module, such as it is, participates in a hyperspace of representation where everyone is already in possession of the technical means for the instant reproduction of his or her own life. Thus the Tupolev's pilots who crash in Bourget were able, by means of their cameras, to see themselves dying at first hand.

This is nothing other than the short-circuit of the response to the question in the test, a process of instant renewal whereby reality is immediately contaminated by its simulacrum.”  
(p.73-74, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

The hyperreal transmedia (games) gets played out by what Baudrillard calls “trans-artistic” and “trans-ideological” when considering graffiti, in this way Neoism plays out this hyperreal transfinite and thereby transaesthetic take on transmedia games. Much like the superimposed hypergraphics included in Too Cool much like ‘hypermades’ expand the ‘hyper-’ in hypergraphics to the readymade, much like graffiti detourns and abolishes the support as framework, thereby playing out this transfinite abolition of the support of any/all mediums, transmedially.

“Graffiti overlaps, is thrown up, superimposes (superimposition amounting to the abolition of the support as a framework, just as it is abolished as frame when its limits are not respected). [...] By tattooing walls, SUPERSEX and SUPERKOOL free them from architecture and turn them once again into living, social matter, into the moving body of the city before it has been branded with functions and institutions. The end of the ‘fourth walls’ when they are tattooed like archaic effigies. [...] This is because graffiti is more offensive and more radical, bursting into the white city; above all it is transideological, trans-artistic. This is almost a paradox: whereas the Black and Puerto Rican walls, even if they have not been signed, always carry a virtual signature (a political or cultural, if not an artistic, reference), graffiti, composed of nothing but names, effectively avoids every reference and every origin. It alone is savage, in that its message is zero.”

(p.82-83, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

Graffiti’s space of terrorism in it’s emptiness remains opposed to the terrorism of the code, of state terror, conservative/jihadist terror, or that of the terrorism of negation its conspiracies by playing out the terror of deconstruction.

““What terrorism revives is something that cannot be traded in a system of differences and generalized exchange. Difference and indifference can perfectly well be traded for one another. What constitutes an event is that for which there is no equivalent. And there is no equivalent for the terrorist act in some transcendent truth. When Caroline Heinrich counterposes graffiti to terrorism as the only rigorous symbolic act, in so far as graffiti signifies nothing and makes use of empty signs to reduce them to absurdity, she does not realize how right she is. Graffiti is indeed a terrorist act (itself also with New York as its place of origin), not by its identity claim — ‘I am so-and-so, I exist, I in New York’ —but by its disinscription of the walls and architecture of the city, by the violent deconstruction of the signifier itself (the graffiti-tattooed subway trains plunged right into the heart of New York in exactly the same way as the terrorists hurtled their Boeings into the Twin Towers).”

(p.74-75, Baudrillard 2002)

As we’ll see most metaphysicalist misreadings of the ‘occult postmodern’ are those with a negationist take on conspiracies while overlooking their hyperreal nihilistic meaningless underpinnings of terror.

“And yet . . . Even if all this were the doing of some clique of extremists or military men, it would still be the sign (as in the Oklahoma bombing) of a self-destructive internal violence, of a

society's obscure predisposition to contribute to its own doom — as illustrated by the high-level dissensions between the CIA and FBI which, by reciprocally neutralizing information, gave the terrorists the unprecedented chance to succeed.

September 11 will have raised with some violence the question of reality, of which the fanciful conspiracy theory is the imaginary by-product. Hence, perhaps, the vehemence with which this theory has been rejected on all sides. Is it because it may be seen as anti-American, and absolves the terrorists from blame? (But to absolve them from blame is to relieve them of responsibility for the event, which comes back round again to the contemptuous view that the Islamists would never have been capable of such a feat.) No, it is, rather, the 'denial' aspect of this theory that explains the violence of the reaction. The denial of reality is terroristic in itself. Anything is better than to contest reality as such. What has to be saved is, above all, the reality principle. 'Negationism' is public enemy number one. Now, in fact, we already live largely in a negationist society. No event is 'real' any longer. Terror attacks, trials, wars, corruption, opinion polls there's nothing now that isn't rigged or undecidable. Government, the authorities and institutions are the first victims of this fall from grace of the principles of truth and reality. Incredulity rages. The conspiracy theory merely adds a somewhat burlesque episode to this situation of mental destabilization. Hence the urgent need to combat this creeping negationism and, at all costs, safeguard a reality that is now kept alive on a drip. For though we can range a great machinery of repression and deterrence against physical insecurity and terrorism, nothing will protect us from this mental insecurity.

Moreover, all the security strategies are merely extensions of terror. And it is the real victory of terrorism that has plunged the whole of the West into the obsession with security — that is to say, into a veiled form of perpetual terror.

The specter of terrorism is forcing the West to terrorize itself — the planetary police network being the equivalent of the tension of a universal Cold War, of a fourth world war imprinting itself upon bodies and mores.”

(p.79-82, Baudrillard 2002)

Baudrillard's account of the body as semiurgic non-site in "Symbolic Exchange And Death", not only similarly invokes his eventual discussion of non-events, but also what Lyotard also calls a non-site, the 'libidinal band'. The pataphysical interlinks between Baudrillard, Lyotard and Deleuze on all of this is covered in a text by Gary Genosko which we cover in the upcoming "Post-End Notes: I Would Prefer Not To : Foreword/Afterwards".

“At best, the body will remain, theoretically too, eternally ambivalent: object and anti-object — cutting across and annulling the disciplines that claim to unify it; site and non-site — the site of the unconscious as the nonsite of the subject, and so on. Even after the partition of the body into the anatomical and the erogenous, contemporary psychoanalysis (Leclaire) continues to set down the movement of desire in its name, under the regime of the letter. Always the body, since there are no words to express the non-site: the best is doubtless still that which, throughout a long history, has designated what has no, or does not take, place: the repressed. We must, however, be aware of the risks this inherited word involves. The subversive privilege the body was given since it was always in a state of repression is now coming to an end in the process of its emancipation (not entirely due to the actions of a repressive politics of desublimation; psychoanalysis too plays its part in the officialisation of sex and the body: here again we find an

inextricable confusion between sex and the body as the crucial event of the subject, as process, labour, and also as an historical advent in the order of concepts and values). We must ask ourselves if this body we are 'liberating' does not forever denegate the symbolic potentialities of the old repressed body, if the body 'everybody's talking about' is not precisely the converse of the speaking body. In the current system, the body as the site of the primary processes is contrasted to the body as secondary process: erotic use- and exchange-value, a rationalisation under the sign of value. The pulsional body menaced by desire is contrasted to the semiurgic, structural body, theatricised in nudity, functionalised by operational sexuality.” (p.117, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

As we'll see, this mention of Leclair interlinks to the (pataphysical) anagrammatics that are traced/erased throughout the hyperreal's deconstruction. Baudrillard also deconstructs the media theory and magical/zen definition of Zhuang-Zi's butcher's knife by opening up its full paradox that runs throughout deconstruction, while also exemplifying what Derrida would call “gestural” deconstruction and Huginn pataphysical ‘inutility’.

“A perfect example of analysis and its prodigious operationality when it exceeds the full, substantial and opaque vision of the object ('at the start I saw only the ox'), the anatomical vision of the body as a full edifice of bone, flesh and organs, unified by external representations, that can be carved up at will. This is the body on which the ordinary butcher labours, cutting by brute force, getting as far as to be able to recognise the blood and bone — because it is pure difference operating on difference in order (mutilate to disassemble a body (a practical operation) which, as we can clearly see, rests on a symbolic economy which is neither 'objective' knowledge nor a relation of forces, but a structure of exchange: the knife and the body are exchanged, the knife articulates the body's lack and thereby deconstructs it in accordance with its own rhythm. This knife is also Leclair's letter. The latter comes to divide a particular site on the body erotogenically in accordance with the logic of desire. A receptive, hard wearing and 'useless' [inusable] symbolic inscription, when the letter, due to its extremely fine thread, disjoins the anatomical body and works in the void articulated by the body. This instead of the poor butcher's full discourse that merely cuts anatomically and according to material evidence. The millennial brother of Lichtenberg's knife, the logical paradox of which (the knife with no blade which is missing a handle) sets up the symbolic configuration of an absent phallus instead of the full phallus and its f(ph)antas(ma)t(ic) evidence. This knife does not work on the body, it resolves it, circling it attentively and dreamily (free-floating attention: hold my breath, fix my gaze and work slowly'), proceeding anagrammatically, that is to say, it does not advance from one term to another, from one organ. juxtaposed and connected to another like words by the thread of a functional syntax: this is how the bad butcher and the linguist of signification proceed. Here, the thread of meaning is quite different: it splits the body and follows the body beneath the body, like anagram which follows the model of the dispersal and resolution of a first term or corpus whose secret is another articulation than that which runs beneath discourse and traces something (a name, a formula) whose absence haunts the text. It is this formula of the body which defies the anatomical body, that the knife describes and resolves. It is certain that the efficacy of the sign, its symbolic efficacy in primitive societies, far from being 'magical', is bound up with this extremely precise labour of anagrammatical resolution. Hence the architecture of the erogenous body, which is only ever the anagrammatic articulation of a formula 'lost without

ever having been', a formula whose thread of desire reforms the disjunctive synthesis that it retraces without saying: desire itself is nothing other than the resolution of the signifier in the orphic dispersal of the body, in the anagrammatical dispersal of the poem, according to the musical rhythm of the knife of Zhuang-Zi's butcher.”  
(p.120-121, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

From here we can make a stab (with Lichtenberg's knife) at retorting to a gullible misreading of the avant garde's spin on Baudrillard with those just out-of-sight/off-camera and overlooked bordering lexis/passages from “Symbolic Exchange And Death”. For instance the accusation of the ‘primitive’ in the hyperreal to be taken as a ethnocentric reading to be labeled as “primitivism”, rather than instead taking the hyperreal ‘primitive’ in Baudrillard, as he states overtly, as the inhuman and a primal scene of nullity.

“Universality is in fact based exclusively on tautology and doubling, and this is where the 'Human' takes on the force of a moral law and a principle of exclusion. This is because the 'Human' is from the outset the institution of its structural double, the 'Inhuman'. This is all it is: the progress of Humanity and Culture are simply the chain of discriminations with which to brand 'Others' with inhumanity, and therefore with nullity.”  
(p.125, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

The double, shadows, mirror images, the Unconscious, the Uncanny, and the specter are all linked to this deconstruction of the “subject” and magic by simulacrum.

“The status of the double (as well as that of spirits and gods, which are also real, living and different beings, not idealised essences) in primitive society is therefore the inverse of our alienation: one being multiplies into innumerable others just as alive as the first. Whereas the unified, individual subject can only confront itself in alienation and death. With the internalisation of the soul and consciousness (the principle of identity and equivalence), the subject undergoes a real confinement similar to the confinement of the mad in the seventeenth century as described by Foucault. It is at this point that the primitive thought of the double as continuity and exchange is lost, and the haunting double comes to the fore as the subject's discontinuity in death and madness. 'Whoever sees his double, sees his death.' A vengeful and vampiric double, an unquiet soul, the double begins to prefigure the subject's death. haunting him in the very midst of his life. This is Dostoevsky's double, or Peter Schlemihl's, the man who lost his shadow. We have always interpreted this double as a metaphor of the soul, consciousness, native soil, and so on. Without this incurable idealism and without being taken as a metaphor, the narrative is so much more extraordinary. We have all lost our real shadows, we no longer speak to them, and our bodies have left with them. To lose one's shadow is already to forget one's body. Conversely, when the shadow grows and becomes an autonomous power (as with the mirror image in The Student of Prague, which has the effect of the Devil and dementia), it is so as to devour the subject who has lost it, it is a murderous shadow, the image of all the rejected and forgotten dead who, as is quite normal, never accept being nothing in the eyes of the living. Our entire culture is full of this haunting of the separated double, even in its most subtle form, as Freud gave it in 'Das Unheimliche' ('the Uncanny': 'Disturbing Strangeness' or 'Disturbing Familiarity'): the anxiety that wells up around the most familiar things. Here the vertigo of separation builds up to its greatest intensity, since this is its simplest form. There

comes a moment, in fact, when the things closest to us, such as our own bodies, the body itself, our voice and our appearance, are separated from us to the precise extent that we internalise the soul (or any other equivalent agency or abstraction) as the ideal principle of subjectivity. This is what kills off the proliferation of doubles and spirits, consigning them once again to the spectral, embryonic corridors of unconscious folklore, like the ancient gods that Christianity verteufelt, that is, transformed into demons. By a final ruse of spirituality, this internalisation also psychologises doubles. In fact it is interpretation in terms of an archaic psychical apparatus that is the very last form of the Verteufelung, the demonic corruption and elimination of the primitive double: projection of the guilt attached to the phantasmatic murder of the other (the close relative) in accordance with the magic of the omnipotence of ideas (Allmacht der Gedanken), the return of the repressed, etc.”  
(p.142, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

Again to take gullibly a misreading of Re:Action #9 on Baudrillard’s supposed “discrimination” or “ignorance” of rituals would obstinately overlook quotes like the following that deconstruct referentiality by the primal nullity involved when evoking (so-called) “magic’s” semiurgic process apart of the Symbolic Exchange.

“But why this revulsion at seeing an animal treated like a human being? Because then man changes into a beast. In the hanged animal there is, by way of the sign and the ritual, a hanged man, but a man changed into a beast as if by black magic. A 'reflex' signification results from the ubiquitous action of the deep reciprocity, whatever we are dealing with, between man and animal or the executioner and his victim, mingled with the visual representation in a terrible confusion, and this malefic ambiguity (as in Kafka's 'Metamorphosis') gives rise to disgust. The end of culture, of the social, the end of the rules of the game. Killing a beast in this fundamentally human manner unleashes an equivalent monstrosity in the man, who thus becomes the victim of his own ritual. The institution of justice, by which man claims to draw a line between himself and 'brutality', turns against him. Of course, such brutality is a myth — a caesura that implies the absolute privilege of the human, the expulsion of the animal into the 'brutal'. This discrimination is justified, however, when at the same time as the privilege, it implies all the risks and responsibilities of the human, in particular that of justice and social death, which by contrast, according to the same logic, does not concern the animal at all. For man to impose this form on the animal is to erase the limit between the two, and at the same time to eliminate the human. Man is then only the squalid caricature of the myth of animality that he himself has instituted. We do not need psychoanalysis, the 'Father-Figure', sadistic eroticism and guilt to explain the nausea attendant upon the torture of animals. Everything here is social, everything relates to the social line of demarcation that man traces around himself in accordance with a mythical code of differences, and to the contortions that shatter this line, in accordance with the law that states that reciprocity never ends: every discrimination is only ever imaginary and is forever cut across by symbolic reciprocity, for better or worse.”  
(p.167-168, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

In the hyperreal death remains nothing, an ignorant misreading of Baudrillard on death/corpses only plays further into this disappearance, this ecstasy of communication, and Hofstadter’s



attempts to cut to the “bones”/“truth” of the issues would only accrue mere simulacrum, organs without bodies, pharmakon...

“It is necessary to ward off death, to smother it in artificiality in order to evade the unbearable moment when flesh's nothing but flesh, and ceases to be a sign. The skeleton, with its stripped bones, already seals the possible reconciliation of the group. for it regains the force of the mask and the sign. But between the two, there is the abject passage nature and the biological that must be warded off at all costs by sarcophagic practices (the devouring of flesh), which are in fact semiurgic practices. Therefore, every thanatopraxis, even in contemporary societies, as the will to ward off this sudden loss of signs that befalls the dead, to prevent there remaining, in the asocial flesh of the dead, something which signifies nothing.”

(p.180-182, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

With the anagram Baudrillard recalls the ramifications of Arthur C. Clarke's “9 Billion Names of God”, and by doing so openly play on these hyperreal/pataphysical anagrammatics of the text's deconstruction of referentiality, a la Lichtenberg's knife wielded as if by Zhuang-Zi's butcher going Jack The Ripper on a *dérive* violently gesturally deconstructing any concept/“God” feasible.

“In fact, the theme-word is diffracted throughout the text. In a way, it is 'analysed' by the verse or the poem, reduced to its simple elements, decomposed like the light spectrum, whose diffracted rays then sweep across the text. In other words then, the original corpus is dispersed into 'partial objects'. It is therefore a matter not of another manner of being the Same, of reiteration or paraphrase, of a clandestine avatar of the original name of God, but rather of an explosion, a dispersion, a dismembering where this name is annihilated. Not an 'artificial double' (what use is this unless it is in order to be reduced to the same thing?), but a dismembered double, a body torn limb from limb like Osiris and Orpheus. Far from reinforcing the signifier in its being, repeating it positively, this metamorphosis of its scattered members is equivalent to its death as such, to its annihilation. To sum it up, this is, on the level of the signifier, of the name it incarnates, the equivalent of putting God or a hero to death in the sacrifice. Following this, the animal totem, the god or the hero circulate, disarticulated, disintegrated by its death in the sacrifice (eventually torn limb from limb and eaten), as the symbolic material of the group's integration. “The name of God, torn limb from limb, dispersed into its phonemic elements as the signifier, is put to death, haunts the poem and rearticulates it in the rhythm of its fragments, without ever being reconstituted in it as such.”

(p.199, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

Much like Saussure writings on anagrams are what's at play with all this, while Bök also covers the pataphysics of the poetic (poeticization of science) and the anagram, but the intersection between Baudrillard, Derrida, and Lyotard are all played out as the crossroads of hyperreality, deconstruction, and postmodernity all at *differance*, the pataphysical anagrammatic nothing.

“This is what societies' games do, and this is all they do. This is what bad poetry, allegory and figurative music do, when they refer in too facile a fashion to what they 'signify', or endlessly metaphorise into other terms. These are charades, riddles and spoonerisms, in which, with the discovery of the key-word, everything is complete. And of course there is pleasure in this detour, as there is removing the mask from what is hidden, and whose secret presence attracts you.

But this pleasure has nothing to do with poetic enjoyment, which is radical in another way, and not perverse: nothing is discovered in it, nothing expressed in it, and nothing shows through it. No riddles or 'divinations', no secret terms, no abutment of meaning. The poetic destroys every cleared path towards a final term, every key, it resolves the anathema, the law weighing down upon language. We could offer the hypothesis that enjoyment is a direct function of the resolution of every positive reference. It is at its minimum where the signified is immediately produced as value: in 'normal' communicative discourse — linear and steady speech, exhausted in decoding. Beyond this discourse — the zero degree of enjoyment — all sorts of combinations are possible where a game of hide-and-seek is set up with the signified, a deciphering, and no longer a pure and simple decoding. This latter is the traditional anagram or the text with keys, the 'Yamamoto Kakpoté' or the texts from the *Fliegende Blätter* (interpreted by Freud and analysed by Lyotard in 'The Dreamwork Does Not Think', *Oxford Literary Review*, 6 (1) 1983), where, behind a coherent or incoherent manifest text, there lies a latent text to be found. In both cases, there is a disengagement, a distantiation of the signified, of the last word of history, a detour by way of the signifier, *différance* as Derrida says. But in any case, it is possible, by whatever developments, to seize hold of the last word, the formula that controls the text. This formula may be subconscious (in the joke, the *mot d'esprit*, to which we shall return) or unconscious (in the dream), but it is always coherent and discursive. With the dawning of this formula, the cycle of meaning is exhausted. And enjoyment, in every case, is proportionate to the detour, the delay, the loss of the statement, to the time lost in rediscovering it. It is therefore extremely restrained in society's games, more intense in the *mot d'esprit*, where the decoding is suspended and where we laugh in proportion to the destruction of meaning. In the poetic text, it is infinite, because no code whatsoever can be found there, no deciphering is possible, and because there is never a signified to put an end to the cycle. Here, the formula is not even unconscious (this is the limit of all psychoanalytic interpretations) it does not exist. The key is definitively lost. This is the difference it does not exist. The key is definitively the entire category of the brainwave, where the operation always ends up with a positive residue) and the symbolic radiation of the poem. In other words, if the poem refers to something, it is always to NOTHING, to term of nothingness, to the signified zero. Poetic intensity consists in the vertigo of this perfect resolution, which leaves the place of the signified or the referent perfectly empty.” (p.208-209, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

So while we're in the nth dimensional area we'll go ahead and play out the hacking up of the pataphysical so-called “god” Galdrux proposed/simulated by #Game23, recalling that. “The poem, too, is the total resolution of the world, as soon as the scattered phonemes of the name of God are consumed in it. When the anagram has been completely declined, nothing remains, the world has turned once again, and the intense enjoyment running through it has nowhere else to come from.” (p.210, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

This is “death of the signifier” is gamed by Harpo Marx's pataphorical proto-hypermade of the 'swordfish' (here, ironically, mistakenly labeled 'sturgeon' by Baudrillard but where upon mention in another text it's re-cited as a/the 'swordfish' [the hypermade involving a fish coupled with a sword in the mouth]).

“By contrast, when Harpo Marx waves a real sturgeon instead of pronouncing the password 'sturgeon', then indeed, by substituting the referent of the term and by abolishing their separation, he really explodes the arbitrariness at the same time as the system of representation, in a poetic act par excellence: putting the signifier 'sturgeon' to death by its own referent.”

(p.214, Baudrillard 1993/1976)

In a portion of “The Illusion of the End” after proposing a series of names for a hypothetical non-existent radical disinformation agency (from which we reworked the names of to conjure the untitled Pata-No UN LTD, in homage to the K Foundation, for the our pseudo-event transmedia game texts like the one at the Musee Patamecanique in 2018 and also in anticipation of our non-event transmedia game texts) Baudrillard interlinks the voidal non-site of the body, and Chuang Tzu's butcher by way of the non-event. Simultaneously also anticipating Pata-No UN LTD as a non-event where Pata-No UN LTD has not and will not take place while remaining paradoxically operational in its “putting the event up for auction” and avant garde-esq disinformation dissemination.

“Simulation is precisely this irresistible unfolding, this sequencing of things as though they had a meaning, when they are governed only by artificial montage and non-meaning. Putting the event up for auction by radical disinformation. Setting a price on the event, as against setting it in play, setting it in history. If there are any historical stakes, they remain secret, enigmatic; they are resolved in events which do not really take place. And I am not referring here to ordinary events, but to the events of Eastern Europe, the Gulf War, etc. Now, the aim of the Agency was precisely to set up against this simulation a radical desimulation or, in other words, to lift the veil on the fact of events not taking place. And thus to make itself secret and enigmatic in their image, to get through to a certain void, a certain non-meaning, by contrast with the media, which are frantic to plug up all the gaps. To move within the void of events like Chuang Tzu's butcher in the interstitial void of the body. Admittedly, this kind of sly, surreptitious intervention on the side of the void against the grotesque, Ubuesque infatuation with news and the political scene was merely a dream and, by dint of being secret and enigmatic, no more came into being, in the end, than did the events themselves. It fell into the same black hole, the same virtual space, as the non-events of which it was to speak (secretly, unbeknown to everyone, while remaining operational, exactly like these newstyle events which are only events to the extent that they are media events). An apparently irresolvable paradox. But the idea is not dead.”

(p.15-16, Baudrillard 1994/1992)

Baudrillard touches on the pataphysicality of all this when evoking Ubu's gidouille/paunch while juxtaposing events striking/an 'event strike' (which again has parallels yet outpaces the notion of the Art Strike [which we briefly touch on in the most recent edition of YAWN in 2 Cool where we give context to the 2015-2016 event strike which we played out]) with 'non-events' like the Gulf War.

“This disruption of cause and effect is not now the work of the critical consciousness, but of objective irony alone. Thus it was the Agency's duty not only to avoid the temptation of providing information on the events which had 'downed tools', but also to avoid appending a critical

commentary to them, in order to capture the originality of this non-event, which is the originality of an objective irony. For the radical irony of our history is that things no longer really take place, while nonetheless seeming to. This is the opposite of the traditional ruse of history which brought about changes that were crucial but did not appear to be. When you think that we took the events in Eastern Europe at face value, with their good, sound coin of freedom and 'democratic values', and the Gulf War, with its Human Rights and New World Order! These events were auctioned off well above their value. The historical scene today is like the art market. Against this speculative inflation, which leaves everyone on edge -- that is, both overexcited and indifferent, riveted and apathetic against these *gidouille* events, worthy of the Grande *Gidouille* of History, we had to find an ironic form of the disruption of information, a casual form of writing to match the casual *événementialité* of our age, together with a subtly catastrophic form which fits with the coming of the end of the century. We had to find, in this event strike, the thread running through, which is that of deterrence, the baleful form which presides over the nullity of our age. Deterrence is a very peculiar form of action: it is what causes something not to take place. It dominates the whole of our contemporary period, which tends not so much to produce events as to cause something not to occur, while looking as though it is a historical event. Or else events do take place in the stead of some other event which did not. War, history, reality and passion — deterrence plays its part in all these. It causes strange events to take place(!), events which do not in any way advance history, but rather run it backwards, back along the opposite slope, unintelligible to our historical sense (only things which move in the direction of history [*le sens de l'histoire*] have historical meaning [*sens historique*]), events which no longer have a negative (progressive, critical or revolutionary) potency since their only negativity is in the fact of their not taking place. Disturbing. The hold deterrence has on us even extends to the past. It can remove all certainty about facts and evidence. It can destabilize memory just as it destabilizes prediction. It is a diabolical force which wrecks the actual acting out of events or, if they still take place — if they have taken place — destroys their credibility. Perhaps this curvature of things which deprives them of meaning or linear end is merely a depression in the meteorological sense of the term the emptiness we feel being the of a failing of meaning or memory, but of a strange coming from elsewhere. Perhaps the atony, the catatonia experiencing is to be interpreted in the opposite sense, as void left by the ebbing of past events, but a void due the suction effect of a future event, to the anticipatory sucking a nearby mass of all the oxygen we breathe, creating a violent depressurizing of the social, political, cultural and mental sphere. A pataphysical hypothesis, that of anti-gravity, anti-density. of a science of imaginary solutions rising above physics and metaphysics.” (p.16-18, Baudrillard 1994/1992)

In “The Perfect Crime” Baudrillard again links this “automatic disappearance” of the world by the Virtual to “The Nine Billion Names of God” by Arthur C. Clarke.

“The perfect crime is that of an unconditional realization of the world by the actualization of all data, the transformation of all our acts and all events into pure information: in short, the final solution. the resolution of the world ahead of time by the cloning of reality and the extermination of the real by its double. This is precisely the theme of Arthur C. Clarke's short story 'The Nine Billion Names of God'. A community of Tibetan monks have for centuries devoted themselves to transcribing these nine billion names of God, and once they have accomplished this the purpose

of the world will be achieved, and it will come to an end. The task is a tiresome one and the weary monks call in technicians from IBM, whose computers do the job in a few months. In a sense, the history of the world is completed in real time by virtual technology. Unfortunately, this also means the disappearance of the world in real time. For suddenly, the promise of the end is fulfilled and, as they walk back down into the valley, the technicians, who did not really believe in the prophecy, are aghast to see the stars going out one by one. This is perhaps the fate that awaits us at the end-point of this technical transfiguring of the world: its accelerated end, its immediate resolution — the final success of modern millenarianism, though with no hope of salvation, apocalypse or revelation. Merely hastening the final term, accelerating the movement towards disappearance pure and simple. And so, quite without knowing it, the human race might, like the IBM technicians, be assigned to this noble task: triggering the code for the world's automatic disappearance by exhausting all its possibilities. This is the very essence of the Virtual.”

(p.25-26, Baudrillard 1996)

To recall that hyperrealistically the spectacularity of the spectacle remains simulation allows for us to read Baudrillard's following notes on both the readymade and the spectacle at the zero degree embellishes all this play with transmedia games. Like the telemorphic nihilistic democracy of reality shows like “The Loft” or “The Real World”.

“Virtuality is different from the spectacle, which still left room for a critical consciousness and demystification. The abstraction of the 'spectacle' was never irrevocable, even for the Situationists. Whereas unconditional realization is irrevocable, since we are no longer either alienated or dispossessed: we are in possession of all the information. We are no longer spectators, but actors in the performance, and actors increasingly integrated into the course of that performance. Whereas we could face up to the unreality of the world as spectacle, we are defenceless before the extreme reality of this world, before this virtual perfection. We are, in fact, beyond all disalienation. This is the new form of terror, by comparison with which the horrors of alienation were very small beer. In what was the golden age of joyful disillusionment, we carried out the critique of all illusions — the metaphysical, the religious and the ideological. Only one remains: the illusion of criticism itself. The objects we subjected to the full glare of criticism — sex, dreams, work, history, power — have taken their revenge by disappearing, producing, in return, the consoling illusion of truth. Having no more victims to devour, the critical illusion has devoured itself. Even more than the industrial machines, it is the machinery of thought itself that is laid off. At the extreme end of its journey, critical thought has wound back on itself. Where once it was future-orientated, it is now umbilical. In surviving its own self, it in fact helps its object to survive. Just as religion has become definitively realized in other — irreligious, secular, political and cultural — forms, where it is impossible to pin it down as religion (including the current revival, where it assumes the mask of religion), so the critique of virtual technologies masks the fact that their concept is seeping everywhere into real life in homoeopathic doses. In denouncing the ghostliness of those technologies — and of the media — one implies that there is somewhere an original form of lived existence. Whereas, if the rate of reality is falling every day, this is because the medium itself has passed into life, has become the ordinary ritual of transparency. All this digital, numeric, electronic equipment is merely incidental to the deep-seated virtualization of human beings. And if this so grips the collective

imagination, that is because we are already — not in some other world, but in this life itself— in a state of socio-, photo- and video-synthesis. The virtual and the media are our chlorophyllous function. And if we are able today to produce a clone of a particular famous actor which will be made to act in his place, this is because long ago, without knowing it, he became his own replica or his own clone, before he actually was cloned.

This whole virtual technology media circus, this perpetual 'reality show,' has an ancestor: the ready-made. Those who are plucked from their real lives to come and act out the psychodrama of their AIDS or their marital problems on TV have an ancestor in Duchamp's bottle-rack which that artist similarly plucked from the real world to confer on it elsewhere — in a field we still agree to call art — an undefinable hyperreality. Paradoxical acting-out, instantaneous short-circuiting. The bottle-rack, exscribed from its context, purpose and function, became more real than reality (hyperreal) and more art than art (transaesthetics of banality, of insignificance, of nullity, against which the pure and indifferent form of art is verified today). Any old object, individual or situation is today a virtual ready-made insofar as one can say of anyone or anything what Duchamp was, at bottom, saying of the bottle-rack: it exists, I've met it. Everyone is invited, in this same way, to present themselves as they are and play out their lives 'live' on-screen, just as the readymade played out its role exactly as it was, 'live' on the gallery screen. And the two are merged in the initiative launched by new museums where the aim is not now to bring people to stand in front of the pictures — which can be done successfully, but isn't interactive enough and smacks too much of the 'spectacle' — but to stand in the pictures — in the virtual reality of *Déjeuner sur l'herbe*, for example — which they can in this way enjoy in real time, possibly even interacting with the work and the figures in it. There is the same problem with the TV 'reality shows': the viewer has to be brought not in front of the screen (he has always been there, and that is indeed his alibi and refuge) but into the screen, taken to the other side of the information setup. He has to be made to carry out the same conversion as Duchamp did with his bottle—rack when he transferred it, just as it was, to the other side of art, creating, as he did so, a definitive ambiguity between art and reality. Art today is simply this paradoxical confusion of the two, and the aesthetic intoxication which ensues. Similarly, information is simply the paradoxical confusion of the event and the medium, and the political uncertainty which ensues. So, we have all become ready-mades. Hypostatized like the bottle-rack, our sterile identities taxidermied, we have become living museum pieces, like those entire populations which are transfigured in situ by aesthetic or cultural decree, cloned in our own image by High Definition and condemned, by that exact resemblance, to media stupefaction, just as the ready-made is condemned to aesthetic stupefaction. And just as Duchamp's acting-out opens on to the (generalized) zero degree of aesthetics, where any old item of rubbish can be taken as a work of art (which also means that any old work of art can be taken for rubbish), so this media acting-out opens on to a generalized virtuality which puts an end to the real by its promotion of every single instant."

(p.27-29, Baudrillard 1996)

In the last essay of "The Perfect Crime" Baudrillard gives some notes of this problematic involved in Borges' "Revenge Of The Mirror People" (which Home evoked earlier on Sinclair). "Such is the allegory of otherness vanquished and condemned to the servile fate of resemblance. Our image in the mirror is not innocent, then. Behind every reflection, every

resemblance, every representation, a defeated enemy lies concealed. The Other vanquished, and condemned merely to be the Same. This casts a singular light on the problem of representation and of all those mirrors which reflect us 'spontaneously' with an objective indulgence. None of that is true, and every representation is a servile image, the ghost of a once sovereign being whose singularity has been obliterated. But a being which will one day rebel, and then our whole system of representation and values is destined to perish in that revolt. This slavery Of the same, the slavery of resemblance, will one day be smashed by the violent resur— gence of otherness. We dreamed of passing through the looking—glass, but it is the mirror peoples themselves who will burst in upon our world. And 'this time will not be defeated'. What will come of this victory? NO one knows. A new existence of two equally sovereign peoples, perfectly alien to one another, but in perfect collusion? Something other, at least, than this subjection and this negative fatality. so, everywhere, objects, children, the dead, images, women, everything which serves to provide a passive reflection in a world based on identity, is ready to go on to the counter—offensive. Already they resemble us less and less. I'll not be your mirror!"

(p.149, Baudrillard 1996)

With the Gulf War as non-war and non-event Baudrillard gives a litany of examples how to play (transmedially) with simulation whether it remain in "real time" or "recurrent time". This mention of "The Thousand and One Nights" both was interplayed on by our 1001 page pdf "Pata-Post-Post-Untitled'(s)" (a particular archive of the transmedia deconstruction of a "(non-)art auction"/"advert"/virtual "press conference" as covered by Baudrillard in texts like "The Consumer Society", "The Mirror of Production" and "For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign") as a play on remainders of the 2018 transmedia game pseudo-events (aka 'Post-Card Game Jams') (also a nod to similar pseudo-events held by the group Ant Farm like 'Media Burn') which we had a "live" premier for during one of the days of Neoism 40 as a part of our 'Zero-Sum Game No Shows' to play out the deconstruction of the auto-historicization and museumification of Neoism via Neoism 40 as non-event (as covered in "Travels In Neolon"), that which would not take place; much like throughout the eventual 5 volume set of the Too Cool series there will get dispersed 1001 (200 per 'meme-zine'-esq collection and to get partially posted on (anti-)social media) aphoristic-esq/meme-esq indeterminate un-titled fragments of text to play on these processes/techniques of artifactualization and actuvirtualization.

"One of the two adversaries is a rug salesman, the other an arms salesman: they have neither the same logic nor the same strategy, even though they are both crooks. There is not enough communication between them to enable them to make war upon each other. Saddam will never fight, while the Americans will fight against a fictive double on screen. They see Saddam as he should be, a modernist hero, worth defeating (the fourth biggest army in the world!). Saddam remains a rug salesman who takes the Americans for rug salesmen like himself, stronger than he but less gifted for the scam. He hears nothing of deterrence. For there to be deterrence, there must be communication. It is a game of rational strategy which presupposes real time communication between the two adversaries; whereas in this war there was never communication at any moment, but always dislocation in time, Saddam evolving in a long time, that of blackmail, of procrastination, false advance, of retreat: the recurrent time of The Thousand and One Nights — the inverse of real time."

(p.65–66, Baudrillard, 1995)

These were all very Trojan measures, and Baudrillard interlinks the non-event, the Gulf War, Trojan measures and Helen as simulacrum (and thereby Gorgias) all into this nihilistic hyperreal void.

“The question is not whether one is for or against war, but whether one is for or against the reality of war. Analysis must not be sacrificed to the expression of anger. It has to be directed in its entirety against reality, against manifestness - here against the manifest reality of this war. The Stoics contest the very self evidence of pain, when the body's confusion is at its height. Here, we must contest the very self-evidence of war, when the confusion of the real is at its height. We must hit out at the weak point of reality. It's too late afterwards: you're stuck with the 'acts of violence', stuck in realist abjection. In a little time, as we get some distance from it, or even now, with a little imagination, it will be possible to read *La guerre du Golfe n'a pas eu lieu*\* as a science-fiction novel, as the anticipation, right in the thick of things, of the event as a fictional scenario — something into which it will surely be turned later. Like Borges' chronicling of cultures which never existed. By making transparent the non-event of the war, you give it force in the imagination somewhere other than in the 'real time' of news where it simply peters out. You give force to the illusion of war, rather than become an accessory to its false reality. Anyhow, the book has fallen quite logically — into the same black hole as the war. It has faded as quickly as the event whose absence it denounced. It was a successful non-event, like the Agency, like appearing on television. All this is as it should have been since it dealt with something which did not take place. It was the simulacrum of Helen that was at the heart of the Trojan War. The Egyptian priests had held on to the original (we do not know what became of it) when she set out again with Paris for Troy. But, even without the magic of the priests, Helen was in any case merely a simulacrum, since the universal form of beauty is as unreal as gold, the universal form of all commodities. Every universal form is a simulacrum, since it is the simultaneous equivalent of all the others — something it is impossible for any real being to be. There are many analogies between the Trojan and Gulf wars. Before the expedition, Menelaus called all the warriors of the 'free world'. The incubation period of the war was very long (seven years in the case of Troy, seven months for the Gulf War) and the final phase was very rapid in both cases. The Greek victory was won at great cost to the victors, whom the gods punished relentlessly (the murder of Agamemnon, Clytaemnestra, Orestes, etc.). What will be the fate of the 'victors' of the Gulf War? Admittedly, this time the war did not take place. This difference leaves the Americans some hope, the gods having no real cause to avenge themselves. If the Helen of the Trojan War was a simulacrum, what was the Gulf War's Helen? Where was there simulacrum here, except in the simulacrum of war itself?”

(p.63-65, Baudrillard, 1994)

Ubu's imaginary solution of transgressing everything was not only the underlying stakes involved in our “conversation”/“interview”/exchange over email with Nick Zedd on xenomorphosis and extremism (like killing art gallery/museum owners), after getting his info from Istvan, as a part of these Zero-Sum Game No Shows (and to get included in “Ex-Communiques), but it's what's at play in this “pataphysical ambiance” of this transmedial/transfinite “terrorist space” of magic and hyperinformation.



"WE HAVE TRANSGRESSED EVERYTHING, including the limits of scene and truth. We've really gone beyond. Imagination is in power; light, intelligence is in power, we're living, or soon will be living, the perfection of the social. Everything is here, heaven has come down to earth, the heaven of utopia, and what existed in profile as a radiant perspective is now lived as a catastrophe in slow motion. We can almost taste the fatal flavor of material paradises; and transparency, which was the ideal maxim for the age of alienation, is realized today in the form of a homogeneous and terrorist space— hyperinformation, hypersensibility. No more black magic of the forbidden, alienation and transgression, but the white magic of ecstasy, fascination, transparency. It's the end of the pathos of law. There will be no Final Judgement. We've passed beyond it without realizing it. [...] This conjunction has been realized under the sign of the hyperreal, ecstatic form of the real. All metaphysical tension has been dissipated, yielding a pataphysical ambiance, that is, the tautological and grotesque perfection of the truth processes. Ubu: the small intestine and the splendor of the void. Ubu: full and obese form, grotesquely immanent, strikingly true, a figure of genius, replete with that which has absorbed everything, transgressed everything, and radiates in the void like an imaginary solution."

(p.97-98, Baudrillard 2007)

There's a fatal strategy involved in all this.

"Choice is an ignoble imperative. Any philosophy that assigns man the exercise of his will can only plunge him into despair. For if, on the one hand, nothing is more flattering for consciousness than to know what it wants, on the other hand, nothing is more seductive for the other consciousness (the unconscious?), that obscure and vital one which makes happiness depend on the despair of the will, than not to know what it wants, to be at the same time delivered from choice and diverted from its own objective will. It makes more sense to give in to some insignificant whim than to be suspended on your own will or on the necessity of choosing. Brummel had a servant for that. Before a splendid landscape constellated with lakes, he turns to his valet to ask: "Which lake do I prefer?" Not only do people surely not want to be told what they want, but they don't even want to know it, and it's not even certain that they want to. Faced with such a solicitation, it is their evil genie that whispers in their ear to leave it to the advertising or information systems to "persuade" them, to make a choice for them (or to leave to politicians the job of making things better), just like Brummel with his servant.... So who is being trapped? The masses know that they know nothing and they have no desire to know. The masses know they are powerless, and they don't want power. We reproach them vigorously for these signs of stupidity and passivity. But they're not that at all: the masses are very snobbish; they act like Brummel and sovereignly delegate the faculty of choice to someone else, in a sort of game of irresponsibility, ironic challenge, sovereign lack of will, or secret ruse. All mediators (political, intellectual, heirs to the philosophers of the Enlightenment in their contempt of the masses) are only good basically for this: to administer by delegation, by proxy, this tedious business of power and will, to relieve the masses of this transcendence for their greater pleasure, and then to reward them with the spectacle of it. Vicarious, to recall Veblen's concept, the status of these "privileged" classes, whose will would have been diverted, without their realizing it, toward the secret finalities of the very masses they despise."

(p.126-127, Baudrillard 2007)

The ex-centered orbital, this transmedial pataphysical “dead point”, gets played out by the model of the non-war as non-event.

“Dead point : the dead center where every system crosses this subtle limit of reversibility, contradiction and doubt and enters live into noncontradiction, into its own exalted contemplation, into ecstasy.. Here begins a pataphysics of systems. This logical going beyond, this escalation, incidentally offers some advantages as well, even if it always assumes the form of a catastrophe in slow motion, as is the case for destructive and strategic weapons systems. At the point of the overcoming of destructive forces, the war scene is over. There is no longer any useful correlation between the potential for annihilation and its objective, so it becomes senseless to employ it. The system dissuades itself, and this is the paradoxically beneficial aspect of dissuasion: there is no more space for war. We should therefore hope for the continuation of this nuclear escalation and arms race as the price we pay for pure war; that is, for the pure and empty form—the hyperreal and eternally deterring form—of war, where for the first time we can congratulate ourselves on the absence of the event. War, just like the real, will never again take place, unless of course the nuclear powers succeed in their deescalation and manage to circumscribe new spaces for war. If military power, at the price of a deescalation of this madness so marvellously useful at one remove, once again finds a theater for war, a restricted space—in a word, a human one—for war, then weapons will once again find their use-value—and their exchange-value: it will again be possible to exchange war. In its orbital and ecstatic form war has become impossible to exchange, and this orbitality protects us.”  
(p.33, Baudrillard 2007)

The non-existence that interlinks the non-event as exemplified by the auctioning off of the event and the pseudo-event as exemplified by the art auction (as advert) is that of the non-existence of money. Hence of the/“our” hypermades that have carried through both of these hyperreal species of event simulations/transmedia games are the attempted sale of ‘Nothing’ for varying degrees of outrageous sums (thousands to millions to billions) so we can even burn millions like The KLF on top of destabilizing markets a la Decadent Action and in various self-reflexive and even more intertextual exappropriations like reworking Yves Klein’s “Immaterial Zones” certificates for “Nothing” certificates (even deployable as ICO offerings for Neoist cryptocurrencies), blank pieces of paper signed by Monty Cantsin (rather than Salvador Dali), or “Zero Hour Dollars” detoured versions of labor notes from the Cincinnati Time Store the experiment by proto-mutualist Josiah Warren in his ‘Cost the limit of price’ labor theory of value. “The obscenity of gaming is total, because there is no longer any appeal to any depth or value whatsoever: here money is naked, metamorphosed into pure circulation, pure fascination, formal, transparent, cold and superficial jouissance. Disembodied lewdness, the ecstatic form of value. But the secret of gaming is also total: it is that money does not exist. It is like the secret of power: that there is none—or that of seduction: that desire does not exist. Money exists neither as essence, nor as substance, nor as value. And gaming returns it to its inexistence. This is just the opposite of political economy and exchange, where money is loaded with the whole symbolic operation of value. Here, money is distributed as pure simulacrum, relieved of all obscenity and circulating only according to the arbitrary rules of the game. The secret of gaming is that money has no meaning. It exists only as appearance. There the substance of value is volatilized by the play of appearances, by the arbitrariness of play. If money can self-generate

so insanely, just as numbers can be multiplied by a simple mental operation, it is possible only because it does not exist. It's like in the game where one is supposed to memorize as many words as possible; you get much further when you can forget the meaning of the words. This is not a matter of consumption or spending; you must passionately believe in money and value in order to consume them. Just as you must believe passionately in the law in order to transgress it. Those are hot passions. Here, one must believe in nothing; you must have a secret, that of the nonexistence of money [...]"

(p.77, Baudrillard 2007)

This nullity of the non-event remains what's behind the magical empty nothing of the signifier, all of these signifiers that hyperrealistically disappears like the 9,000,000,000 names of God in Clarke.

"All of this is close to what Lévi-Strauss called, in linguistic terms, the excess of the signifier—the idea that the signifier is there from the beginning, spread everywhere, in a profusion that happily the signified never exhausts. This overabundant order of the signifier is that of magic (and poetry). It is not an order of chance or indetermination; far from that, it is rather an arranged order, a necessity superior to the one which joins the signifier and the signified (which itself is highly arbitrary). The long work of joining signifier and signified, the work of reason, somehow brakes and absorbs this fatal profusion. The magical seduction of the world must be reduced, annulled. And it will be so the day when all signifiers receive their signifieds, when all has become meaning and reality."

(p.186, Baudrillard 2007)

In this passage we get Baudrillard's input on the fatal strategy underlying this seduction of hyperreal (transmedia) gaming (with all the arbitrary anagrammatic Oulipolian patamechanisms).

"The gambler is rather looking for chance, but not chance as random effect, punctual and contingent. He wants chance as a sign of election, as a process of general seduction, which it is the rule of the game to capture (this has nothing to do with the laws of probability). The gambler is looking for chain reaction, charming catastrophe. All strategy in the sphere of the game is aimed at provoking a deescalation of rational causes and an inverse escalation of magical linkage. Not one lucky occasion, then another, throw by throw (the famous equiprobability of chance at every throw), but on the contrary a fatal sequence of lucky throws (or unlucky throws: what is essential is not to win but to be fatal, to trap fate in its own game, where nothing can any longer arrest the production of a world given up to the pure solicitation of mind). Chance, we know, is only chance if it snowballs, just like catastrophe; chance has nothing to do with an objective probability that stops and allows for calculation. Chance must be forced, duly solicited, duly seduced. God can only respond; he can only give you everything. He can only let things happen according to their destiny, which is to link all forms (including numbers) together without exception, without accident, without fail. This is the basic rule of the game, and God himself is subject to it. This is the basic rule of the world's secret organization, of all the wondrous conjugation of forms according to destiny. This allows the arbitrary modality of the game (concrete rules) for ceremonial purposes (and not for contractual purposes, as in exchanges regulated by law), as a perfectly conventional ritual where there is reflected—not without a

glimmer of irony—the absolute necessity that underlies hope. We are all gamblers. What we desire most intensely is that the inexorable procession of rational connections cease for a while. That there be installed, even for a short time, an unheard-of unravelling of another kind, a marvellous escalation of events, an extraordinary succession, as if predestined, of the smallest details, to the point where we think that things—until now maintained artificially at a distance through a contract of succession and causality suddenly find themselves, not delivered over to chance, but converging spontaneously, concurring through their very connection in this self same intensity. That gives us pleasure. Those are our real events. This obvious fact that nothing is neutral or indifferent—that all things converge if only we can eliminate their "objective" causal contract—this is the very evidence of seduction. To circumvent the circuits of causality, arbitrary signs must be projected, some kind of arbitrary codes, which is what the rules of a game are. These are the temptations that are going to upset the causal system and the objective way things proceed and re-engage their fatal linkage. These are the real challenges that we commonly throw down, just like the player in the game. Writing itself does that. Whether poetry or theory, it's nothing but the projection of an arbitrary code, an arbitrary system (an invention of the rules of a game) where things come to be taken in their fatal development. Those little catastrophes like the collapse of meaning, those effects of the turbulence of events, we may interpret them, as does David Ruelle, as part of a rational logic of the unexpected, according to what he calls "the sensitive dependency of initial conditions" of systems." (p.188-189, Baudrillard 2007)

Once more Baudrillard recalls Chuang-Tzu's butcher in regards to this fatal strategy of the void. "Combats are never confrontations, rapports of force, but stratagems, that is to say the agonistic illustration of a ruse, of a non-frontal violence, of a parallel and mobile strategy. Everybody duplicates the movement of the other, draws itself as a lure where the other, petrified, finds only the void. Each one triumphs by appearance, by sending back to the other the appearance of his strength. But each one knows that triumph is not definitive, for no one will ever occupy the blind spot around which the battle is arrayed. Wanting to occupy it, wanting to take the empty space of stratagem (like wanting to annex the empty heart of truth), is madness and an absolute misunderstanding of the world as play and ceremony. This is, however, what our Western theatre does when it substitutes the speculative mirror of psychology for the dual reversibility of bodies and gestures. Bodies and signs collide because they have lost their ceremonial aura (Benjamin). The difference can be felt even in movements of crowds and masses: while in the Western space of the subway, the city, the market, people bump against each other, fighting for space, or at best avoid each other's trajectories, in an aggressive promiscuity, the crowds in the Orient, or in an Arab casbah, know how to move differently, glide with presentiment (or consideration), care, even in a tight space, the interstitial spaces the meat-cutter of the Chuang-Tzu was talking about, through which his blade passes effortlessly. And this is not a question of boundaries between bodies that we make an effort to demarcate by "free" spaces or individual territories; it is the consequence of a ceremonial space, of a sacred space of arrangement that also controls the way bodies appear to each other." (p.215, Baudrillard 2007)

Pata-irony and fatal strategies remain intertwined.

“THESE FATAL STRATEGIES, do they exist? I don't even feel that I've described them, or even come close, nor that the hypothesis is anything but a dream—so great is the sway of the real over the imagination. Where do you get what you say about the object? Objectivity is the opposite of fatality. The object is real, and the real is subject to law, period. And so: faced with a delirious world, there is only the ultimatum of realism. This means that if you want to get away from the madness of the world you have to sacrifice all of its charm as well. The world, in augmenting its delirium, has only raised the ante on sacrifice. Blackmail by the real. Today, illusion no longer counts; in order to survive, we need to approach ever closer to the nullity of the real. There is perhaps but one fatal strategy and only one: theory. And doubtless the only difference between a banal theory and a fatal theory is that in one strategy the subject still believes himself to be more cunning than the object, whereas in the other the object is considered more cunning, cynical, talented than the subject, for which it lies in wait. The metamorphoses, the ruses, the strategies of the object surpass the subject's understanding. The object is neither the double nor the repressed of the subject, neither its fantasy nor its hallucination, neither its mirror nor its reflection—it has its own strategy and holds the key to the rules of a game, impenetrable to the subject, not because they are deeply mysterious, but because they are infinitely ironic. It is objective irony that lies in wait for us, the irony of the fulfillment of the object without regard for the subject or its alienation. In the phase of alienation, it is subjective irony that triumphs; it is the subject that constitutes an insoluble challenge to the blind world that surrounds him. Subjective irony, ironic subjectivity, is the essence of a world of interdiction, Law and desire. The power of the subject lies in its promise of fulfillment, whereas the sphere of the object is the order of what has been fulfilled, and from which, for this very reason, it is impossible to escape.”

(p.219-220, Baudrillard 2007)

The fatal strategy of meta-gaming with its transmedia gaming (beyond their own ends/finality of medium/apparatus) leaving the field open to meta-irony gets played out with these deconstructions.

“At the end of all that, if the object is ingenious, if the object is fatal, what can we do about it? After the art of survival, the ironic art of disappearance? The subject has always dreamed of this, a dream inverse to its dream of totalization, and the one has never been able to erase the other. Quite the contrary. Its failure today awakens passions that are much more subtle. At the heart of banal strategies is the fiery desire of fatal strategies. Nothing can guarantee us a fatality, even less a strategy. What is more, the conjunction of these two terms is paradoxical: how could there be fatality if there is strategy? That's just the point: the enigma is that fatality is at the heart of every strategy. It's what peeks through the heart of more banal strategies. It's the object, whose fatality would be a strategy something like the rule of another game. Basically, the object mocks the laws we attach to it; it would rather figure in our calculations as a sarcastic variable, and leave it to the equations to verify themselves. But the rules of its game, the conditions according to which it accepts playing? No one knows them, and they can change without notice. No one knows what a strategy is. There are not enough means in the world for us to be able to dispose of ends. And, therefore, no one is capable of articulating a final process. God himself is forced to employ a trial-and-error method. The interesting thing about this is the inexorable logical process that is visible here, by which the object is taken in the very

game that we wanted to make it play—doubling the ante somehow, escalating the bidding on the strategic limits it will tolerate, installing thereby a strategy that doesn't have its own ends: a "playful" strategy that stills the play of the subject, a fatal strategy in that the subject thereby succumbs to the surpassing of its own objectives. We are accomplices in this excess of finality that is there in the object (this can be the excess of meaning, and therefore the impossibility of deciphering a word that plays the game of meaning all too well). We invent all these strategies in the hope of having them result in the unexpected event. The real we invent wholly in the hope of seeing it result in a prodigious artifice. From any object we hope for a blind response that hampers our projects. From strategy we expect control. From seduction we look for surprise. Seduction is fatal. It's the effect of a sovereign object that recreates in you an original confusion and seeks to surprise you. Fatality, in turn, is seductive, like the discovery of a hidden rule. The discovery of a hidden rule of the game is dazzling, and compensates us in advance for the cruelest losses. Likewise with the joke. If I look for a fatal connection in language, I fall on the joke, which is itself the *dénouement* of language immanent to language (that is the fatal: the same sign presiding over a life's crystallization and its resolution, at the knotting of the intrigue and its *dénouement*). In language become pure object, irony (of the Witz\*) is the objective form of this *dénouement*. Everywhere, as in the Witz, redoubling and escalating the stakes are spirited forms of denouement. Everything must unfold in a fatal and ingenious way, just as everything was caught from the start in an original subversion. Even predestination is a form of ironic subversion of fatality. Chance is also one. What's the use of trying to establish chance as an objective process, if it is an ironic one? Of course it exists, but against all science, in the irony of the aleatory, and even at the molecular level. And of course fatality exists too, simultaneously—there's no paradox involved in this. The difference is that the irony of fatality is greater than the irony of chance, which just makes it more tragic and more seductive. It's true that this is a difficult and obscure route: to side with the object, to take up the cause of the object. To find another rule, another axiom: nothing mystical in this, nothing of the otherworldly delirium of a subjectivity trapped and escaping headlong into a paroxysmal inventory. But simply to delineate this other logic, unravel those other strategies, leave the field open to objective irony. That also is a challenge—eventually it threatens absurdity, and runs the risk of what it describes—but the risk is to be taken. The hypothesis of a fatal strategy must itself be fatal, too."

(p.227-229, Baudrillard 2007)

And in "Simulacra and Simulation" Baudrillard once again gives context on how the meta- of GEB can go beyond its own ends with the pata- of PNT.

"Through I don't know what Möbius effect, representation itself has also turned in on itself, and the whole logical universe of the political is dissolved at the same time, ceding its place to a transfinite universe of simulation, where from the beginning no one is represented nor representative of anything anymore, where all that is accumulated is deaccumulated at the same time, where even the axiological, directive, and salvageable phantasm of power has disappeared.

[...]

Challenge or imaginary science, only a pataphysics of simulacra can remove us from the system's strategy of simulation and the impasse of death in which it imprisons us.

(p.152-154, Baudrillard 1981/1994)

### **File (ω): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

“Symbolic Exchange and Death” (p.71-74, 82-83, 117, 119-121, 125-127, 140-144, 167-168, 180-182, 199, 208-214), “The Gulf War Did Not Take Place” (p.63-66), “The Illusion of the End” (p.15-18), “The Perfect Crime” (p.25-29), “Fatal Strategies”, “The Spirit of Terrorism” (p.74-82); by Jean Baudrillard

## **Gestural Deconstruction: Hauntology, Pharmakos, Artifactualization & Actuvirtualization**

All of this is tied up in the visor effect of the simulacrum and Derrida traces this in “Specters of Marx”.

“Nor does one see in flesh and blood this Thing that is not a thing, this thing that is invisible between its apparitions, when it reappears. This Thing meanwhile looks at us and sees us not see it even when it is there. A spectral asymmetry interrupts here all specularity. It de-synchronizes, it recalls us to anachrony. We will call this the visor effect: we do not see who looks at us. Even though in his ghost the King looks like himself (“As thou art to thy selfe, says Horacio), that does not prevent him from looking without being seen: his apparition makes him appear still invisible beneath his armor (“Such was the very Armour he had on ”) . We will probably not speak of this visor effect any more, at least not by that name, but it will be presupposed by everything we advance on the subject of the specter in general, in Marx and elsewhere. As will be spelled out later on the basis of The German Ideology and the argument with Stirner, what distinguishes the specter or the revenant from the spirit, including the spirit in the sense of the ghost in general, is doubtless a supernatural and paradoxical phenomenality, the furtive and ungraspable visibility of the invisible, or an invisibility of a visible X, that non-sensuous sensuous of which Capital speaks (we will come to this) with regard to a certain exchange-value; it is also, no doubt, the tangible intangibility of a proper body without flesh, but still the body of someone as someone other. And of someone other that we will not hasten to determine as self, subject, person, consciousness, spirit, and so forth. This already suffices to distinguish the specter not only from the icon or the idol but also from the image of the image, from the Platonic phantasma, as well as from the simple simulacrum of something in general to which it is nevertheless so close and with which it shares, in other respects, more than one feature. But that is not all, and that is not the most irreducible. Another suggestion: This spectral someone other looks at US,<sup>6</sup> we feel ourselves being looked at by it, outside of any synchrony, even before and beyond any look on our part, according to an absolute anteriority (which may be on the order of generation, of more than one generation) and asymmetry, according to an absolutely unmasterable disproportion. Here anachrony makes the law. To feel ourselves seen by a look which it will always be impossible to cross, that is the visor effect on the basis of which we inherit from the law. Since we do not see the one who sees us, and who makes the law, who delivers the injunction (which is, moreover, a contradictory injunction), since we do not see the one who orders “swear” we cannot identify it in all certainty, we must fall back on its voice. The one who says “I am thy Fathers Spirit” can only be taken at his word. An essentially blind submission to his secret, to the secret of his origin: this is a first obedience to the injunction. It will condition all the others. It may always be a case of still someone else. Another can always lie, he can disguise himself as a ghost, another ghost may also be passing himself off for this one. It’s always possible. Later we will talk about the society or the commerce of specters among themselves, for there is always more than one of them. The armor, this “costume” which no stage production will ever be able to leave out, we see it cover from head to foot, in Hamlet’s eyes, the supposed body of the father. We do not know whether it is or is not part of the spectral apparition. This protection is rigorously problematic (problema is also a shield) for it prevents perception from deciding on the identity that it wraps so solidly in its carapace. The armor may be but the body of a real artifact, a kind of technical prosthesis, a body foreign to the spectral body that it dresses, dissimulates, and protects, masking even its identity. The armor lets one see nothing of the spectral body, but at the level of the head and beneath the visor, it permits the so-called father to see and to speak. Some slits are cut into it and adjusted so as to permit him to see without being seen, but to speak in order to be heard. The helmet, like the visor, did



not merely offer protection: it topped off the coat of arms and indicated the chief's authority, like the blazon of his nobility. For the helmet effect, it suffices that a visor be possible and that one plays with it. Even when it is raised, in fact, its possibility continues to signify that someone, beneath the armor, can safely see without being seen or without being identified. Even when it is raised, the visor remains an available resource and structure, solid and stable as armor, the armor that covers the body from head to foot, the armor of which it is a part and to which it is attached. This is what distinguishes a visor from the mask with which, nevertheless, it shares this incomparable power, perhaps the supreme insignia of power: the power to see without being seen. The helmet effect is not suspended when the visor is raised. Its power, namely its possibility, is in that case recalled merely in a more intensely dramatic fashion. When Horatio reports to Hamlet that a figure like his father's appeared "Arm'd at all points exactly, Cap a Pe"), the son is worried and questions. He first insists on the armor and the "Cap a Pe" ("Hamlet: Arm'd, say you? Barnardo and Marcellus: Arm'd, my Lord. Hamlet: From top to toe? Both: My Lord, from head to foote"). Then Hamlet gets to the head, to the face, and especially the look beneath the visor. As if he had been hoping that, beneath an armor that hides and protects from head to foot, the ghost would have shown neither his face, nor his look, nor therefore his identity ("Hamlet: Then saw you not his face? Horatio: Oh yes, my Lord, he wore his Beaver up" [I, ii]). Three things, then, would decompose in analysis this single thing, spirit, or specter-or king, for the king occupies this place, here the place of the father, whether he keeps it, takes it, or usurps it, and beyond the return of the rhyme (for example "The Play's the thing/Wherein I'll catch the Conscience of the King ") . King is a thing, Thing is the King, precisely where he separates from his body which, however, does not leave him (contract of secession, necessary pact in order to have more than one body, that is, in order to reign, and, first of all, to inherit royal dignity, whether by crime or election: "The body is with the King, but the King is not with the body. The King, is a thing").“

(p.6-8, Derrida)

The Ubu-esq(ue) implications abound, this talk of the specter, simulacrum and magic all a part of this deconstruction of ontology, left with only a spectral remainder, a hauntology.

“Repetition and first time: this is perhaps the question of the event as question of the ghost. What is a ghost? What is the effectivity or the presence of a specter, that is, of what seems to remain as inef-fective, virtual. insubstantial as a simulacrum? Is there there, between the thing itself and its simulacrum, an opposition that holds up? Repetition and first time, but also repetition and last time, since the Singularity of any first time, makes it also the last time. Each time it is the event itself, a first time is a last time. Altogether other. Staging for the end of history. Let us call it a hauntology. This logic of haunting would not be merely larger and more powerful than an ontology or a thinking of Being (of the "to he," assuming that it is a matter of Being in the "to be or not to be, " but nothing is less certain) . It would harbor within itself, hut like circumscribed places or particular effects, eschatology and teleology themselves. It would comprehend them, but incom-prehensibly. How to comprehend in fact the discourse of the end or the discourse about the end? Can the extremity of the extreme ever be comprehended? And the opposition between "to be" and "not to he" ? Hamlet already began with the expected return of the dead King. After the end of history, the spirit comes by coming back [revenant], it figures

both a dead man who comes back and a ghost whose expected return repeats itself, again and again.”

(p.10, Derrida)

This text also has a rare remark on pataphysics by Derrida when covering Kojève “end of history” and the post-historical snobbism (of the post-war Japanese) and indifference that Baudrillard will interlink to Duchamp and Warhol (the nothingness at the heart of the image) as a pataphysical mechanical snobbism, i.e. patamechanical snobbism. And as we mention “Travels In Neolon” that the messianic without messianism corresponds to Neoism without Neoism.

“Upon returning from this visit which he made as an important public official of the European Community, Kojève concluded that “post-historical” Japanese civilization had set out on a path diametrically opposed to the “American path, and this because of what he then names, in that profoundly offhand, nutty, and pataphysician manner which is, to be sure, his genius but which is also his entire responsibility, “the Snobbism in the pure state” of the cultural formalism of Japanese society.

[...]

This indifference to the content here is not an indifference, it is not an attitude of indifference, on the contrary. Marking any opening to the event and to the future as such, it therefore conditions the interest in and not the indifference to anything whatsoever, to all content in general. Without it, there would be neither intention, nor need, nor desire, and so on. The concept of this singular indifference (difference itself) is not projected by our reading onto Kojève's text. The latter speaks of it. It characterizes in his view a future that would carry beyond what has up until now been called history. Apparently “formalist”, this indifference to the content has perhaps the value of giving one to think the necessarily pure and purely necessary form of the future as such, in its being-necessarily-promised, prescribed, assigned, enjoined, in the necessarily formal necessity of its possibility- in short, in its law. It is this law that dislodges any present out of its contemporaneity with itself Whether the promise promises this or that, whether it be fulfilled or not, or whether it be unfulfillable, there is necessarily some promise and therefore some historicity as future-to-come. It is what we are nicknaming the messianic without messianism.”  
(p.89-92, Derrida)

During an interview on the ‘spatial arts’ Derrida traces what we mentioned earlier as gestural deconstruction.

“Now, in terms of my competence in philosophy, I have been able to devise a certain program, a certain matrix of inquiry that permits me to begin by asking the question of competence in general terms — that is to say, to inquire into how competence is formed, the processes of legitimization, of institutionalization, and so on, in all domains then to add very sincerely but also by asking the question of competence, that is to say, what defines the limits of my domain, the limits of a corpus, the legitimacy of the questions, and so on. Each time that I confront a domain that is foreign to me, one of my interests or investments concerns precisely the legitimacy of the discourse, with what right one speaks, how the object is constituted — questions that are actually philosophical in origin and style. Even within the field of philosophy, I have worked to elaborate deconstructive questions concerning it, that deconstruction of philosophy comes with it a certain number of questions that can be asked in different fields. Moreover, each time I was

trying to discover what in a determined field liberates it from philosophical authority. That is to say, I have learned from philosophy that it is a hegemonic discourse. structurally hegemonic, considering all discursive regions to be dependent upon it. And by means of a deconstruction of this hegemonic gesture we can begin to see in each field, whether it be what we call psychology, logic, politics, or the arts, the possibility of emancipation from the hegemony and authority of philosophical discourse. So, each time I approach a literary work, or a pictorial or architectural work, what interests me is this same deconstructive force with regard to philosophical hegemony. It's as if that is what carries my analysis along. As a result, one can always find the same gesture on my part, even though each time I try to respect the singularity of the work. That gesture consists of finding, or in any case looking for, whatever in the work represents its force of tance to philosophical authority, and to philosophical discourse on it. The sam ration can be found or recognized in the different discourses I have developed concerning particular works; yet I have always tried to do it by respecting the individual signature of an Artaud or an Eisenman.”

(p.9-10, Derrida 1990)

In this regard the deconstruction of the virus and deconstruction as virus not only has a bearing on the Post-Neoist #Game23 viral meme-plexes, but also ties into the impossible revolution of rogue events that again we touch on in “Preface: Of Impossible Revolution- Poppin-Off Mondo Neoism”. Much like pata-no and pataproxy remain apart of these chain of deconstructive “undecidables”.

“Yes, you’re right, and paradoxically the question is more intimately connected with my work. I often tell myself, and I must have written it somewhere - I am sure I wrote it somewhere - that all I have done, to summarize very reductively, is dominated by the thought of a virus, agar could be called a parasitology, a virology, the virus being many things. I have written about this in a recent text on drugs. The virus is in part a parasite that destroys, that introduces disorder into communication. Even from the biological standpoint, this is what happens with a virus; it derails a mechanism of the communicational type, its coding and decoding. On the other hand, it is something that is neither living nor non-living; the virus is not a microbe. And if you follow these two threads, that of a parasite which disrupts destination from the communicative point of view — disrupting writing, inscription, and the coding and decoding of inscription — and which on the other hand is neither alive nor dead, you have the matrix of all that I have done since I began writing. In the text just referred to I allude to the possible intersection between AIDS and the computer virus as two forces capable of disrupting destination. Where they are concerned, one can no longer follow the tracks, neither those of subjects, nor those of desire, nor the sexual, and so on. If we follow the intersection between AIDS and the computer virus as we now know it, we have the means to comprehend, not only from a theoretical point of view but also from the sociohistorical point of view, what amounts to a disruption of absolutely everything on the planet, including police agencies, commerce, the army, questions of strategy. All those things encounter the limits on their control, as well as the extraordinary force of those limits. It is as if all I have been suggesting for the past twenty-five years is prescribed the idea of destinerrance... the supplement, the pharmakon, all the undecidables — it’s the same thing. It also gets translated, not only technologically but also technologicopoetically.”

(p.12, Derrida 1990)

With this text Derrida also deconstructs the specificity of any medium (and it's popular critical discourses) by following beyond its limits the medium of cinema, thereby opening up even further this paleonymic transfinity of the transmedial hyperrealistically.

"Now, film is a very particular case: first, because this effect of presence is complicated by the fact of movement, of mobility, of sequentiality, of temporality; second, because the relation to discourse is very complicated, without even speaking about the difference between silent film and sound film, for even in silent film the relation to the word is very complicated. Obviously, if there is a specificity to the cinematic medium, it is foreign to the word. That is to say that even the most talkative cinema supposes a reinscription of the word within a specific cinematic element not governed by the word. If there is something specific in cinema or in video — without speaking of the differences between video and television — it is the form in which discourse is put into play, inscribed or situated, without in principle governing the work. So from that point of view we can find in film the means to rethink or refound all the relations between the word and silent art, such as they came to be stabilized before the appearance of cinema. Before the advent of cinema there was painting, architecture, sculpture, and within them one could find structures that had institutionalized the relation between discourse and nondiscourse in art. If the advent of cinema allowed for something completely new, it was the possibility of another way of playing with the hierarchies. Now here I am not speaking of cinema in general, for I would say that there are cinematic practices that reconstitute the authority of the discourse, while others try to do things more closely resembling photography or painting — still others that play differently with the relations among discourse, discursivity, and nondiscursivity. I would hesitate to speak of any art, but in particular of cinema, from that point of view. I think that there is probably more difference among different works, different styles of cinematic work, with respect to the point just made about discourse and nondiscourse than there is between cinema and photography. In that case it is probable that we are dealing with many different arts within the same technological medium — if we define the cinema on the basis of its technical apparatus — and perhaps there's no unity in the cinematic arts. I don't know what you think, but a given cinematic method may be closer to a certain type of literature than to another cinematic method. And thus we need to ask whether or not identifying an art — presuming we can speak of cinema as though we knew what art was — proceeds from the technical medium, that is to say, whether it proceeds from an apparatus such as a camera that is able to do things that can't be done by writing or painting. Does that suffice to identify art, or in fact does the specificity of a given film depend in the end less on the technical medium and more on its affinity with a given literary work rather than with another film? I don't know. These are, for me, questions that have no answers. But at the same time, feel strongly that one should not reduce the importance of the film apparatus."

(p.13-14, Derrida 1990)

In another interview "Deconstruction of Actuality" Derrida gives further context of the specter and its interlink/interplay with the simulacrum and the virtual by expanding of the terms *artifactuality* and *virtuactuality* that are coined in the text "Echographies of Television" alongside Bernard Stiegler.

“The argument is organised by the question of the spectre (networked with those of repetition, mourning, and inheritance, the event and the messianic, of everything that exceeds the ontological oppositions between absence and presence, visible and invisible, living and dead, and hence above all of the prosthesis as ‘phantom limb’ , of technology, of the tele-technological simulacrum, the synthetic image, virtual space, etc.; and so back to the themes I have already discussed: artifactuality and virtuactuality). Remember the opening sentence of the Communist Manifesto: ‘A spectre is haunting Europe, the spectre of communism.’”  
(Derrida)

As we’ll see, artifactuality and virtuactuality are crucial to gestural deconstruction, especially non-events (including playing them as transmedia games).

“These days, anyone who wants to think their time, especially if they want to talk about it too, is bound to pay heed to a public space, and therefore to a political present which is constantly changing in form and content as a result of the tele-technology of what is confusedly called news, information or communication. But your question referred not only to the present, but to actuality. Very schematically, let me quickly mention just two of the most actual features of the moment. They are too abstract to capture the most characteristic features of my own experience of ‘actuality’, or any other philosophical experience of it, but they do point to something of what constitutes actuality in general. I will try to designate them by two portmanteau terms: artifactuality and actuvirtuality. The first means that actuality is indeed made: it is important to know what it is made of, but it is even more necessary to recognise that it is made. It is not given, but actively produced; it is sorted, invested and performatively interpreted by a range of hierarchising and selective procedures factitious or artificial procedures which are always subservient to various powers and interests of which their ‘subjects’ and agents (producers and consumers of actuality, always interpreters, and in some cases ‘philosophers’ too), are never sufficiently aware. The ‘reality’ of ‘actuality’ however individual, irreducible, stubborn, painful or tragic it may be – only reaches us through fictional devices. The only way to analyse it is through a work of resistance, of vigilant counter-interpretation, etc. Hegel was right to tell the philosophers of his time to read the newspapers. Today, the same duty requires us to find out how news is made, and by whom: the daily papers, the weeklies, and the TV news as well. We need to insist on looking at them from the other end: that of the press agencies as well as that of the teleprompter. And we should never forget what this entails: whenever a journalist or a politician appears to be speaking to us directly, in our homes, and looking us straight in the eye, he or she is actually reading, from a screen, at the dictation of a ‘prompter’, and reading a text which was produced elsewhere, on a different occasion, possibly by other people, or by a whole network of nameless writers and editors.”  
(Derrida)

Again this is not simply extrapolation but the Gulf War comes up both here and in “Echographies of Television”, much like Baudrillard comes up in the latter.

“But the tragedy, as always, lies in a contradiction, a double demand: the apparent internationalisation of sources of news and information is often based on the appropriation and monopolisation of channels of information, publication and distribution. Just think of what happened in the Gulf War. It may have represented an exemplary moment of heightened

awareness, or even rebellion, but this should not be allowed to conceal the normality and constancy of this kind of violence in conflicts everywhere, not just the Middle East. Sometimes, then, this apparently international process of homogenisation may provoke 'national' resistance. That is the first complication. A second qualification: this international artifactuality, the monopolisation of the 'actuality effect', and the centralisation of the artifactual power to 'create events' may be accompanied by advances in 'live' communication, taking place in so-called 'real' time, in the present. The theatrical genre of the 'interview' is a propitiation, at least a fictive one, of this idolatry of 'immediate' presence and 'live' communication. The newspapers will always prefer to publish an interview, accompanied by photographs of the author, rather than an article which will face up to its responsibilities in reading, criticism and education. But how can we carry on criticising the mystifications of 'live' communication (videocameras, etc.) if we want to continue making use of it? In the first place, by continuing to point out, and argue, that 'live' communication and 'real time' are never pure: they do not furnish us with intuitions or transparencies, or with perceptions unmarked by technical interpretation or intervention. And any such argument inevitably makes reference to philosophy. And finally – as I just mentioned – the necessary deconstruction of artifactuality should never be allowed to turn into an alibi or an excuse. It must not create an inflation of the image, or be used to neutralise every danger by means of what might be called the trap of the trap, the delusion of delusion: a denial of events, by which everything – even violence and suffering, war and death – is said to be constructed and fictive, and constituted by and for the media, so that nothing really ever happens, only images, simulacra, and delusions. The deconstruction of artifactuality should be carried as far as possible, but we must also take every precaution against this kind of critical neo-idealism. We must bear in mind not only that any coherent deconstruction is about singularity, about events, and about what is ultimately irreducible in them, but also that 'news' or 'information' is a contradictory and heterogeneous process. Information can transform and strengthen knowledge, truth and the cause of future democracy, with all the problems associated with them, and it must do so, just as it often has done in the past. However artificial and manipulative it may be, we have to hope that artifactuality will bend itself or lend itself to the coming of what is on its way, to the outcome which carries it along and towards which it is moving. And to which it is going to have to bear witness, whether it wants to or not."

(Derrida)

For those still unsure about intertextual links between Psychedelia/Psychonautics/Gonzo and magic to Neoism, look no further than the deconstructive pharmakon and the simulacrum of Helen defended nihilistically by Gorgias which Derrida also recalls in "Dissemination".

"In contrast to this blind servant with its haphazard, clumsy movements, the Attic school (Gorgias, Isocrates, Alcidas) extolled the force of living logos, the great master, the great power: logos dunastis megas estin, says Gorgias in his Encomium of Helen. The dynasty of speech may be just as violent as that of writing, but its infiltration is more profound, more penetrating, more diverse, more assured. The only ones who take refuge in writing are those who are no better speakers than the man in the street. Alcidas recalls this in his treatise "on those who write speeches" and "on the Sophists." Writing is considered a consolation, a compensation, a remedy for sickly speech. Despite these similarities, the condemnation of writing is not engaged in the same way by the rhetoricians as it is in the Phaedrus. If the written

word is scorned, it is not as a pharmakon coming to corrupt memory and truth. It is because logos is a more effective pharmakon. This is what Gorgias calls it. As a pharmakon, logos is at once good and bad; it is not at the outset governed exclusively by goodness or truth. It is only within this ambivalence and this mysterious indetermination of logos, and after these have been recognized, that Gorgias determines truth as a world, a structure or order, the counterpart (kosmos) of logos. In so doing he no doubt prefigures the Platonic gesture. But before such a determination, we ate in the ambivalent, indeterminate space of the pharmakon, of that which in logos remains potency, potentiality, and is not yet the transparent language of knowledge. If one were justified in trying to capture it in categories that are subsequent to and dependent upon the history thus opened up, categories arising precisely in the aftermath of decision, one would have to speak of the "irrationality" of living logos, of its spellbinding powers of enchantment, mesmerizing fascination, and alchemical transformation, which make it kin to witchcraft and magic. Sorcery (goiteia), psychagogy, such ate the "facts and acts" of speech, the most fearsome of pharmaka. In his Encomium of Helen, Gorgias used these very words to qualify the power of speech. [...] Persuasive eloquence (peithii) is the power to break in, to carry off, to seduce internally, to ravish invisibly. It is a furtive force per se. But in showing that Helen gave in to the violence of speech (would she have yielded to a letter?), in disculpating this victim, Gorgias indicts logos in its capacity to lie. "By introducing some reasoning (logismon) into speech (toi logoi)," he wishes "to free the accused of blame and, having reproved her detractors as prevaricators and proved the truth, to free her from their ignorance." But before being reined in and tamed by the kosmos and order of truth, logos is a wild creature, an ambiguous animality. Its magical "pharmaceutical" force derives from this ambivalence, which explains the disproportion between the strength of that force and the inconsiderable thing speech seems to be: But if it was speech which persuaded her and deceived her heart, not even to this is it difficult to make an answer and to banish blame as follows. Speech is a powerful lord, which by means of the finest and most invisible body a/effects the divinest words: it can stop fear and banish grief and create joy and nurture pity. Such persuasion entering the soul through speech is indeed a pharmakon, and that is precisely what Gorgias calls it: The effect of speech (tou logou dunamis) upon the condition of the soul (pros ten tes psuches taxin) is comparable (ton auton de logon) to the power of drugs (ton pharmakon taxis) over the nature of bodies (ten ton somaton phusin). For just as different drugs dispel different secretions from the body, and some bring an end to disease and others to life, so also in the case of speeches, some distress, others delight, some cause fear, others make the hearers bold, and some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion (tin psuchin epharmakeusan kai exegoeteusan). The reader will have paused to reflect that the relation (the analogy) between the logos/soul relation and the pharmakon/body relation is itself designated by the term logos. The name of the relation is the same as that of one of its terms. The pharmakon is comprehended in the structure of logos. This comprehension is an act of both domination and decision." (p.115-117, Derrida 1981)

These links between pharmakon, pharmakeus and magic interweave with the problematic of metaxy by way of Plato's "Symposium".

"But if this is the case, and if logos is already a penetrating supplement, then isn't Socrates, "he who does not write," also a master of the pharmakon? And in that way isn't he the spitting image

of a sophist? a pharmakeus? a magician? a sorcerer? even a poisoner? and even one of those impostors denounced by Gorgias? The threads of these complicities are almost impossible to disentangle. Socrates in the dialogues of Plato often has the face of a pharmakeus. That is the name given by Diotima to Eros. But behind the portrait of Eros, one cannot fail to recognize the features of Socrates, as though Diotima, in looking at him, were proposing to Socrates the portrait of Socrates (Symposium, 203c,d,e). Eros, who is neither rich, nor beautiful, nor delicate, spends his life philosophizing (philosophon dia pantos tall bioll); he is a fearsome sorcerer (deinosgoes), magician (pharmakeus), and sophist (sophistis). A being that no "logic" can confine within a noncontradictory definition, an individual of the demonic species, neither god nor man, neither immortal nor mortal, neither living nor dead, he forms "the medium of the prophetic arts, of the priestly rites of sacrifice, initiation, and incantation, of divination and of sorcery (thllsias-teletas-epOdas-manteian)" (202e). In that same dialogue, Agathon accuses Socrates of trying to bewitch him, to cast a spell over him (Pharmattein bOlllei me, O Sokrates, 194a). The portrait of Eros by Diotima is placed between this exclamation and the portrait of Socrates by Alcibiades."

(p.117, Derrida 1981)

The play of pharmakon remains extensive, occasioned as venomous magic.

"The Socratic pharmakon also acts like venom, like the bite of a poisonous snake (217-18). And Socrates' bite is worse than a snake's since its traces invade the soul. What Socrates' words and the viper's venom have in common, in any case, is their ability to penetrate and make off with the most concealed interiority of the body or soul. The demonic speech of this thaumaturge (en)trains the listener in dionysian frenzy and philosophic mania (218b). And when they don't act like the venom of a snake, Socrates' pharmaceutical charms provoke a kind of narcosis, benumbing and paralyz-ing into aporia, like the touch of a stingray (narki)[...]" (p.118, Derrida 1981)

The deconstruction of binaries, identity and the magical/occult are all tied up in this irony of the pharamakon's indeterminacy.

"Socrates arrested as a wizard (goes or pharmakeus): that will have to wait. What can be said about this analogy that ceaselessly refers to the socratic pharmakon to the sophistic pharmakon and, proportioning them to each other, makes us go back indefinitely from one to the other? How can they be distinguished? Irony does not consist in the dissolution of a sophistic charm or in the dismantling of an occult substance or power through analysis and question-ing. It does not consist in undoing the charlatan(esque) confidence of a pharmakeus from the vantage point of some obstinate instance of transparent reason or innocent logos. Socratic irony precipitates Out one pharmakon by bringing it in contact with another pharmakon. Or rather, it reverses the pharmakon's powers and turns its surface over-thus taking effect, being recorded and dated, in the act of classing the pharmakon, through the fact that the pharmakon properly consists in a certain inconsistency, a certain impropriety, this nonidentity-with-itself always allowing it to be turned against itself. What is at stake in this overturning is no less than science and death. Which are consigned to a single type in the structure of the pharmakon, the one and only name for that potion that must be awaited. And even, In Socrates' case, deserved."

(p.119, Derrida 1981)



Altogether double downed on with Derrida's contextualization of the sacrificial pharmakos. "The circuit we are proposing is, moreover, all the more legitimate and easy since it leads to a word that can, on one of its faces, be considered the synonym, almost the homonym, of a word Plato "actually" used. The word in question is pharmakos (wizard, magician, poisoner), a synonym of phar-makeus (which Plato uses), but with the unique feature of having been overdetermined, overlaid by Greek culture with another function. Another role, and a formidable one. The character of the pharmakos has been compared to a scapegoat. The evil and the outside, the expulsion of the evil, its exclusion out of the body (and out) of the city-these are the two major senses of the character and of the ritual. Harpocration, commenting on the word pharmakos, describes them thus: "At Athens they led out two men to be purifications for the city; it was at the Thargelia, one was for the men and the other for the women." In general, the pharmakoi were put to death. But that, it seems, was not the essential end of the operation. Death occurred most often as a secondary effect of an energetic fustigation. Aimed first at the genital organs. Once the pharmakoi were cut off from the space of the city, the blows were designed to chase away or draw out the evil from their bodies. Did they burn them, too, in order to achieve purification? In his *Thousand Histories*, Tzetzes gives the following account, based on certain fragments by the satirical poet Hipponax, of the ceremony: "The (rite of the) pharmakos was a purification of this sort of old. If a calamity overtook the city by the wrath of God, whether it were famine or pestilence or any other mischief, they led forth as though to a sacrifice the most unsightly of them all as a purification and a remedy to the suffering city. They set the sacrifice in the appointed place, and gave him cheese with their hands and a barley cake and figs, and seven times they smote him with leeks and wild figs and other wild plants. Finally they burnt him with fire with the wood of wild trees and scattered the ashes into the sea and to the winds, for a purification, as I said, of the suffering city." The city's body proper thus reconstitutes its unity, closes around the security of its inner courts, gives back to itself the word that links it with itself within the confines of the agora, by violently excluding from its territory the representative of an external threat or aggression. That representative represents the otherness of the evil that comes to affect or infect the inside by unpredictably breaking into it. Yet the representative of the outside is nonetheless constituted, regularly granted its place by the community, chosen, kept, fed, etc., in the very heart of the inside. These parasites were as a matter of course domesticated by the living organism that housed them at its expense. "The Athenians regularly maintained a number of degraded and useless beings at the public expense; and when any calamity, such as plague, drought, or famine, befell the city, they sacrificed two of these outcasts as scapegoats." The ceremony of the pharmakos is thus played out on the boundary line between inside and outside, which it has as its function ceaselessly to trace and retrace. Intra muros/extra muros. The origin of difference and division, the pharmakos represents evil both introjected and projected. Beneficial insofar as he cures-and for that, venerated and cared for-harmful insofar as he incarnates the powers of evil-and for that, feared and treated with caution. Alarming and calming. Sacred and accursed. The conjunction, the coincidentia oppositorum, ceaselessly undoes itself in the passage to decision or crisis. The expulsion of the evil or madness restores sophrosune. These exclusions took place at critical moments (drought, plague, famine). Decision was then repeated. But the mastery of the critical instance requires that surprise be prepared for: by rules, by law, by the regularity of repetition,

by fixing the date. This ritual practice, which took place in Abdera, in Thrace, in Marseilles, etc., was reproduced every year in Athens. And up through the fifth century. Aristophanes and Lysias clearly allude to it. Plato could not have been unaware of it. The date of the ceremony is noteworthy: the sixth day of the Thargelia. That was the day of the birth of him whose death--and not only because a pharmakon was its direct cause--resembles that of a pharmakos from the inside: Socrates. Socrates, affectionately called the pharmakeus in the dialogues of Plato; Socrates, who faced with the complaint (graphe) lodged against him, refused to defend himself, declined the logographic offer of Lysias, "the ablest writer of our time," who had proposed to ghost-write a defense for him; Socrates was born on the sixth day of the Thargelia. Diogenes Laertius testifies to this: "He was born on the sixth day of Thargelion, the day when the Athenians purify the city."  
(p.130-134, Derrida 1981)

With the pharmakon are intertwined the ersatz maliciously appropriated royal sovereignty of Ubu and the alchemical of Dr. Faustroll.

"The rite of the pharmakos: evil and death, repetition and exclusion. Socrates ties up into a system all the counts of indictment against the pharmakon of writing at the point at which he adopts as his own, in order to uphold it, interpret it, and make it explicit, the divine, royal, paternal, solar word, the capital sentence of Themis. The worst effects of writing were only predicted by that word. The king's speech was not demonstrative; it did not pronounce knowledge--it pronounced itself. Announcing, presaging, cutting. It is a manteia, Socrates suggests (275c). The discourse of Socrates will hence apply itself to the task of translating that manteia into philosophy, cashing in on that capital, turning it to account, taking account of it, giving accounts and reasons, upholding the reasoning of that basileo-patro-helio-theological dictum. Transforming the mythos into logos."  
(p.134, Derrida 1981)

Phantom, pharmakon, magic and simulacrum in Plato and metaphysics (of presence) as Derrida indicates.

"If one considers that imitators and masters of illusion will later be presented as charlatans and thaumaturges (602d)-species of the genus pharmakeus-then once again ontological knowledge becomes a pharmaceutical force opposed to another pharmaceutical force. The order of knowledge is not the transparent order of forms and ideas, as one might be tempted retrospectively to interpret it; it is the antidote. Long before being divided up into occult violence and accurate knowledge, the element of the pharmakon is the combat zone between philosophy and its other. An element that is in itself, if one can still say so, undecidable. Of course, in order to define the poetry of imitation, one has to know what imitation in general is. This is where that most familiar of examples comes in: the origin of the bed. Elsewhere, we will be able to take the time to inquire about the necessity governing the choice of this example and about the switch in the text that makes us slide insensibly from the table to the bed. The already made bed. In any case, God is the true father of the bed, of the clinical eidos. The carpenter is its "Demiurge." The painter, who is again called a zoographer, is neither its generator (phutourgos: author of the phusis-as truth-of the bed), nor its demiurge. Only its imitator. It is thus by three degrees that he is separated from the original truth, the phusis of the bed. And hence, from the king. "This, then,

will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature at three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators" (597e). As for couching this eidolon in written form, writing down the image that poetic imitation has already made, that would be equivalent to moving to a fourth degree of distance from the king, or rather, through a change of order or of element, wandering into an excessive estrangement from him, if Plato himself did not elsewhere assert, speaking of the imitative poet in general, that "he is always at an infinite remove from truth" (tou de alitholl Sporropanu aphestota) (605c). For in contrast to painting, writing doesn't even create a phantasm. The painter, of course, does not produce the being-true but the appearance, the phantasm (598b), that is, what is already a simulation of the copy (Sophist, 236b). In general, phantasma (the copy of a copy) has been translated as "simulacrum." He who writes with the alphabet no longer even imitates. No doubt because he also, in a sense, imitates perfectly. He has a better chance of reproducing the voice, because phonetic writing decomposes it better and transforms it into abstract, spatial elements. This decomposition of the voice is here both what best conserves it and what best corrupts it. What imitates it perfectly because it no longer imitates it at all. For imitation affirms and sharpens its essence in effacing itself. Its essence is its nonessence. And no dialectic can encompass this self-inadequation. A perfect imitation is no longer an imitation. If one eliminates the tiny difference that, in separating the imitator from the imitated, by that very fact refers to it, one would render the imitator absolutely different: the imitator would become another being no longer referring to the imitation does not correspond to its essence, is not what it is—imitation—unless it is in some way at fault or rather in default. It is bad by nature. It is only good insofar as it is bad. Since (de)fault is inscribed within it, it has no nature; nothing is properly its own. Ambivalent, playing with itself by hollowing itself out, good and evil at once-undecidedly, mimesis is akin to the pharmakon. No "logic," no "dialectic," can consume its reserve even though each must endlessly draw on it and seek reassurance through it. , And as it happens, the technique of imitation, along with the production of the simulacrum, has always been in Plato's eyes manifestly magical, thaumaturgical[...]" (p.138-139, Derrida 1981)

What "occult postmodernists" and "occult psychogeographers" like Moore claim by linking language, art and magic had well been traced as far back as Plato as we've noticed. "The antidote is still the epistimi. And since hybris is at bottom nothing but that excessive momentum that (en)trains being in(to) the simulacrum, the mask, the festival, there can be no antidote but that which enables one- to remain measured. The alexipharmakon will be the science of measure, in every sense of the word. [...] The illusionist, the technician of sleight-of-hand, the painter, the writ-er, the pharmakeus. This has not gone unnoticed: ". . . isn't the word pharmakon, which means color, the very same word that applies to the drugs of sorcerers or doctors? Don't the casters of spells resort to wax figurines in pursuing their evil designs?" Bewitchment (fenvoutement) is always the effect of a representation, pictorial or scriptural, capturing, captivating the form of the other, par excellence his face, countenance, word and look, mouth and eye, nose and ears: the tlultus. The word pharmakon, then, also designates pictorial color, the material in which the zographima is inscribed. Turn to the eratylus: in his exchange with Hermogenes, Socrates examines the hypothesis according to which names imitate the essence of things. He compares, in order to make a distinction between them,

musical or pictorial imitation, on the one hand, and nominal imitation, on the other. What he does then is interesting to us not only because he refers to the pharmakon but also because another necessity imposes itself on him, one on which we will henceforth progressively attempt to shed some light: at the moment he takes up the question of the differential elements of nominal language, he is obliged, as is Saussure after him, to suspend the insistence on voice as sonority imitative of sounds (imitative music). If the voice names" it is through the differences and relations that are introduced among the stoikheia, the elements or letters (grammata). The Same word (stoikheia) is used for both elements and letters. And one ought to reflect upon what here appears to be a conventional or pedagogical necessity: phonemes in general, vowels-phonienta -and consonants, are designated by the letters that inscribe them." (p.140-141, Derrida 1981)

This all gets intertextually linked by syzygy through the transaesthetic transmedial contexts of Neoist APT Fests as fêtes mobiles, where a movable feast is an event which takes place at no regular time, so too the pharmakon's evocation of the festival.

"The Republic also calls the painter's colors pharmaka (420c). The magic of writing and painting is like a cosmetic concealing the dead under the appearance of the living. The pharmakon introduces and harbors death. It makes the corpse presentable, masks it, makes it up, perfumes it with its essence, as it is said in Aeschylus. Pharmakon is also a word for perfume. A perfume without essence, as we earlier called it a drug without substance. It transforms order into ornament, the cosmos into a cosmetic. Death, masks, makeup, all are part of the festival that subverts the order of the city, its smooth regulation by the dialectician and the science of being. Plato, as we shall see, is not long in identifying writing with festivity. And play. A certain festival, a certain game." (p.142, Derrida 1981)

Elsewhere in some of Derrida's earliest lectures, recently released as "Heidegger: The Question of Being & History", Derrida deploys the term deconstruction (in feasibly the earliest mention/usage recorded).

"The difference between interiorizing refutation, between refutation as Hegelian Erinnerung and Heideggerian destruction, is thus as close as possible to nothing. Like Hegelian refutation, Heideggerian destruction is neither the critique of some error, nor the simply negative exclusion of some past of philosophy. It is a destruction—that is, a deconstruction, a de-structuration, the shaking that is necessary to bring out the structures, the strata, the system of deposits. As Heidegger said in the passage from a moment ago, sedimentations of the ontological tradition—sedimentations that have, according to a certain necessity, always covered over the naked question of being—covered over a nudity that in fact never unveiled itself as such." (p.9, Derrida 2016)

We cite the above to cite the following as a note Derrida stresses for all deconstruction (and thereby would be clearly for pataphysics as well) that deconstruction remains a deconstruction of ontology itself not merely its history but the entire "ontological project itself". Like Baudrillard saying nothing lies behind anagrammatics, Derrida reminds us that there's not an ontology

involved in any of this, not even a meontologically definable “nothing”, that’s the hyperreal/pataphysical void.

“Well, this is not the case; the destruction of the history of ontology is a destruction of ontology itself, of the entirety of the ontological project itself. What I’m saying goes against appearances and against public rumor, and it is true that it is in the name of an ontological point of view and, especially in *Sein und Zeit*, using the word ontological, that Heidegger destroys the tradition and conducts his analyses. But if these destructions mean to be ontological, what he wants to constitute is anything but an ontology. Here we must consider Heidegger’s thought in its movement; or here, rather than his thought, his terminology. There is no doubt that in *Sein und Zeit* the term ontology is taken positively and what Heidegger wishes to awaken is a fundamental ontology slumbering beneath special or general metaphysics, which is interested only in beings and does not ask the question of the being of beings. He wants to awaken the fundamental ontology under metaphysical ontology and the ontological under the ontic. But immediately after *Sein und Zeit*, and increasingly as he advances, the word ontology will seem more and more dangerous to him, both because of its traditional use and the meaning that at bottom legitimates this traditional use, ontology meaning not thought logos of being (double genitive on which he will insist in the “Letter on ‘Humanism’”) but discourse on the on—that is, on the being in general, on the being qua being (general metaphysics). To follow this progressive abandonment of the notion, and this destruction of the history of ontology as destruction of ontology itself, I will pick out three reference points in the path of Heidegger’s thinking in this regard.”

(p.11, Derrida 2016)

This remains the fatal strategy of difference as a non-concept. All of these chains of deconstructive undecidables remain non-concepts.

“Now, HOW AM I TO SPEAK OF the a of difference? It is clear that it cannot be exposed. We can expose only what, at a certain moment, can become present, manifest; what can be shown, presented as a present, a being-present in its truth, the truth of a present or the presence of a present. However, if difference is (I also cross out the “is”) what makes the presentation of being-present possible, it never presents itself as such. It is never given in the present or to anyone. Holding back and not exposing itself, it goes beyond the order of truth on this specific point and in this determined way, yet is not itself concealed, as if it were something, a mysterious being, in the occult zone of a nonknowing. Any exposition would expose it to disappearing as a disappearance. It would risk appearing, thus disappearing. Thus, the detours, phrases, and syntax that I shall often have to resort to will resemble—will sometimes be practically indiscernible from—those of negative theology. Already we had to note that difference is not, does not exist, and is not any sort of being-present (on). And we will have to point out everything that it is not, and, consequently, that it has neither existence nor essence. It belongs to no category of being, present or absent. And yet what is thus denoted as difference is not theological, not even in the most negative order of negative theology. The latter, as we know, is always occupied with letting a supraessential reality go beyond the finite categories of essence and existence, that is, of presence, and always hastens to remind us that, if we deny the predicate of existence to God, it is in order to recognize him as a superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being. Here there is no question of such a move, as will be confirmed as

we go along. Not only is difference irreducible to every ontological or theological—onto-theological—reappropriation, but it opens up the very space in which onto-theology—philosophy—produces its system its history. It thus encompasses and irrevocably surpasses onto-theology or philosophy. For the same reason, I do not know where to begin to mark out this assemblage, this graph, of difference. Precisely what is in question here is the requirement that there be a *de jure* commencement, an absolute point of departure, a responsibility arising from a principle. The problem of writing opens by questioning the *arché*. Thus what I put forth here will not be developed simply as a philosophical discourse that operates on the basis of a principle, of postulates, axioms, and definitions and that moves according to the discursive line of a rational order. In marking out difference, everything is a matter of strategy and risk. It is a question of strategy because no transcendent truth present outside the sphere of writing can theologically command the totality of this field. It is hazardous because this strategy is not simply one in the sense that we say that strategy orients the tactics according to a final aim, a *telos* or the theme of a domination, a mastery or an ultimate reappropriation of movement and field. In the end, it is a strategy without finality. We might call it blind tactics or empirical errance, if the value of empiricism did not itself derive all its meaning from its opposition to philosophical responsibility. If there is a certain errance in the tracing-out of difference, it no longer follows the line of logico-philosophical speech or that of its integral and symmetrical opposite, logico-empirical speech. The concept of play [*jeu*] remains beyond this opposition; on the eve and aftermath of philosophy, it designates the unity of chance and necessity in an endless calculus. By decision and, as it were, by the rules of the game, then, turning this thought around, let us introduce ourselves to the thought of difference by way of the theme of strategy or stratagem. By this merely strategic justification, I want to emphasize that the efficacy of this thematics of difference very well may, and even one day must, be sublated, i.e., lend itself, if not to its replacement, at least to its involvement in a series of events which in fact it never commanded. This also means that it is not a theological thematics. I will say, first of all, that difference, which is neither a word nor a concept, seemed to me to be strategically the theme most proper to think out, if not master (thought being *e'* Perhaps, held in a certain necessary relation with the functional limits of mastery), in what is most characteristic of our "epoch." I start off, then, strategically, from the place and time in which "we" are, even though my opening is not justifiable in the final account, and though it is always on the basis of difference and its "history" that we can claim to know who and where "we" are and what the limits of an "epoch" can be." (p.134-136, Derrida 1973)

With no center and ex-centralized, difference [with the strange loop (sans origin) similar to a difference of a difference and a deferral of that difference of a difference and a deferral of that deferral of that difference of a difference] traces the theory-fiction of this pataphysical vacuum of the deconstruction of referentiality.

"The two apparently different meanings of difference are tied together in Freudian theory: differing [*le différer*] as discernibility, distinction, deviation, diastem, spacing; and deferring [*le différer*] as detour, delay, relay, reserve, temporalizing. I shall recall only that:

1. The concept of trace (*Spur*), of facilitation (*Bahnung*), Of forces of facilitation are, as early as the composition of the *Entwurf*, inseparable from the concept of difference. The origin memory and of the psyche as a memory in general (conscious unconscious) can only be described by

taking into account difference between the facilitation thresholds, as Freud says explicitly. There is no facilitation [Bahnung] without difference and no difference without a trace.

2. All the differences involved in the production of unconscious traces and in the process of inscription (Niederschrift) can also be interpreted as moments of difference, in the sense of "placing on reserve." Following a schema that continually guides Freud's thinking, the movement of the trace is described as an effort of life to protect itself by deferring the dangerous investment, by constituting a reserve (Vorrat). And all the conceptual oppositions that furrow Freudian thought relate each concept to the other like movements of a detour, within the economy of difference. The one is only the other deferred, the one differing from the other. The one is the other in difference, the one is the difference from the other. Every apparently rigorous and irreducible opposition (for example, that between the secondary and primary) is thus said to be, at one time or another, a "theoretical fiction." In this way again, for example (but such an example covers everything or communicates with everything), the difference between the pleasure principle and the reality principle is only difference as detour (Aufschieben, Aufschub)." (p.149-150, Derrida 1973)

Which again interlinks deconstruction and difference to nothing, with no limits, parameters or rules.

"The ontology of presence is the ontology of beings and beingness. Everywhere, the dominance of beings is solicited by difference—in the sense that sollicitare means, in old Latin, to shake all over, to make the whole tremble. What is questioned by the thought of difference, therefore, is the determination of being in presence, or in beingness. Such a question could not arise and be understood without the difference between Being and beings opening up somewhere. The first consequence of this is that difference is not. It is not a being-present, however excellent, unique, principal, or transcendent one makes it. It commands nothing, rules over nothing, and nowhere does it exercise any authority. It is not marked by a capital letter. Not only is there no realm of difference, but difference is even the subversion of every realm. This is obviously what makes it threatening and necessarily dreaded by everything in us that desires a realm, the past or future presence of a realm. And it is always in the name of a realm that, believing one sees it ascend to the capital letter, one can reproach it for wanting to rule." (p.153, Derrida 1973)

### **File (a): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

"Specters of Marx" (p.6-10, 89-92), "Dissemination", "Echographies of Television", "Deconstruction of Actuality", "Speech And Phenomena", "Heidegger: The Question of Being & History", and "The Spatial Arts";

by Jacques Derrida

<https://sharifabraham.com/media/pages/blog/the-spatial-arts-an-interview-with-jacques-derrida/2300827f57-1602456532/the-spatial-arts-interview-with-j.-derrida.pdf>

<https://www.radicalphilosophy.com/interview/jacques-derrida>

## **Metaconverting & Pata-Hinges: Postmodern Nihilism, The Sublime, Transformers & Gorgias' Kettle**

These aporias are innumerable due to the formlessness of the (postmodern) Sublime as traced by Lyotard when tracing the deconstruction of judgment and the “subject”.



“The effect of sensation's recurrence with every occurrence of (conscious) thought is that thinking “knows” the state (without cognizing it, but sensation is a representation with consciousness, a perception) in which it finds itself in this occurrence. Sensation is thus able to pass through the different spheres of thought that the critique distinguishes. Sensation is there on the occasion of any object that thought can think, wherever it may be in the “field” of possible knowledge. For sensation never takes place except on the occasion of a thought. The differences that have allowed a hierarchy to exist between the simple “dwelling place” of an object of thought in relation to a “territory” in which its knowledge is possible, and a “realm” in which thought legislates a priori (12—13; 9—10), do not prevent thought from being able to feel itself on every occasion. Thought must still be able to feel itself as it relates to objects in the “unbounded . . . field” (13; 11) of the supersensible, even if one only finds in it Ideas of reason about whose objects one can have no theoretical cognition (ibid.). One might contend that this transitivity is assured from the moment that one has presupposed one mind, one thought, one subject, and that, therefore, reflection is nothing more in the end than the predicate of one of these entities. So that the recurrence of sensation would only translate, in succession, the permanence of a substrate. This objection raises nothing less than the question of the subject in Kantian thought. We will come back to this. But as to the presupposition of a substrate “bearer” of sensation, the refutation of such a hypothesis is simple. If there is a substrate in Kantian thought, it exists as the regulative Idea, for the substrate is the supersensible about which we have no knowledge (213—15; 203—5). The idea that we have of it cannot even be unique, for it must be suited to each of the antinomies proper to the three highest faculties that are the object of the critique. To represent this substrate one needs not one but three Ideas: that of the “supersensible of nature in general,” that of a “subjective finality of nature cognitive faculties,” and that of a finality of freedom in with the finality in the moral sphere (215; 20', see Chapter 8 215—18). It is striking that little mention is made of a subject in the majority of Kant's texts that touch on reflection. In general the ceptions are to be found in the Introduction. Whatever the case may be, the notion of a “subject” in its substantive form does not seem necessary to the understanding of what reflection is. The notion of actual thought (in the sense evoked above) is sufficient. On the contrary, the adjectival or adverbial forms, “subjective,” “subjectively,” abound in these texts. They do not designate an instance, subjectivity, to which sensation refers. They allow one to distinguish the information that sensation provides thought from the information that a knowledge of the object brings thought. We have read (59; 57) that Kant places sensation in a kind of symmetry with the schema. The parallel is quickly abandoned, for schema makes knowledge possible, whereas sensation provides no knowledge at all. However, something of the symmetry may be preserved: just as the schema unites the two faculties, imagination and understanding, in order to make knowledge of an object possible—on the side of the object, so to speak—so sensation is sign of their union (pleasure) or of their disunion (displeasure), *on the occasion* of an object and on the side of thought. In both cases, it is indeed a relation between the same faculties. It is nevertheless a fact that the schema is determinant of the object knowledge, and the sensation is a simple sign for thought of the state of thinking of this object. The sign provides an indication of this state every time that thought thinks. One could say that thought is reflected there, on the condition that one accepts a reflection without representation in the modern sense of the word (Freud, for example, conceives of affect as a “representative” without representation). In order to account for this disposition, Kant introduces the notion of a

supplementary faculty—rather neglected until now, especially in its "tautological" aspect—the simple capacity to feel pleasure or displeasure. It has no more need than do the other faculties of referring back to a substantial "subject." In critical thought, these other faculties are, after all, or should simply be sets of conditions that make synthetic judgments possible a priori. As to its logical implication, a faculty can be reduced to a group of "primary" propositions that are a priori conditions: the definition of thinkable objects, the axioms of the syntheses that can be performed on them. What Kant calls the "territory" or the "realm" of the faculty corresponds to what the logician calls the domain of application of a set of axioms (*mutatis mutandis*. . . ).

"Subjective" always determines a state of thought (of "mind," one could say, although the *Gemiit* of *Gemiitszustand* [*Geisteszustand*] is more of a sentimental mode than it is a *Geist*). The term "subjective" forces the critique to question what thinking feels when it thinks and what it cannot fail to feel in every case or, as Kant writes, on all occasions. If one can speak of the occurrence of sensation in all of the uses of thinking, let there be no mistake: this occurrence is but the insistence of a shadow thrown by a certain actual thought on itself, and not the persistence of a substantial predicate attached to "thinking." In sensation, the faculty of judging judges subjectively, that is, it reflects the state of pleasure or displeasure in which actual thought feels itself to be. This almost elementary characteristic on which the deduction of the subjective universality of taste will lean comes to light in aesthetic judgment. This is because, in the case of aesthetic judgment, judgment has no objective validity, and the faculty of judging has, in effect, only to judge a state of pleasure or of displeasure, which is by this time already the judgment. The "Subjective"

The second observation relates to what the first implied as to the nature of an aesthetic temporality. I can only begin to outline it here, for the latter certainly merits a study of its own. An indispensable element of this study lies in the analysis of the pleasure experienced in taste from the perspective of the faculties of knowledge in general. There is a certain minimalism to the apriori condition of pleasure provided by the beautiful: "Now the concepts in a judgment constitute its content (what belongs to the cognition of the object). But the judgment of taste is not determinable by means of concepts. Hence it can only have its ground in the subjective formal condition of a judgment in general. The subjective condition of all judgments is the judging faculty itself, or judgment" (143; 136-37). Here we see why the "deduction" of the judgment of taste is "so easy": "It is spared the necessity of having to justify the objective reality of a concept" (147; 141). This minimalism on the side of the faculties of knowledge prevents pleasure from being attributed to a subject. On the contrary it leads to an analysis of the part played by the two other faculties, imagination and understanding, in the "state" of thought that is pleasure. The nuance of this state or that in which this state consists is to be found in the relation of these faculties to one another outside of any cognitive aim. The analytic of the judgment of taste makes this clear under the double heading of quantity and modality. We will come back to the use of categories in this analysis (see pp. 43—49 and Chapter 2). If taste is not to lapse into the particularity and contingency of a determined empirical agreeableness, one should be able to discover in it a universality and a necessity, despite its wholly "subjective" nature. We know the solution given to this problem by the analytic: a judgment of the beautiful is not immediately universal, but it immediately "imputes" (*sinnt*. . . *an*), "waits for" (*erwartet*), "promises itself" (*sich verspricht*) (56—57 t.m.; 54) a subjective universality in the name of a *Gemeingültigkeit*, of a universal validity (54; 52). This for its quantity. For its modality, the judgment of taste unites, in a necessary way, the "favor"

(Gunst: 49; 47) that distinguishes it from other delights with the form judged beautiful: this form cannot fail to please. But this necessity cannot be demonstrated, nor can it be anticipated by a reasoning. It is said to "exemplary" (exemplarisch: 81; 78) because judgment, in the singularity of its occurrence on the contingent occasion of an object's form, only gives the "example of a universal rule that one cannot formulate [die man nicht angeben kann]" (ibid., t.m.). This form cannot fail to please."  
(p.13-16, Lyotard 1994)

We retrace a series of abysses with all this not only those of the archipelago of differends, language games and phrase regimes (like the "subject" or reflection) but the abyssal incommensurable gaps between them. Again tied back to the antinomy both pataphysicians and deconstructors play on, that of the imploded yes/no.

"I have chosen the example of the sublime judgment because it responds clearly, that is, negatively, to the question of the possibility of a subject and an aesthetic temporality (both sublime) constituted according to the model of the Ich denke and the temporality required for theoretical thinking. There seems to be no question that the most elementary conditions (the syntheses of time) for the synthesis of a Selbst are lacking here. Yet this failing does not in the least prevent the feeling of the sublime from being a feeling, that is, a "sensation" by which a thought, reflective in this case, is made aware of its state. This state is certainly complex, ambivalent as to the quality of the judgment that is made about the object, for thinking says both "yes" and "no" to the latter, according and refusing the object its "favor": thinking is both "attracted" (angezogen) and "repelled" (abgestoßen: 91; SS). It remains that "the judgment itself [that is, the sublime feeling all the while steadfastly preserves its aesthetic character, because it represents, without being grounded on any definite concept of the object, merely the subjective play of the mental powers" (107; 103). I conclude that the properties that prevent the deduction of a sublime subject are the same ones that allow the sublime to be maintained in the order of the "subjective." The "subjective" can and must persist as the sensation of itself that accompanies any act of thinking the instant it occurs. This it must do even when the most elementary synthesis required by knowledge, that of a minimal apprehension of the givens in a single instantaneous grasp, is no longer assured by the imagination, the faculty whose responsibility it is to ensure this apprehension. In such a case where this synthesis is wanting in the order of determination, the lack of synthesis is felt just as strongly in the order of reflection. This is the case because the only synthesis relevant for reflection is the synthesis that puts the faculties at work in thinking in contact with each other. If imagination succumbs in its duel with reason, it is signaled in and as a "state" of thought; it is felt. It is a displeasure. When it is a matter of taste, the relation between partners is good, well proportioned, and "free" because it is not subject to the legality of understanding that constrains the imagination by schematism and principles to prepare the givens for their subsumption under concepts. This freedom is manifest in the gentle, reciprocal emulation between the faculty of concepts and the faculty of presentation, without the former taking over with its "surfeited" excess (89; 85) of order (of geometry, for example), or the latter with a fantasy so uncontrolled it would escape all subjective finality (85—88; 82—84). This euphonic disposition (to motif of Stimme) is examined in the analysis of taste from the spectre of the relation, which, here, is finality (61—81; 58-77). This finality is subjective in that it puts the components of the thinking of the beautiful, that is, of

imagination and understanding, gether in such a way as to suggest their accord. Thus it is, I repeat, that one "subject," a subject, that is, one is promised. To say on the contrary that the relation of the faculties question in the sublime feeling—imagination and reason—is cacophonous does not change the general disposition that places any aesthetic on the side of the "subjective" or reflective judgment. It seems the feeling must be the opposite of what it is in taste for what is felt in the sublime is not the proper proportion in the free play of the two faculties that are being exercised, but their disproportion and even their incommensurability: an "abyss" (Abgrund) separates them. An abyss that repels and attracts an imagination (107; 103) is enjoined to present the absolute. The paradox of Kant's analysis (which here, no matter what he says, closely follows Burke's analysis of delight) is that it discerns in this cacophony a secret euphony of superior rank (see Chapter 5). However, the partners have also changed; reason has been placed by understanding in the challenge to imagination, and because of this another finality is revealed in the ruins of the agreement of the faculties that made the beautiful pleasurable. Due to the change of imagination's partner, a conflict, which at first appears to be merely "mathematical" in the antithetical first Critique, turns into a "dynamical" conflict. From a conflict in which reflection dismisses both parties with its double "no": neither of you, neither one nor the other, has any legitimacy to what you claim—we move to a conflict in which it credits both of them with a double "yes": imagination is justified in trying to present the unrepresentable and in not being able to succeed; reason is right to demand that it make this vain effort, because reason here is practical and the Idea to be presented is unconditioned causality, freedom, which constitutively requires its present realization but also constitutes the supreme "destination" of the mind (see Chapter 7, pp. 171—73). Thus the question of whether the subject of the sublime is the same as the subject of the beautiful makes no sense. There cannot be a subject as synthesis, as container, or as agent of sublime feeling any more than there can be a subject of taste. To say that the sublime feeling is subjective means that it is a reflective judgment and as such has no claim to the objectivity of a determinant judgment. It is subjective in that it judges the state of feeling, and judges according to the state of feeling, in a tautegorical fashion. As with taste, the filtering of the analysis of this aesthetic judgment through the categories allows one to determine a concept of this "state." The procedure reveals the degree to which the unity of the faculties is precarious, lost almost—this is the component of anguish in this feeling. The "aptitude" for Ideas of reason must be developed in order for the perspective of a unity to reemerge from the disaster and, to say it simply, for a sublime feeling to be possible. This is its component of elevation that makes it similar to moral respect. Taste promises everyone the happiness of an accomplished subjective unity; the sublime speaks to a few of another unity, much less complete, ruined in a sense, and more "noble" (edel: 125; 120). By recalling these various predicates, one is painting shades, the nuances of feeling; one is not constructing a subject. In the singularity of its occurrence, aesthetic feeling is pure subjective thinking or reflective judgment itself. For Kant, what one calls the subject is either the subjective aspect of thinking, and as such consists entirely in the category that makes feeling the sign, for thought, of its state, thus the sign of feeling itself because the "state" of thinking is feeling; or else the subject is only a ground zero where the synthesis of concepts is suspended (in the first Critique) or is the ever receding horizon of the faculties' synthesis (in the third Critique). In both ideas the paralogisms of which the first that reflexively attach themselves to a transcendental one is not careful (KRV, 328-83; 370—436). It is precisely (re)lection, using the subjective state as a

guide for thinking, feeling that accompanies it in all its acts, that one can locate this appearance and restore all proper domiciliations. And when the act of thinking is directed at the subject, it is with reflection again that one can critique the notion of 'subject.'"  
(p.22-26, Lyotard 1994)

Lyotard in "Driftworks" gives us more examples of gestural deconstruction. This mention of Heizer we homaged after our APT Fest transmedia game (aka a 'So-Called-Whatever' as mentioned in "A Mere Outline") absolute event simulation that was live-streamed in 2013 untitled "The Reemergence of the Absolute Event", where after smashing a litany of various items from various mediums and dumping them in a trash can, wrapping them up in plastic and then digging a trench similar to Heizer's "Double Negative" in a random someone's front yard/trash area and suspending the trash can in the trench like Heizer's "Levitated Mass" to get possibly unwrapped like Home's "The One And The Many" (as mentioned in "Hypermakes").

"The function of the artist, from then on, is no longer to produce good forms, new good forms, but on the contrary deconstruct them systematically and to accelerate their obsolescence... from an experimental point of view, because an attempt is made to deconstruct the traditional space of sculpture and to invert it; what Heizer produces is a sunk carving on the earth itself. Maybe this is why he has to work in the countryside [...] because he starts from this primary hypothesis. So, in spite of the fact that the social effect is nil, it is an interesting attempt, one example of a deconstruction among thousands of others, Surrealism having been a mere episode from this point of view, nothing more [...] Only from this point of view though, I insist."  
(p.26-27, Lyotard, 1984).

Lyotard then fully interlinks this gestural deconstruction to what Baudrillard would claim as transaesthetics (again more ramifications for potential transmedia game experiments in deconstruction).

"——But is deconstruction an action? ——Yes, you've just raised the right question: does politics ultimately consist in producing organizations which could replace those currently in power, after having destroyed them on the one hand, and, on the other, is what the artistic deconstruction produces an action? The two questions are linked. I believe it is absolutely obvious today, and has been for quite some time that, for one thing, the reconstitution of traditional political organizations, even if they present themselves as ultra-leftist organizations is bound to fail, for these settle precisely into the order of the social surface, they are "recovered," they perpetuate the type of activity the system has instituted as political, they are necessarily alienated, ineffective. The other thing is that all the deconstructions which could appear as aesthetic formalism, "avant-garde" research, etc., actually make up the only type of activity that is effective, this because it is functionally—the word is very bad, ontologically would be better and more straightforward—located outside the system; and, by definition, its function is to deconstruct everything that belongs to order, to show that all this "order" conceals something else, that it represses. ——To show that this order is based on no justifiable authority? ——Yes. And this deconstructing activity is a truly radical critical activity for it does not deal with the signifieds of things, but with their plastic organization, their signifying organization. It shows that the problem is not so much that of knowing what a given discourse says, but rather how it is

disposed. It shows that it is active on account of its very disposition, its configuration, and that the deconstruction of its disposition is going to reveal all of its mystifying content.” (p.29-30., Lyotard, 1984).

Lyotard interlinks all of this to the postmodern nihilism of, for example, what he calls Cage’s “events” (evoking George Brecht’s ‘events’).

“What is needed is a “practice” (a word probably devoid of meaning as soon as it no longer refers to a “subject”), a practice that is not dominated, without domain, without domus, without the cupola of the Duomo of Florence in Brunelleschi’s little box, but also the vessel of the Ark of the Covenant that contains the stone tablets. Without arche: and even without an-arche, Daniel Charles! To interpret Cage with Levinas, or even Heidegger, is to persevere within nihilism. When Cage says: there is no silence, he says: no Other holds dominion over sound, there is no God, no Signifier as principle of unification or composition. There is no filtering, no set blank spaces, no exclusions; neither is there a work anymore, no more limits #1 to determine musicality as a region. We make music all the time, “no sooner finish one than begin making another just as people keep on washing dishes, brushing their teeth, getting sleepy and so on: noise, noise, noise. The wisest thing to do is to open one’s ears immediately, and hear a sound suddenly before one’s thinking has a chance to turn into something logical, abstract, or symbolical.” (4 Year From Monday, “Julliard Lecture”) Thus, liquidate, liquify limit #1, the element that selects what is musical, that results in there being thus-and-so sounds to listen to and thus-and-so ears capable of listening to them (these ears can, for example—and it’s a sign of their capacities—treat themselves to seats, good seats, the seats of princes, inside a concert hall). To destroy limit #1 is to establish all noise as sound, body noise, the unheard-of noises of the social “body.” Silence is displaced: it is no longer the composer’s, the signifier’s, Jehovah’s silence that must remain unheard, be effaced, but silence as noise-sound of the involuntary body, the noise-sound of the libido wandering over bodies, “nature,” that must be heard. A critical political party also inhabits the silence of the signifier, the silence of domination; it considers the surface of experience as appearance, mere symptom, and even if it decides not to take power, power is already taken by it to the extent that it repeats this device of appearance and effacement, of theater, of politics as a domain. Even should “tonal resolution” be deferred endlessly, this party will be a tragic political party, it will be the negative dialectic of the Aufklärung; it is the Frankfurt School, demythologized, Lutheran, nihilistic Marxism. The answer is not spontaneism: for “sounds are not men,” says Cage, libidinal flows are not men, freedom is not someone’s freedom, activity is not expression. Spontaneism still maps energetic commutations back onto a memory, a subject, an identity. It still belongs to theatricality (the “nature” it invokes is the sole subject of Western theater: its “outside”). I don’t know what the answer is. The question is: what is the silence off capital, its silence as a composer and stage director? First answer: it is the law of value, the single rule, i.e. the exchangeability of equal quantities (of labor?). Now, this law allows; encourages dissonances: the most diverse objects (sonorous and other) find their rate of exchange in this composition as long as they are exchangeable (sale-able). No need for us to cry over that, we do not want more order, a music that is more tonal, more unified, or more rich and elegant. We want less order, more circulation by chance, by free wandering: the abolition of the law of value, which constitutes the body of Capital as a surface to puncture, as appearance. Second answer: Daniel Buren writes

concerning Documenta 5 (Kassel, 1972), "More and more the subject of an exhibition tends not to be the exhibition of works of art, but the exhibition of the exhibition as a work of art (...). The work today serves only as a decorative gadget for the survival of the museum as painting, painting whose author is none other than the organizer of the exhibition himself." Transposed to Kapital: it is production no longer of products, but of productions; consumption no longer of objects, but of consumptions; music no longer of sounds, but of musics. So that the question is: the silence heard in noise, Immediately, suddenly, is it not still dominated by the unheard silence of the Komposer-organizer, capital? Kapital, is it not the stage director scene? Destroy the work, but also destroy the work of works and kapitalism as museum, as memory of everything that is possible. De-memorize, like the unconscious."  
(p.108-110, Lyotard, 1984).

In "Duchamp's Transformers" Lyotard makes a crucial connection in Duchamp that emphasizes the spinning bar of both Lyotard's libidinal band of demarcation and Baudrillard's deconstruction of the slash/bar between binaries like signifier/signified. Again the pataphysical syzygy of all of this is touched on by Genosko as these are both manifestation of Jarry's/Ubu's bâton-à-physique or "physic stick", that of the 4D "meta- or patahinge" that divides the "Large Glass".  
"3. Examples: A hinge in logic would be a paradoxical operator, its minimum property would be to stand in the way of one of the great operators of congruence, for example implication (if p, then q), which is the very serious logical causality. Would it be the case for an inclusive disjunction: and / or? Monsieur Marceland/or Mademoiselle Rose. Door (of the rue Larrey) open and/or closed. If man, then nonwoman; but: if man and / or woman, what then? The and/or hinge appears to affirm the symmetry and the incongruence of the two terms. An equivalent in the theory of modalities might be: it is contingent that it be necessary that . ("the irony of having chosen [contingency]" the primitive body or object, which inevitably [necessity] becomes according to this perspective [or other conven. .") (DDS, 55) A temporal equivalent: a current future taken as a current past; theme of speed in Duchamp, and its "solution" sought on the side of "a time 3 dim, etc." (DDS, 130) A deontic equivalent: if is obligatory to permit everything. Etc.  
4. Pertinence of the hinge for Duchamp, it sustains the tale and above all the spatial device of The Bride See in DDS, 130—137, all the "analogisms" of the passage from the 3- to the 4-dimensional with that from the 2- to the 3- : a rectangle turning like a hinge engenders a cylinder; imagine the hinge-plane of a volume (3-dim) engendering by rotation a 4-dim figure. The two transversals of glass that separate the Bachelor region and the Bride region are also generators of this sort. "Make a hinge-picture." (DDS, 42) 5. Instruction: Here it is a question of a meta- or a patahinge..."  
(p.128-129, Lyotard, 1990).

Lyotard in "The Differend" fully explores the nihilistic logical paradox of Gorgias from "On Not-Being"...

"Gorgias

In its form, the argumentation establishing reality follows the nihilist reasoning of Gorgias in On Not-Being: "Nothing is; and even if it is, it is unknowable; and even if it is and is knowable, it cannot be revealed to others" (Anonymous 979 a 12). The framework of the argumentation (its taxis) rests on the concession granted the opponent. Let's call him x. X says: there is

something. — Gorgias: there is nothing at all. X answers: there is something, and that something is apprehensible. — Gorgias: if there were something, that something would not be apprehensible (akatalépton anthropō, writes Sextus, 65). X continues: this something which is and which is apprehensible is able to be conveyed to others. — Gorgias: it is not able to be conveyed to others (anexoīs/on hétéro, writes Sextus, 83; oistos, the verbal adjective of phero, to carry; for his part, the Anonymous text says: "even if they [realities] were knowable, how, he says, could someone make them manifest to another?"). It is a matter of logical retreat (concession), as in — what Freud calls the "piece of sophistry" about the kettle. The plaintiff x declares that he lent to the accused (Gorgias) an undamaged kettle which was returned to him with a hole in it. The dialectical argumentation is: x: borrowed. — Gorgias: not borrowed. x: borrowed undamaged. Gorgias: borrowed with a hole in it already. x: borrowed undamaged and returned with a hole in it. — Gorgias: returned undamaged (Freud, 1905: 62). Even if there is a reality (borrowed), it is not predictable (undamaged/with a hole in it); and if it is, the case corresponding to the attribute cannot be shown (returned with a hole in it/returned undamaged). The logical retreat, absurd when it is isolated from the course of the prosecution's argumentation, unveils the rules for the family of cognitive phrases: determination of the referent (kettle borrowed or not), attribution of a predicate to the subject of the utterance (borrowed with a hole in it or not), display of a case which proves conclusively (returned with a hole in it or not). Note that, in this trial, Gorgias pleads for the defense. Barbara Cassin has shown that he is "defending" the thesis of Parmenides. He tries to make an argument for it instead of sticking to its divine revelation by the goddess, and he thereby ruins the thesis: "It is possible (ouk esti) neither to be nor not to be." This is his conclusion, and here is how it is reasoned: "For if Not-Being is Not-Being [which is what Parmenides writes], just as much as the existent, then the non-existent would be: in fact, the non-existent is non-existent as the existent is existent, such that actual things (ta pragmata) are, no more than they are not" (979 a 25ff.). He adds: "But then if Not-Being is, its opposite, Being, is not. In fact, if Not-Being is, it makes sense that Being is not." So nothing would be, either because Being and Not-Being are the same thing, or because they are not. If they are, it is because Being is Not-Being; if they are not, it is because Being is not Not-Being, and is only affirmed through a double negation. Gorgias thus anticipates Hegel's argumentation in the first chapter of the Science of Logic. What Hegel calls "becoming" in order to name the Resultat immanent to his argumentation, Gorgias calls "neither Being nor Not-Being." He "ignores" the rule of the result (Hegel Notice) which is the mainspring of speculative dialectics. This rule presupposes the finality of a Self (a sort of Aristotelian god), who could not hold out against the Gorgian refutation. In constructing itself, the logos, the argument, ruins the demonic phrase, the revelation upon which Parmenides' poem opens. This argument does not refute that phrase, it turns it into a family of phrases. Ontology, poesis, is permitted, it is a genre. This genre does not have the same rules as the dialectical genre (in the Greek sense). Specifically, the goddess is not an interlocutor subject to the rules of refutation. It suffices for Parmenides to indicate two paths available to thought, that of Being and that of Not-Being, for Gorgias to turn them into a thesis and an antithesis argued by partners in a dialectic from which the goddess is absent and to have them refute each other. The duality of paths is intolerable to ontology, it implies contrariness and authorizes a negative dialectic. The dialectic obeys rules. (Aristotle gave himself the task of establishing them, especially in the Topics and the Sophistical Refutations. ) Whatever they may be, and no matter how hard it is to establish them, however,



these rules presuppose in themselves a kind metaprinciple. Barbara Cassin (who calls it arch-origin) disengages it from the mostly reported Treatise by offering an original interpretation of a disputed phrase nothing is therefore, then demonstrations say everything without exception (ei mén oun oudén, tas apodeixeis légein hapanta)" (980 a 9). It is from this simultaneously nihilistic and logological standpoint that we receive and study the question of reality. Reality is bestowed by some goddess at the tip of her index finger, it has to be "demonstrated," that is, argued and presented as a case, and, once established, it is a state of the referent for cognitive phrases. This state does not preclude that, simply put, "nothing is." Just as for Wittgenstein, color serves Gorgias as a paradigm for the question of reality. Phrases like "To begin with, he does not say a color but a saying" (980 b 5), or 'There is neither a conceiving (dianoesthai) nor a seeing of color, no more than there is of sound, there is only hearing" (980 b 6) are to be placed next to "For looking does not teach us anything about the concepts of colors"; or "Imagine a tribe of color-blind people, and there could easily be one. They would not have the same color concepts as we do. For even assuming they speak, e. g. , English, and thus have all the English color words, they would still use them differently than we do and would learn their use differently. Or if they have a foreign language, it would be difficult for us to translate their color words into ours.' Or: "We do not want to establish a theory of color (neither a physiological one nor a psychological one), but rather the logic of color concepts. And this accomplishes what people have often unjustly expected of a theory" (Wittgenstein, 1950—51: 1 72, 1 13, 1 22)." (p.14-16, Lyotard 1988)

Meanwhile Lyotard in "Postmodern Fables" gives us examples for navigating the aforementioned nihilistic logic of abyssal language games, phrase regimes, and differends including the abysses of the incommensurable gaps between them that of substitutive litigation that operates off the suspension by quotation and the heterogeneity of games (lack of) ends. The examples given below (tennis balls, or as chess pieces/board, or playing cards, or bits of fabric) were each turned into pataphorical hypermades as a part of our transmedia games for the (Post-Card Game Jam) pseudo-event texts (including where they languished a part of the pataphysical "auction house" and later hyperreal "nothing museum" the Transfactory) where they got featured in the "Pata-Post-Post-Untitled'(s)" pdf catalogue that was sent out anonymously via Luxury Transmedia Blockchain to troll and seduce a myriad of figures including those from the underground, academia, pop-mainstream and millionaire/billionaire collectors for the virtual collection, while the of the four untitled hypermades two (the "[Indifference] Playing Cards" and the "[Differend] Tennis Balls") were brought to Neoism 40 as featured in "Travels In Neolon".

"This is what I would respond: there is a philosophical reason a priori for a litigation to be substituted for a differend. and there is a philosophical reason a priori for that substitution to leave intact language's potential for differends. The first reason stems from the ability of every sentence to put itself or let itself be placed between quotation marks. This ability is the very one use (if I may be allowed his word too) in discussion, among many others, as I hope I showed at the beginning. The second reason stems from the ability every sentence has to be linked with another according to heterogeneous ends. As Wittgenstein says, you can play tennis, chess, or bridge. The same is true for language: you can "play" at the true, the just, or the beautiful. You could say that every game has the same end, that of winning. But this is false. All by herself, a

child play with pieces of fabric, with no particular end in mind. Writers, too, with their fabrics of language. Comparing genres with games is only valid, obviously, if we admit that the same words or the same sentences can be treated sometimes as tennis balls, or as chess pawns, or playing cards, or bits of fabric. This being the case, the question of translating one sentence into another, I repeat, poses no particular problem (unless it be that of translation itself, which is an immense one. Maybe it's the most obscure language game of all). But translating the "employment" of a sentence with one aim into its employment with another is impossible. Mutatis mutandis, you may utilize tennis balls or playing cards or fabrics in the place of chess pieces, but the moves you impress upon the balls used as pawns are not those you impress when you play tennis with them. I refer to these moves as links. They are nothing more than modes of associating words or sentences. But these modes are heterogeneous. It is false to bring them all back to varieties of rhetoric, or to confuse them with the grammar of a language. Let's accept now that you are beginning to play with the tennis balls in someone's company. You are surprised to observe that this other person does not seem to be playing tennis with these balls, as you thought, but is treating them more like chess pieces. One or the other of you complains that "that's not how you play the game." There is a differend. When I ask what is the tribunal that will judge the complaint, I am doing nothing more than following out the metaphor already implied in the very term differend. You must not object, as Rorty does, that I am invoking a judge armed with "pre-established criteria. There are such judges only for a game whose rules have been more or less fixed, after the fact, of course, such as chess or tennis. But under the circumstances, you and your partner must decide what game you are playing or wish to play with the balls. This is as far as the comparison goes. For balls do not talk balls. But words and sentences can be taken in reference and also refer to their mode of linking. Language, we tell ourselves, is self-referential. You ask the other what game he or she is playing. Democratic liberalism intervenes then. It declares that it is a good thing for the other to respond and for the discussion to be engaged. In the absence of your interlocution, your partner continuing to play his/her game and you yours, you will not be able to continue to play together. I agree with this. In exploring the nature of the game that you and your partner intend to play, you situate this game as a reference to your discussion (you make a "referral"). Litigation replaces your differend, and you are able to come to an agreement about the way to proceed. But it remains to be proved that it is always better to play together. With their bit of fabric, the little girl and the writer invent or discover many things. The question of Einsamkeit loneliness needs to be taken up again in terms that far exceed the way in which Wittgenstein interrogates private language. To return to my own for a moment, you might object that the writer and the little girl are solitary only as "individuals," but that, in their intimacy, several partners, conscious or not, are engaged in their play, and that they are thus having an internal discussion. But what do we know? We can say they are discussing on the inside only if we postulate that the dissent between intimate partners never exceeds litigation. That is to say, only if we admit that the little girl and the writer suffer only hesitations or contradictions that can be solved by an inner debate. This is what the very notion of the individual presupposes. I suppose that this can take place in effect. But there is no reason a priori to eliminate the other case, which is that of a differend between intimate partners. Resituated on the "outside," the latter case would be more or less as follows: you are playing tennis with the balls, your partner is playing a game you don't know with them. You ask what it is that he/she is playing, he/she doesn't answer you. What is it

reasonable to do? I think what is reasonable is to try to learn the other's game. This is what the little girl and the writer are doing within their respective differends. Writers try to arrange words and sentences as they presume their mute "interlocutor" arranges them. This is called writing, and I could say as much for thought. If something new surfaces as the event of a work within thought or writing, this can only be within this pragmatic disorder. By disorder, I mean only this: that none of the conditions for a free discussion, whether intra- or interindividual, about an identified object is met. In this sense, one can speak of violence. Violence does not at all consist of the presence of police officers in the room who would constrain one of the interlocutors to accept, under threat, the thesis or game of the other. Violence stems from this dilemma: either you reject the unknown game of your partner, you even reject the fact that it is a game, you exclude it, pick up your balls, and seek a valid interlocutor; and this is a violence done to the event and to the unknown of such a kind that you stop writing or thinking; or else, you do violence to yourself in trying to learn the moves that you don't know and that your silent partner imposes upon the balls, I mean upon the words and sentences. This is called the violence of learning to think or write, which is implied in every education. I believe this violence is inevitable, because I believe the encounter with this bizarre partner is inevitable. Moreover, I believe this encounter to be constitutive, on the same level that the encounter with an unnameable addressee is inevitable for a work. It is even plausible that this addressee and this partner are one and the same. But what do we know? All of this, you, my interlocutors, are quite able to understand, we can have a discussion about it, elaborate it together, and perhaps arrive at a consensus about that other. We can come to agreement on such sentences as: "Yes, there is a bizarre partner; yes, there is an unnameable addressee," etc. But this assent is possible only because that partner, that addressee, that other is precisely not ours while we are discussing. The discussion eliminates that other a priori, since it is not an interlocutor. The discussion can only admit it as a third person, as that about which we discuss. This is what I call placing between quotation marks. We cite that other to come forth (*comparaître*). But, at the very moment we are dealing with that other, in writing or in thinking, it in no way comes forth (*comparaît*): it barely even shows forth (*paraît*) and is barely even in our company (*compagnie*). How can we be liberal democrats with such an other? Consequently, I conclude that it is not more reasonable to make the order of litigation rule over the disorder of the differend, than vice versa. Increasing the capacity to discuss is good; an increasing possibility to the event is just as good. I leave for the reader to draw from this conclusion that fashion he/she judges appropriate to deal with trans-Atlantic relations. As for me, I think the "mainland" Rorty wishes for is not desirable in itself. It would be, it already is, occupied by the Empire of meta-conversation, by communicational pragmatics. Keeping watch over our archipelago seems to me to be a wiser disposition. I'm talking about heterogeneous "games" or "genres" of discourse. In America as in Europe, the secret ocean that bathes them is the language of reflection." (p.142-147, Lyotard, 1997)

Whereas in "Libidinal Economy" interlinks deconstruction, the parergon, the frame and Gödel's theorem altogether while contextualizing the group 'Support-Surface'.

"The abstract does not act through a simulacrum-effect, but by means of the organization of its material alone. Now this is precisely the merit claimed by theory, that it advances no illusion or ideology. This claim was obeyed by, for example, the strategy of 'material decomposition', which

the group 'Support-Surface', in its time, applied to pictorial simulacra: exhibiting frames, canvases, uniform coloured stamps, reels of lightweight wood or tarlatan twisted into the shape of a Moebian band and left lying on the ground, creating in sensible space the exact equivalent of a set of axioms for paintings in the space of language; these were supposed to be nothing other than acceptable statements, as defined by this axiomatic, within its lexis and syntax. And, in fact, Dezeuze and Cane, under the title 'For a Pictorial Theoretical Programme', formulated the theoretical discourse corresponding to those exhibits. One cannot, of course, say the same for all abstract painters, of whom the 'Support-Surface' group was in any case no less critical than they were of figurative art. Nevertheless, the libidinal dispositif is noticeable in every abstraction, and in particular of the theoretical kind, in that it thwarts the client's transference onto a simulated object, onto a reference. Transference can only bear on the material and its arrangement; is this correct? is it authorized? is this statement acceptable? 'These become the 'right' questions, the same ones you ask us, theoreticians, and which we question in turn. Questions full of the concern for truth, full of justice and guilt. What does the theoretical text offer its fascinated client? An impregnable body, like a thief, a liar, an imposter who can never be caught. Everything stated in this text is in principle capable of being derived from its set of axioms. A text which is utterly consistent within its own terms and can be derived from itself by explicit procedures, a wide-open organic body, which the client is supposed to be able to go through without the solution of continuity, repeating it or replying to it without error; a body which tolerates no errancy, which defines the apparatuses of exclusion and channels of implication. Every statement formed within it has right on its side: the client may in principle derive it from the others. Nice tautological body of the theoretical text, without any external reference, without a risky interior region where roads and tracks may be lost, a model sealed up in its blank identity, exposing itself to repetition. The theoretical text is a model, something to imitate, which has itself its own model to imitate, its set of axioms; and this set has its own, properly formalist, model. And rather than seeking to show that the closure of models is impossible (Gödel's theorem), and that there is always a primary opacity of the symbol, of ordinary language, one would do better to identify this return to the same as a dispositif of the passions, no more nor less so than the return to the origin with which hermeneutics would like to contrast it. In both cases it is semiotic; the operation bears only on the relations between signs. Let's rather comprehend this model according to its force. This force is revealed in its expansion through mimesis. The mannequin (mannekin, little man) presents collection models. It transports the jubilation of the repetition of the same, jouissance through serial reproduction." (p.258-259, Lyotard 1993)

Lyotard also brings us back to the interlinks between Cage, Zen and nihilism while situating this all a part of the libidinal band as non-place.

"Let's observe, however, that these problematics are in fact dominated by precisely that which does not, in any way, hang over Taoist thought, even less its erotics: the category of the subject. For if the Tao is important to us libidinal economists, it is not because of its nihilism, but because of its refinement in the search for and the affirmation of mutability, and thereby the non-existence in it of the question of the subject. Such, precisely, is the other line to follow from P'ong-tsou's response, and it is this that in other respects all of Van Gulik's texts substantiate: the fortification of the man's body, the refinement of his hearing, his vision, his alertness, this

something which, after Zen, as Cage says, leaves everything just as it was before, except that one is three inches above the ground— all that, obtained by means of the retention of semen and the constraint imposed upon it, by means of techniques, whether mental or physical (like the pressure of the middle and index fingers on the seminal duct before emission), to turn back towards the head—all that comes not from nihilism but from intensification. This man couldn't care less about the woman he is sleeping with. The Great Chinese have gynaeceae of a thousand women: hence anonymity. Perhaps, however, the same goes for him. What must he do? Multiply the circulations, the connections, excite the water with the fire burning in his loins, travel [voyager] with extreme reserve, within the tiny margin given by the rules of the books of the *Ars amatoria*. These rules in their minute detail must be understood and practised as those that govern the gestural code, the song, the dance and the music of a Nôh spectacle: they perform the function of a guide only for apprentices for whom they delimit a contrario the field of things not to do. But the great art, as in Taoist erotics, and doubtless as in madness also, consists in turning the whole field they delimit on its head, making it into a sort of non-place which they sweep over rather than circumscribe, and where no-one will never know whether this inclination of the torso, this beat of the tambourine, this gesture of the arm, inclines a little to this side or that side of the rule.”  
(p.217, Lyotard 1993)

Immediately after Lyotard goes even further connecting meta-, nihilism, and the alchemical zero/void that play out further during the deconstruction of Zen/Tao problematics. “And what just a moment ago passed for the refinement of precepts allowing the non-place of the libidinal band to be singled out, now appears, by the moralization of the affair and the nihilism which restricts its range to the central void, to be the simple maximization of energetic profit. It is not because this latter is allegedly cosmological or ontological that it is less interesting or incredible. There is a Taoist trade. This can be clearly seen in the alchemical interpretation that can be given of erotic texts. Nothing is more commercial than alchemy: a trade of the simulacra of affects, a quantification of the puls(at)ions of death and life, a weighing-up of the sexes, for purposes of enrichment, and even for absolute wealth, i.e. gold. It is no surprise that this dispositif is discovered, by means of Lavoisier's balance and its position of equilibrium for exchanges of body-weights, in industry. Taoist erotics, strategy, alchemy, ethics, with their central nihilism, these are so many metaconversions, profoundly analogous to what presides over generalized mercantilism. But there is more, that is, more unimaginative and more directly metaconverted: if the man (for, ultimately, in the majority of texts, it is still the man who vampirizes) practises the coitus reservatus, it is not only to practise Tao, it is also a safeguard, on the other hand, so that all the semen thus accumulated produces beautiful boys and girls, when advisedly released. Of course favourable erotic, atmospheric, seasonal, social conditions are necessary; it remains that what he reserves by his studied priapism, is not only annihilation on the central zero, it is the best propagation on the cycle of Chinese political economy. And so the head which his un-emitted semen climbs towards and collects itself in is not a mystical head, but more bureaucrat. For this head is the head of a family chief, and this chief will be all the more powerful the greater the number of male children he has, and they will be all the more numerous and energetic the more he has hoarded his sperm, and his treasure of sperm will be all the richer the more concubines he has, therefore the richer or more capable he will be, a

military man, a man of high office, of procuring for himself numerous women. In short, through this the woman totally fulfils the function of an energy source (you could say the sun, soil, labour force, waterfall, wind) from which he must appropriate for himself the force that she can provide, by optimizing her yield and transforming her into another form of energy (children here), which in turn, by transmutation, will give a supplement of energy (in this case a large family, many fine male heirs, enabling the extension of the family and its powers and its clientele over the spaces on which the bureaucratic hierarchy is superimposed). A Confucian perspective on reserved coitus, itself a very reserved perspective, which judges Taoist erotics indecent and will repress it. One can indeed see that, at the same time as it is the decline of the vulgarity of power, it is also the reverse side and the complement of the Taoist search for annihilatory intensities.” (p.219-220, Lyotard 1993)

Before we continue we'll remind you that in “Libidinal Economy” Lyotard while claiming affinity for Baudrillard's work does also, like Home but directly, caution against a “Western”/Marxist reading of Baudrillard's simulacrum of the ‘primitive’ for it could indeed lead down that hierarchical racism of Western metaphysics. Lyotard is quick to note that “There are no primitive societies.” Much like the Baudrillard already cited agrees, emphasizing that the only ‘primitive’ is that of the ‘primal’ nullity of the void.

“Let us admit that, in the field of productive labour, the corporation indeed this non-hierarchical body; it remains the case that such a characterization stands only on condition that this field is isolated, separated from the political organization from which it is taken, whether this be Oriental despotism, the free town, the city, or the empire, and—to stay with Greece—on condition that the appearance of speech as political techné is not taken into account, which is equivalent, all things being equal, to a process of cephalization and even of capitalization reducing each manual task to a fragmentation subordinated to the political body. In other words, the head did indeed exist in the age of the corporation, not in the corporation perhaps, but certainly in the ‘social body’. The social body may not be the body of political economy in our age, and the productive body does not perhaps take on the form of the metaconversion of the partial drives (for it is a question of these), it is the political body which effects this metaconversion, but it is no less extant here, and the folding down onto the central Zero, which is not necessarily currency (in Sparta, for example), but always the centre of speech and the sword, sets up no less of a hierarchization of these pulsions and social entities where they give way to free play in a privileged way. This much will be said of a non-political, therefore a ‘primitive’ or a savage society, given that metaconversion does not take place in war and discourse, at least not systematically. What we must take a look at here, beyond an ‘error’ which appeared to be an error of detail, is the fantasy, so powerful and constant in the best Marxist heritage, of a happy state of the working body, this happiness being (in the pure tradition of the West) thought as the self-unity of all its parts. But under examination, this fantasy will be seen to be nothing other than Baudrillard's primitive society in another guise. ‘Symbolic exchange’ is also a political economic exchange, just as the law of civic speaking in Athens, and the tetralogos is also a law of the mercantilization of discourse, and, complementarily, just as the scrupulous fragmentation of tasks in the regulated disciplines implies their subordination to a central Zero which, while not being professional (perhaps), is no less the caput of the alleged social body. There are no primitive societies.”

(p.133, Lyotard 1993)

The hyperreal's map proceeding the territory, from Borges' "On Exactitude in Science", also remains driven by this meta-converting great central Zero of the spinning libidinal band. "The great metaconverter wants stable circuits, equal cycles, predictable repetitions, untroubled accountability. It wants to eliminate every partial pulsion, it wants to immobilize the body. Such is the anxiety of the emperor of whom Borges speaks, who desired a map of the empire so exact that it had to cover the whole territory in every aspect and therefore duplicate its scale exactly, to such an extent that the monarch's subjects spent so much time and used up so much energy in putting the finishing touches to it and maintaining it that the empire 'itself' fell to more and more ruin as its cartographic blueprint became more and more perfect—such is the madness of the great central Zero, its desire to bring a body, which can only 'be' if it is represented, to a standstill. And such is the madness of political economy, recognized in Sraffa's constructs. But this was already the madness of the Little Girl Marx, the desire for a social genitality, into which all the partial pulsions would be reabsorbed, which would have its unity in itself and where the 'truth' of political economy would finally prevail, in this case a reproduction conforming to nature. There is in this desire for 'nature', which is a unitary totality, a furious metaconverting energy."

(p.226, Lyotard 1993)

And in "Heidegger and "the jews"" Lyotard gives us further context on deconstruction as assemblage which overtly plays out with Neoism. "Even the severest apologies, those that deconstruct the Heideggerian text with the care of a true rereading, do not escape this "montage." To deconstruct is also to "stage, assemble." I am sure that Jacques Derrida would agree: to assemble by disassembling."

(p.56, Lyotard, 1990).

### **File (0): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

"Lessons on the Analytic of the Sublime", "Libidinal Economy", "Duchamp's Transformers", "Driftworks", "Heidegger and "the jews"", "Postmodern Fables";  
by Jean-Francois Lyotard

## **Patamathematics, Paradoxes, Nonsology & A Transmedia Strange Loop Vortex Where All Levels Cross**

We have already indicated the many various aporias in which the metaphysics, metaphilosophy, metamathematics and metalogic surveyed by Hofstadter implode pataphysically. Regardless there's still much to thoroughly play along with the deconstruction of all this, in a way,

Hofstadter's systematic observations on strange loops plays into the metaconversion of the great Zero Lyotard covers. With strange loops as the crux of consciousness and reality as a code (which tENT in PNT cites) Hostadter only lays a meta-logic for the metaconversion of integral reality, while Baudrillard has already taken both of these "observations" to a pataphysical level.

"I simultaneously grew obsessed with symbolic logic, whose arcane symbols danced in strange magical patterns reflecting truths, falsities, hypotheticals, possibilities, and counterfactualities, and which, I was sure, aflörclcd profound glimpses into the hidden wellsprings of human thought. As a result of these relentlessly churning thoughts about symbols and meanings, patterns and ideas, machines and mentality, neural impulses and mortal souls, all hell broke loose in my adolescent mind/brain.

#### The Mirage

One day when I was around sixteen or seventeen, musing intensely on these swirling clouds of ideas that gripped me emotionally no less than intellectually, it dawned on me — and it has ever since seemed to me — that what we call "consciousness" was a kind of mirage. It had to be a very peculiar kind of mirage, to be sure, since it was a mirage that perceived itself, and of course it didn't believe that it was perceiving a mirage, but no matter— it still was a mirage. It was almost as if this slippery phenomenon called "consciousness" lifted itself up by its own bootstraps, almost as if it made itself out of nothing, and then disintegrated back into nothing whenever one looked at it more closely."

(p. xii, Hofstadter 2007)

These "magical patterns" (or 'metamagical themas') of 'strange loops' that Hofstadter links especially to the simulacrum of consciousness/the will also are underlined by another earlier name for many of them, a *misé en abyme*. In that regard Hofstadter's work, much like Foucault's, encapsulates the abyssal continuum and make-up of the simulacrum of structures. "When, some ten years or so later, I started working on my first book, whose tide I imagined would be "Gödel's Theorem and the Human Brain", my overarching goal was to relate the concept of a human self and the mystery of consciousness to Gödel's stunning discovery of a majestic wraparound self-referential structure (a "strange loop", as I later came to call it) in the very midst of a formidable bastion from which self-reference had been strictly banished by its audacious architects. I found the parallel between Gödel's miraculous manufacture of self-reference out of a substrate of meaningless symbols and the miraculous appearance of selves and souls in substrates consisting of inanimate matter so compelling that I was convinced that here lay the secret of our sense of "I", and thus my book Gödel, Escher, Bach came about (and acquired a catchier title)."

(p. xiii, Hofstadter 2007)

Hofstadter makes a litany of statements symptomatic of the technicians of the postmodern condition.

"There's another point to be made, though: in the final analysis, virtually every thought in this book (or in any book) is an analogy, as it involves recognizing something as being a variety of something else. Thus every time I write "similarly" or "by contrast", there is an implicit analogy, and every time I pick a word or phrase (e.g., "salad", "storehouse", "bottom line"), I am making



an analogy to something in my life's storehouse of experiences. The bottom line is, every thought herein could be listed under "analogies".  
(p. xviii, Hofstadter 2007)

In Hofstadter's circle of meta-logic (where he through Gödel's theorem can consider an infinite regress of chains of ever more meta-'s as in "meta+meta+..." but this would only house it in the 'autological' according to the GEB model that he outlines, willfully trying to metaphysically contextualize the strange loop of the Epimenides' liars paradox. Try as he might, and perhaps without thorough research, Hofstadter has overlooked the meta- (this epi-meta-), while passages like the following fuels tENT's romps with PNT (the Russell paradox featuring heavily throughout both GEB and PNT).

"Later in the nineteenth century, the English logicians George Boole and Augustus De Morgan went considerably further than Aristotle in codifying strictly deductive reasoning patterns. Boole even called his book "The Laws of Thought"—surely an exaggeration, but it was an important contribution. Lewis Carroll was fascinated by these mechanized reasoning methods, and invented many puzzles which could be solved with them. Gottlob Frege in Jena and Giuseppe Peano in Turin worked on combining formal reasoning with the study of sets and numbers. David Hilbert in Gottingen worked on stricter formalizations of geometry than Euclid's. All of these efforts were directed towards clarifying what one means by "proof" In the meantime, interesting developments were taking place in classical mathematics. A theory of different types of infinities, known as the theory of sets, was developed by Georg Cantor in the 1880's. The theory was powerful and beautiful, but intuition-defying. Before long, a variety of set-theoretical paradoxes had been unearthed. The situation was very disturbing, because just as mathematics seemed to be recovering from one set of paradoxes—those related to the theory of limits, in calculus— along came a whole new set, which looked worse! The most famous is Russell's paradox. Most sets, it would seem, are not members of themselves—for example, the set of walruses is not a walrus, the set containing only Joan of Arc is not Joan of Arc (a set is not a person)—and so on. In this respect, most sets are rather "run-of-the-mill" However, some "self-swallowing" sets do contain themselves as members. such as the set of all sets, or the set of all things except Joan of Arc, and so on. Clearly, every set is either run-of-the-mill or self-swallowing, and no set can be both. Now nothing prevents us from inventing R: the set Of all run-of-the-mill sets. At first, R might seem a rather run-of-the-mill-yourself, "Is R invention—but that opinion must be revised when you ask itself a run-of-the-mill set or a self-swallowing set?" You will find that the answer is: "R is neither run-of-the-mill nor self-swallowing, for either choice leads to paradox." Try it! But if R is neither run-of-the-mill nor self-swallowing, then what is it? At the very least, pathological. But no one was satisfied with evasive answers of that sort. And so people began to dig more deeply into the foundations of set theory. The crucial questions seemed to be: "What is wrong with our intuitive concept of 'set'? Can we make a rigorous theory of sets which corresponds closely with our intuitions, but which skirts the paradoxes. Here, as in number theory and geometry, the problem is in trying to up intuition with formalized, or axiomatized, reasoning systems• A startling variant of Russell's paradox, called "Grelling's paradox" can be made using adjectives instead of sets. Divide the adjectives in into two categories: those which are self-descriptive, such as "pen labic", "awkwardnessful", and "recherché", and those which are not, such as "edible", "incomplete", and "bisyllabic". Now if we

admit "non-self-descriptive" as an adjective, to which class does it belong? If it seems questionable to include hyphenated words, we can use two terms invented specially for this paradox: autological (= "self-descriptive"), and heterological (= "non-self-descriptive"). The question then becomes: "Is 'heterological' heterological?" Try it! There seems to be one common culprit in these paradoxes, namely self-reference, or "Strange Loopiness". So if the goal is to ban all paradoxes, why not try banning self-reference and anything that allows it to arise? This is not so easy as it might seem, because it can be hard to figure out just where self-reference is occurring. It may be spread out over a whole Strange Loop with several steps, as in this "expanded" version of Epimenides, reminiscent of Drawing Hands: The following sentence is false. The preceding sentence is true. Taken together, these sentences have the same effect as the original Epimenides paradox; yet separately, they are harmless and even potentially useful sentences. The "blame" for this Strange Loop can't be pinned on either sentence—only on the way they "point" at each other. In the same way, each local region of Ascending and Descending is quite legitimate; it is only the way they are globally put together that creates an impossibility. Since there are indirect as well as direct ways of achieving self-reference, one must figure out how to ban both types at once—if one sees self reference as the root of all evil.

**Banishing Strange Loops** Russell and Whitehead did subscribe to this view, and accordingly, Principia Mathematica was a mammoth exercise in exorcising Strange Loops from logic, set theory, and number theory. The idea of their system was basically this. A set of the lowest "type" could contain only "objects" as members—not sets. A set of the next type up could only contain objects, or sets of the lowest type. In general, a set of a given type could only contain sets of lower type, or objects. Every set would belong to a specific type. Clearly, no set could contain itself because it would have to belong to a type higher than its own type. Only "run-of-the-mill" sets exist in such a system; furthermore, old R—the set of all run-of-the-mill sets—no longer is considered a set at all, because it does not belong to any finite type. To all appearances, then, this theory of types, which we might also call the "theory of the abolition of Strange Loops", successfully rids set theory of its paradoxes, but only at the cost of introducing an artificial-seeming hierarchy, and of disallowing the formation of certain kinds of sets—such as the set of all run-of-the-mill sets. Intuitively, this is not the way we imagine sets. The theory of types handled Russell's paradox, but it did nothing about the Epimenides paradox or Grelling's paradox. For people whose interest went no further than set theory, this was quite adequate—but for people interested in the elimination of paradoxes generally, some similar "hierarchization" seemed necessary, to forbid looping back inside language. At the bottom of such a hierarchy would be an object language. Here, reference could be made only to a specific domain—not to aspects of the object language itself (such as its grammatical rules, or specific sentences in it). For that purpose there would be a metalanguage. This experience of two linguistic levels is familiar to all learners of foreign languages. Then there would be a metametalanguage [meta(meta)metalinguistics] for discussing the metalanguage, and so on. It would be required that every sentence should belong to some precise level of the hierarchy. Therefore, if one could find no level in which a given utterance fit, then the utterance would be deemed meaningless, and forgot. ten. An analysis can be attempted on the two-step Epimenides loop given above. The first sentence, since it speaks of the second, must be on a higher level than the second. But by the same token, the second sentence must be on a higher level than the first. Since this is impossible, the two sentences are "meaningless". More

precisely, such sentences simply cannot be formulated at all in a system based on a strict hierarchy of languages. This prevents all versions of the Epimenides paradox as well as Grelling's paradox. (To what language level could "heterological" belong?) Now in set theory, which deals with abstractions that we don't use all the time, a stratification like the theory of types seems acceptable, even if a little strange—but when it comes to language, an all-pervading part of life, such stratification appears absurd. We don't think of ourselves as jumping up and down a hierarchy of languages when we speak about various things. A rather matter-of-fact sentence such as, "In this book, I criticize the theory of types" would be doubly forbidden in the system we are discussing. Firstly, it mentions "this book", which should only be mentionable in a "metabook"—and secondly, it mentions me—a person whom I should not be allowed to speak of at all! This example points out how silly the theory of types seems, when you import it into a familiar context. The remedy it adopts for paradoxes—total banishment of self-reference in any form—is a real case of overkill, branding many perfectly good constructions as meaningless. The adjective "meaningless", by the way, would have to apply to all discussions of the theory of linguistic types (such as that of this very paragraph) for they clearly could not occur on any of the levels—neither object language, nor metalanguage, nor metametalanguage, etc. so the very act of discussing the theory would be the most blatant possible violation of it! Now one could defend such theories by saying that they were only intended to deal with formal languages—not with ordinary, informal gauge. This may be so, but then it shows that such theories are extremely academic and have little to say about paradoxes except when they crop up in special tailor-made systems. Besides, the drive to eliminate paradoxes at any cost, especially when it requires the creation of highly artificial formalisms, puts too much stress on bland consistency, and too little on the quirky and bizarre, which make life and mathematics interesting. It is of course important to try to maintain consistency, but when this effort forces you into a stupendously ugly theory, you know something is wrong. These types of issues in the foundations of mathematics were responsible for the high interest in codifying human reasoning methods which was present in the early part of this century. Mathematicians and philosophers had begun to have serious doubts about whether even the most concrete of theories, such as the study of whole numbers (number theory), were built on solid foundations. If paradoxes could pop up so easily in set theory—a theory whose basic concept, that of a set, is surely very intuitively appealing—then might they not also exist in other branches of mathematics? Another related worry was that the paradoxes of logic, such as the Epimenides paradox, might turn out to be internal to mathematics, and thereby cast in doubt all of mathematics. This was especially worrisome to those—and there were a good number—who firmly believed that mathematics is simply a branch of logic (or conversely, that logic is simply a branch of mathematics). In fact, this very question—"Are mathematics and logic distinct, or separate?"—was the source of much controversy. This study of mathematics itself became known as metamathematics—or occasionally, metalogic, since mathematics and logic are so intertwined. The most urgent priority of metamathematicians was to determine the true nature of mathematical reasoning. What is a legal method of procedure, and what is an illegal one? Since mathematical reasoning had always been done in "natural language" (e.g., French or Latin or some language for normal communication), there was always a lot of possible ambiguity. Words had different meanings to different people, conjured up different images, and so forth. It seemed reasonable and even important to establish a single uniform notation in which all mathematical work could be done,

and with the aid of which any two mathematicians could resolve disputes over whether a suggested proof was valid or not. This would require a complete codification of the universally acceptable modes of human reasoning, at least as far as they' applied to mathematics. Consistency, Completeness, Hilbert's Program This was the goal of Principia Mathematica, which purported to derive all of mathematics from logic, and, to be sure, without contradictions! It was widely admired, but no one was sure if (1) all of mathematics really was contained in the methods delineated by Russell and Whitehead, or (2) the methods given were even self-consistent. Was it absolutely clear that contradictory results could never be derived, by any mathematicians whatsoever, following the methods of Russell and Whitehead? This question particularly bothered the distinguished German mathematician (and metamathematician) David Hilbert, who set before the world community of mathematicians (and metamathematicians) this challenge: to demonstrate rigorously—perhaps following the very methods outlined by Russell and Whitehead—that the system defined in Principia Mathematica was both consistent (contradiction-free), and complete (i.e., that every true statement of number theory could be derived within framework drawn up in P.M.). This was a tall order, and one could argue that it was somewhat circular: how do you justify your methods of reasoning on the basis of those same methods of reasoning? is like lifting yourself up by your own bootstraps. (We just don't seem to be able to get away from these Strange Loops!) Hilbert was fully aware of this dilemma, of course, and therefore expressed the hope that a demonstration of consistency or completeness could be found which depended only on "finitistic" modes of reasoning. These were a small set of reasoning methods usually accepted by mathematicians. In this way, Hilbert hoped that mathematicians could partially lift themselves by their own bootstraps: the sum total of mathematical methods might be proved sound, by invoking only a smaller number of methods. This goal may sound rather esoteric, but it occupied the minds of many of the greatest mathematicians in the world during the first thirty years of this century. In the thirty-first year, however, Gödel published his paper, which in some ways utterly demolished Hilbert's program. This paper revealed not only that there were irreparable "holes" in the axiomatic system proposed by Russell and Whitehead, but more generally, that no axiomatic system whatsoever could produce all number-theoretical truths, unless it were an inconsistent system! And finally, the hope of proving the consistency of a system such as that presented in P.M. was shown to be vain: if such a proof could be found using only methods inside P.M., then—and this is one of the most mystifying consequences of Gödel's work—P.M. itself would be inconsistent! The final irony of it all is that the proof of Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem involved importing the Epimenides paradox right into the heart of Principia Mathematica, a bastion supposedly invulnerable to the attacks of Strange Loops! Although Gödel's Strange Loop did not destroy Principia Mathematica, it made it far less interesting to mathematicians, for it showed that Russell and Whitehead's original aims were illusory.”

(p.20-24, Hofstadter 1979)

Embellished by Hofstadter 'quining' a phrase where the phrase repeats a quote of itself to imitate the strange loop of Gödel's theorem. Which theorem claims lies at the no-center of PNT.

““WHEN QUINED, YIELDS A TORTOISE'S LOVE SONG”

WHEN QUINED, YIELDS A TORTOISE'S LOVE SONG.”

(p.435, Hofstadter 1979)

In an early excerpt from GEB on Bach, Hofstadter mentions how strange loops are also 'tangled hierarchies'.

"Such, one imagines, was Bach's intention; but Bach indubitably also relished the implication that this process could go on infinitum, which is perhaps why he wrote in the margin "As the modulaü rises, so may the King's Glory." To emphasize its potentially infinite aspect I like to call this the "Endlessly Rising Canon". In this canon, Bach has given us our first example of the notion of Strange Loops. The "Strange Loop" phenomenon occurs whenever moving upwards (or downwards) through the levels of some hierarchical system, we unexpectedly find ourselves right back where we started. (Here the system is that of musical keys.) Sometimes I use the term Tangled Hierarchy to describe a system in which a Strange Loop occurs."

(p.10, Hofstadter 1979)

Meanwhile the strange loop of Escher's "Print Gallery" almost gives a visualized model of a hyperreal transmedia game, an image which is simultaneously a self-enveloped city/gallery/painter/painting. 'One-step' strange loops like "Print Gallery" model how to abyssally set up a feedback loop that plays on an infinite process in a seemingly finite way (as a hyperreal 'lost object'/archive). This is skirted by Hofstadter when discussing GEB vortexes where all levels cross. Gödel's Vortex, "[...] this "vortex" of self is responsible for the tangledness, for the Gödelian-ness, of the mental processes[...]", the Escher Vortex "Now are we the observers of *Print Gallery*, also sucked into ourselves by virtue of looking at it? Not really. We manage to escape that particular vortex by being outside of the system[...]" and the Bach Vortex "The *Musical Offering* is a fugue of fugues, an Tangled Hierarchy like those of Escher and Gödel, an intellectual construction that reminds me, in ways I cannot express, of the beautiful many-voiced fugue of the human mind. And that is why in my book the three strands of Gödel, Escher, and Bach are woven into an Eternal Golden Braid." Such a braid/vortex that crosses all levels/mediums beyond their finitude as hyperreal transmedia games.

"As we tighten our loop, we come to the remarkable Drawing Hands (Fig. 135), in which each of two hands draws the other: a two-step Strange Loop. And finally, the tightest of all Strange Loops is realized in Print Gallery (Fig. 142): a picture of a picture which contains itself. Or is it a picture of a gallery which contains itself? Or of a town which contains itself? Or a young man who contains himself? (Incidentally, the illusion underlying Ascending and Descending and Waterfall was not invented by Escher, but by Roger Penrose, a British mathematician, in 1958. However, the theme of the Strange Loop was already present in Escher's work in 1948, the year he drew Drawing Hands. Print Gallery dates from 1956.) Implicit in the concept of Strange Loops is the concept of infinity, since what else is a loop but a way of representing an endless process in a finite way? And infinity plays a large role in many of Escher's drawings. Copies of one single theme often fit into each other, forming visual analogues to the canons of Bach. Several such patterns can be seen in Escher's famous print Metamorphosis (Fig. 8). It is a little like the "Endlessly Rising Canon": wandering further and further from its starting point, it suddenly is back. In the tiled planes of Metamorphosis and other pictures, there are already suggestions of infinity. But wilder visions of infinity appear in other drawings by Escher. In some of his drawings, one single theme can appear on different levels of reality. For instance, one level in a drawing might clearly be recognizable as representing fantasy or imagination; another

level would be recognizable as reality. These two levels might be the only explicitly portrayed levels. But the mere presence of these two levels invites the viewer to look upon himself as part of yet another level; and by taking that step, the viewer cannot help getting caught up in Escher's implied chain of levels, in which, for any one level, there is always another level above it of greater "reality", and likewise, there is always a level below, "more imaginary" than it is. This can be mind-boggling in itself. However, what happens if the chain of levels is not linear, but forms a loop? What is real, then, and what is fantasy? The genius of Escher was that he could not only concoct, but actually portray, dozens of half-real, half-mythical worlds, worlds filled with Strange Loops, which he seems to be inviting his viewers to enter. Gödel In the examples we have seen of Strange Loops by Bach and Escher, there is a conflict between the finite and the infinite, and hence a strong sense of paradox. Intuition senses that there is something mathematical involved here. And indeed in our own century a mathematical counterpart was discovered, with the most enormous repercussions. And, just as the Bach and Escher loops appeal to very simple and ancient intuitions, a musical scale, a staircase—so this discovery, by K. Gödel, of a Strange Loop in mathematical systems has its origins in simple and ancient intuitions. In its absolute barest form, Gödel's discovery involves the translation of an ancient paradox in philosophy into mathematical terms. That paradox is the so-called Epimenides Paradox, or liar Paradox. Epimenides was a Cretan who made one immortal statement: "All Cretans are liars." A sharper version of the statement is simply "I am lying"; or, "This statement is false". It is that last version which I will usually mean when I speak of the Epimenides paradox. It is a statement which rudely violates the usually assumed dichotomy of statements into true and false, because if you tentatively think it is true, then it immediately backfires on you and makes you think it is false. But once you've decided it is false, a similar backfiring returns you to the idea that it must be true. Try it! The Epimenides paradox is a one-step Strange Loop, like Escher's print Gallery. But how does it have to do with mathematics? That is what Gödel discovered. His idea was to use mathematical reasoning in exploring mathematical reasoning itself. This notion of making mathematics "introspective" proved to be enormously powerful, and perhaps its richest implication was the one Gödel found: Gödel's Incompleteness Theorem."

(p.15-17, Hofstadter 1979)

In Hofstadter's search for essentialism he finds shadows. Baudrillard notes in "Simulacra and Simulation", "The Gordian knot can at least be cut. The Möbius strip, if one divides it, results in a supplementary spiral without the reversibility of surfaces being resolved (here the reversible continuity of hypotheses)." Since pataphysically as Hugill notes in "Pataphysics: A Useless Guide", "[...] the spiral in fact creates two spirals: the one that is drawn and the one that is described by what is drawn[...]" or as Fania notes "[...] the outer and the inner spiral[...]" Similar to how "...a pataphor is that which occurs when a lizard's tail has grown so long it breaks off and grows a new lizard."

"I have sought to weave an Eternal Golden Braid out of these three strands: Gödel, Escher, Bach. I began, intending to write an essay at the core of which would be Gödel's Theorem. I imagined it would be a pamphlet. But my ideas expanded like a sphere, and soon touched Bach and Escher. It took some time for me to think of making this connection explicit, instead of just

letting it be a private motivating force. But finally I realized that to me, Gödel and Escher and essence] Bach were only shadows cast in different directions...”  
(p.28, Hofstadter 1979)

The hyperreal intertextual deconstruction by Baudrillard of the adage “truth is stranger than fiction” since it, “[...] has been outrun, since there is no longer any fiction that life can possibly confront, even as its conqueror. Reality has passed completely into the game of reality[...]” again remains how the ‘meta-’ of Hofstadter’s ‘metamagical’ gets pushed, via transmedial games, to a hypothetical “pata-magical” that’s still only the simulacrum of ‘Pataphysics. This is all a part of the irony involved when Hofstadter uses an anagram to get “Metamagical Themas” from the name of Gardner’s column “Mathematical Games”.

“I have kept his title “Mathematical Games” in the form of an anagram: “Metamagical Themas”. What does “metamagical” mean? To me, it means “going one level beyond magic”. There is an ambiguity here: on the one hand, the word might mean “ultramagical”—magic of a higher order—yet on the other hand, the magical thing about magic is that what lies behind it is always nonmagical. That’s metamagic for you! It reflects the familiar but powerful adage “Truth is stranger than fiction.” So my “Metamagical Themas” will, in Gardnerian fashion, attempt to show that magic often lurks where few suspect it, and, by the opposite token, that magic seldom lurks where many suspect it.” (p.6, Hofstadter 1985) “The diversity of my columns is worth discussing for a moment. On the surface, they seem to wander all over the intellectual map—from sexism to music to art to nonsense, from game theory to artificial intelligence to molecular biology to the Cube, and more. But there is, I believe, a deep underlying unity to my columns. I felt that gradually, as I wrote more and more of them, regular readers would start to see the links between disparate ones, so that after a while, the coherence of the web would be quite clear. My image of this was always geometric. I envisioned my intellectual “home territory” as a rather large region in some conceptual space, a region most people do not see as a connected unit. Each new column was in away a new “random dot” in that conceptual space, and as dots began peppe the space more fully over the months, the shape of my territory would begin to emerge more clearly. Eventually, I hoped, there would emerge region associated with the name “Metamagical Themas”.”  
(p.xxiv, Hofstadter 1985)

Hofstadter’s nihilistic encounter with meaninglessness, purposelessness, and pointlessness is exactly what his meta-logic applied to strange loops tries to avoid but PNT embraces. “Before going further, I should explain the term “self-reference”. Self-reference is ubiquitous. It happens every time anyone says “I” or “me” or “word” or “speak” or “mouth”. It happens every time a newspaper prints a story about reporters, every time someone writes a book about writing, designs a book about book design, makes a movie about movies, or writes an article about self-reference. Many systems have the capability to represent or refer to themselves somehow, to designate themselves (or elements of themselves) within the system of their own symbolism. Whenever this happens, it is an instance of self-reference. Self-reference is often erroneously taken to be synonymous with paradox. This notion probably stems from the most famous example of a self-referential sentence, the Epimenides paradox. Epimenides the Cretan said, “All Cretans are liars.” I suppose no one today knows whether he said it in ignorance of its

self-undermining quality or for that very reason. In any case, two of its relatives, the sentences "I am lying" and "This sentence is false", have come to be known as the Epimenides paradox or the liar Paradox. Both sentences are absolutely self-destructive little gems and have given self-reference a bad name down through the centuries. When people speak of the evils of self-reference, they are certainly overlooking the fact that not every use of the pronoun "I" leads to paradox. Let us use the Epimenides paradox as our jumping-off point into this fascinating land. There are many variations on the theme of a sentence that somehow undermines itself. Consider these two: This sentence claims to be an Epimenides paradox, but it is lying. This sentence contradicts itself—or rather—well, no, actually it doesn't! What should you do when told, "Disobey this command"? In the following sentence, the Epimenides quality jumps out only after a moment of thought: "This sentence contains *exactly* three errors." There is a delightful backlash effect here. Kurt Gödel's famous Incompleteness Theorem in metamathematics can be thought of as arising from his attempt to replicate as closely as possible the liar paradox in purely mathematical terms. With marvelous ingenuity, he was able to show that in any mathematically powerful axiomatic system S it is possible to express a close cousin to the liar paradox, namely, "This formula is unprovable within axiomatic system S." In actuality, the Gödel construction yields a mathematical formula, not an English sentence; I have translated the formula back into English to show what he concocted. However, astute readers may have noticed that, strictly speaking, the phrase "this formula" has no referent, since when a formula is translated into an English sentence, that sentence is no longer a formula! If one pursues this idea, one finds that it leads into a vast space. Hence the following brief digression on the preservation of self-reference across language boundaries. How should one translate the French sentence *Cette phrase en français est difficile à traduire en anglais*? Even if you do not know French, you will see the problem by reading a literal translation: "This sentence in French is difficult to translate into English." The problem is: To what does the subject ("This sentence in French") refer? If it refers to the sentence it is part of (which is not in French), then the subject is self-contradictory, making the sentence false (whereas the French original was true and harmless); but if it refers to the French sentence, then the meaning of "this" is strained. Either way, something disquieting has happened, and I should point out that it would be just as disquieting, although in a different way, to translate it as: "This sentence in English is difficult to translate into French." Surely you have seen Hollywood movies set in France, in which all the dialogue, except for an occasional *Bonjour* or similar phrase, is in English. What happens when Cardinal Richelieu wants to congratulate the German baron for his excellent command of French? I suppose the most elegant solution is for him to say, "You have an excellent command of our language, *mon cher baron*", and leave it at that."

(p.7-8, Hofstadter 1985)

The problems of paradox, translation and self-reference are indeed all tied together (although Hofstadter overlooks the deconstructive implications of all this).

"It seems that all paradoxes involve, in one way or another, self-reference, whether it is achieved directly or indirectly."

(p.9, Hofstadter 1985)



Use-mention distinction strange loop anomalies and butchering the Zen Buddha brings us back to Cage in Hofstadter's texts, but again he sees only the tautological (simulacrum) of supposed "Being/being", a misreading of the nihility/pataphysics entailed as noted prior.

"When a word is used to refer to something, it is said to be being used. When a word is quoted, though, so that one is examining it for its surface aspects (typographical, phonetic, etc.), it is said to be being mentioned. [...] Finally, consider this use-mention anomaly: 'i should begin with a capital letter.' This is a sentence referring to itself by the pronoun 'I', a bit mauled, instead of through a pointing-phrase such as 'this sentence'; such a sentence would seem to be arrogantly proclaiming itself to be an animate agent. Another example would be 'I am not the person who wrote me.' Notice how easily we understand this curious nonstandard use of 'I'. It seems quite natural to read the sentence this way, even though in nearly all situations we have learned to unconsciously create a mental model of some person—the sentence's speaker or writer—to whom we attribute a desire to communicate some idea. Here we take the 'I' in a new way. How come? What kinds of cues in a sentence make us recognize that when the word 'I' appears, we are supposed to think not about the author of the sentence but about the sentence itself? [...] This raises a whole new set of possibilities. Couldn't 'I' stand for the writing instrument ('I am not a pen'), the language ('I come from Indo-European roots'), the paper ('Cut me out, twist me, and glue me to form a Möbius strip, please')? One of the most involved possibilities is that 'I' stands not for the physical tokens we perceive before us but for some more ethereal and intangible essence, perhaps the meaning of the sentence. But then, what is meaning? The next examples explore that idea: I am the meaning of this sentence. I am the thought you are now thinking. I am thinking about myself right now. I am the set of neural firings taking place in your brain as you read the set of letters in this sentence and think about me. This inert sentence is my body, but my soul is alive, dancing in the sparks of your brain. The philosophical problem of the connections among Platonic ideas, mental activity, physiological brain activity, and the external symbols that trigger them is vividly raised by these disturbing sentences. (p.9-11, Hofstadter 1985) "The latter, via its form, alludes to the Buddhist saying 'If you meet the Buddha on the road, kill him.' Allusion through similarity of form is, I have discovered, a marvelously rich vein of self-reference, but unfortunately this article is too short to contain a full proof of that discovery. I shall explicitly discuss only two examples. The first is 'This sentence verbs good, like a sentence should.' Its primary allusion is to the famous slogan 'Winston tastes good, like a cigarette should', and its secondary allusion is to 'This sentence no verb.' The other example involves the following lovely self-referential remark' once made by the composer John Cage: 'I have nothing to say, and I am saying it.' This allows the following rather subtle twist to be made: 'I have nothing to allude to, and I am alluding to it.'"

(p.16, Hofstadter 1985)

Ironically Hofstadter continues to cite postmodern texts without a fuller context of their pataphysical lineaments.

"Humor, particularly self-referential humor, is one of the most pervasive flavors of verbal behavior in this century. One has only to watch the Muppets or Monty Python on television to see dense and intricate webs of self-reference. Even advertisements excel in self-reference. In art, René Magritte, Pablo Picasso, M. C Escher, John Cage and dozens of others have played with the level-distinction sometimes between that which represents and that which is

represented. The "artistic behavior" that results includes much self-reference and many confusing and sometimes exhilaratingly paradoxical tangles."  
(p.18-19, Hofstadter 1985)

Let us also mention while we're chatting about all the hocus pocus, voodoo/hoodoo, and mumbo jumbo another Clarke quote that Baudrillard mentions occasionally.  
"Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic."  
(Clarke)

Which remains perfectly juxtaposed as a strange loop to this quote from hyperreal "vampire" film by George A. Romero "Martin" (1978), a line from the eponymous so-called "vampire" Martin.  
"There's no real magic...ever."  
(Martin, 1978)

Although this text isn't one in which we'll cover the full breadth of the deconstruction of the 'Impossible', the following text from Kaku (evoking the Clarke quote) highlights the paradoxical hyperreality of the simulacrum of the ontic & ontology ontologically in all of its indeterminate potentialities for science.

"Normally such feats would be considered impossible by today's physicists. Might they become possible within a few centuries? Or in ten thousand years, when our technology is more advanced? Or in a million years? To put it another way, if we were to somehow encounter a civilization a million years more advanced than ours, would their everyday technology appear to be "magic" to us? That, at its heart, is one of the central questions running through this book; just because something is "impossible" today, will it remain impossible centuries or millions of years into the future?"  
(p.xii, Kaku)

Kaku's impossibility ties epistemology to an event horizon of the ontic.

"The reason that these technologies were deemed "impossibilities" is that the basic laws of physics and science were not known in the nineteenth century and the early part of the twentieth. Given the huge gaps in the understanding of science at the time, especially at the atomic level, it's no wonder such advances were considered impossible."  
(p.xiii, Kaku)

In a way Kaku walks between the Kuhn versus Popper debate of paradigm shifts and fallibilism, another facet of the metaconverting zero's spinning demarcation a la the physics stick. The spin of the bicycle's wheel propelled as time machine.

"Today, because there is no law of physics preventing the existence of time machines, physicists have had to take their possibility very seriously. The purpose of this book is to consider what technologies are considered "impossible" today that might well become commonplace decades to centuries down the road."  
(p.xvi, Kaku)

All of which are explored by the pataphysical exceptions explored by Kaku's three categories of the "impossible" for metaconverting decategorization.

"In this book, therefore, I divide the things that are "impossible" into three categories.

The first are what I call Class I impossibilities. These are technologies that are impossible today but that do not violate the known laws of physics. So they might be possible in this century, or perhaps the next, in modified form. They include teleportation, antimatter engines, certain forms of telepathy, psychokinesis, and invisibility. The second category is what I term Class II impossibilities. These are technologies that sit at the very edge of our understanding of the physical world. If they are possible at all, they might be realized on a scale of millennia to millions of years in the future. They include time machines, the possibility of hyperspace travel, and travel through wormholes. The final category is what I call Class III impossibilities. These are technologies that violate the known laws of physics. Surprisingly, there are very few such impossible technologies. If they do turn out to be possible, they would represent a fundamental shift in our understanding of physics. This classification is significant, I feel, because so many technologies in science fiction are dismissed by scientists as being totally impossible, when what they actually mean is that they are impossible for a primitive civilization like ours. Alien visitations, for example, are usually considered impossible because the distances between the stars are so vast. While interstellar travel for our civilization is clearly impossible, it may be possible for a civilization centuries to thousands or millions of years ahead of ours. So it is important to rank such "impossibilities." Technologies that are impossible for our current civilization are not necessarily impossible for other types of civilizations. Statements about what is possible and impossible have to take into account technologies that are millennia to millions of years ahead of ours."

(p.xvi-xvii, Kaku)

Possibility and meaning are deconstructed in Derrida's "Speech and Phenomena" in regards Husserl's grammars of sense versus nonsense.

"Without such distinctions, no pure logical grammar would be possible. The possibility of a theory of the pure forms of judgments, which supports the entire structure of the Formal and Transcendental Logic, would be blocked. We know that pure logical grammar depends entirely on the distinction between *Widersinnigkeit* and *Sinnlosigkeit*. If it obeys certain rules, an expression may be *widersinnig* (contradictory, false, absurd according to a certain kind of absurdity) without ceasing to have an intelligible sense that permits normal speech to occur, without becoming nonsense (*Unsinn*). It may have no possible object for empirical reasons (a golden mountain) or for a priori reasons (a square circle) without ceasing to have an intelligible sense, without being *sinnlos*. The absence of an object (*Gegenstandslosigkeit*) is hence not the absence of meaning (*Bedeutungslosigkeit*). Pure logical grammar, then excludes from normal discourse only what is nonsense in the sense of *Unsinn* ("Abracadabra," "Green is where"). If we were not able to understand what a "square circle" or "golden mountain" means, how could we come to a conclusion about the absence of a possible object for such expressions? It is this modicum of comprehension that is denied us in the *Unsinn*, in the ungrammaticalness of nonsense."

(p.91-92, Derrida 1973)

Thereby interlinking the nonsense of magic to the problematics of the deconstruction of referentiality.

"In other words, the genuine and true meaning is the will to say the truth. This subtle shift incorporates the *eidos* into the *telos*, and language into knowledge. A speech could well be in conformity with its essence as speech when it was false; it nonetheless attains its entelechy when it is true. One can *well* speak in saying "The circle is square"; one speaks *well*, however, in saying that it is not. There is already sense in the first proposition, but we would be wrong to conclude from this that sense does not wait upon truth. It does not await truth as expecting it; it only precedes truth as its anticipation. In truth the *telos* which announces the fulfillment, promised for "later" has already and beforehand opened up sense as a relation with the object. This is what is meant by the concept of normality each time it occurs in Husserl's description. The norm is knowledge, the intuition that is adequate to its object, the evidence that is not only distinct but also "clear." It is the full presence of sense to a consciousness that is itself self-present in the fullness of its life, its living present.

Thus, without disregarding the rigor and boldness of "pure logical grammar," without forgetting the advantages it has over the classical projects of rational grammar, we must clearly recognize that its "formality" is limited. We could say as much about the pure morphology of judgments, which, in the Formal and Transcendental Logic, determines pure logical grammar or pure morphology of significations. The purification of the formal is guided by a concept of sense which is itself determined on the basis of a relation with an object. Form is always the form of a sense, and sense opens up only in the knowing intentionality relating to an object. Form is but the emptiness and pure intention of this intentionality. Perhaps no project of pure grammar can escape this object-related intentionality, perhaps the *telos* of knowing rationality is the irreducible origin of the idea of pure grammar, and perhaps the semantic theme, "empty" as it is, always limits the formalist project. In any case transcendental intuitionism still weighs very heavily upon the formalist theme in Husserl. Apparently independent from fulfilling intuitions, the "pure" forms of signification, as "empty" or canceled sense, are always governed by the epistemological criterion of the relation with objects. The difference between "The circle is square" and "Green is where" or "Abracadabra" (and Husserl links up these last two examples somewhat hastily; he is perhaps not attentive enough to their difference) is that the form of the relation with an object and of a unitary intuition appears only in the first example. Here this aim will always be disappointed, yet this proposition makes *sense* only because *another content*, put in this form (*S is p*), *would be able* to let us know and see an object. "The circle is square," an expression that has sense (*sinnvoll*), has no possible object, but it makes sense only insofar as its grammatical form tolerates the possibility of a relation with the object. The efficiency and the form of signs that do not obey these rules, that is, that do not promise any knowledge, can be determined as nonsense (*Unsinn*) only if one has antecedently, and according to the most traditional philosophical move, defined sense in general on the basis of truth as objectivity. Otherwise we would have to relegate to absolute nonsense all poetic language that transgresses the laws of this grammar of cognition and is irreducible to it. In the forms of nondiscursive signification (music, non-literary arts generally), as well as in utterances such as "Abracadabra" or "Green is where," there are modes of sense which do not point to any possible objects. Husserl would not deny the signifying force of such formations: he would simply refuse them the formal quality of being expressions endowed with sense, that is, of being

logical, in the sense that they have a relation with an object. All of which amounts to recognizing an initial limitation of sense to knowledge, of logos to objectivity, of language to reason.”  
(p.98-99, Derrida 1973)

The nonsology (the search for nonsense [especially with its “roots” in everyday experience] to fragment gradually solidified “thought forms” and by proceeding without any rules) of all this remains vast. Carroll’s “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” are ubiquitous throughout the postmodern, many already mentioned like Hofstadter, Baudrillard, and #TheGame23 all interlink to this and so there’s also another piece of “nonsense fantasy” child literature we can look to in regards concepts/conceptual space, paradoxes, math, and magic; Juster’s “The Phantom Tollbooth” (often compared to Wonderland, as well as “The Wizard Of Oz”). The tales of Milo’s adventures in the land ‘Beyond’.

“Hailed as pre-eminent works of nonsense fantasy, Lewis Carroll’s Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland (1865) and Norton Juster’s The Phantom Tollbooth (1961) quickly became and remain landmarks of children’s literature. As their respective protagonists, Alice and Milo, wander through unfamiliar and illogical other-worlds and find their knowledge continually exercised, confused and contradicted, both works effectively function as allegories of children’s learning. For, as Tolkien notes, “Children’s knowledge of the world is often so small that they cannot judge, off-hand and without help, between the fantastic, the strange (that is rare or remote facts), the nonsensical, and the merely ‘grown up’” (38-9). Representative of two “golden moments” in children’s literature, Alice and Tollbooth employ nonsense and word play to acknowledge children’s experiences and struggles with tedium, educational methods, language, mathematics, manners, justice and their own processes of individuation.”  
(Brown)

Both children in their hyperreal dark continent of childhood have a fascination/entanglement with ‘nothing’.

“From the first pages of their respective stories, it is painfully apparent that Alice and Milo are plagued by ennui and a general disenchantment with learning. Alice is “tired” of “having nothing to do” and, after glimpsing at her sister’s book, Alice wonders, “what is the use of a book . . . without pictures or conversations?” (Carroll 9). She also frequently decries school lessons, making such remarks as, “always to have lessons to learn! Oh, I shouldn’t like that !” (Carroll 33). Similarly, when Milo is introduced it is told that “nothing” interested him much and, “since no one bothered to explain otherwise, he regarded the process of seeking knowledge as the greatest waste of time of all” (Juster 9). Indeed, Milo himself proclaims, “I can’t see the point in learning to solve useless problems, or subtracting turnips from turnips, or knowing where Ethiopia is or how to spell February” (Juster 9). While Milo admits he “can’t see the point” in learning, Alice often demonstratively misses the point of precepts and, like Milo, struggles with the application of things she has learned. When she spots a bottle labelled “DRINK ME,” Alice speciously recalls the morals of several Victorian cautionary tales “such as, that a red-hot poker will burn you if you hold it too long; and that, . . . if you drink much from a bottle marked ‘poison’, it is almost certain to disagree with you, sooner or later” (Carroll 13-14). Alice learns that although everything in Wonderland supposedly has a moral, she has to find (or debunk) these herself, just as Milo discovers that in the lands beyond the Tollbooth, “If you want sense [you]

have to make it yourself" (Juster 175). By way of the wily word play they are so often commended for and compared by, Carroll and Juster satirize educational methods--rote or otherwise--which divorce words from meaning. Though Milo doesn't understand his taunt, the Humbug infuriates the "Spelling Bee" by exclaiming, "A slavish concern for the composition of words is the sign of a bankrupt intellect" (Juster 54). Even the self-proclaimed "advisers" of King Azaz the Unabridged state that making sense is not their job. As many a droning, wordy teacher may seem to, the advisers operate by the fallacious philosophy that, "if one [word] is right, then ten are ten times as right" (Juster 40). The quasi-teacher figures that Alice encounters also value words and memorization over meaning. After delivering a very "dry" history lecture, the Dodo is accused of verbosity. "'Speak English!' [says] the Eaglet. 'I don't know the meaning of half those long words, and, what's more, I don't believe you do either!'" (Carroll 25). The denizens of Wonderland also often order Alice to "repeat" popular Victorian moralising poems; as Alice recalls them incorrectly, these poems and the rote teaching techniques they represent are parodied. When Alice recites "You are old, Father William," and the Caterpillar merely comments, "That is not said right" (Carroll 45). Later, when Alice transposes Isaac Watts' "'Tis the voice of the sluggard" with "'Tis the voice of the Lobster" (Carroll 93), the impatiently didactic Gryphon assumes that Alice "can't explain" it and yet urges, "Go on with the next verse" (Carroll 94). The Mock Turtle then seemingly speaks on behalf of Victorian students when he asks, "What is the use of repeating all that stuff . . . if you don't explain it as you go on?" (Carroll 94)." (Brown)

Brown wants, like the books, to seemingly play into a metalogical didactic reading of magically nonsensical strange loops, to make sense out of nonsense.

"Just as child readers are likely to identify in some way with such allegorical struggles and successes with language, they will likely relate to Alice and Milo's incertitude about the applications and abstractions of mathematics. Feeling "changed" and quite unlike herself, Alice turns to Math before any other discipline in hopes of discovering exactly who she is. Unable to multiply properly, she realises that "the Multiplication Table doesn't signify" (Carroll 19). To the mind of the fact-laden Victorian child, continually informed of the value of mathematical tables, this would be a refreshingly comical statement, to be sure;<sup>[2]</sup> but it also bears some truth. As Heath explains, Math "is a purely formal science, having nothing to say . . . about questions of empirical fact. A knowledge of such elementary formal truths would thus be of little help for purposes of identification" (25). Milo also grapples with the metaphysical nature and limitations of mathematics. When he meets 0.58 of a child (the average family has 2.58 children), Milo objects, "But averages aren't real . . . they're just imaginary" (Juster 195). Milo "had always had trouble in school with just this subject" (Juster 197). Yet, what child is not at times perplexed by such abstract notions as fractions (broken numbers?), infinity (you can never reach it?), or averages, as is Milo? Learning theorists observe that, "with the emphasis on the practicality of the rudimentary computing skills, nothing in the way the children have been taught mathematics has made them aware of the fascinating world of numbers" (Bettelheim and Zelan 49). Unlike Alice, Milo has at least one tutor who alludes to the magic of abstract arithmetical exercises. The 0.58 child patiently explains, "one of the nicest things about mathematics, or anything else you might care to learn, is that many of the things which can never be, often are" (Juster 197)." (Brown)

The pataphysics of the surreal absurdity of these conceptual nonsensical shenanigans at this rate may seem almost readily transparent.

“How appropriate it is, then, that the Mad Tea Party seems a breaking point in Alice's social tolerance. [4] With reference to *Decorum: A Practical Treatise on Etiquette and Dress* (1877), a typical etiquette guide of its time, Alice's indignation with the March Hare and the Mad Hatter may be better understood by the contemporary reader. Regarding conversation, *Decorum* advises against making personal remarks to strangers; using puns, proverbs and riddles; engaging in arguments; frequently consulting one's timepiece; interrupting a person who is speaking and interjections. The Hatter's "first speech" to Alice is, "Your hair wants cutting," to which Alice responds, "You should learn not to make personal remarks . . . it's very rude" (Carroll 60). To this the Hatter responds with the riddle, "Why is a raven like a writing desk?" (Carroll 60). Although Alice, being a child and engaged in awkward conversation, is glad of the sport, the riddle is eventually revealed to have no proper answer. Many arguments, several timepiece references and a good deal of confusion later, the Hatter irrevocably offends Alice. "I don't think--" begins Alice before being interrupted by the Hatter who remarks, "Then you shouldn't talk" (Carroll 67). It is this "piece of rudeness" that incites Alice to get up and walk off. Hereafter, our customarily polite and pleasant Victorian protagonist is less tolerant of such social trespasses and "nonsense." That is not to say, however, that Milo is any less critical of ill-founded rules or contraventions of rights and freedoms, for both Alice and Milo contest the abuses and misuses of justice in the nonsense-ruled realms they visit. Though "childkind" is particularly susceptible to unfair, arbitrary, and extemporaneous rules, those which Alice and Milo impugn are clearly far-fetched and farcical. When in the Doldrums Milo is accused of breaking two "local ordinances," thinking and laughing (though smiling is permitted every other Thursday). Rightly so, Milo dismisses these laws as ridiculous. When at the Knave of Heart's trial, the rapidly growing Alice is asked to leave on account of "Rule Forty-two," namely that all persons exceeding one mile in height must leave the court. Alice refuses to leave and astutely adds, "besides, that's not a regular rule: you invented it just now" (Carroll 105). The King answers with the proverb, "it's the oldest rule in the book" and Alice triumphantly contends that, in that case, it ought to be the first rule in the book, not the forty-second. Carroll's mockery of the justice system seems more deliberate than many of his other social farces. Indeed, neither the mouse's tale about "old Fury" who acts as both judge and jury, nor the presentation of evidence at the Knave's trial appeared in the original manuscript, *Alice's Adventures Underground*. Yet, whether the Queen yells "first the sentence, and then the evidence!" as in *Alice's Adventures Underground* (Carroll n. pag.), or "Sentence first--verdict afterwards" as in *Alice's Adventures in Wonderland* (Carroll 108), the message is the same and so is Alice's response: "nonsense." Not unlike Carroll's decapitation-happy Queen, Juster's Officer Shrift accuses anyone and everyone of being "guilty." When Milo "forgets" Shrift's birthday (not that he ever knew it) Shrift, who is a police officer, judge and jailer, assigns Milo a short sentence, "I am," and six million years in jail. Of all the absurdities that Alice and Milo must evaluate and contend, those concerning their respective justice systems are perhaps the most alarming." (Brown)

Such absurdity involved in the “making fun of learning” to “make learning fun” seems to interlink to the abyssal plays of “litigation to be substituted for a differend” that Lyotard mentions in the text cited prior where, “you do violence to yourself in trying to learn the moves that you don't know and that your silent partner imposes upon the balls”.

“Carroll's and Juster's narratives operate to both diagnose and remedy children's struggles with learning: by making fun of learning, they make learning fun. As theorists Bettelheim and Zelan explain, “learning, particularly learning to read, must give the child the feeling that through it new worlds will be opened to his mind and imagination” (50). The nonsense worlds visited in Alice and Tollbooth create ideal climates for the consideration of knowledge and its applications, for in them Alice and Milo (and by identification, their child readers) make as much sense or more than any other. Moreover, in discerning nonsense they also consider what is sensible. Although to the adult mind such grossly illogical worlds may seem nightmarish, to the mind of a child such worlds may seem instead a “wonderful dream” (as does Wonderland to Alice), which reflects and thus validates their own daily bouts with confusion wrought by the hodgepodge of learning. Thus, with any luck, the child reader's journey will parallel those of Alice and Milo such that, at journeys' end, all may return to their own “realities” with a fresh perspective on learning, renewed by the power of story.”

(Brown)

Notice the pataphorical juxtaposition of Juster's Mathemagician to Hofstadter's metamagical themas traced/erased to the zero degree.

““No indeed,” replied the Mathemagician, and this time he raised the sharpened end of his staff, drew a thin straight line in the air, and then walked gracefully across it from one side of the room to the other.

“Most of the time I take the shortest distance between any two points. And, of course, when I should be in several places at once,” he remarked, writing  $7 \times 1 = 7$  carefully on the note pad, “I simply multiply.”

Suddenly there were seven Mathemagicians standing side by side, and each one looked exactly like the other. “How did you do that?” gasped Milo. “There's nothing to it,” they all said in chorus, “if you have a magic staff.” Then six of them canceled themselves out and simply disappeared.

“But it's only a big pencil,” the Humbug objected, tapping at it with his cane.

“True enough,” agreed the Mathemagician; “but once you learn to use it, there's no end to what you can do.”

“Can you make things disappear?” asked Milo excitedly.

“Why, certainly,” he said, striding over to the easel. “Just step a little closer and watch carefully.” After demonstrating that there was nothing up his sleeves, in his hat, or behind his back, he wrote quickly:

$$4 + 9 - 2 \times 16 + 1 \div 3 \times 6 - 67 + 8 \times 2 - 3 + 26 - 1 \div 34 + 3 \div 7 + 2 - 5 =$$

Then he looked up expectantly.

“Seventeen!” shouted the bug, who always managed to be first with the wrong answer.

“It all comes to zero,” corrected Milo. “Precisely,” said the Mathemagician, making a very theatrical bow, and the entire line of numbers vanished before their eyes.”

(p.188-189, Juster)



A similar magic allows one to locate Infinity...

"The Mathemagician stopped what he was doing and explained simply, "Why, in a box that's so small you can't see it—and that's kept in a drawer that's so small you can't see it, in a dresser that's so small you can't see it, in a house that's so small you can't see it, on a street that's so small you can't see it, in a city that's so small you can't see it, which is part of a country that's so small you can't see it, in a world that's so small you can't see it.

Then he sat down, fanned himself with a handkerchief, and continued.

"Then, of course, we keep the whole thing in another box that's so small you can't see it—and, if you follow me, I'll show you where to find it." They walked to one of the small windows and there, tied to the sill, was one end of a line that stretched along the ground and into the distance until completely out of sight. "Just follow that line forever," said the Mathemagician, "and when you reach the end, turn left. There you'll find the land of Infinity, where the tallest, the shortest, the biggest, the smallest, and the most and the least of everything are kept."

"I really don't have that much time," said Milo anxiously. "Isn't there a quicker way?"

"Well, you might th' this flight of stairs," he suggested, opening another door and pointing up. "It goes there, too."

Milo bounded across the room and started up the stairs two at a time. "Wait for me, please," he shouted to Tock and the Humbug. "I'll be gone just a few minutes."

[...]

Up he went—very quickly at first—then more slowly— then in a little while even more slowly than that—and finally, after many minutes of climbing up the endless stairway, one weary foot was barely able to follow the other. Milo suddenly realized that with all his effort he was no closer to the top than when he began, and not a great deal further from the bottom. But he struggled on for a while longer, until at last, completely exhausted, he collapsed onto one of the steps. "I should have known it," he mumbled, resting his tired legs and filling his lungs with air.

"This is just like the line that goes on forever, and I'll never get there. "

"You wouldn't like it much anyway," someone replied gently. "Infinity is a dreadfully poor place. They can never manage to make ends meet.""

(p.191-193, Juster)

Yet the pataphysical implications of strange loops still baffle the Mathemagician. While the contradiction below offers a caricature of the struggles over the debates of Neoism's definition.

"Has Azaz agreed to it?" the Mathemagician inquired.

"Yes, sir," the dog assured him.

"THEN I DON'T," he thundered again, "for since they've been banished, we've never agreed on anything—and we never will." He emphasized his last remark with a dark and ominous look.

"Never?" asked Milo, with the slightest touch of disbelief in his voice. "NEVER!" he repeated.

"And if you can prove otherwise, you have my permission to go." "Well," said Milo, who had thought about this problem very carefully ever since leaving Dictionopolis. "Then with whatever Azaz agrees, you disagree."

"Correct," said the Mathemagician with a tolerant smile.

"And with whatever Azaz disagrees, you agree."

"Also correct," yawned the Mathemagician, nonchalantly cleaning his fingernails with the point of his staff.

"Then each of you agrees that he will disagree with whatever each of you agrees with," said Milo triumphantly; "and if you both disagree with the same thing, then aren't you really in agreement?"

"I'VE BEEN TRICKED!" cried the Mathemagician helplessly, for no matter how he figured, it still came out just that way.

"Splendid effort," commented the Humbug jovially; "exactly the way I would have done it myself."

"And now may we go?" added Tock."

(p.199-200, Juster)

Patamathematics are not simply paramathematics.

"Paraconsistent mathematics is a type of mathematics in which contradictions may be true. In such a system it is perfectly possible for a statement A and its negation not A to both be true. [...]

While Russell's Paradox is clearly directly applicable to mathematics, one can motivate paraconsistency in mathematics indirectly through paraconsistent logic. If logic is paraconsistent, then mathematics built on this logic will be paraconsistent[...] (but, perhaps, not *pataconsistent*).

(McKubre-Jordens)

Paramathematics, like GEB takes the liar paradox and Russell's paradox and tries to house them within a metaphysics (albeit a Zen-like contradictory or 'paraconsistent' one again similar to Hofstadter). It's notable that metamathematicians and metalogicians like McKubre-Jordens and Seife do explore the magical potential of math to turn anything into anything (which tENT will explore under the experiments of PNT the Neoist slogan he most endorses 'Anything is Anything'), but interestingly enough whether or not contradictions could turn anything into a carrot.

"The parallels between this solution to the liar paradox and the ZF solution to Russell's paradox are clear. However, looking at this second case shows that paradox or inconsistency is not merely a quirk of naive set theory, but a more widespread phenomenon. It seems that to avoid inconsistency, classicists are forced to adopt some arguably ad hoc rules not just about the nature of sets, but also about meaning. Besides, it intuitively seems that the liar sentence should be meaningful; it can be written down, is grammatically correct, and the concepts within it understood.

Explosive logic

How does a paraconsistent perspective address these paradoxes? The paraconsistent response to the classical paradoxes and contradictions is to say that these are interesting facts to study, instead of problems to solve. This admittedly runs counter to certain intuitions on the subject, but from a paraconsistent perspective, localised contradiction such as the truth and falsity of the liar sentence, does not necessarily lead to incoherence."

(McKubre-Jordens)

Paraconsistent logic again tries to prevent logic from exploding by trying to contain these problematics within the parameters of logical classicism.

“An explosive logic maintains that from a contradiction, you may conclude quite literally anything and everything. The logical principle is *ex falso quodlibet*, or “from a falsehood, conclude anything you like”. If  $A$  and  $\neg A$  are both true, then Cleopatra is the current Secretary-General of the United Nations General Assembly, and the page you are currently reading is, despite appearances, also a carrot. So why is classical logic explosive? Because it accepts the argument form *reductio ad absurdum* (RAA), meaning reduction to the absurd. We will see below that paraconsistent logicians can use a modified version of RAA, but for now let's just consider the classical version. To use classical RAA, one first makes an assumption. If further into the proof a contradiction arises, one is entitled to conclude that the initial assumption is false. Essentially, the idea is that if assuming something is true leads to an “absurd” state of affairs, a contradiction, then it was incorrect to make that assumption. This seems to work well enough in everyday situations. However, if contradictions can exist, say if Russell's set both is and is not a member of itself, then we can deduce anything. We merely have to assume its negation, and then prove ourselves “wrong”. Thus contradiction trivialises any classical theory in which an inconsistency arises. Naive set theory, for example, is classically disinteresting, because it not only proves that  $1+1=2$ , but also that  $1+1=7$ . All because of Russell's paradox. So to the classical mathematician, finding a contradiction is not just unacceptable, it is utterly destructive. There is no classical distinction between inconsistency (the occurrence of a contradiction) and incoherence (a system which proves anything you like). Paraconsistent logic does not endorse the principle of explosion *ex contradictione quodlibet*, nor anything which validates it (notice the subtly different wording; “contradictione” in place of “falso”; this will become important later). The thought is this: suppose I have a pretty good theory that makes sense of a lot of the things I see around me, and suppose that somewhere in the theory a contradiction is hiding. Paraconsistent logicians hold that this does not (necessarily) make the theory incoherent, it just means one has to be very careful in the deductions one makes to avoid falling from contradiction into incoherence. For the most part, it makes no difference to us if the liar sentence really is both true and false, and the paraconsistent perspective reflects that. By removing RAA (or altering it as we see below), and making a few other tweaks to classical logic, we can create a logic and mathematical system where contradictions are both possible and sensible.”

(McKubre-Jordens)

Where paramathematics tries to reduce the absurdity of the RAA, PNT looks to amplify it.

“Paraconsistent mathematics is mathematics where some contradictions are allowed. The term “paraconsistent” was coined to mean “beyond the consistent”. The objects of study are essentially the same as classical mathematics, but the allowable universe of study is enlarged by allowing some inconsistent objects. One of the main projects of paraconsistent mathematics is to determine which objects are inconsistent, and which inconsistencies are allowed in a theory without falling into incoherence. It is a fairly recent development; the first person to suggest paraconsistency as a possible foundation of mathematics was Newton da Costa from Brazil (1958). Since then various areas have been investigated through the paraconsistent lens. An important first step towards developing paraconsistent mathematics is establishing a tool kit of acceptable argument forms. One charge that has been levelled against the paraconsistent mathematician is that the classical version of RAA is not allowed. Proofs by contradiction,

reductio ad contradictione, are no longer allowed, since the conclusion could be a true contradiction, and the logic must allow for this case. Similarly, disjunctive syllogism is lost. Disjunctive syllogism states that if I can prove that A or B is true, and I can prove that A is false, then B must be true. However, paraconsistently, if A and not-A is a true contradiction, then B cannot be validly deduced. We do not receive any information about the truth of B from the fact A is not true, because it might also be true, thus satisfying the disjunction. Paraconsistentists are able to salvage a form of RAA. The classical mathematician does not distinguish between a contradiction and total absurdity; both are used to reject assumptions. However, from the paraconsistent viewpoint, not all contradictions are necessarily absurd. To someone with this view, classical RAA actually equates to reductio ad contradictione. The paraconsistentist can use a form which allows them to reject something which is genuinely, paraconsistently absurd. This take on RAA is used to reject anything which leads to a trivial theory (a theory in which everything is true). Likewise, while ex contradictione quodlibet (from a contradiction, anything follows) is out, ex absurdum quodlibet is still valid. Allowing inconsistencies without incoherence opens up many areas of mathematics previously closed to mathematicians, as well as being a stepping stone to making sense of some easily described but difficult to understand phenomena. One such area is inconsistent geometry.”  
(McKubre-Jordens)

Still all of this remains a problem for paramathematics since it looks to house itself within a metaphysics, one of “Truth”.

“Paraconsistency in mathematics: mathematics where contradictions may be true. Is it as outlandish as it sounds? Probably not. As we have seen, paraconsistent mathematics elegantly deals with paradoxes to which classically mathematicians have had to find ad-hoc, complicated solutions to block inconsistency. There are also many areas in which paraconsistent mathematics may provide meaningful insights into inconsistent structures. It offers new insights to old problems such as Hilbert's program and the halting problem. Paraconsistency in mathematics: an interesting and promising position worthy of further exploration.”  
(McKubre-Jordens)

While McKubre-Jordens may overlook the consequences of this magical non-carrot, Seife gives us more of a context on zero and infinity (although somewhat metaphysically phrased) that they are doubles of one another, an observation, by tENT's own admission, emphasizes PNT (while Jarry's patamathematical equation for the surface of God made up of zeros and infinities anticipates this).

“Zero and infinity always looked suspiciously alike. Multiply zero by anything and you get zero. Multiply infinity by anything and you get infinity. Dividing a number by zero yields infinity; dividing a number by infinity yields zero. Adding zero to a number leaves the number unchanged. Adding a number to infinity leaves infinity unchanged. These similarities were obvious since the Renaissance, but mathematicians had to wait until the end of the French Revolution before they finally unraveled zero's big secret. Zero and infinity are two sides of the same coin—equal and opposite, yin and yang, equally powerful adversaries at either end of the realm of numbers. The troublesome nature of zero lies with the strange powers of the infinite, and it is possible to understand the infinite by studying zero. To learn this, mathematicians had

to venture into the world of the imaginary, a bizarre world where circles are lines, lines are circles, and infinity and zero sit on opposite poles.”

(p.131-132, Seife)

With the above and the following statement from Seife on multiplying by 0 to change anything into anything (the specific passage below TENT cites in greater lengths in PNT, but the admission stands that this is the perfect mathematical excuse for PNT's 'Anything is Anything', which remains the case only if you consider that Anything and Everything remain merely Nothing).

“(There is a simpler way to prove this. Adding 1 to both sides of equation 7 gives the equation  $2 = 1$

Winston Churchill and a carrot are two different things, therefore they are one thing. But that's not nearly as satisfying.) What is wrong with this proof? There is only one step that is flawed, and that is the one where we go from equation 4 to equation 5. We divide by  $a - b$ . But look out. Since  $a$  and  $b$  are both equal to 1,  $a - b = 1 - 1 = 0$ . We have divided by zero, and we get the ridiculous statement that  $1 = 0$ . From there we can prove any statement in the universe, whether it is true or false. The whole framework of mathematics has exploded in our faces. Used unwisely, zero has the power to destroy logic.”

(p.219, Seife)

Pataphors show how 'pataforms'/'pata-' outdoes the 'metaform'/'meta-' (as well as 'para-' since its merely beside/beyond and thus not achieving 'pata-').

“The etymology of meta, from the Greek μετά, meant 'beyond, after'. It signified an abstraction 'beyond' the subject itself, or that which came 'after' something else, the latter the same as how the prefix 'post-' functions in contemporary conversation. Metaphysics, for Aristotle's pupils, had the tandem meaning of 'that which is beyond the physical' & 'the book written after the book called Physics'. The etymology of meta, from the Greek μετά, meant 'beyond, after'. In colloquial English, over two millennia, meta has evolved to mean 'beyond, about'. In its current connotation meta is ambiently understood as meaning 'a thing which studies itself'. An X about X. At a once remove, the meta- prefix creates an inversion of any word onto itself. Metafiction can be viewed as any moment in a fiction revealing any facet of the act of fiction; metaphilosophy comprises various philosophies about philosophy itself; metaethics would be any proposed ethics about a discussion of ethics; a metajoke is any ironic joke mocking the act of jokes themselves. These are not metaphors, so much a metaforms. The suffix -phor meant 'to carry', suggesting a metaphor 'carries' two things in comparison. Note that to say “A metaphor 'carries' something” is a metaphor itself. A metaphor is a nonliteral comparison of two things. X is Y or X of Y. Time is money. Life is a journey. Rollercoaster of emotion. Blanket of snow. Heart of gold. We are one. Most clichés become metaphors even though most metaphors attempt to resist cliché. All X are Y but not all Y are X is a useful cliché, but is it always true? A simile is a yet more honest type of metaphor. X as Y or X like Y. Cute as a button. Poor as dirt. Pure as snow. Shake like a leaf. Grow like a weed. Like flies on shit. Like lovers do. Like nothing on Earth. It is crystal clear that a metaphor & a simile are a similar type of speech act, with only certain words (is/of & as/like) which keep the act of expressing verbal comparison in two formal categories. A simile is merely a particular type of metaphor. Meta contains more gravity. A

metaphor is essentially a lie. These two things are not each other, but are exaggerated to be so, to infer their similarity, to suggest their complimentary natures. A simile is however closer to a truth in that it says outright two things are 'like' each other but are separate. Meta carries the added weight of the thing-in-itself. The metaform, to be curt, 'the thing that studies itself' can be found in precise permutations, portions of composition, fragments in fiction admitting artifice, moments during cinema that reveal all that is behind the ominous fourth wall. The writer writing about the act of writing. The portion of a painting which contains another canva(s)s being painted. The television audience watching television. The film about a filmmaker making a film. The music lyrics referencing their own genre: "I've got the blues" due to this reflexivity being so readily found & increasingly utilized ad nauseum as the prior century progressed inwardly toward the deadend labyrinth of excavating ones medium. Précis redundant summary: A simile infers for us; a metaphor allows us to infer. Both provide a way of understanding an abstract by congruity. Whereas the metaform is all ways in which a media can carry the presentation of aspects of its medium. Beyond these even, pataforms propose an odd way of understanding an abstract by way of incongruity, with methods of expression that have the potential to transcend 'medium' itself. Rather than play within, it blooms from out, eclipsing its roots. pata. The etymology of pata, a French pun made of a contraction of the Greek ἐπὶ μετὰ ('epi meta'), translates malleably as either: 'that which is beyond the beyond', a meta of a meta; but also 'that which is altered after what is already meta', or 'post-meta'. Cockney rhyming slang is a type of pataform. The phrase 'apples & pears' rhymes with 'stairs', therefore in Cockney 'going up the apples' is said instead of 'going upstairs'. Here we see an essential aspect of the pataform, the twice-remove, obscuring its own origin."

(Anonymous Party)

Daumal's 'pataplasm' and 'patagrams' opens up how the meta-physical turns into mere shadow pataphysically.

"...in connection to this Treatise, especially its first part, "Treatise on Pataphotograms." Harfaux had devoted himself to this photographic procedure (a photograph obtained without a camera through the placement of objects directly on photosensitive paper exposed to light), and Daumal also took great interest in the method and experimented with it himself. Although Man Ray's earlier work with photograms (which he named "Rayographs") is better known in the history of photography, Harfaux's contributions to the medium were not negligible, and the fact that the photogram is a negative shadow image, which is very much in keeping with the "Everything - x" theme Daumal had introduced in his earlier pataphysical essay, acts as a visual illustration of how he conceived the general notion of a pataphysical supplementary universe (the negative, "inside-out world"). The opening "Treatise on Pataphotograms," then, could be read as something of a photography handbook through a pataphysical lens."

(p.xvii, Daumal)

For this might be the peril of one reading of Daumal's pataphysics.

"For Daumal, then, pataphysics is what enables the individual to attain the Universal: it leads from the concrete particularities of physics to the universality of metaphysics, and thus lies between them. This was an evident difference from Jarry's claim that pataphysics extended as far beyond metaphysics as metaphysics extended beyond physics; what for Jarry had been the

ultimate endpoint of pataphysics and the ultimate expression of the failure of metaphysical solutions, for Daumal was but a starting point toward a new brand of metaphysical solution. It was specifically for this reason that Daumal's friend, Julien Torma, berated him..."  
(p.xvi, Daumal)

The only way to prevent this "metaphysical solution" reading of Daumal would be to recall the more pataphysical context of the metaphysical. The antinomy of the spinning pataphinge that deconstructs dialectical binaries.

"Pataphysics is the science of the realm beyond metaphysics; or, 'Pataphysics lies as far beyond metaphysics as metaphysics lies beyond physics-in one direction or another.'  
(p.8, Jirgens & Cantsin, et. al)

Bök even gives us a brief outline of patamathematics.

"Oulipo resorts to 'pataphysics in order to suggest that even a mechanic calculus has the potential to generate the novelty of anomaly. Just as science might propose rigorous systems for producing innovative knowledge, so also might poetry propose rigorous systems for producing innovative literature. Like the Futurists, who explore the molecularity of a mechanic language, so also do the Oulipians resort to a lingual atomism in order to imagine their own anagrammatic radicalities. Such an axiomatic condition provides the basis for a 'pataphysical mathematics, whose ludic rules oppose the royal science of structural linguistics. Such nomad(ismo) science suggests that the mathesis of anagrams can subtend a cybernetic literature of the future (the potential of which has already been portended by such novelties as hypertexts and videogames)."  
(p.140-141, Bök)

### **File (±): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

"Gödel, Escher, Bach", "Metamagical Themas", and "I Am A Strange Loop";

by Douglas Hofstadter

"Speech and Phenomena";

by Jacques Derrida

"The Phantom Tollbooth";

by Norton Juster

"Pataphysical Essays";

by René Daumal

"Zero: The Biography of a Dangerous Idea";

by Charles Seife

"Pataphysics: The Poetics of an Imaginary Science";

by Christian Bök

"Martin" (1978) by George Romero

<http://pataphormagazine.com/what-is-a-pataphor>

<https://yetemonamone.wordpress.com/2012/11/physics-of-the-impossible-by-michael-kaku1.pdf>

<https://www.lib.latrobe.edu.au/ojs/index.php/tlg/article/view/122/117>

<https://plus.maths.org/content/not-carrot>  
<http://pataphormagazine.com/meta-->-pata>

## **Framing Transmedia Games**

A paleonymic detournement of transmedia by expanding beyond all limits/ends and deconstructing the nesting doll Gesamtkunstwerk approach to mediums in media theory (every medium prior to cinema into cinema, into intermedia/multimedia, into (post-)conceptual/post-



medium) by playing with feedback/strange loops for 'tangled hierarchies'. But first a quickie outline of the term 'transmedia' in contemporary new media theory...

"Transmediality is a term used in intermediality studies, narratology, and new media studies (in particular in the collocation 'transmedia storytelling' derived from Henry Jenkins, to describe phenomena which are non-media specific, meaning not connected to a specific medium, and can therefore be realized in a large number of different media, such as literature, art, film, or music. The medium from which a given phenomenon originated is either irrelevant or impossible to determine; it is not an adaptation of a phenomenon from one medium to another.

[...]

media-unspecific phenomena that can be carried out in different media with the means of the respective medium, without the assumption of a contact-making source medium being important or possible.

[...]

In her theory, the concept of transmediality is differentiated from the two opposing concepts of intramediality and intermediality. She defines intramediality as the quality of phenomena which occur only within one medium, while intermediality describes the quality of phenomena which can move in between two or more media, that is, which transgress media boundaries. The important distinction between intermedial and transmedial phenomena is that an intermedial phenomenon has a clear origin medium, while a transmedial phenomenon does not, it is non-media specific. Werner Wolf adopted Rajewsky's term transmediality in his intermediality theory and defined it similarly, saying that transmediality "concerns phenomena that appear in more than one medium without being (viewed as) specific to, or having an origin in, any of them. The difference is that in his approach, transmediality is defined as a subcategory of intermediality, next to intermedial transposition (e.g. film adaptation of a novel), intermedial reference (e.g. imitating film in a novel) and plurimediality (e.g. graphic novels). It is therefore not a separate and opposing concept, but a kind of extracompositional intermediality, that is, relations between media that involve more than one work or composition.

[...]

In narratology and new media studies, the term transmediality is frequently used to refer to the concept of transmedia storytelling, which was coined by Henry Jenkins in 2006. Transmedia storytelling is the technique of unfolding a story across multiple media platforms, "with each new text making a distinctive and valuable contribution to the whole." This is often done, for instance, by extending the story of a film in a computer game or TV series. Less frequently, the term transmediality is also simply defined as "the state of being represented in multiple media." By this definition, any content which occurs in more than one medium is transmedial, which includes adaptations. For some scholars, the term expresses the process of the transfer of content from an origin medium to a target medium, the transition from one media specific expression to another."

(Wiki)

Talk about the medium is the message! Once more for transmediation...

"From McLuhan's definition, it is possible to infer the definition of transmediation could involve at least two different dimensions: a sensory and semiotic translation. When referring to medium as a sensory mode, transmediation would require to move between sensory modes (e.g., visual to

aural, aural to tactile). When referring to transmediation as semiotic translation, transmediation can refer to the process of "responding to cultural texts in a range of sign systems -- art, movement, sculpture, dance, music, and so on -- as well as in words." Transmediation may utilize more than one media form. All the components of a transmediated work are interlinked with each other to form the whole network. Therefore, transmediated works are closely linked to semiotics and technology in the context of digital media. Transmediation can include response to traditional printed texts, as well as multimedia materials including video, animation, a website, a podcast, a game, etc. Transmediation is closely linked to semiotics, which is the impact study of signs. Academic researchers and educators interested in transmediation are often also interested in media literacy, visual literacy, information literacy, and critical literacy. Leonard Shlain highlights the importance of engaging students in the process of transmediation when writing, "Digital information comes in multiple forms, and students must learn to tell stories not just with words and numbers but also through images, graphics, color, sound, music, and dance. There is a grammar and literacy to each of these forms of communication. Bombarded with a wide variety of images regularly, students need sharp visual-interpretation skills to interact with the media analytically. Each form of communication has its own rules and grammar and should be taught in ways that lead students to be more purposeful, specific, and concise in communicating."

(Wiki)

Jenkins gives the seemingly broadest etymological ambiguity of 'transmedia' as "across media" as we've mentioned prior, but the hyperreal transfinite paleonymic detournement of transmedia again would involve going beyond all of its ends/finitude playing on a PNT take on the Russel's paradox.

"Transmedia, used by itself, simply means "across media." Transmedia, at this level, is one way of talking about convergence as a set of cultural practices. Keep in mind that Marsha Kinder in *Playing with Power* wrote about "transmedia intertextuality", while I was one of the first to popularize the term, transmedia storytelling. Transmedia storytelling describes one logic for thinking about the flow of content across media. We might also think about transmedia branding, transmedia performance, transmedia ritual, transmedia play, transmedia activism, and transmedia spectacle, as other logics. The same text might fit within multiple logics."

(Jenkins)

The deconstruction of 'transmedia' paleonymically disseminated as hyperreal 'transmedia games' remains a recursive pataphysical double-bind of gestural deconstruction.

"Paleonymics

Derrida begins to introduce this word into his work in 1972. It is his invention. By a characteristic inverse irony, then, the new word paleonymy comes to designate a certain operation according to which one continues to put old words to work. By that time the (old) word deconstruction had caught on but Derrida seems intent on introducing this alternative alongside it, a kind of repetition with a difference. It's the risk laden use of old terms that he focuses on in the opening section of *Dissemination*, his "book" of 1972 (which contains the acknowledged "great" readings of Plato and Mallarmé). The "opening section," called in the English translation "Outwork" (from the French "Hors livre," literally "out [or outside the] book") is not quite a preface; but it focuses

for its subject matter on the problem of pre-faces. (We could argue—and I'm certain that this is the intention—that it plays the role of a preface in the theatrical sense). The old word—in the sense that Derrida is concerned to demonstrate—plays a role that mobilizes what he calls the “structure of the double mark” (we've talked about the structure of the mark and its difference from itself in its repetition): Caught—both seized and entangled—in a binary opposition, one of the terms retains its old name so as to destroy the opposition to which it no longer quite belongs, to which in any event it has never quite yielded, the history of this opposition being one of incessant struggles generative of hierarchical configurations. (Dissemination 4). The opposition between speech and writing, and that between the signified and the signifier, have both, by this time, undergone considerable deconstruction. Writing, once the name for the little inscriptions that were always supposed to have represented spoken words symbolically, now designates the basic conditions that underlie the entire field of meaning and (tele-) communication (all communication is already tele!). When one speaks, one performs a kind of writing. The hierarchy generated by the opposition has crumbled. One can no longer put speech ahead of writing; or the presence of my meaning ahead of its representation in words. Writing, in other words, is an old word with a new significance. It now stands in—amongst several other terms—for that which is absent and has no name: trace. “Trace,” of course, is an old word too. To reread the texts of 1967, particularly, is to witness the theatre of this agonistic couple (speech and writing) fighting it out, desperately trying to name something absent. The important thing to remember about these old words with new roles to play is that they do not themselves escape “the double mark” effect but, rather, they mobilize it: The rule according to which every concept necessarily receives two similar marks—a repetition without identity—one mark inside and the other outside the deconstructed system, should give rise to a double reading and a double writing. Writing both names the little inscriptions that represent words but it also marks the absolute nameless “outside” of the system without which there'd be no words to represent. It names and marks at the same time. To recap, paleonymy is a new name for old words (like writing) that operate both inside and outside the system to which they problematically belong. There would, of course, be no paleonymics without the mobilization of these problematic old words, so it's not a matter simply of refuting or denying the senses given to them by the tradition. These are exactly the senses that help the work of paleonymy along (which “critiques, deconstructs, wrenches apart the traditional, hierarchical opposition”). Derrida also acknowledges the “risk” involved in paleonymics: “the risk of settling down or of regressing into the system that has been, or is in the process of being, deconstructed”. One must therefore acknowledge the risk: “to deny this risk would be to confirm it: it would be to see the signifier—in this case the name—as a merely circumstantial, conventional occurrence of the concept or as a concession without any specific effect”. The risk of using an old name is that one might be accused of simply playing with language, substituting synonyms. If an old name is really to “designate something absent that is nameless” (in Althusser's evocative phrase) it must do so as part of the system (always a given historical hierarchy of forces) to which it must be located and for which reason it has the power to force open. Writing works for Derrida as a forceful lever in the logic of paleonymics because the opposition to which it belongs constitutes “a dissymmetric, hierarchically ordered space whose closure is constantly being traversed by the forces, and worked by the exteriority, that it represses: that is, expels and, which amounts to the same, internalizes as one of its moments”. The old word, then, has been articulated by a

system of oppositions as belonging to it but in fact tends to designate—in moments of tension and struggle—moments that cannot in fact be contained by that system. Against this, to cling (as one might cling to a fetish) to the old word—especially if it has now gained some transgressive force (and don't forget that transgressive force is always fashionable)—might simply be to confirm the opposition once again but in reverse, championing now the autonomy of the signifier—or the materiality of the mark—in the belief that one has critiqued the previous hierarchy out of existence simply by overturning it.”  
(Phillips)

### **File {{{{}}}): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmediality>

<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transmediation>

[http://henryjenkins.org/2011/08/defining\\_transmedia\\_further\\_re.html](http://henryjenkins.org/2011/08/defining_transmedia_further_re.html)

<https://courses.nus.edu.sg/course/elljwp/deconstruction&paleonymy.htm>

## **Hypersitions, Occult Postmodernism & Cyber-Psychogeography: The KLF, Discordianism, Thee Temple Ov Psychick Youth & Church Of The Subgenius**

Discordianism only remains of interest if one considers its underlying nihilism and pataphysical absurdity and humor, any metaphysical misreading seems naive and gauche.

"Discordianism is often described as being either an elaborate satire disguised as a religion or an elaborate religion described as a satire, a description which wrongly assumes that it cannot be both at the same time. It certainly was a joke, of course, at least to start with. The whole concept was an atheist satire or, at most, a way to deal with nihilism by wrapping it up with a Goddess and a sense of humour. As events unfurled and strange synchronicities began to stack up, however, it became harder and harder to claim that what was going on was 'just' a joke." (Higgs)

Disordianism's Operation Mindf\*\*k gets paralleled by Neoism as the "Great Confusion" ("3 a.m. Time Is Eternal!" "It's Always 6 O'Clock!"). The KLF as mentioned prior are at the crossroads of these problematics on a *dérive* to the void of "The White Room", much like their other album "Chill Out" is portraying a mythical night-time *dérive* throughout the U.S. Gulf Coast states, beginning in Texas and ending in Louisiana.

"With that in mind, a further claim in Information Sheet 8 is worth noting. Drummond and Cauty claimed that their solicitor was sent... ...a contract with an organization or individual calling themselves 'Eternity'. The wording of this contract was that of standard music business legal speak, but the terms discussed and the rights required and granted were of a far stranger kind. "Whether The Contract was a very clever and intricate prank by a legal minded JAMS fan was of little concern to Drummond and Cauty," Information Sheet 8 continues.... For them it was as good a marker as anything as to what direction their free style career should take next.... In the first term of The Contract they, Drummond and Cauty, were required to make an artistic representation of themselves on a journey to a place called THE WHITE ROOM. The medium they chose to make this representation was up to them. Where or what THE WHITE ROOM was, was never clearly defined. Interpretation was left to their own creativity. The remuneration they are to receive on completion of this work of art was supposed to be access to THE "real" WHITE ROOM. The pair claim that they went on to sign this contract, despite the advice of their solicitor to have nothing to do with it. It is worth noting at this juncture that Cauty and Drummond were ignorant of Operation Mindf\*\*k. Their sole knowledge of Discordianism came from Illuminatus!, which Cauty had never read and which Drummond had not, at that time, ever finished. By signing any such contract they were not simply 'playing along', for they would have had no context for what the contract was, or where it had come from. In this reading of events, Drummond and Cauty appear to have taken a Discordian Operation Mindf\*\*k prank letter at face value, and spent hundreds of thousands of pounds making a piece of work that would fulfil their part of a hoax contract that they chose to sign. As to what the 'real' White Room which the contract alluded to was, Drummond and Cauty were typically candid: "Your guess is as good as anybody's." In Discordian terms, however, the meaning is relatively clear. The White Room refers to illumination, or enlightenment. The word 'room,' however, is interesting. The use of a spatial metaphor defines enlightenment as a place that can be travelled to, or sought in a quest. The search for the White Room becomes a pilgrimage, with the White Room itself taking on the character of the Holy Grail. Drummond and Cauty's film, when seen in this light, becomes a

means to an end. The White Room was not intended as a film that would make money or enhance their careers. It was, instead, a step along the path in a search for enlightenment.” (Higgs) “Discordianism is, at its heart, wilfully contradictory. It claims that chaos, confusion and uncertainty are the true nature of reality. This claim does tend to raise the question as to how Discordianism itself, and all the assumptions that it is based on, can be accepted with any authority. Or to put it another way, if someone tells you that there can be no certainty, then believing in what they've told you becomes a paradox. Hill and Thornley were not put off by such problems. If anything, they enjoyed them. As they developed their ideas over the following years, they found that there were ways around such things, if they only kept their sense of humour about them.”

(Higgs)

Thee Temple Ov Psychick Youth's positive pagan nihilism parallels the pataphysical underlying the magical and the postmodernity of the pagan, similar to the alchemy of Neoism.

“TOPY is... .. action against dissatisfaction in a society that is passive not peaceful (aiming for the throat) From the Institute Of Positive Pagan Nihilism to the passionate process that enfolds (but does not control) there is hope through energy. Energies directed and multiplied, energies conformed then deformed, energies facilitating psychick enemas. To purge and purify, to pain and putrefy. To communicate is to cure.”

(HL)

Although Home may consider them mostly occult randoms, that tENTATIVELY a cONVENIENCE is a saint of the Church of the Subgenius may seem less obscure when considering 'Slacks' attempt to combat the 'discarnate effect'. With the latter acting as a prestaton/brainwashing of conformity as a side effect to the deterritorialization of the body by electronic media/screen effect where the body is dismembered into the non-site of the 'post-body', a body-without-organs. The detournement of this conformity is what the de-maintenance (or undermining) of reality maintenance traps in PNT involve.

“Led by The Secret Council of Ten, The Conspiracy has allegedly robbed mankind of its humanity through the use of electronic media, a strategy known as the "discarnate effect.”

According to Church lore, Bob's purpose is to overcome The Conspiracy; this he has accomplished by attaining "Slack," the SubGenius term for enlightenment. Bob is now living in Toronto, where he fights his never-ending battle against The Secret Council and its unwitting lackeys, known as "Pinks.””

(Bough & Dobbs)

In this way the Subgenius combats this museumification of the real, the maintenance of "visual space conditions" and its hauntological virtualization of space. “Inner cities there have basically deconstructed into war zones, and yet the people just don't question it.”

“The fact that we've killed the human dimension, that we've been devastated by this new horrific environment, that's the real Conspiracy.

[...]

The reason violence is in our future is because whole cultures are being wiped out by the discarnate effect of television, computers, satellites, radio, telephone, etc.”

(Bough & Dobbs)

Dobbs then gives two definitions of Slack linked to the psychotic/psychopathic,

“You know—that’s Slack—to be crazy and get away with it!

[...]

That’s Slack—to know the most extreme emotions and behavior without being trapped in it.

That’s what I call imagination.”

(Bough & Dobbs)

In his first printed interview, Dobbs contextualizes Bough; this (pataphysical) imaginary psychosis of Slack to the nihilistic underpinnings of The Church of the Subgenius.

“Anyway, the other theme is nihilism. If you define a nihilist as someone who believes in nothing except his or her own existence, then Bob could easily be dismissed as a nihilist.

[...]

In that situation, whole populations as well as individuals live in a state of fantasy. I have to come up with concepts that express the discarnate state. The concept here is that Bob is the most perfect, psychotic, and fanciful projection—in other words, the most nihilistic, the most happy and drugged out and most ecstatic person is the only way I can begin to match with my listeners to give them reference points, because they’re all experiencing that unconsciously.”

(Bough & Dobbs)

We see the naive metaphysicalist (even if remaining “nihilistic”) parallels to pataphysical imaginary (why Asher John cautioned against pataphysics taken as a religion) that a misreading of The Church of Subgenius like a “sister Church” of it “in self-organized gatherings under various names, among them: the Church of Skeptical Mysticism, the Temple of Ironical Faith, the Companions of Compassionate Nihilism, and the Brotherhood of Brother Void” can have.

“The Church of Skeptical Mysticism follows the path of daily affliction, not the path daily affirmation. While both are affirming in their own way, they follow radically different approaches to affirmation. Daily affirmations bathe you in light and manifest all that is positive. They promise that you can attract what you wish for by visualizing it. Afflictions make no such promises. They remind you that when you feel desperate and alone, you are. Afflictions mobilize the suppressed power of your dark side. If your inner child can help you cry again, just imagine what your inner critic, inner bigot, and inner psychopath can do to you.”

(Boyd)

The Church of the Subgenius like the contemporary Temple of Satan can get paralleled to “[...] the yippies, who in their day were derided as “Groucho Marxists” by humorless leftists [...]” where their hyperstitions turn into,

“[...] pure trolling -- an act of provocation in line with the founders of the Dada movement or the good-natured nihilism of the Church of the Subgenius than the free speech and anti-movements of the '60s.”

(Martin)

This is what distinguishes the pataphysically playful nihilism of the recombinant postmodern hauntological play of floating signifiers of the Church of the Subgenius from the mere underlying passive nihilism of postmodern cults/religions like Scientology which the Subgenius consider as party of "The Conspiracy".

"Scientologists are part of a larger organization known as The Conspiracy.

[...]

Scientology, meanwhile, is recognized by every government around the world as a real, legitimate religion, (NWO style) and has become the religion for the vast majority of citizens in every Western US state (until you hit Vegas). This, combined with the fact that Scientology's leader L. Ron Hubbard is still alive and well (and is just in hiding) has resulted in L. Ron Hubbard becoming the most powerful supraego on Earth. Under his wise pupilage, we are all moving towards a New World Order of pay-4-hell, entertainment, Politically Correct gentrified culture, of non-understanding, thought control and a worldwide slavery, united in the belief that the greatest threat to humanity is still the Church of Christ, even though most of its members have converted to agnosticism, nihilism, Judaism or Islam."

(Wikia)

Thus the intertextual interlinks also between Subgenius 'Slack' and the slack/slacking of postmodern nihilistic slackers (associated with 90s grunge and the Richard Linklater movie "Slacker"). While the Subgenius may make arbitrary distinctions between 'Original Slack' (a spoof on original sin) that supposedly The Conspiracy attempts to steal, 'False Slack' (of consumer sublimation), and the 'Involuntary Slack' of failure/setbacks. A hyperreal deconstruction of slacking (that the postmodern nihilistic slacker embellishes) is the indifferent patamechanical snobbery of Smith the eponymous long distance runner in Alan Sillitoe's "The Loneliness of the Long-Distance Runner" who as Baudrillard claims (in "For a Critique of the Political Economy of the Sign"), "is a very fine example, from a social and political point of view, of this ubiquitous counter-economy. The hero is an adolescent in a rehabilitation center who deliberately renounces a decisive victory in a running contest in order to avoid spreading any of the glory to his institutional oppressors. By losing, he preserves his own truth: here, failure merges with class revolt. Admittedly, in this story, the failure is explicitly deliberate, but it is not difficult to see how 'accidental' lapses and physical slips may acquire virtually the same meaning of denial and resistance [...]"

"Slack The SubGenius must have Slack! Slack is hard to define, but the SubGenius must have Slack! Slack is the main goal of the Church of the SubGenius. Bobbies and Pinks don't have any Slack. Only true Yetinsyny have Slack. Slack CAN be money, Slack CAN be Sex, but SLACK IS "Bob"! The Slack that can be described is not true Slack."

Not only do many of these "occult postmodern" problematics link to these parodistically mystical Post-Neoist contexts but also to the links between contemporary Accelerationism and "occult psychogeography", unfortunately often with a metamodern obliviousness.

"Nor does the kernel of this annealing Grey Hat Accelerationism (GHx) movement appear to accept the tomes of the great postmodernist philosophers wholesale in their opposition to Modernism (or anything else for that matter). Rather it displays an oscillation between Modernist and Postmodernist ideas. In the former case, this Modernist strain of thought includes concepts



such as rational thinking, technological progress and an objective purpose to life. In the later that 'the self' is influenced by social constructs, battles are won on Baumann's diagonal and language is both fluid and messy. In this regard, GHx will likely be considered metamodernist and largely have its roots in contemporary transhumanist (H+) and internet Futurology culture. A plethora of subreddits and blogs floating in the digital ether are exactly the type of breeding ground where we see this mode of thought emerging."

(Meltdown)

While no particular paradigm of Accelerationism is entirely palatable, the underlying postmodern nihilism remains palpable despite its skew towards association with neo-retro-fascists like Nick Land.

"This isn't lost on elements of the Lx movement however who attack the nihilistic stances of Land: The nihilism exhibited by Nick Land and his NRx acolytes looks anemic from where we're standing. NRx/Right Accelerationism is nihilism for cowards."

(Meltdown)

Though the psychogeography of technomancy/meme-magick opens up so many Oulipolian transmedia potentialities. Still all of this remains pataphysical so these recombinant hauntological "Gods" like Land's elder Lovecraftian gods or Gnon are still ripped a part, butchered by a Jack The Ripper cum Zhuang Zi's butcher with Lichtenberg's knife.

"In regards to the second point on religion, something interesting has taken place. Land has been a promoter of the idea of GNON . Gnon is no less than reality, whatever else is believed. Whatever is suspended now, without delay, is Gnon. Whatever cannot be decided yet, even as reality happens, is Gnon. If there is a God, Gnon nicknames him. If not, Gnon designates whatever the 'not' is. Gnon is the Vast Abrupt, and the crossing. Gnon is the Great Propeller. This concept has attempted to bridge the theological divide between traditionalist religious types in the NRx and Secular Atheists. And within the Alt-Right there have certainly been religious undertones just as there have with some who foresee a singularity culminating in an Omega point. As we saw during the run-up to US elections in 2016 and even beyond this, aspects of the Alt-Right and NRx adopted a belief in what can be described as Technomancy or as some call it "Meme-magick".

(Meltdown)

There are interesting parallels for exploration between a Neoism without Neoism, Neo-Futurism, Unconditional Accelerationism, and Nihilism.

"Garton points out other terms have been used to describe this non-socio-political-aligned understanding. However, he traces the roots of this purer form of Accelerationist thought back to the Ccru itself. Specifically Steve Metcalf's Neo-Futurism piece. The following excerpt from that text gives us a flavour of Metcalf's thoughts: Beyond the authoritarian mania of modernist econometric planning, and the nihilistic, self-referential third cycle damnation of the ultramodern NOW, NEO-FUTURISM tracks a double process: — (i) where the operational political, economic, and sociological codes of universalized humanity contract — to the point where, condemned to endlessly circulate in an interminable statistical survey, they finally collapse into a black hole where meaningless signs reduplicate themselves. This is the secondary process.

The humanities are in flames. (ii) The primary process: where the abstract, generic value of human intelligence migrates beyond the madreporic core of an organism regulated by the negative feedback of these archaic codes — becoming increasingly artificial and synthetic at intense speeds, converging on a future in which it has already been rewired. Here the “medium is the message”: a viral mechanism accelerating the replication of more of itself. Runaway capitalism; anarchic, “headless” self-organization. Invasion from the future. — Steve Metcalf If Metcalf has captured the essence of Accelerationism in its unconditional form it is that Accelerationism (at least as a mechanism of observation) is a looking glass to the fate of mankind. Through this term, we see the future as essentially an implosion following the technomical explosion. After the big bang, the big contraction. The true singularity, a one-dimensional point of huge mass in an infinitely small space where all physics’ laws are rendered null and void. Perhaps the final outcome of an intelligence spread like matter throughout the universe which collapses in on itself via a Big Crunch and divides itself by zero.

[...]

Garton in his article Unconditional accelerationism as antipraxis touches upon the unimportance of the human agent that embodies this Ux epiphany: The unconditional accelerationist, instead, referring to the colossal horrors presented to the human agent all the way from the processes of capital accumulation and social complexification to the underlying structure, or seeming absence of structure, of reality itself, points to the basic unimportance of unidirectional human agency. — Vincent Garton It is here the parting with the singularitarians can be found. Garton summarizes this divergence with one of Metcalf’s stances in a single sentence: He rejects the ‘idiotic gurglings’ of those transhumanist futurologists who claim they can rescue humanity from the explosion. — Vincent Garton Ultimately the Ux approach is to reject the collective assertion that Accelerationism can be controlled as said control is impossible. The system is uncontrollable due to its state of entropy and multiple feedback loops that feed said state.” (Meltdown)

In regards to the potential strange loops of ‘hypersigils’ we can see their expansion with ‘hyperstitions’.

“HYPERSTITIONS BY THEIR VERY EXISTENCE AS IDEAS FUNCTION CAUSALLY TO BRING ABOUT THEIR OWN REALITY — NICK LAND

[...]

Functioning as magical sigils or engineering diagrams hyperstitions are ideas that, once ‘downloaded’ into the cultural mainframe, engender apocalyptic positive feedback cycles — Delphi Carstens

[...]

Perhaps there is more than a grain of truth to Adam Curtis’ criticism of the hyper-normalized simulacrum type world we inhabit and how it feeds this collapse.”

(Meltdown)

The pataphysicality of theory-fiction and psychogeography gets emphasized by contemporary Accelerationism’s examples of occult cyber-psychogeography.

“[...] use contemporary research, theory-fiction and psychogeography to understand and influence the world around it.

[...]

Its members, of course, having read Marx, through Deleuze and Guattari, H.P Lovecraft, William Gibson and Philip K Dick had an eclectic number of influences from across political and fictional spectrums which can be witnessed in their writings. Meshing together fiction, number theory, voodoo, philosophy, anthropology, p(a)late tectonics, information science, semiotics, geotraumatism, occultism, and other nameless knowledges, in these pages the incomplete evidence gathered by explorers including Burroughs, Blavatsky, Lovecraft, Jung, Barker, J.G. Ballard, William Gibson, and Octavia Butler, but also the testimony of more obscure luminaries such as Echidna Stillwell, Oskar Sarkon, and Madame Centauri, are clarified and subjected to systematic investigation, comparison, and assessment so as to gauge the real stakes of the Time-War still raging behind the collapsing façade of reality. – Urbanomics — Description of Ccru writings from 1997–2003 However, the Ccru had no official specific political alignments as a group as far as we can discern but was channelled from a Left-wing origin (Deleuze) as Nick Land mentioned in a recent interview with syntheticzero.net: The original revival of accelerationism in the English speaking world comes about with the recapitulation of CCRU's take-up of Deleuze and Guattari's recapitulation of Nietzsche's accelerated process. In Deleuze and Guattari there's an explicit invocation of going in the direction of the market. At the origin, the CCRU was pushing this orientation in advance of a word accelerationism having yet been formed, which was done by a critic later. It was a Left position, because it was articulated by Deleuze & Guattari as an anti-capitalist political strategy. I don't think CCRU was revisionist about that. Deleuze and Guattari's accelerationism as the way to accelerate capitalism to its death was also CCRU-phase accelerationism. There was a suggestion that it came from the Right, because at that stage of its articulation it's impossible to differentiate Left and Right Accelerationism. – Nick Land, Interviewed at syntheticzero” (Meltdown)

Also of interest is the fatal strategy behind the transmedial nihilistic anti-praxis potentially involved.

“ If Ux then is arguably a continuation of the works of the 90s using the insights of multiple fields to understand the exponential change technomics is undergoing, then the manner it takes is one of a hands-off approach. It would appear that it's not a case of actively speeding up the Accelerationism process, but one of watching it unfold. It takes the position that the human is no longer at the centre of the equation but an input, merely part of the User class. That politics is largely window dressing. It is thus the study/recognition/acceptance of Accelerationism as an emergent property with an attitude/spirituality of what will be, will be — an anti-praxis. Anti-praxis is a mantra central to the nihilist chic of U/ACC. This idea of “letting go” and letting deterritorialization run its course is curiously theological.. – Preliminary notes on Acceleration and the Body, hypostition blog.

[...]

a nihilistic stance of unconditional acceleration.”  
(Meltdown)

All a part of hyperreal deterritorialization.

“This is the world where Accelerationism’s unwitting incubators unleashed Adam Curtis’ Hypernormalisation. The radical transformation and de-terr(I.T.)orization of the world by a technomic elite. Banks, computers, technocrats, the genesis of neo-China. A post ’68 world.” (Meltdown)

Meltdown also notes how cyber-psychogeography can detourne the overall ‘megastructures’ involved.

“The term psychogeography itself could be imagined as the set of alternate Protocol Data Units (PDU) that pass information between layers of the Stack, from User and City via Interface and Address layers and then down the Stack and back up to another User experiencing the hack via an Interface. It provides a User defined mechanism for how each layer can interact (often bypassing existing mechanisms) pulling tools from the psychogeographic toolbox including the *dérive* and culture jamming. An example of this in action can be seen with the quasi-fictional work by the Portals of London collective. The Guardian newspaper recently reported on one of their latest psychogeographic experiments regarding a time anomaly with the Woolwich tunnel. The creation of a fictional Interface to aspects of the City layer. The Guardian described it as follows: It’s a great example of the blurring of fact and supernatural fiction, presented as documentary fact. – Martin Belam, The time anomaly of the Woolwich foot tunnel and other portals of London” (Meltdown)

Where psychogeography has accelerated itself into a cyber-psychogeography.

“And through websites such as this, we see psychogeography has gone beyond merging the physical with the mythic. It can be seen how as a concept, psychogeography, found its way whether consciously or not onto the Web as cyber-psychogeography. Cyber-psychogeography can be envisaged as happening in its early years solely within the realm of the Internet. Initially, it would have described the world of the Web as the “online world” which was separated by physical barriers from IRL (In Real Life). However, it now goes beyond mere websites (including those that describe the physical world with their cartographic portrayals of the built environment). It now literally merges the concrete and digital. An intersection exists between cyber-psychogeography and psychogeography. Or perhaps better yet psychogeography has become cyber-psychogeography and the boundaries between the two are torn down. Areas of the Web have existed that adopt a mirage-like physical presence, the terms: address, location and so forth all use the terminology of the built world to describe a spectral place made of bits and bytes. But this mirage is blending with the corporeal. With QR codes and ambient computing impregnating a digital soul to the physical world. API’s connect the physical with the digital. VR overlays the digital onto the physical.” (Meltdown)

Whereby cyber-psychogeography assembles an array of imaginary solutions like hyperstitional culture jamming. In this regard the the transmedia game events ‘Post-Card Game Jams’ were (the hyperreal species of event) pseudo-events (much like ‘Zero-Sum Game No Shows’ remain ‘non-events’) which characteristically like advertising are beyond true/false distinctional self-fulfilling prophecies and thereby hyperstitional.

“What can be ascertained then with cyber-psychogeography is that it guides the User to interact via new Interfaces with the Address, City and so on via mediums that blend fiction and non-fiction. This interaction happens at two levels, the textual level (both material and digital) followed by the physical level. Closer examination of Accelerationism has revealed how Users within the Stack see an accelerating future unfold via a variety of mediums that refactor the parts of the Stack they operate in. When cyber-psychogeographic texts describe the world and result in self-fulfilling prophecies of physical interaction it becomes hyperstitional. When they take the next step and alter the world blending the cyber and physical it becomes hyperreal. And beyond psychogeography, we see other influences that draw upon mixing fact and fiction in the same text to construct a hyperstitional narratives and culture-jamming interactions with the Stack.”

(Meltdown)

It's no surprise then that The KLF's nothingness of the lost continent of Mu (a term for 'nothing' used in Zen) and Discordianism would get wrapped up in all this dissimulatory conspiracy.

“The Ccru was also known to indulge in blending fact and fiction in both the Sci-Fi/Horror sense but also with conspiracy/hoax like letters written by others but purporting to be about them (did the Ccru really write them one wonders?) as can be seen in CCRU Writings 1997–2003 —

“Who's Pulling Your Strings?” chapter. One mythology that also reoccurs in Ccru texts is that of the lost continent of Mu. The merry band of philosophers out of Warwick were not the only 90's denizens to experiment with the ideas of Le Plongeon and use them as a mechanism to influence other Users.”

(Meltdown)

And again while Meltdown may interlink all of this to various postmodern examples like 'Pataphysics but GHx's metamodern misreading egregiously overlooks the paradoxes entailed in such implications and falls short dwelling ironically in an absurd obliviousness.

“During the latter half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s, The KLF sometimes going by the moniker The Justified Ancients of Mu Mu and inspired by The Illuminatus! Trilogy books weaved esoteric concepts into their music and art which often included situationist and culture jamming aspects. Here we see evidence of how the Stack can be hacked using audio-visual components to provide a new User Interface. The Discordian and conspiratorial ideas expressed by the writers of the Illuminatus! Trilogy, the antics of the KLM, the Situationists, the wanderings of the psychogeographer and facade of mythology expressed by many Accelerationists can be articulated as further growths of a rhizome dating to the end of the 19th Century. The tendrils having passed through the post-modern philosophers, OULIPO, H.P Lovecraft, futurists and Alfred Jarry back to something of an origin with the symbolists. All of these groups provide ideas for hacking, annotating, understanding and/or speeding up the emergent Stack. All of these enumerated items can be combined with existing and hyperstitional concepts to amplify their effects.”

(Meltdown)

While GHx may portend to supersede it's merely psychogeographical predecessors, but by it's invoking of theory-fiction and Oulipo while metamodernistically ignoring the pataphysical

implications involved it falls flat by pussyfooting over the metaphysics of bourgeois frivolities of excess like ethics and the like with all that power-violence baggage.

“As demonstrated in our previous post the web has provided a vessel for psychogeography that goes beyond the writings of Guy Debord, Iain Sinclair and similar authors. GHx is not wedded only to the cyber-punk and Lovecraftian symbolism — although these certainly form a core part of it. When developing “it” in the form of theory-fiction we can imagine the GHx mythos being layered upon a type of Assembly language, from which its constituent parts can be built — essentially an algorithmic approach to writing. A constraint in an unconstrained world. Much like the *Ouvroir de Littérature Potentielle* (OULIPO) might have imagined.”

(Meltdown)

At least we can exappropriate GHx’s interlinking of patadata to the strange loops of infinite games as examples of fatal strategies for transmedia game Oulipolitan patamechanisms.

“This is the Users of the Stack’s programming language for hyperstitions and psychogeography, which in turn can be mapped onto the Holochain, blockchain or similar technology and then downwards into a hardware layer.

[...]

‘Pataphysics unsurprisingly has also begun to find its way into the world of technology.

Professor Andrew Hugill of Bath Spa University proposed the concept of a patadata format for search results. Better yet this format can actually be applied as exploration results, as demonstrated in the pataphysical search engine. It won’t be lost on those readers familiar with the Symbolists, that Oedipus was a figure often covered in their art. And nor will it be lost on those readers that he was an early example of a hyperstition/self-fulfilling prophecy, personified in Greek myth. Those who have delved into the tomes of Deleuze and Guattari, of course, will be familiar with the name from *Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia*, which along with their other works has had a discernible effect on Accelerationism. Our group of writers, the OULIPO over the course of their existence experimented with a number of algorithmic and constrained approaches to writing.

[...]

However, the concepts expressed by the Symbolists, Pataphysicists and their ilk are not constrained to leaf and canvas. There have been some individuals who have gone beyond quill and sable. They have applied them to what can best be described as living theatre, or better yet, infinite games.”

(Meltdown)

Such infinite games, psychogeography, and Oulipolitan patamechanisms for transmedial Trojan horse ploys. Like the pataphysician hoax that helps fuel contemporary conspiracy theories like that of the Holy Grail which again gets mentioned in the old *Re:Actions*.

“An example IRL

As we mentioned in our previous post the KLM incorporated aspects of the *Illuminatus!* Trilogy in their art. They weren’t the first, however. Some prior, merged psychogeography, myth, hoaxes and the techniques of the OULIPO to construct elaborate stories. In turn, their tales took on a life of their own, spawning yet more tentacle-like narratives, mysteries, hoaxes and psychogeographic quests. An example we shall look at takes us back to the mid-20th Century,

when the bubbling cauldron of artistic change was sweeping over France in the form of the OULIPO, Situationists and Pataphysicians. On the fringes of the OULIPO was a radio host, author and sometime actor known as Philippe de Chérisey. A pataphysician, satirist and lover of surrealism, de Chérisey was at the heart of a quasi-hoax with two other individuals, that would have a profound impact on Rennes-le-Château, a small village in South West France (and upon the bank account of a certain author known as Dan Brown in years to come). This is not the medium to pass judgement on the historical claims of de Chérisey and his companions, nor those who have come since. We'll leave that to the Historians and Archaeologists out there. For those interested in a critical look at some of the Rennes-le-Château mystery's constituent parts, you may be interested in reading *The Treasure of Rennes Le Chateau: A Mystery Solved*. Of course, the book that brought the story of Rennes-le-Château to the Anglophone world (and which some of you may have read yourselves) was Henry Lincoln's *Holy Blood Holy Grail* (which followed his *Chronicle* TV series on the same subject). Finally, in the early 2000s the story was resurrected once again with Dan Brown's *Da Vinci Code*, which caused quite a stir at the time for its challenge of the Catholic church and orthodox narrative of the crucifixion and resurrection. Anyone familiar with the subject, however, will tell you the likelihood of every player agreeing the mystery has been solved (or even what it truly is), is infinitesimally small, hence why it has evolved into something like a modern legend and infinite game combined. An infinite game, taken from the title of James P. Carse's book *Finite and Infinite Games* is described as: There are at least two kinds of games: finite and infinite. Finite games are those instrumental activities — from sports to politics to wars — in which the participants obey rules, recognize boundaries and announce winners and losers. The infinite game — there is only one — includes any authentic interaction, from touching to culture, that changes rules, plays with boundaries and exists solely for the purpose of continuing the game. A finite player seeks power; the infinite one displays self-sufficient strength. Finite games are theatrical, necessitating an audience; infinite ones are dramatic, involving participants. – *Finite and Infinite Games*, J. P. Carse

It's the evolution of the Rennes-le-Château tale into a modern legend/infinite game that is the hyperstitional quality we are interested in. Using tools from the OULIPO, psychogeographic and pataphysical toolboxes and arguably Situationist techniques, Philippe de Chérisey and his companions (the controversial figure Pierre Plantard and surrealist loving journalist Gérard de Sède) whether wittingly or not, went on to construct a 20th Century myth that many saw unfold in 'real time'."

(Meltdown)

With infinite games like hyperstition as examples of hyperreal transmedia game strange loops various Oulipolian potential patamechanisms open up further opportunities for the deconstruction of meta-narratives.

"Writer and illusionist Mariano Tomatis has done some of the more interesting research into the myth behind Rennes-le-Château. Rather than try and solve the puzzles following the conventional route, he's looked at the meta-narrative. That being, the construct that allows Rennes-le-Château (from this blog's perspective) to act as a hyperstition. Or if you please, a channel for many artistic and political techniques, that create a kind of hack upon Users in the Stack, and subsequently creating ripple effects. Tomatis was perhaps the first individual to suggest that the Rennes-le-Château myth was an infinite game. Although there was some

academic discussion around whether the players knew it was a game or not. If they didn't, did it really count as a game? Or was it some parallel act, sharing many similarities with said term? Further still and perhaps his most interesting insight can be read here. To quote from it: .. the idea that Rennes-le-Château is at the core of an Infinite Game (in the meaning of James Carse) and that the whole mythology condensed around the village is having a "measurable" effect on some people "immersed" in it, despite being made up of immaterial information."

(Meltdown)

In this way we could consider hyperstitions as an option for transmedia hauntological conjuring of simulacrum.

"Hyperstition is a positive feedback circuit including culture as a component. It can be defined as the experimental (techno-)science of self-fulfilling prophecies. Superstitions are merely false beliefs, but hyperstitions – by their very existence as ideas – function causally to bring about their own reality. Capitalist economics is extremely sensitive to hyperstition, where confidence acts as an effective tonic, and inversely. The (fictional) idea of Cyberspace contributed to the influx of investment that rapidly converted it into a technosocial reality. Abrahamic Monotheism is also highly potent as a hyperstitional engine. By treating Jerusalem as a holy city with a special world-historic destiny, for example, it has ensured the cultural and political investment that makes this assertion into a truth. Hyperstition is thus able, under 'favorable' circumstances whose exact nature requires further investigation, to transmute lies into truths. Hyperstition can thus be understood, on the side of the subject, as a nonlinear complication of epistemology, based upon the sensitivity of the object to its postulation (although this is quite distinct from the subjectivistic or postmodern stance that dissolves the independent reality of the object into cognitive or semiotic structures). The hyperstitional object is no mere figment of 'social construction', but it is in a very real way 'conjured' into being by the approach taken to it."

(Carstens & Land)

The postmodern implications of these hyperstitional "positive feedback cycles" of hype again evoke the abyss of strange loops.

"Hyperstition is a neologism that combines the words 'hyper' and 'superstition' to describe the action of successful ideas in the arena of culture. Akin to neo-Darwinist Richard Dawkins' concept of memes, hyperstitions work at the deeper evolutionary level of social organisation in that they influence the course taken by cultural evolution. Unlike memes, however, hyperstitions describe a specific category of ideas. Coined by renegade academics, the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU), hyperstition describes both the effects and the mechanisms of apocalyptic postmodern 'phase out' or 'meltdown' culture.

Functioning as magical sigils or engineering diagrams hyperstitions are ideas that, once 'downloaded' into the cultural mainframe, engender apocalyptic positive feedback cycles. Whether couched as religious mystery teaching, or as secular credo, hyperstitions act as catalysts, engendering further (and faster) change and subversion. Describing the effect of very real cultural anxieties about the future, hyperstitions refer to exponentially accelerating social transformations. The very real socio-economic makeover of western (and increasingly global) society by the hyperstitions of Judeo-Christianity and free-market capitalism are good examples of hyperstitional feedback cycles. As Nick Land explains: "capitalism incarnates hyperstitional



dynamics at an unprecedented and unsurpassable level of intensity, turning mundane economic 'speculation' into an effective world-historical force"(email interview).

Not only do the ideas themselves function as hyperstitions, but the trauma and fear engendered by their cultural 'makeovers' (whether in the form of crusade, jihad, secular war, industrial revolution or economic reform) merely serve to further empower the basic premise and fan the flames.

"Popular anxieties about the uncertainties of the future procured by rapid change are not merely the issue of ignorance," explains historian Felipe Fernández-Armesto. "Rather they are symptoms of a world in the grip of 'future shock'" (2001:556). Those who find change unbearable not only expect it to become uncontrollable but work to make it so by fanning the flames of paranoia. 'Future shock' is one mechanism whereby hyperstition works to bring about the causal conditions for apocalypse. Once started, a hyperstition spreads like a virus and with unpredictable effects. They are "chinese puzzle boxes, opening to unfold to reveal numerous 'sorcerous' interventions in the world of history," explains Land (CCRU.net).

It's not a simple question of true or false with hyperstitions, explains Land. Rather, it's a question of "transmuting fictions into truths". Belief in this context isn't passive. As the CCRU website explains, the situation is closer to the modern phenomenon of hype than religious or rational 'belief' as we'd ordinarily think about them. "Hype actually makes things happen and uses belief as a positive power. Just because it's not 'real' now, doesn't mean it won't be real at some point in the future. And once it's real, in a sense, it's always been" (CCRU.net).

"Hyperstitions by their very existence as ideas function causally to bring about their own reality," explains the CCRUs Nick Land. "The hyperstitional object is no mere figment or 'social construction' but it is in a very real way 'conjured' into being by the approach taken to it" (ibid). Even conventional historians allude to this process. As Fernández-Armesto cautions in *Civilizations* (2001: 544), "illusions – if people believe in them -change the course of history." (Carstens & Land)

To deconstruct these metamodern magics further, let us look at the metamodern spin on photography which both invokes postmodernity, deconstruction, and alchemy.

"More recently, Christopher Williams, with his meticulous studio photographs of high-end consumer camera equipment, sought to deconstruct our fetishisation of photographic technology itself. In the process, he created a feedback loop of sorts by simultaneously laying bare the transformative power of the photographic image, whilst utilising that very same trait to elevate his works towards a kind of (postmodernist) metaphysical pedestal (for, simply, they had become 'art'). Both Gursky's and Williams's works are fabulously seductive and alienating at the same time. Their continual mediation and remediation insists on an endless poststructuralist deferral of meaning, prohibiting any Romantic notion of transcendent artistic creation in or of itself. We might, by now, be forgiven for feeling lost in a sea of signifiers, where the only truth is that of the medium as the message. Where, then, could photography navigate from here? [...]

Bailes's practice has evolved from that of a landscape photographer, in the past using elegant lighting techniques to artificially illuminate and exalt the nocturnal scenery to which he is so often drawn. His journey owes as much to Caspar David Friedrich's Romantic quest for the sublime as it does Mondrian's attempts to distil the world to its very essence through

abstraction. Like the modernists before him, Bailes's art seems to pursue the Absolute. His enquiries, however, demand a speculatively subjective version of the Absolute, reborn with every reading. The titles of his works (The Informants, Report, Vessel, Recovery) reflect this subjective slant, alluding to photography's inherent tendency to conceal information by abstracting its subjects to an irreversibly two-dimensional plane, and by permitting the viewer access to only those facets deemed worthy by the photographer's flashlight. There is, then, an inherent contradiction at the heart of Bailes's processes. "I don't believe in abstraction", he tells me, "because I think the world is already abstract." For Bailes, the medium of photography has been thoroughly deconstructed, the rules of engagement long since agreed upon. On one level, he sees his compositions as the result of a series of binary decisions, as an empirical exploration of the world around. His aim is to show things as they are, to isolate his subjects in order to uncover a pre-existing autonomous or abstract nature. However, as he remarks of his works, "I like them for the reason that they are photographs, and they can only exist as photographs." He revels in the transfiguration of bare materials into this kind of transcendent image-state: a process seemingly irreconcilable with the desire to show things as they truly are. Nonetheless, I would argue, Bailes is able to satisfy both these needs, to swing between positions, by knowingly adopting the role of artist as metamodern alchemist, able to reveal and transform the world in equal measure. Photography, perhaps over and above painting, is the perfect vessel for such oscillatory activity. Its creations are able to flutter with perfect ease above the threshold of 'that which is' (the objectively photographed scene) and 'that which might be' (the subjectively transcendent image)."

(Turner)

Again, although claiming itself as an extension of this "thoroughly deconstructed" photography yet still fool-hardedly looks to reconstruct the "subject" with a wish to transform while overlooking the transformative deconstruction of "Duchamp's Transformers". Yet the "quasi-scientific investigation" and "unknown territories" of these photos with their "alchemy" do evoke the pataphysical.

"The sequence appears as if the result of some sort of quasi-scientific investigation; a homemade quantum slit experiment enacted upon the photographer's desk.

[...]

Across and beyond this, a taut black cord weaves its angular way through the space, layering further geometries atop the picture's bright white surface, whilst instating a sense of temporal and topographic movement. The ends of the cord are knotted firmly in place with intricate precision, and yet the path it navigates appears far more erratic and unresolved, exploring both the pictorial space and the minimal grey monolith as if they were unknown territories."

(Turner)

In addition to the multi-level megastructural detournement involved in cyber-psychogeography there's also various options for virtual/textual dérives, for instance 'cyberflânerie'.

"A cyberflâneur, by definition, strolls through the Internet. Little purpose guides his journey, and hours slip by as the individual explores the many different crevices of the ever-growing web, from Wikipedia to Tumblr, from popular news sites to Twitter, from obscure journals to social media. He crawls through them all and is all the stronger for it. How do you turn a corner into the

unknown online? You click a link. You go places. Who cares where? The cyberflâneur strolls more for the journey, the experience, the flow of the digital landscape, all to seek without any one destination or goal. He pokes around in Pinterest and dives into Digg, cruises Archive.org and gazes deep into Google Books, ventures into Vimeo and calculates Kickstarter potential. There's never been a better, more suitable time to be a cyberflâneur, after all."  
(Hendel)

This information cyberflânerie as Oulipolian patamechanism has accrued numerous texts for cut-ups/samples for all the various transmedia games we've played. The expanse of virtual rabbit holes remains vast.

"Choice rhetoric may paint a sad vista for the cyberflâneur to roam but the rabbit-hole mysteries through which the Internet user can tumble still exist -- and they've skyrocketed in the years since the late '90s, a time Morozov evokes as full of hope for cyberflânerie.

[...]

"I would posit that today's Flâneurs can be found in Web space," Steven Goldate wrote in 1998. "The Cyberflâneur 'strolls' through information space, taking in the virtual architecture and remaining anonymous."

[...]

In 2011, researchers in Calgary imagined "the information flâneur" struggling for meaning through the spaces of the Internet and called the old urban archetype an "inspiring lens" to help make sense of how we navigate online. The Internet provides ample opportunity to, as the old wanderers did in Morozov's words, "observe, to bathe in the crowd, taking in its noises, its chaos, its heterogeneity, its cosmopolitanism." The cyberflâneur continues to probe our online paths today, and I suspect the same will be true tomorrow."

(Hendel)

### **File (▲): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

"The KLF: Chaos, Magic, and the Band Who Burned A Million Pounds";  
by Daniel Higgs

<https://www.dailygrail.com/2013/05/the-strange-journey-of-the-klf/>

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[http://xenopraxis.net/readings/carstens\\_hyperstition.pdf](http://xenopraxis.net/readings/carstens_hyperstition.pdf)

<http://www.metamodernism.com/2012/05/09/photography-a-metamodern-alchemy-the-work-of-stuart-bailes/>

<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2012/02/the-life-of-the-cyberfl-neur/252687/>

## **There's No Wave: Non-Place/Non-Time, Post- Refere[n]tial Sound, Zero Culture, Deathly Ambiance & Haunted Graffiti**

Non-place/Non-time of the hauntological remains what haunts all of the (post-post-modern) metamodern attempts at recombination, reconstruction and nostalgia. Which gets so often overlooked in the headlong rush back to modernist mirages to salvage the lost object of meaning they lose grasp of like specters in the dismembered hands of Orpheus.

“Like its close relative psychogeography, hauntology originated in France but struck a chord on this side of the Channel. In *Spectres of Marx* (1993), where it first appeared, Jacques Derrida argued that Marxism would haunt Western society from beyond the grave. In the original French, “hauntology” sounds almost identical to “ontology”, a concept it haunts by replacing - in the words of Colin Davis - “the priority of being and presence with the figure of the ghost as that which is neither present, nor absent, neither dead nor alive”. Today, hauntology inspires many fields of investigation, from the visual arts to philosophy through electronic music, politics, fiction and literary criticism. At its most basic level, it ties in with the popularity of faux-vintage photography, abandoned spaces and TV series like *Life on Mars*. Mark Fisher – whose forthcoming *Ghosts of My Life* (Zero Books) focuses primarily on hauntology as the manifestation of a specific “cultural moment” – acknowledges that “There’s a hauntological dimension to many different aspects of culture; in fact, in *Moses and Monotheism*, Freud practically argues that society as such is founded on a hauntological basis: “the voice of the dead father”. When you come to think of it, all forms of representation are ghostly. Works of art are haunted, not only by the ideal forms of which they are imperfect instantiations, but also by what escapes representation. See, for instance, Borges’s longing to capture in verse the “other tiger, that which is not in verse”. Or Maurice Blanchot, who outlines what could be described as a hauntological take on literature as “the eternal torment of our language, when its longing turns back toward what it always misses”. Julian Wolfrey argues in *Victorian Hauntings* (2002) that “to tell a story is always to invoke ghosts, to open a space through which something other returns” so that “all stories are, more or less, ghost stories” and all fiction is, more or less, hauntological. The best novels, according to Gabriel Josipovici, share a “sense of density of other worlds suggested but lying beyond words”. For the reader or critic, the mystery of literature is the opacity – the irreducible remainder – at the heart of writing that can never be completely interpreted away. The whole western literary tradition itself is founded on the notion of posterity, which Paul Eluard described as the “harsh desire to endure” through one’s works. And then, of course, there’s the death of the author ... All this, as you can see, could go on for quite a while, so perhaps we should wonder if the concept does not just mean all things to all (wo)men. Steen Christiansen, who is writing a book on the subject, explains that “hauntology bleeds into the fields of postmodernism, metafiction and retro-futurism and that there is no clear distinction – that would go against the tension which hauntology aims at”. As a reflection of the zeitgeist, hauntology is, above all, the product of a time which is seriously “out of joint” (*Hamlet* is one of Derrida’s crucial points of reference in *Spectres of Marx*). There is a prevailing sense among hauntologists that culture has lost its momentum and that we are all stuck at the “end of history”. Meanwhile, new technologies are dislocating more traditional notions of time and place. Smartphones, for instance, encourage us never to fully commit to the here and now, fostering a ghostly presence-absence. Internet time (which is increasingly replacing clock time) results in a kind of “non-time” that goes hand in hand with Marc Augé’s non-places. Perhaps even more crucially, the web has brought about a “crisis of overavailability” that, in effect, signifies the “loss of loss itself”: nothing dies any more, everything “comes back on YouTube or as a box set retrospective” like the looping, repetitive time of trauma (Fisher). This is why “retromania” has reached fever pitch in recent years, as Simon Reynolds demonstrates in his new book - a methodical dissection of “pop culture’s addiction to its own past”. Hauntology is not just a symptom of the times, though: it is itself haunted by a nostalgia for all our lost futures.”

(Gallix)

It's then less surprising that the (musical) hauntology of Ariel Pink would go under the moniker "Haunted Graffiti" considering the hyperreality of graffiti remaining 'trans-artistic' and 'trans-ideological' much like Pink's "Life In L.A." remains a hauntological/psychogeographical conceptual *dérive* through L.A.. Transmedia games have many de-compositional Oulipolian patamechanisms to garner from various postmodern experimentation especially those of experimental composition. Where like Pink mentions, this assemblage of hauntology, 'haunted graffiti', like recording an album turns out as, "A game of roulette. If you work often enough, you create vision by default. It's not exactly a moment in time, because records don't happen in real time, but it's a kind of gelling of many things that happened at a certain time."

"Credited as the founder of Chillwave, Ariel Pink was also central to hauntology (it's now often forgotten that much of the initial discussion of hauntology was prompted by Pink's records) and he is the single most significant influence on hypnagogic pop, which seems to be similarly poised between FM rock, MTV and the avant-garde. In Ariel Pink's music, the past is simultaneously invoked and obstructed: fragments of what seem to be familiar rock and pop jewels are tantalisingly veiled behind multiple layers of distortion and effects. The name "Haunted Graffiti" perfectly captures the appeal of Ariel Pink's sound: it is psychedelic as well as spectral, spray-paint-vivid as well as ectoplasm-insubstantial."

(F/AP)

The spectral jumping out of frame of such 'Haunted Graffiti' gets linked to the abyssal postmodern sublime.

"I realised since my early youth that I had an affinity for it, that it had an odd effect on me, something akin to learning about memory for the first time, and being able to realise upon reflection, that something that was part of you, like a song, had a resonating effect back then. Something isn't the same any more. You've lost the feeling that it initially gave you, before you even knew you'd enjoyed it. Maybe the first time you hear it, it blows your mind, or maybe it just seeps in. I relish the moment when I hear something that I hadn't heard before, and I know right then that I'm going to be singing it in the street. You can't wait for the effect of being introduced to something you've never heard before. That sublimeness, it's at the core of you."

(F/AP)

Hauntology's intertextual links to Afrofuturism also gives context to a further deconstruction of Ishmael Reed's "Mumbo Jumbo" (with its inspiring of P-Funk and thereby G-funk as well as many other sub/microgenres including vaporwave, and the parallel utopian developments of black power/Black Panthers, syndicalist-illegalism/"gang culture", to accelerationism/"net culture").

"There has always been an intrinsically "hauntological" dimension to recorded music. But Derrida's concept of hauntology has gained a new currency in the 21st century, when music has lost its sense of futurism, and succumbed to the pastiche- and retro-time of postmodernity. The emergence of a 21st century sonic hauntology is a sign that "white" culture can no longer escape the temporal disjunctions that have been constitutive of the Afrodiasporic experience since Africans were first abducted by slavers and projected from their own lifeworld into the

abstract space-time of K/Capital. Time was always-already out of joint for the slave, and Afrofuturism and hauntology can now be heard as two versions of the same condition.“  
(p.1, Fisher)

The way in which transmedia game's textual archived lost-objects/hypermades implode the reader/writer (listener/composer) or addressee/addressor/channel distinction breaking the 4th and 5th walls (Breaking the fourth wall [paratext] occurs when actors/narrators reference the audience or the fact that they are in a performance. Breaking the fifth wall [epitext] is similar, but it occurs when the actors/narrators reference their previous works, or their lives outside of the performance.). Can be likened to Brian Eno's "wallpaper" approach to ambient music as an extension of Satie's furniture music to simulate a non-site of non-place/non-time.

"Ambient music must be able to accommodate many levels of listening attention without enforcing one in particular, it must be as ignorable as it is interesting."  
(Eno)

Parallel to indeterminate composition like Cage's 4'33" or Christian Wolff incorporation of the environment in composition/performance is Eno's ambient incorporation of the environment in the consumption (i.e. listening) of the mass produced archive/lost-object (i.e. the record album). Such a vast influence of these considerations for instance the chill out sounds of The KLF and their contemporaries The Orb, or the ambient microsounds of the genre 'Lowercase' and the free improvised sounds of nothing/"quiet noise" of the genre "Onkyokei".

"This presented what was for me a new way of hearing music – as part of the ambience of the environment just as the colour of the light and sound of the rain were parts of the ambience."  
(Eno)

It's no wonder then that early 2010s Pataproxy, White Colours and Dark Trace \$creen transmedia game releases were occasionally tagged, in their indefinability, on SoundCloud as noise, post-vaporwave, or 'death ambient', with the latter's temporary Wikipedia page even including mention of Pataproxy at some point. Not surprising, since goth music (with its death, occult and supernatural imagery) of all varieties (like Cramer's mention of post-punk and the like as 80s era avant-garde movements) embody a hyperreal postmodern nihilism, regardless though, all genres must get deconstructed.

"The pessimistic and apocalyptic language of postmodern theory has much in common with the music of goth bands, and as Walser has shown with heavy metal as well. Baudrillard, for example, speaking during the early 1980s stated "Our emotional mood oscillates between boredom and terror and its psychological signs are decomposition." Given the imagery, lyric content of the songs, and musical devices employed, the connection between goth (and most other British subcultures) and such a statement should be obvious as I have explained in Chapter 2. The writings of Baudrillard and the music of goth artists share the same level of cynicism in their descriptions of contemporary living: "an incoherent cowboy film modernity: concrete, dust, duty-free, transistors, petrol, computers and the hubbub of useless traffics—as though the silence at the ends of the earth had to be obliterated. All that is inhuman here is sublime in its natural desolation. All that is human is sordid, civilization's waste. There is some justice in the fact that modern man treats himself as a waste product." Goth artists, by

embracing visual and musical symbols of decay and ephemerality, underscore this idea of people as a waste product to an even greater degree than punk groups did. However, one could argue that the tone of their music reflects a sense of resignation, demonstrating the principle that people generally desire signs more than revolution.”  
(p.212, Mueller)

Postmodern gothic intertextuality musically parallels its ambiguous undefinability as a coherent “subculture”. This intertextuality between postmodern sounds like punk, post-punk, goth, grunge and metal (the pataphors of Warrant’s “Cherry Pie” music video) are reemphasized by their contemporary evolutions, for instance The Horrors’ garage goth cover of “Jack The Ripper” (a proto-punk/proto-goth song by Screaming Lord Sutch).

“I agree with Jameson’s statement that the awareness of past styles is part of the experience; goth music plays upon the public’s knowledge of Poe, gothic films, and cabaret, and I agree that the ensemble of different styles is designed to be as stimulating as possible.”  
(p.214, Mueller)

This nihility of the hauntology of the postmodern gothic’s hyperreal intertextuality influenced a vast array of experimental composition such as the hypnagogic pop of Ariel Pink and thereby plagiarist extensions of plunderphonics like vaporwave with its anamorphic distorting of samples. All of these hauntological strategies of artifactuality and actuvirtuality are deployed in transmedia games, much like many of the releases from the open patacollective/context Pata-No UN LTD and its milieu of open patacollective/context pseudonyms like Pataproxy, White Colours and Dark Trace \$creen include sampling from these amongst (m)any other genres. “One gets the sense that the goth style, constructed from so obviously appropriated signs and sounds, is a cynical celebration of unoriginality in the same way that Baudrillard claims that modern art is formality elevated into a perverse aesthetic value.

In Chapter 4, I explained how goth artists and fans identified with characters in early black and white and B-level horror films, and the situations that they found themselves in. Postmodern theorists would probably describe this relationship as an unfortunate characteristic of the time period where people feel they have more in common with what they see on the screen than anything in real life.

[...]

Also, it should be noted that goth bands wrote songs about films in a way that drew attention to the fact that they were based in an artificial reality and popular ephemeral culture. This can be seen in the way bands treated film-based songs as studies in atmosphere, attempting, in postmodern fashion, to emulate musically the immersion of the video experience.”  
(p.216, Mueller)

Kantor’s exploration of new wave sounds and Home’s interest in punk are both documented. It’s even less surprising then that the early transmedia experimentation of Pataproxy would emerge from a hyperreal assemblage of post-avant-garde postmodern nihilistic activists pulled from syzygically from ‘Pataphysics, Neoism, Situationism, Fluxus, No Wave and the Cinema of Transgression? It’s also of interest that Eno helped produce the “No Wave New York” compilation LP.



"No wave music presented a negative and nihilistic worldview that reflected the desolation of late 1970s downtown New York and how they viewed the larger society."

(Wiki)

The anamorphic strange loop/feedback loops that Pataprox, White Colours, and Dark Trace \$creen deploy not only developed from the experimental music of Musique concrète to industrial music to plunderphonics to the underground like turntablism and shoegaze with its DIY use of elaborate innumerable effect pedals but also the post-referential sound of liquid media that Kroker's "Spasm:CD" explores, with its Duchamp approach to readymade sound that also presages with its play of recombinant sound the hauntology of vaporwave.

"When the liquid machinery is armed, a hyper-charged energy field is created in which the history of western music is suddenly touched by the elementary particle of charm. Western music goes recombinant. It is suddenly uplinked into a starlight horizon of a thousand billion data bytes, becoming a malleable object. Not a sound-object, that's too hard-edged, formalistic, and mechanical, but more like liquid sound, where noise melts down into a fluid, viscous material, endlessly combinatorial, following an indefinite curvature of violent velocity. We might have entered this universe of charmed sound through Duchamp's famous "gateway," through his brilliant mind plays with illusion and anamorphosis, but when we launch into the universe of recombinant music we have suddenly disappeared through Duchamp's gateway, and what he could only do by way of performance sculpture, we can actually experience sensorially. For what is Spasm: the CD, after all, but the android future predicted by Duchamp finally migrating beyond the prison-house of the plastic arts, and breaking into song, becoming a fantastic sound matrix to which our heads are only illusory optical referents? A new architectural space of music appears, what might be called sound anamorphosis, where android songs from Johnny Mnemonic and Aliasing to Windows and Madonna Mutant, actually serve as liquid gateways, hinges by which we can see in undistorted form what we have become in digital reality. In Spasm: the CD, understood as the recombinant history of Western music, we finally have a hard-driving, but immensely delicate and configured, auditory instrument for hearing our violent immersion in the liquid media of digital reality. This is Duchamp for the ears: a hinged world of sound partitions, displacements, aliasing in a process of endless reproduction.

#### Post-Referential Sound

Certainly not a world of referential finalities, the music hints at the definite termination of all referents. Consider this: before Spasm: the CD, we could still talk in comfortable terms about the pedigreed world of sound-objects, each with their own narrative history and enveloping rhetoric. After Spasm: the CD, however, the sound-object is actually vaporized, speed-processed into a purely relational process through a violent algorithmic manipulation. What emerges is not nostalgia for the lost continent of the sound-object, but the instant creation in Spasm: the CD of the world's first post-referential sound-object: an endlessly reconfigurable sound matrix. And this world of liquid sound turns out to have a very distinct personality. It is a cybernetic pathogen, part-predator/part-parasite, always engaged in a sadistic hunt for unlikely new sound combinations (Renaissance polyphony rubs against Einstürzende Neubauten, Jungle Brothers' Hip Hop is smeared across a sound background of fast spastic industrial jazz, metallic drones and whining machine drills alternate with the smashing sounds of imploding windows). It is also an android voyager that loves walking in the streets of a dirty materialism,

where the noise of Sleazomania culture meets the tight-assed, closed-sphincter tones of the highly-formalized music of high society.

[...]

Sound parasites don't exist outside of the text, but are integral to its logic. They race across the perfect matrix of recombinant sounds, infecting it with diseased noises, forcing it to come alive and confess its secret. The recombinant history of western music is about liquid sound-objects that are purely cynical, that are disappearing zones at the vanishing centre of sliding signifiers. Spasm: the CD is outlaw music, not simply because it challenges the sovereignty of the capitalist rules of private property (which would make its politics nostalgic), but because it takes recombinant culture on its own terms (Spasm's formal compositional strategies represent the advanced theoretical edge of digital reality), and then subverts the process by privileging the previously excluded figure of the parasite. Not the parasite as foreign agent, but the inner telematic parasite hidden at the digitally encrypted centre of every techno-mutant (from Madonna Mutant, Michael Jackson and Jesse Helms to Elvis and Seduction Miserere), the parasite virus that is triggered not as an invasive agent from the outside, but one that is armed from the inside. Spasm: the CD triggers the inner parasite enfolded in the digitally encoded logic of recombinant culture by pushing the process to its extremes, forcing it to reveal its excesses, compelling it to re-energize itself by rubbing primitivism against digitally perfected sound. (The secret ideology of Madonna Mutant is forced to the surface of sound consciousness by a compositional strategy of surplus excess, the inertia at the centre of John Zorn's hyper-jazz is disclosed by straining his music through android smart machines.)"

(p.58-61, Kroker)

Spasm remains part and parcel of the hauntological virtualization of referentiality, deconstructing them into organs without bodies.

"Organs without Bodies Spasm is a libidinal descent into this sea of liquid media populated by organs without bodies, a world of robo-theory, machine sex, virtual reality, electronic TV fibrillation, surveillance scanning, and recombinant culture where our bodies migrate daily, and especially nightly, to be processed and re-sequenced. A seductive descent of the body where the flesh flips open, and out fly all the previously hidden codes of human genetic history on their way to a fateful meeting With recombinant technology. Maybe it is no longer technology, as d genes finally coming alive and taking possession of us. And we adore it. For this is not a passive world, but a violent one: a universe of sacrificial violence, and we are its willing practitioners; a world that promises maximum information, wealth and mobility, but actually produces radically minimal understanding. Not anew universe of mass communication, but a society of alienated masses, radically independent of others, but uniformly dependent on elite command centres. A cold and antiseptic world of technologically constituted power where virtual experience means the sudden shutting down of a whole range of human experiences. Not really a new virtual world, but a fulfillment of the more ancient phallogentric dream of reco(r)ding experience with such intensity that the body floats away from itself, and in that universe of digital impulses finally alienates itself from its own life functions. Virtual reality is the exteriorization of the human genetic apparatus with such speed and violence that the body finally becomes its own techno-skin. Consider the cinema, which is, after all, how virtual reality is first inoculated into the system of liquid media: a site of low epistemological profile but mass emotional appeal.

It provides an already superseded electronic travelogue concerning how we have learned anew how to swim in the sea of data. And if we flock so eagerly to the cinema of virtual reality, it is because we have long ago recognized ourselves as mirrored images of special effects, spectral personalities floating within liquid media: data workers, practitioners of sex without secretions, floating tongues, memory minds, and fax hearing. Consequently, we can participate so enthusiastically in the crash cinema of Lawn Mower Man, RoboCop and Terminator 2 probably because these are less fateful images of a future not yet experienced, but vague intimations of a past forever eclipsed. For better or worse, we are the progenitors of special effects personalities. Crash bodies are always on the hunt for a new techno-thrill. Having long ago sworn off the neurosis of user-friendly technology as terminally boring, we've become frontier riders of a digital reality that always moves too inertially for our long-suppressed taste for the forbidden pleasures of telematic speed. We are on the hunt for abuse technology, for digital gear that can be strapped on or swiftly patched into our neural networks. Crash gear that will allow us to arm the liquid media, and trigger a dizzying array of special effects experiences." (p.41-43, Kroker)

Thereby imploding the binary of reality/culture at the zero degree through this metaconverting virtualization.

"To speak, then, of the world as the Baudrillardian scene is to articulate a primary political question: What does understanding Baudrillard have to tell us about our present situation of living out the end of the twentieth-century amid the excesses of zero-culture.

Zero-culture? That's the present age of high-intensity reactionary movements: a zero-culture where politics, culture, society and economy are driven backwards to the illusive, and always unobtainable, gold standard of zero. A cold, and deeply inertial, point of no difference, where just as in mathematics what is privileged is the fatal cancellation of the sign.

Zero-tolerance: the famous "war on drugs" where what is really targeted, particularly in the United States, is the population of African-Americans who become sacrificial victims, actually scapegoats, for all the anxieties of suburban white populations.

Zero-dissent: that's the politics of backlash against women as well as against the sexual rights of gays and lesbians. A sexual war that can be waged by the hysterical male against the social gains of the women's movement, and most certainly against the outlaw sexuality of gays and lesbians.

Zero-difference: that's the politics of "ethnic cleansing," a fundamentalist reaction against the difference of immigrants, ranging from the war cry of "Germany for the Germans" by attacking mobs of skinheads (supported by 51% of the German population who support the statement "Germany for the Germans") as they burn down immigrant hostels and Le Pen's National Front in France who can be vociferous in their denunciations of French immigrants because theirs is a return to a social policy of the degree-zero on the question of ethnic difference.

Zero-bodies: that's the haunting memory of the "disappeared" of Chile, Guatemala, Ecuador, Argentina and Peru. Not simply the exterminism of ethnic difference as in Europe, but something more perverse. A state policy of disappearances, where the body itself becomes a sign of annihilation.

And finally, zero-inflation: that's the class war that is waged everywhere against the poor, the unemployed, and certainly the working classes. Not so much an economic policy for a future

prosperity as an ideological campaign of class suppression where employment itself becomes an instrument of power.

Zero-culture, therefore, as our present. That political circumstance where ascendant forces of fundamentalism initiate warfare in the languages of race, class, sexuality, labour. Not so much the disappearance of the referents, but their recuperation under the banners of reaction. A politics of reaction that is waged in the sacrificial language of scapegoatism with appeals to spurious identity, and that can be so unrelieved in its intensity because it is in the way of a recuperation of illusory referents."

(p.151-152, Kroker)

In "Digital Delirium" the Krokers (who's hypermodernity model of hyper-nihilism has its own issues as Baudrillard notes, in a way due the specter of recombination as a hauntological one that the Krokers attempt to overcome, an attempted working around of deconstruction, into the realm of a Heideggerian post-metaphysical stopping short of the pataphysical nth degree) announce that "[...] there is no medium, and there certainly is no message." Instead of merely taking this as an affirmation of simply the 'post-media' of Guattari, looking to comments made later in the collection from Baudrillard on the undifferentiation/indifferentiation/indifference of media implies the hyperreal transfinite beyond its own ends of any medium's remainder, and thereby anticipates the transaesthetic play of transmedia games.

"I have some difficulty replying to this question because sound, the sphere of sound, the acoustic sphere, audio, is really more alien to me than the visual. It is true there is a feeling [word spoken in English] about the visual, or rather for the image and the concept itself, whereas sound is less familiar to me. I have less perception, less analytic perception, of this aspect. That is not to say that I would not make a distinction between noise and sound, but ultimately, in terms of this ambient world's hyperreality, this noosphere, I see it much more as a visualization of the world rather than its hypersonorization.

What can I say about the difference between the two? I have the impression that cutting across the world of McLuhan he too is very much oriented to the visual, of course, in spite of the fact that he was, I believe, a musician there is a small problem, which is that the different sensorial, perceptual registers tend, in this media noosphere, to conflate, to fuse together into a kind of depolarization of sensory domains. We speak quite rightly today of the audio-visual; we couple them together in some sort, some kind of amalgam or "patchwork". Perhaps I am led to view space in this way by my lesser sensitivity to the acoustic, but it seems to me that everything is summed up in a logistic which integrates all the perceptual domains in a way even more undifferentiated than before. Everything is now received in a manner that is indistinct, virtually indistinct, in fact.

The virtual is the kind of concept that is a bit cosmopolitan, if one can call it that; or postmodern, I do not know. In that respect, it is not about the gaze but the visual, it is not about the acoustic, but the audio. Besides, for McLuhan in fact, everything is ultimately reduced to the tactile.

Tactility is really that register of sense which is of the order of contact, not of physical or sensual contact of course, but a sort of communication contact where, right now in fact, there is a short-circuit between receiver and sender. I mean directly in individual perception, not only in the world of the media but in our bodily way of living, there is a form of indistinction, of amalgamation, of indifferentiation where all the perceptions en bloc and are reduced to a tactile

ambiance. In the latter there would be a differentiation of registers, a lesser singularity of the gaze, a lesser singularity of sound, of music.

So, that is all one can say. That said, within this state of affairs of course is perhaps still a way to master the tactile world. I think that McLuhan himself thought so in every way; he thought that there really was a strategy of the tactile world, and that it is not just any one. It is not at all a question of saying that it is insignificant, but simply that it is more undifferentiated.”  
(p.49-50, Kroker et. al.)

### **File (✦): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

“Spasm”, “Digital Delirium”;

by Arthur Kroker

“Music For Airports”;

by Brian Eno

<https://www.telegraph.co.uk/music/artists/how-brian-eno-created-a-quiet-revolution-in-music/>

<https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2011/jun/17/hauntology-critical>

<https://www.factmag.com/2010/04/26/ariel-pink-russian-roulette/>

<https://dj.dancecult.net/index.php/dancecult/article/download/378/391/0>

<https://fsu.digital.flvc.org/islandora/object/fsu:180435/datastream/PDF/download/citation.pdf>

[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No\\_wave](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/No_wave)

## **Pataphors, Patatextual Black Holes & Pataphysical Graffiti**

So what’s all this mumbo jumbo of transmedia games got to do with “Mumbo Jumbo” by Ishmael Reed? Well there’s much to consider from and older version of the Mumbo Jumbo wiki, “Techniques of reading

There are a variety of ways to approach Mumbo Jumbo as a reader. Of course, there is the conventional methodology: treat it as any other novel would be treated. However, given that Reed describes his own work as a form of poetic conjuring through “Neo-HooDoo,” it is possible to approach the text as a spiritual artifact, a relic imbued with spiritual powers within the tradition of Neo-HooDoo. In order to investigate these modes of relating to the text spiritually, it is suggested that readers educate themselves about Nkisi and Mojo bags, two possible models of sacred objects within African-derived religions.”

To parallel this we recently ran across a text that'll provide further context on all this in regards postmodernity and deconstruction.

"Reed's conception of his book as amulet and as sacred object implies that the object itself has power on the lived world, and its textuality infects the words of the page, then the pages of the book, then the reader as it circulates through new hosts. The contagion spreads through the host as the reader processes the text. It begins recoding as the reader processes the words on the page. Julian Cowley, in a discussion of the sacred objects in the Centers for Art Detention, finds that, like the sacred objects housed in the museum, —Mumbo Jumbo is just such an amulet. Its appearance alone cannot disclose the positive power it can exercise in the world, but it proclaims its objecthood loudly, through typography and illustrations, footnotes and bibliography (1240). As the object and carrier of Jes Grew, Mumbo Jumbo itself has the agency to reconfigure and shape the tangible world. Reed engineers his virus to incubate inside the text which appears as a sacred object, a book. This gives more agency to the text because he constructs it to maximize infiltration into the body of Western institutions. In order to reach this end and plant an infection deep enough in the center of the Western —universality|| to gradually infect the entirety of its being, Reed selects the most susceptible entranceway. Reed chooses the world of the academy, where methods of thinking are actually taught, to achieve maximum efficacy in rethinking thinking. For the seed of the infection to set, it needs to be placed where there will be a phase of metastasis – an infection beginning in the brain (the academy), spreading into the rest of the body (mainstream society). Of course, to infect the world of the reader and, by consequence, the world of the academy, the novel must be made into more than only text. It must function beyond the boundaries of fictional space and have agency in lived reality. Reginald Martin argues in his book *Ishmael Reed & the New Black Aesthetic* that the central mystery of the novel, that of finding Jes Grew's Text22 (the Book of Thoth), constructs the new, living Text (Mumbo Jumbo) where Jes Grew can incubate. —Mumbo Jumbo is itself the Text, and it appears in 1972 as a direct, written response to the assertion that there is not a black way of doing things; that black contributions to world culture have been insignificant at best (Martin 93). Martin's argument conflates Reed's spreading infection in the plot of the novel, Jes Grew, with the actual, lived embodiment of blackness, and Reed intends it to be that and more. Reed's argument deconstructs assumptions about the agency of all marginalized ethnicities. In order to reconfigure thought and dismantle these marginalizing assumptions, Reed revises history and culture by beginning his antiplague in the fictional world of his novel where, between plot and paratext, Jes Grew mutates and escapes from the fictional plot to influence the thinking of the real world reader. Jes Grew's rewrites history, culture, and thinking and, through the performance of reading the text, the reader becomes infected by the virus and thinking in the reader becomes reconfigured. For both the characters and the readers, Jes Grew, therefore, becomes —psychic epidemic"..." (p.55-56, Piatkowski)

"Mumbo Jumbo" as a postmodern telepathic virus/magic spell of voodoo embellishes transmedia play within the lost-object/archive of the "book".

"Reed reveals in an interview with John O'Brien that the inception for Mumbo Jumbo and the possibility of creating Jes Grew —"jes grew" out of his poem —"D Hexorcism of Noxon D Awful"

in which he attempts to put a —“writing” — something like a hex or the 20 use of a gris gris doll Reed explains, —“I wanted to make a crude, primitive fetish, and that would put a ‘writing’ on an individual considered an enemy to the tribe” (Reed —W a SII 59). He then describes how —“In the ‘writing’ I wanted to encapsulate his essential characteristics and through the inter-telepathic energy of the readers aim a psychic ‘fix’ at this individual” (59). This is the first time Reed makes contact with the physical through the writing process, proving to Reed that writing in the imaginary can affect the physical.

[...]

In order to effectively contest this manner of thinking in lived reality, —“[Reed] made the abstract concrete in [his] fiction” (Nazareth 117). Reed explains how the imaginary — the spiritual or metaphysical — can cross into the real, lived world.

[...]

Reed states that, —[m]y reading leads me to believe that Hoodoo—or, as they say in Haiti and other places, ‘Voodoo’ or ‘Vodun’ —was always open to the possibility of the real world and the psychic world intersecting|| (Reed —“W a S” 62). In these intersections, abstract and concrete ideas lose their separation and the boundaries between the two become hazy.“

(p.52-54, Piatkowski)

Considering the text “Mumbo Jumbo” as both transformer and transmitter of the ‘antiplague’ “[...] the “Jes Grew” virus, a personification of ragtime, jazz, polytheism, and freedom[...]” we get a hauntological metaconverting meta-model and meta-allegory that could get raised hyperreal transmedially beyond its ends via a pata-hinge to the nth degree for a series of pata-models/pata-allegories, the famed imaginary solutions of pataphysics.

“The antiplague only stabilizes, according to the novel’s plot that serves as a meta-model for Jes Grew’s real-life diffusion, when it finds a textual host in lived reality. Stabilizing for Jes Grew means gaining substance enough to grow and not just be —mistaken for entertainment (211). In the same way, the real world —Jes Grew taking the form of Mumbo Jumbo must be considered more than entertainment, and actually lead to a reevaluation of culture and identity. Thinking must be reshaped. The Text that the characters search for in Reed’s novel becomes the living Text that the reader has in his or her hands. This action moves beyond allegory into meta-allegory—an allegory that is aware of itself working through the reader’s imagination to reconfigure it into a new reality.”

(p.57, Piatkowski)

The 4th/5th wall breaking of the Text (what Reed calls the [deconstructive] textuality of the text) from the “text” (what Reed deploys as a moniker for what Derrida would call the “narrowly” written [i.e. type on page/physical book] text i.e. it’s “medium”) further deconstructs both the notion of magic pataphysically and the text/paratext/epitext demarcation patatextually via hyperreal transmediation as a *narrativohazardous* hypersigil/hyperstitional information virus.

“The Text’s liberation from the text grants it substance and offers a pathway for it to follow and spread. Jes Grew, Reed’s antiplague, escapes from the walls constructed by the novel and begins to infect the reader [...] Metastasis gets reached once the reader completes reading Reed’s book. Michael A. Chaney’s reading of the book asserts, similarly that, as readers, —we are also becoming a host for the antiplague with which Reed tantalizes us. The novel quite distinctly becomes a carrier of the information (virus) that destabilizes the linearity of Western

Judeo-Christian epistemologies (274). But Chaney's argument neglects to discuss how the virus can actually affect such change, nor does it explain how Jes Grew, as an informational virus, can actually infect the European methodologies and institutionalized thought that homogenizes the global conversation. Reed, however, hacks into a specific host from which the infection can spread and affect, deconstruct, and transform this Western hegemony."

(p.58, Piatkowski)

We garner the teen narrativohazard from the contemporary pataphysically influenced superfiction group the SCP Foundation for further exploration of this term's ARG/superfiction facets for hyperreal transmedial games/operations/events.

"NOTICE FROM THE PATAPHYSICS DEPARTMENT

The file you wish to access, "SCP-3309," describes an unpredictable narrativic anomaly intersecting with multiple subnarrative layers. Narrativic inoculation is required, as this document contains several embedded narrativohazards. Personnel without inoculation against such anomalies may experience a narrative paraphrasing event."

Where the term narrativo hazard designates a viral memetic infection/exposure.

"Narrativohazard: A cascading hazard affecting elements of a narrative and its mode of transmission, often leading to their mutual destruction. Definitions of a narrative differ among cultures but typically describe a story and its medium."

We can see how with the particular narrativohazard SCP-3309 where there's a disappearance of catalogued anomalies involved such that there's a pataphysical clinamenal swerve of the pata-hinge from a metaconverted anomaly spiraling back out towards the margin of the vacuum in its disappearance even more pataphysically.

"Description: SCP-3309 is a phenomenon in which catalogued anomalies spontaneously disappear. Items affected by SCP-3309 have included anomalous objects, entities, locations, and conceptual structures. Anomalies affected by this phenomenon appear to lack a causal relation; SCP-3309 activity is indicated by a note of unknown origin (designated SCP-3309-1)."

"Starlight in Two Million: A Neo-Scientific Novella" by Amy Catanzano is another text we've not had enough time to investigate but all of the slyzgy and imaginary solutions provided and mentioned in a review already warrant's a mention. The interlinking between names and stars as in Clarke's "Nine Billion Names of God" leads to a technique of 4th person narration to transform these stars into black holes (which parallels the tactics of #Game23 black hole rabbit holes).

"The gravity of these epigraphed works remains strong throughout the book. The way "matter causes a curvature of spacetime in its immediate vicinity" is intrinsically connected to how these texts interact. These objects enact a gravitational pull and are in turn acted upon as Catanzano's characters write, act, and morph from a shifting perspective: the hyperslow visual comfort of starlight. Words, readers are asked to consider, are just one possible molecular division of a novella; letters and even the shapes of letters are deceptive at microscopic scales.



“We made more names, and in doing so, we tried to unname the war. / Our names deleted us. / We translated our names. / Our names are symbols. / We tried to stop the war by creating names—as many names as the stars. / Our language is starlight.”  
(Brittain)

A non-event, this pataphysical non-war of 4th person narration’s non-linearity (like the ghost notes in “Travels In Neolon” that homages Dr. Manhattan’s 4th person narrative from “Watchmen”).

““Our language is starlight” gets at the book’s galactic ambitions: literature which imagines on either a molecular or a multiversal level where laws of equal and opposite reactions just don’t function the way we expect. Alfred Jarry’s crucial equation of ‘pataphysics is twisted into starshape in the book’s front (is) matter  $\infty - 0 - a + a + 0 = \infty$  and a promise of the novella would seem to be: exploring uncertainty in infinity. So, the concept of Aletheia employed “as a ‘pataphysical response to war” depends on an optimistically recursive reading of Jarry’s equation in which subatomic misbehavior would disrupt the inevitable infinite (in which  $\infty$  would not equal  $\infty$ ). So what does this mean for Language? War? Influence? Catanzano asks the reader to imagine a scenario in which these things are not just warped by bent light but warped until they are unrecognizable and no longer themselves, or what they might look like in unbent light, in a vacuum, or if they had never been seen in the first place? 4th person narration relates intimately to concepts of perception and time, as Catanzano states: “To intentionally and/or unintentionally engage in a narrative mode within or beyond the fourth dimension might be to read, write, or construct texts outside of time, or in all times, making nonlinearity and simultaneity points of view and spacetime a literary device.” She visually and architecturally creates a narration that deviates from linear time – a multiplicity of voices and perspectives interacting with a multiplicity of hybrid forms.”  
(Brittain)

The interlinking abyssally of the abyssal frames of phrase regimes/language games/differends plays out via the pataphor. This gets embellished by the disappearance of reality at the 4th dimension which gets retraced by these interlinking black holes of 4th person narration.

“One of the novella’s great successes is the way it juggles these supermassive concepts in intimate portraits of instability. The way it employs its morphing cast of unstable characters, like The Enduring Karmanaut. To bring the influence of Jarry back in, descriptions of this character act as brilliant realizations of the concept of pataphor, essentially a metaphor of a metaphor (and so on) which abandons its first tenor. Like early motion picture technologies which relied on persistence of vision to fill in gaps, Catanzano trusts the reader to constantly recalibrate their understanding of the scene, to follow along. At molecular levels, persistence of vision is more extreme: frames that might not logically follow one another follow one another. This is how pataphors work. When I was born, I was a letter being delivered by the sea in a ship crafted with no limit for travel. My fingerprint unlocked a civilization behind my throat. My cells write without sight. The ship sailed between the horizon and the sea to the land where I was born. I was born into a letter. Pataphor acknowledges and intensifies the collaborative effort between author and reader. The idea of an original tenor is completely obscure to us. And before we have a handle on the character as a letter, we’re asked to consider the character as it morphs,

recurs, misbehaves when observed. Misbehavior is a specialty of Catanzano, and she takes it to bonkers extremes in this novella which doesn't quite behave like we expect novellas to behave.

The hybridity of *Starlight in Two Million* lends itself at least in part to assisting in Catanzano's depiction of 4th person narration. In particular, her poetry ("U+F+O+L+A+N+G+U+A+G+E") suggests a sense of malleability and nonspecificity, power in disruption and deviation from the linear hierarchy. Take for a specific and more focused example, the TAZ (temporary autonomous zone) located "where the poetic imagination is free to reign." The site of poetry is a catalyst for a chain reaction that moves outward, uncoiling, asking questions that produce yet more questions. Inquiry expands into infinite space and non-linear time: "In TAZ the practice of framing a rule as a ruin makes even more ruins, as anyone familiar with the latest studies has been informed." The prose form overlaps with the poetic, the hybridity presenting scientific inquiry within a framework of imaginative speculation and the powerful disruptive force of deviation from traditional form. Overall structure mirrors micro-scale intent. Moving outward to a broader perception of how the form is functioning, the image of "the coil" provides an interesting focus point for examination. The book uncoils as a multiverse of disparate but coexisting parts: "The multiverse = book is the acceleration of a Big Bang toward expansion and expansion itself, the multiple orgasms that roll and roll. Its narrative capacity is the idealized coil of the poem and the coil uncoiling and coiling." Here the exploration of 4th person narrative is explicitly referenced as directly related to the simultaneity within the form of poetry and the book itself. In the same way that the poem often functions in opposite modes within a singularity, *Starlight in Two Million* contains a hybridity of form that works in a plethora of ways to overall portray a sense of temporal destruction and multiplicity. This text is a scientific experiment. It moves language in new directions as Catanzano strives "to cross expectations of genre in order to make discoveries about what [she] see[s] as any exploratory work's mutable carrier: inquiry itself." She challenges the boundaries and rules of language and literature through experimentation on all levels: perspective, time, form, literary genre, and scientific genre. Language contains mighty potential to disrupt time. It mutates attempts at creating hierarchy and linearity: "is one consequence that language / wherever it is becomes our hero. / like us it lives. deranging the output / where anterior triggers aperture." I like to read this quotation as statement on language as it directly affects our visual focus, that is, how we perceive literature often depends on how we view our linguistic past. Here, the mutative nature of language and poetics refuses tradition, it insists on the 4th dimension, the 4th person narrative. As such, the novella creates a perfect laboratory space for language to infinitely replicate and mutate. Poetry's "black hole" functions similarly, as a space where words and information both fuse and divide: "Black holes are a site where information disappears from perception, never to be redistributed in any detectable form [...] This is an allegory of space and time and how each word became one" and "First, locate the poems equator. Find the black hole at the center of its galaxy." This is the point of origin from where language contaminates, exploding outward from the ground zero site of the black hole and into the literary galaxy. Catanzano states, Just as swerves in space locate and dissipate words on a page, swerves in time inspire and dissolve rhythm. And like the relationship of the observed and the observer in quantum theory, the reader influences text through interpretation. It is also in this way that meaning, in both the new physics and poetic innovations, is a process rather than an end point. Swerves in spacetime—in

physical reality, poetry, and consciousness—detach linear time from its imaginary web of straight lines, allowing for the experience of all points in space at the same time.”  
(Brittain)

Meanwhile Strickstein anticipates many aspects of the transmedia games ‘Zero-Sum Game No Shows’ with her post-conceptual/post-medium performance piece a pataphorical zero-sum game show, “Pataphor”.

“Pataphor, by artist Tara Strickstein, the second in a series of calculated situational constructs rooted in social psychology and behavioral theory; the seven deadly sins incarnate. Performed in an exaggerated and macabre game-show aesthetic, this interactive installation investigates zero-sum game theory as it relates to pride, greed and envy. Through a series of absurd feats of strength, wit and endurance, viewers-cum-participants will undergo a psychological re-valuation of symbols of victory.”  
(Hildwine)

Brewton’s pataphysical graffiti further interlinks to the hyperreal play of graffiti, thereby opening up more transmedia game imaginary solutions, fatal strategies, and Oulipolian patamechanisms.

“In 1962-63, and again in 1965, Jim spent time in Denmark with the Nyholms and Jorn. Back in Philadelphia, he continued to innovate, synergizing the concepts he admired with his own lyrical style. He called his method “Graffiti Pataphysic.””  
(Schilling)

These pataphysical graffiti of Brewton (inspired by Asger Jorn’s research in vandalism) seem like hyper-painterly hauntological hypersigils.

“A year later, now well-versed in Alfred Jarry’s philosophy of pataphysics and adding his own graffiti to his pictures, Brewton painted the mysterious Key to the City, a small panel in pewter-colored paint, covered with symbols, and with a real key in the lower center of the work. The pale Detached, from the last year of his life, appears to show a male figure in a suit with a tiny arrow above his head. One of this show’s revelations is how much Brewton seemed to have had in common with the late Thomas Chimes, who was similarly steeped in pataphysics. Brewton’s intentional obfuscations of images in the late 1960s echoes in Chimes’ shrouded paintings of the late 1980s.”  
(Newhall)

How does one then extrapolate ‘pataphysical graffiti’? If graffiti is writing or drawings made on a wall or other surface, usually without permission and within public view, what then would be metaphysical graffiti? Perhaps Led Zeppelin’s (those old plagiarists) album title “Physical Graffiti” may give us an example since it was coined by Page to illustrate the whole physical and written energy that had gone into producing the set, so ironically “Physical Graffiti” gets us a model of ‘metaphysical graffiti’ which matches its hauntological substitute of Pink’s ‘haunted graffiti’. Oddly enough this somewhat lines up Brewton’s ‘pataphysical graffiti’, if ‘physical graffiti’ remains as far from ‘metaphysical graffiti’ as ‘pataphysical graffiti’ would be from ‘metaphysical graffiti’, and this might remain the case if we consider this in light of Daumal’s kaleidoscopic take

on 'Pataphysics that Brewton shares and also his pataphorical deployment of graffiti in the conceptual art/hyperpainting hybrids he considered 'pataphysical graffiti', "muted, wall-like pieces incorporating graffiti". In this way 'pataphysical graffiti' remains a (transmedial) assemblaged pataphysical detournement.

““The Pataphysician,” wrote Brewton in 1965, when his “Graffiti Pataphysic” we’re introduced at Kenmore Galleries here, “is the science of imaginary solutions. . . The pataphysician is concerned, not through engagement in any attempt to create human values, but in the manner of a child looking through a kaleidoscope. Only the comic is serious. . .”

With all this metadata of 'Pataphysics we too can find more imaginary solutions involving transmedia games with patadata.

“Resources at the Getty Research Institute illustrate the expanding and prolonged gyre of connections that begin with a single individual such as Jarry. Metadata and controlled vocabularies provide a map of these connections that otherwise lie latent in printed matter and its digital surrogates. They also enable us to trace a concept like pataphysics in the formation of modernity. Through metadata and Linked Open Data, we can connect these strands on a global scale, and in the process, separate rumor and anecdote from the equally astonishing facts that precede them.”

(Beecroft)

Patadata, pataphors, and cyber-psychogeography have vast transmedia game potential.

“For example, as Pablo Lopez suggests, because string theory is speculation based on theories that are or have been themselves speculative, such as general relativity and quantum mechanics, string theory cannot in fact be considered physics, but rather, should be understood as pataphysics. Likewise, string theory and quantum calculations do not portray an actual reality, but are mathematical pataphors. Extended metaphors that create their own context, pataphors inform the patadata of the Semantic Web. As coined by Jim Hendler in 2008, “patadata” are “data interpreted through the truth of contradictions and exceptions” which is “as far from metadata as metadata extends from a databased representation of reality.” The Semantic Web, like all things “pata”, foregrounds uncertainty, exceptions, and contradictions. It supports what I call a messy, joyful yet sober, oscillating ontology. These language- based activities often seem to attribute equal consistency and equal weight and truthfulness to the, in fact, serendipitous semantics and structures of a data field. This furnishes ways to share and repurpose information thanks to the combinatory formats that become possible. As we learn from Jarry, who invented a code and culture of rotating points of view and kaleidoscopic perspectives, of new structures that accord equivalence to motifs and language observed and evaluated from different virtual angles, paradox as a semantic strategy creates parallel and potential universes. In one universe, we can say that we all generate data such as spending and income or storing wine in barrels or cylinders; let’s say that, then, a government agency collects and links that data into one database of content-rich metadata. This is another, superinduced, universe. Likewise, the data about that data, patadata, with all of its equivocal and equivalent information, provide an accessible way to find supplementary input about any group.”

(Stillman)

The pataphysical “ontology” conjured by patadata that Hugill mentions remains a hauntology of digitized information(al) pataphors very similar to quantum mechanics/string theory’s mathematical pataphors.

“Nowadays, as the web has begun to develop an intelligence of its own, a greater level of machine comprehension, a richer and more targeted user experience, is promised. The Semantic Web is already established in fields such as biochemistry and genetics, whose systems readily suit the formation of its vocabularies, or “ontologies”. In the arts and humanities, the picture is more patchy, but some fields are developing semantic toolsets. The problem with the way this technology is evolving is that it is failing to reconcile itself with the contradictions and exceptions which constitute pataphysics. In other words, as Jim Hendler remarks, it has fallen into the hands of “the forces of neatness”. The objective of the semantic web is apparently ever greater precision. But, as we have seen, it is ironically through precision that pataphysical liberty may be found. Pataphysicians may take courage from the idea that this technology lends itself to creative use and abuse. A pataphysical ontology is one in which the laws governing exceptions and contradictions are expressed through the syllogistic platform for transcendent eccentricity provided by RDF triples. Equivalences may be deployed that contradict expectations. Queries may return results that stand at a clinamen swerve away from the predictable path. The time is ripe for a pataphysical project that builds upon metadata. Hendler and I call this patadata, which is to metadata as metadata is to data.”

(Hugill)

We can see that much like how deconstructively there’s no ontology with only pataphysical hauntologies remaining, so too does Drucker’s hypothesis for a “patacritical” method would easily fit for what Derrida elsewhere calls the stabilizing jette of deconstruction that normally goes under the guise of “deconstructionism” in academic circles much like a mythical “Yale School of Deconstruction”, these remain part of the simulacra involved in the stabilizing jette of deconstruction, but deconstruction involves the implosion/deconstruction of any stabilizing and destabilizing of any deconstructive jette. The antinomy of the pataphysical game of deconstructions.

“Johanna Drucker described the development at University of Virginia of a ‘patacritical method, based on puns, which contrasts with the normative effects of standard quantitative methods: “Only a punning method suffices, thus the invention of our term ‘patacritical. If norms, means, and averages govern statistics, then sleights, swerves, and deviation have their way in the ‘pataphysical game” (Drucker 2009, 26).”

(Hugill)

With regards Hugill’s observations of Jarry’s contributions to the ‘imaginary music technologies’ there may still remain some further ambiguity yet as we’ll see, mainly seemingly due to the ambiguity itself between Jarry’s “mention” of pataphysics in regards music versus the “use” of popular forms of music as vehicles for pataphysics in his plays. Whereas those such as Duchamp and Busoni seem to trace the development of manifestations of ‘imaginary music technologies’. Exploring this nuance may contextualize the pataphysics of transmedia games further.

“This seems a good moment to ask whether Jarry himself made any contribution to the field of imaginary music technologies. There are numerous references to music throughout the texts, such as the 'Ringing Isle' in *Faustroll*, and the songs in *Ubu*. With Claude Terrasse, Jarry wrote musical comedies for his Théâtre Mirlitonesque, and there seems to be ample evidence that music was part of his work at all levels. However, his main interest was in using popular forms as a vehicle for his ideas, so neither the music nor the technology that produced it is particularly innovative. The most significant contribution was therefore, of course, the idea of pataphysics itself and its associated texts. I would suggest that 'Commentary and Instructions for the practical construction of the Time Machine' is the most important from this perspective, since it addresses music's most fundamental parameter: time.

[...]

This meta-ironic treatment of the questions of skill and weight recall of the imaginary solutions of another Normandais: Marcel Duchamp. The importance of music in Duchamp's work should not be underestimated. In fact, we can trace an interesting path from the imaginary music technologies of Busoni through to the Large Glass itself.

[...]

This is one of a number of Picabia's paintings that express a musical concept of abstraction that seems to derive from Busoni. By June 1912, when Picabia, Buffet, Duchamp and Apollinaire famously attended a performance of the stage version of Raymond Roussel's *Impressions d'Afrique* in Théâtre Antoine, Paris, this had evolved into a mechanomorphic style that was to characterise both Picabia and Duchamp's output for many years to come. As we shall see later, Roussel may be regarded as the master of imaginary music technologies and many of the fantastic machines in *Impressions d'Afrique* were created for musical performance. This places music at the heart of so-called conceptual art, and makes this event immensely significant for our study today.“

(Hugill)

Jones' "Plunderphonics, 'Pataphysics and Pop Mechanics", according to Hugill seemingly skimps on the pataphysical. *Les Granules* remains seemingly one of the exceptions with their overt nods to Jarry.

“Both Lussier and Derome have roots in progressive Québécois folklore ensembles of the 1970s Lussier with *Conventum*, Derome with *Nébu*. Since 1978, the duo have forged an intuitive working relationship and a brilliant cut-and-splice compositional method over years spent in Montréal screening rooms, recording soundtracks for over 50 documentaries. films with subjects as diverse as the closing of an iron mine in Schefferville to the bizarre synchronicity of the Pope and Michael Jackson visiting Montréal the same week. Onstage or in the studio, Derome and Lussier show a high degree of finely-honed, intuitive interplay, chops and technique in spades, and plenty of vaudevillian tomfoolery. Their intriguing solo projects — such as Derome's music for stage adaptations of Samuel Beckett and Alfred Jarry to Lussier's examination of the musical possibilities of the French language — betray a more sober, though no less zealous, approach to their individual interests.”

(p.75, Jones)

Jones notes that, “If *musique actuelle* is a homemade, guerrilla music, then its arsenal lies all around us. There are Cagean musical possibilities in a broken harp, a boiling kettle, or a talking Captain America doll.” Not only does this bricoleur assemblage have transmedia game ramifications for Oulipolian patamechanisms but it might allow us to trace the links between ‘*musique actuelle*’ and ‘imaginary music technologies’ for even more transmediation of fatal strategies.

“A brazen new music driven by the headlong speed of the late 20th Century. Fueled by the art of bricolage, *musique actuelle* is a quicksilver appropriation and reassembly of the sonically familiar — television, pop tunes, film noir, free jazz, modern art, cultural icons, folk songs, the classical repertory and the dope vernacular of the street — into a new and surrealistic whole, evoking Lautréamont's infamous phrase “Beautiful, like the chance meeting of an umbrella and a sewing machine on a dissecting table.” Like the automatic writing of André Breton and Philippe Soupault, the pioneering cut-ups of William S. Burroughs and Brion Gysin or the hallucinatory blues collages of Captain Beefheart's Trout Mask Replica, *musique actuelle* lets the future leak through when musical worlds collide. Freely partaking of all musical sources — the chord changes in Boplicity, Martin Denny's 1950s Exotica, Puccini's Turandot, heavy metal thunder, ritual Gamelan music, fiery Brazilian sambas, New Orleans funeral marches, folk songs our grandparents taught us, dance instruction records — *musique actuelle* is music about music, a metamusic that sounds like your parents' copy of The Readers' Digest Collection of Music Of The World put through a Ronco Veg-o-matic. The short attention span of works like John Zorn's gaming piece Cobra or MFC's Bruire La Barman A Tort de Sourire could only be the product of the information age and its saturated media landscape, bombarding us with bite-sized infotainment as we change the channels of our culture. By building exhaustive record collections and embracing the flotsam and jetsam of musical history that likes littered around us, John Zorn and Michel F. Côté have a head start that Mozart, Charlie Parker or even Pierre Boulez never even dreamed of. To paraphrase Public Enemy's Chuck D, *musique actuelle* is politically “cold,” that is to say, hip, informed, dangerous and intended to provoke. White South African dissidents The Kalahari Surfers cut up the Lord's Prayer and saw their LP Bigger Than Jesus promptly banned, underground Japanese groups like After Dinner and Mizutama Shobodan [The Polka Dot Fire Brigade] turned Tokyo's repressive pop music industry on its ear by refusing to conform to its sexist imagery and slick production values, and Russian jazz pianist Sergei Kuryokhin once disdained the “Russian Piano School” typified by Rachmaninoff by sawing a piano in half on stage. This quixotic, subversive attitude often places *musique actuelle* at the eye of the geopolitical storm: British composer Lindsay Cooper's 1989 Oh Moscow was a jazzy bit of musical providence that foreshadowed the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Soviet Union.”

(p.7, Jones)

So *musique actuelle* seems then to have an expansive parameters for much of postmodern musical experimentation.

“It's as good a handle as any. Chicago jazz critic Art Lange has called it 'Third Stream,' noticing a number of striking parallels between *musique actuelle* and the theory of a hybrid jazz/classical music first proposed by Gunther Schuller in the 1960s, while the acerbic and eminently readable New York jazz scribe Kevin Whitehead isn't sure that *musique actuelle* is a brand new bag at

all: "It sure sounds like a recipe for post-modernism to me," Whitehead cracked at a *musique actuelle* symposium held at Montréal in 1989. The closest anyone else has come to an elegant and succinct nomenclature may have been California new music writer Josef Woodard, who inventively proclaimed it to be the antithesis of minimalism, "totalism."" (p.9, Jones)

Clearly with plunderphonics included in this expanse that the hauntological bricolage of hypnagogic pop mixed alongside with those experiments in noise, ambient, glitch tunes (with sea punk), goth (with witch house) and rap (with chopped n' screwed) that it would culminate in the hyperreal and accelerationist vaporwave (which also incorporates the consumer version of furniture music, elevator music and the consumer-mystical of New Age music for sonic/sample fodder in a hauntological fashion). These varieties of patamechanics and postmodern spectrum of transaesthetics echoes throughout transmedia games with cues for plundering, improv, bricolage, de-composition, and detournement.

"Plunderphonics, 'Pataphysics and Pop Mechanics, then, traces the fractal tree of *musique actuelle*, from the formation of left-leaning European movements like Rock In Opposition and the Berlin-based Sogennantes Linksradikales Blasorchester through the radical brass of Chicago's Association for the Advancement of Creative Musicians [AACMI] and European cool schools like the Dutch International Composers' Pool IICPI. From there it explores the trailblazing work of women composers and musicians in the field, the hothouse improv scene of New York during the 1980's, the cutting edge of sonic manipulation and reappropriation, and the subversion of the innocuous pop song. The summit of both the book and the genre itself is at the Festival International de Musique Actuelle de Victoriaville, an annual pilgrimage of fans, journalists and musicians alike to a small town in Québec's bois francs that's unparalleled in new music circles. Like a runaway Trojan Horse virus infecting computer software, *musique actuelle* is changing fast, constantly mutating and breeding newer and more sophisticated strains of itself to tackle our fragmented world. It is their music — the music of Chris Cutler, Fred Frith, Ferdinand Richard, Heiner Goebbels, Willem Breuker, Henry Threadgill, Sergei Kuryokhin, The Rova Saxophone Quartet, Amy Denio, Lindsay Cooper, Tenko, Zeena Parkins, John Oswald, John Zorn, Charles Hayward, Roberto Musci & Giovanni Venosta, Les Granules, Fat. Bruire, Justine, The Residents, Kalahari Surfers, After Dinner and Tom Zé — that is the physical graffiti heralding the coming of the next musical generation." (p.10, Jones)

At this point the pataphysical may seem nigh ubiquitous in the postmodern, but what metaxists like metamodernist (and other post-post-modern varieties) overlook is that their metaxy and recombinant meta-narratives are merely hauntological flailings of postmodern recyclage and repentance, and since 'Pataphysics remains the "esprit"/specter of the postmodern, that their lost-object of spectral modernist grand narratives/ontologies are mere simulacrum. Thereby all post-post-modern currents/variants remain part of what tENT calls the 'Age of 'Pataphysics' (similar time Nietzsche's 200 year era of nihilism), i.e. a patamodernity. That's how a pataphysical virus like Neoism can like Jes Grew can infect academia through a Trojan horse viral maneuver and then embellish the underlying pataphysical absurdity of academia much like



the terror that permeated departments when postmodernism and deconstruction were “all the rage” in the 80s and 90s.

“The “Pataphysical Spirit” of Postmodernism

[...]

This may sound utterly irrelevant to anything happening in modern academia, until you realize the foundational role pataphysics played in the development of postmodernism. Many of the early figureheads of postmodernism (or related art movements like surrealism and Dadaism) were card-carrying pataphysicians. Notable members of the Paris-based Collège de ‘Pataphysique included Marcel Duchamp, Man Ray, Eugène Ionesco, and Raymond Queneau. In pop culture, references to pataphysics abound if you know where to look. Even the Beatles sang about it. Academics have often noted that Alfred Jarry’s ideas were closely associated with those of postmodern thinkers Derrida, Deleuze, Baudrillard, and Serres. The book “The French Connections of Jacques Derrida” dedicates many pages to Alfred Jarry and his philosophy of pataphysics, emphasizing the influence Jarry had on the development of Derrida’s ideas and also noting that Jarry has been linked directly to deconstruction. Of all postmodern philosophers, Baudrillard seems to be the most heavily influenced by pataphysics. For example, he took inspiration in part from Jarry in championing the idea of “symbolic change” — an idea “which resists capitalist values of utility and monetary profit for cultural values.”

[...]

You’ll know pataphysics has crept into academic work when it’s marked with Jarry’s unique sense of humor. When you read postmodern works that include not only a dose of obscurantism but also a helping of the pataphysical, just as when you read Ubu Roi, you’ll find yourself laughing.

[...]

Trying to understand the mechanics of pataphysical humor is not easy. It has something to do with moving from non-figurative language, past metaphor, and into the realm of the pataphor — not as a deceptive trick, but through high-brow dream-logic. This type of “logic” can be seen in how Jarry viewed reality, as described neatly in “The avant-garde case of Alfred Jarry” by Joost Haan. “Jarry made no distinction between being alive or being in Eternity,” writes Haan, “making no distinction between the living and the deceased. He also made no distinction between the real or the fictional, or being writer or reader.” This relates to postmodernism, Haan observes, because “Postmodernism has an ambivalent position to language. On the one hand, the idea is that language often fails in its description of what ‘really’ has happened, but on the other hand language seems able to create history and ‘reality.’”

(Clarke)

With Canada for ‘Pataphysics being “nowhere” (with its absence from the map of the Collège de ‘Pataphysique), the Canadian “Pataphysicists earlier featured along with Neoists like Istvan Kantor and John Berndt in that pataphysical issue of RAMPIKE are of much interest to us with the play on an absence of thought/archive/inscription remaining crucial to hyperreal transmedia games.

“McCaffery and Nichol write that “Canadian “Pataphysics quite clearly is a literature that, as yet, has no archive,” and “[i]ts absence of inscription superbly parallels its absence of thought” (TRG 1992:303). Wershler-Henry observes that Canadian “Pataphysics eludes definition, because

"many Canadian "Pataphysicians share the affinity of the European and American colleagues for dissimulation" ( 68 ) , with individuals coexisting under various pseudonyms amid various collectives, be they actual or unreal: the Toronto Research Group, the Institute of Linguistic Onto-Genetics, et al. Canadian "Pataphysics does indeed mimic the 'pataphysics of such European institutes as le collège de 'pataphysique or l'ouvroir de littérature potentielle; however, such a science marks its difference from European 'pataphysics through a change in diacritical orthography.

Canadian "Pataphysics adds another vestigial apostrophe to its name in order to mark not only the excess silence imposed upon Canadians by a European avant-garde, but also the ironic speech proposed by Canadians against a European avant-garde. McCaffery and Nichol suggest that Canadian "Pataphysics moves from elision ( ' ) to quotation ( " ) through a superinducement on elision--"the doubling of the elide, a doubled inversion and inverted doubling" (TRG 1992:301). A parody of parody itself, such 'pataphysics performs a clinamen upon its own history, simulating it (through quotation) while disrupting it (through deviation). The unknown origins of 'pataphysics are explained by the unknown science of 'pataphysics: "the quotation [...] of the given that we do not understand but with emendations that serve to constitute our explanation" (301-302)."

(p.184-185, Bök)

Especially Nichol with his early post-conceptual pataphorical hypermades from "The "Pataphysical Hardware Company".

"The "Pataphysical Hardware Company, moreover, imagines an applied science that might utilize such surrational innovations in order to produce an array of marketable commodities-- "[e]verything for your imaginary needs" (Nichol 1993:115): not blank paper, but "Genuine Brand Blank Verse"; not plaster dust, but "Jarrry Brand Plaster de Paris"; not rose seeds, but "Grow Your Own Stein Poem , " etc. Such a project does not celebrate a functional technology so much as satirize the linguistic dysfunction of the object itself, its potential to be deployed in any way imaginable, despite the standard function for which it has been normally designed. Such objects parody the fetishes of a capital economy, whose phynance encourages conspicuous consumption (among other imaginary solutions) in order to fulfill a panoply of desires that do not exist. Irrational think tanks such as these are as ephemeral as a toy balloon with the word "thought" written upon it (so that the owner of such "Pataphysical Hardware might dramatize the act of "pataphysics itself by inserting the inflated balloon into a headband, literally producing a comic-strip thought-bubble that is in turn destroyed through the use of an accompanying "thought suppressant"--a pin). Such an allegorical destruction of reason characterizes the whimsy of what McCaffery might call a "'pataphysicalized (f)unction" (1980:12)--an exercise in "FUTILITY, which, expressed as F + UTILITY becomes that[...]which is ONE LETTER BEYOND UTILITY" (12). The letter "Fu symbolizes the excess of anomalous exception--"the play of FREEDOM[ . . . ] WITHIN FUNCTION" (12): ie. what supplements the "unction" of an otherwise reassuring, but inhibiting, purpose."

(189-190, Bök)

Also the Canadian "Pataphysicists provide pataphysical fields that interlink you psychogeography, that is, 'rational geomancy', 'geognosy' & 'psychopaleontology' all of which

ties Daumal's pataphysical oscillating spin imploding universal/particular much like for Home "psychogeography is the universalism of the specific, of the particular, i.e. at its point of dissolution."

"Pataphysics swerves away from the royal science of geology toward the nomad science of geognosy - imagining a rational geomancy that can oppose a national geography: "[w]e mean by Rational Geomancy the acceptance of a multiplicity of means[ ...]to reorganize those energy patterns we perceive in literature," and "[b]y energy pattern we mean that configuration of discharges[ . . . ] arising from [ . . . ]engagement with a text" (TRG 1992:153). Geomancy normally involves an art of divination by interpreting the signs of the earth, its telluric rhythm and tectonic stresses. Such a discipline involves a realignment of topographies. Parts are arranged to produce ley lines of force; cracks are read as fault lines in a form. To read is a seismic act that makes a schiz, a shift, in the relation of these parts to each other, either fusing them together or rending them apart. To be a rational geomancer is to apply this model of reading, not only to the land (the as is of the ontic), but also to a text (the as if of the semic): "the geomantic view of literature sees interpretation as any system of alignment" (TRG 1992:153). A rational geomancer uses 'pataphysics to rechart the fault lines that separate reason from unreason, realigning the nationalist cartography of both a terrain and its culture. Canadian "Pataphysics suggests that rational geomancy deploys the exception of the clinamen in order to read against the grain: ie. such geomancy involves a radicalized realignment in the very idea of geomancy itself. Whereas a thematic pedagogue (such as Atwood or Frye ) interprets sovereign geography as a metaphysical cipher for a mythic memory (believing such a "myth" to be true), a rational geomancer interprets memory itself as a 'pataphysical cipher for an imaginary landscape (believing the "true" to be a myth ) . What Truhlar calls "psychopaleontology" refers to this geomantic principle of memory: "the theory that societies [ . . . ] unconsciously determine [ . . . ] their [ . . . ]biological destinies through the procreative force of their languages" (1985 : [ 2 ]) . Such a mnemonic paradigm regards culture as nothing more than a geographic simulacrum. Wursthagen, for example, indulges in 'pataphysical archaeology by misreading a Muskokan water tower as a Yucatan sky temple, "as if the architecture [has] framed a discourse in which stone [is] speaking to stone without the clumsy intermediary of the human mind" (1980:148). Wursthagen misreads the evidence of the structure in order to argue that historians have misread the structure of evidence itself. Canadian history has occulted its potential for the occulting of Canadian history. The very "mytho-bastardization" (1980:144) that he vilifies in others, he practices himself--but only to imply that all such standardized knowledge is bastardized knowledge. The clinamen in the form of his argument parallels the clinamen in the form of the ziggurat: "a dominant aesthetic[ . . . ]of telluric rhyme [ . . . ]and energ(et)ic clinamen" (145). Wursthagen argues that the absence of writing on this ancient obelisk stems from a stone taboo, "the strict injunction that no man shall write upon the stone-that-is- already written" ( 1980:149). Unlike any other petroglyphic civilization, this bizarre culture does not write messages upon the rock, but reads messages into the rock. The archaeologist plots the evolution of an aboriginal settlement from a reading culture (that is agraphie) to a writing culture (that is dyslexic). All writing emerges from this functional illiteracy only as a kind of occluded vagrancy--a "topographic cipher" (153) that acts as a palimpsest, mimicking the writing in the granite, while deviating from the writing in the granite. All writing becomes a "vacuscript" (153)--not an absence of writing so much as a writing of absence.

Canadian "Pataphysicians suggest that such a vacuscript coincides with 'pataphysics itself, insofar as its imaginary solutions code their own existence into the form of their own non-existence."

(p.191-194, Bök)

Let us not forget that to 'play with play' and play with the rules of the game, the pata-game of transfinite transmedia games involves patatextuality.

""PATATEX" (13)--a kind of vacuscript, whose reading eludes the instrumentalism of an imperial semantic by putting the notion of play itself into play. Such a 'patatextual sensibility characterizes the nomadic studies of "pataphysicians, who resort to the tropes of the anomalos, the syzygia, and the clinamen, in order to create their own forms of satirical criticism (be it the probable systems of Nichol, the perseus projects of McCaffery, or the natural histories of Dewdney). As Dewdney might imply, such criticism reveals that "[the poet is] in the same vanguard of research as physics, molecular chemistry, and pure mathematics" (1980b:ZI)."

(p.195, Bök)

In an interlinking yet tangentially specific note, Hugill also contextualizes further the pataphysicality underlying unexplained facets of that which is considered magical, mystical or supernatural.

"It's the kind of thing one used to read in doctors' waiting rooms. Reader's Digest would often have a "stranger than fiction" section. What's fascinating is the extent to which modern science has incorporated a lot of this stuff. Most of what Corliss describes as unexplained is now explained, in one way or another, by modern science. It becomes an archive of what people thought was anomalous at the time — Corliss began his publishing activity in the mid-1970s, which is in itself interesting; it doesn't invalidate it. Corliss's work has this rather detached quality. You could compare him to Charles Fort who explored similar terrain, but actively fostered a mythology around the unexplained becoming a Messianic figure with disciples who followed him and truly believed in this stuff. (2) Corliss is more scientific, dare I say more objective. He is a cataloguer.

[...]

Corliss's anomalies often point to metaphysical things: things that are unexplained in physical terms and imply something beyond the physical.

[...]

It's the pursuit of the anomaly that connects Corliss to pataphysics. It certainly seems that we are not convinced that any of the phenomena he catalogued are truly beyond explanation. But that's not the point. This is often true in pataphysics, that it's a question of administration. How you administer things rather than the things themselves."

(Hugill & Langdon)

When inquiring about magic and 'Pataphysics, one person recommends...

"After you checked out Ubu, go find out about a certain Dr. Faustroll, a monkey and the surface of god."

(Otto)

Just a reminder the #Game23 and the like are not the only ones to contemplate this link between the magical and the pataphysical, some have already investigated towards 'Pataphysics and Kabbalah, or a 'patamagical' 'patakabbal'.

"A 'pataphysician has an altitude in if but no attitude in life. The person, that which mosbunall confuse with the self, is considered as an imaginary solution. There are as many roles on the stage of life as there are possible answers to a poll answered by Jarry. The character of a 'pataphysician is like a glove, like a puppet in a theater. Théâtre des Pantins Advertisement by Jarry for "Les Minutes de Sable Mémorial" in L'Ymagier II (January 1895) A kabbalist also sees life as a theatre play. The role played is considered a mere shadow resulting from the rules of the divine light. The role on the stage of existence is played seriously but without equating the self with the person. Any emotion, thought, feeling are just necessary props for playing the role. Both the awakened kabbalist and the conscious pataphysician (hence the apostroph) try not to desire, but to elevate the value of the world they adapt themselves to by the way they consider it. In this sense both can be seen as an art of existence."

(Borsky)

While those like Karasick even link this overtly to deconstruction.

"Kabbalah announces itself as a "metaphysical" discourse. However, through a deconstructionist or post-colonial reading praxis, the "meta" (beyond) becomes an intervening space, a place of syncretism, juxtaposition and integration. Further, Kabbalah is primarily concerned with text as "a continuum of letters", a network of echoes. traces; displaced in a palimpsestic process of rupture, supplementation and dis(ease). With a re-politicization of socio-historic linguistic structures, this research reassesses the "mystical" or "metaphysical", not an onto-theologically insulated discourse validated by transcendency, but as that without specific meaning and heterogenous to all hermeneutic totalization. This text then reviews, re-claims. rehabilitates Kabbalistic discourse not as an esoteric philosophy, but, perhaps, in Derridean terms, as an exoteric aporia, "a single duty that recurrently duplicates itself interminably, fissures itself and contradicts itself without remaining the same". And if 'pataphysics is defined as "the science of the elision" and operates through an unanswerable process of "imaginary solutions" which are always-already "both beyond and beside the topography of its telos", and if Kabbalah (as both transcendent and immanent), embodies the impossible paradox of legitimacy and illegitimacy in a multi-hierarchized arena, then Kabbalah must be re-viewed as not metaphysical but 'pataphysical, a linguistically based ideology which problematizes notions of Origin, Authenticity, Presence, Truth and Closure. So, through feminist-deconstruction (which questions the possible impossibility of Law, of language), and Kabbalah (which embodies that which is simultaneously transcendent and immanent; where what's same, other, pure, proper, encrypted. private and public. are folded through each other in an intertextatic contaminative process), this thesis 'pataphysically performs itself as "the question of the question" or poses "answers to questions never been asked". As such, this "antimetaphysical metaphilosophical" research presents itself as a self-reflexive reading grounded in a specific socio-historic context; emerging from a twentieth century feminist deconstructionist reading praxis and, thus, does not serve to answer, define or close down. It does not aim to provide a final analysis but, inscribed through slippage, elision, differentiation and it carves out a supplemental space that opens possibilities for alternate reading strategies."

(p.2-3, Karasick)

This may lend to Joseph Beuy's shamanistic influence on Istvan's Neoist alchemy which evokes the "messianism without messianism" of deconstruction (perhaps as both 'applied grammatology' [Ulmer]).

"Thinking about the German artist Joseph Beuys (1921-1986) and the notion of ritual brings up a paradoxical situation. On the one hand there seems to be a strong connection. Beuys—allegedly rescued by native Tartarians after an air crash in the Second World War—can be seen as the artist who tried to work out a holistic concept of art and life in answer to the crisis that Europe, and particularly Germany, faced after 1945. To this effect he studied Asian worldviews, Celtic myths, and Christian symbols. The concept of ritual appeared both in his reading and in titles for drawings or objects. It also was an obvious model for his performances, where he played with the attitude of the shaman. Hence, many spectators described their experience of Beuys' works in ritualistic terms, or in terms of a 'rite of passage'."

(p.48, Gronau)

Gronau elaborates linking the shamanistic ritual to the transformative.

"As recent publications have shown, there is a wide range of definitions to describe and explain rituals. They can be seen as 'processes of embodiment', as 'symbolic actions,' or as 'cultural performances.' These divergent concepts overlap in at least two points: rituals are transformative actions, based on traditional patterns. As transformative actions, rituals generate a natural or social transformation or change. Arnold van Gennep showed in his description of ceremonies surrounding birth, death, and marriage that such rites change the social role and the status of a subject. Even while rituals are cultural mechanisms to overcome a difficulty or a crisis, they do not merely have a stabilizing function. They can unfold transgressive energies and violent conflicts, by triggering a state of 'liminality', i.e., a zone of 'betwixt and between.' Rituals follow traditional patterns of action, which have to be reiterated in every performance. As modern theories pointed out, these repetitions are always reinventions of a fixed scheme, which can vary to a certain degree. The ludic and playful elements of rituals may include various materials, sounds, gestures, actions, and linguistic signs."

(p.49, Gronau)

Beuy's transaesthetic statements on everything/everyone as art/artist with its parallels to Karpow calling 'happenings' 'quasi-rituals' thereby clarifying ritualistic aspects of transmedia games like Neoist APT Fests.

"It is remarkable that an artist like Allan Kaprow, commonly known as the 'inventor' of an art form called 'Happening', tried to define it using ritualistic terms. He argued: Happenings, freed from the restrictions of conventional art materials, have discovered the world at their fingertips, and the intentional results are quasi-rituals, never to be repeated. As much as the idea of an unrepeatable ritual is an oxymoron, Kaprow's Happenings do have affinities with cultural performances such as 'parades, carnivals, games, expeditions ... and secular rituals.' While Kaprow uses the term 'ritual' or 'quasi-ritual' to describe a formal structure of performance which will no longer be 'staged theatre', his European colleague Joseph Beuys seems to justify the

notion of ritual in a different way. Beuys' work appears to be inspired by various mythological traditions, by symbolic elements, and by the idea of shamanism.”  
(p.50, Gronau)

Such a staging of a portrayed ritual's demystifying and de-metaphysicalizing of ritual opens up the hyperreal 'patamagical' potential of transmedia games.

“In Beuys' own words, the allusion to shamanistic fashioning and practice gives the possibility to overcome the dissociated world of now: I did take the role of the shaman. But not in the sense of pointing backwards, in the sense of 'we have to go back', but to express something futuristic/utopian. The shaman symbolises someone who brings materialistic and spiritual relations into a unity. Taking ancient elements to achieve an utopian state—as Beuys' words suggest here—is characteristic for the re-theatricalization or re-ritualization the avant-garde and neo-avant-garde promoted. Achieving a collective and artistic unity—as the idea of a 'Gesamtkunstwerk' suggests—can only be reached by acts of transgression. In this sense, taking the role of a shaman seems to enable the artist to function as a medium between here and there, the perceivable material world and its hidden spiritual forces. Beuys' interest in transgressive actions is always motivated by the search for an 'anthropological art', or an 'organic society'. He tries to initiate a 'healing process'. Critics of these ideas should be aware that a certain distance remains between the performer (artist) and his role (shaman), and between an artistic performance and a true ritual. As Gabriele Brandstetter claimed for Strawinsky's *Le sacre du printemps*, reading the performances strictly as a ritual would not justify their complexity, because 'it is not a *mise-en-scène* of a ritual but rather (...) the staging of a portrayed ritual'.”

(p.51-52, Gronau)

These texts as events deconstruct the action of/as ritual. Much like the opaque seeming obscurantism of those figurants trapped/interacting in these webs of Symbolic Exchange during these mock-rituals shamanistic shenanigans often can only laugh and mock the proceedings themselves out of sheer confusion. A issue Istvan encounters often like with his recent “Free Painting Give-Away From An Unknown Artist” or whatever the fuck it's called. All of which remains promising for transmedia game events. Much like the role of the trickster's survivance in Vizenor with his blank books with fabricated signatures in “Hotline Healers”.

“Nonetheless, Beuys' action is not a ritual, because the different action sequences are performed within the framework of an artistic event, which may quote rituals and refer to their meanings and structures, but cannot effect the change of status which is an essential part of ritual as a cultural performance. Ritualistic moments only function within this action as quotations of symbolic meaning, and as cultural references.

[...]

By representing such different roles various religious, mythical and aesthetic contexts are juxtaposed and blended. If we follow this description of personas, we may similarly identify a list of roles adopted by the audience. They are, first, the Apostles or followers of Jesus, or a Christian community witnessing a baptism; next, a herd of sheep; thirdly, a swarm of animals; fourthly, the knights of the Grail, and so forth. The question remains if the audience had read these roles into the actions, and did consciously adopt them. But even if they did, it was not

enough for them to impersonate an attributed role affirmatively. Rather, the participants created and displayed the roles they chose for themselves, such as the role of ‘troublemakers’ performed by students who disturbed the action and distributed anti-art-leaflets, or the role of an annunciator, performed by a young lady who suddenly climbed the piano, shouting ‘Bitte machen Sie Platz, der Herr Beuys kann ja nicht atmen.’ The multiple creation of roles turned the relationship between the audience and the artist into a permanent play – or even a struggle.” (p.56-57, Gronau)

### **File (‘): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

“Infecting the Academy: How Reconfigured Thought Jes Grew from Ishmael Reed’s Mumbo Jumbo.”

by Paul David Piatkowski

“Plunderphonics, 'Pataphysics and Pop Mechanics”;

by Andrew Jones

[https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/Piatkowski\\_uncg\\_0154M\\_10848.pdf](https://libres.uncg.edu/ir/uncg/f/Piatkowski_uncg_0154M_10848.pdf)

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**The Nth Degree & Jack The Ripper's Lazy Shadow Of  
Silent 4D Disappearance: Occult Psychogeography,  
Organs-Without-Bodies, Hypersigils, Hypermades,  
Transmedia Events, Cut-Up Data/Memplexes, Pata  
Reality Hacking, Non-Philosophy, Non-Photography,  
Non-Cinema, Non-Idiomatic Improvisation, Post-  
Thought/Non-Thought, Non-Concepts & Unidentified  
Non-Narrative Objects (UNNOs)**

Considering 'Supports/Surfaces' mentioned in Lyotard's "Libidinal Economy" we might frame these problematics of the fatal strategies of gestural deconstruction and the transfinite transmedia game as parergon.

"Supports/Surfaces' version of Deconstruction drew on several contemporary tendencies then widely exhibited across northern Europe, such as Analytic Abstraction (for self-referentiality), Process Art (means and methods), Arte Povera (humble materials), Minimalism (presentation strategies), etc., and it managed to produce its own Southern European synthesis, with an emphasis on the haptic and the visual over the conceptual. Even as it systematically deconstructed the constitutive elements of painting, Supports/Surfaces never considered the concept of its death, an overriding critical viewpoint at the time, as a valid proposition. Their aim was to analyze painting as an "objet de connaissance" (literally: object of knowledge) with a Post-Structuralist angle. From this perspective, painting's main instrument, the tableau, reduced to its basic constituents of a support (stretcher) and a surface (canvas), defined the whole field of investigation. The intent was to recast the dice and to experiment with what painting could be after jettisoning the idealistic critical discourse of the School of Paris."

(Kerlidou)

Simultaneously Woody Allen's "Magic in the Moonlight" (with its nihilistic last men of Nietzschean camels that deconstruct the passive nihilism of Christianity with the ramifications echoing throughout a deconstruction of the supernatural, religions and onto-theology) vanishing magic and God through revealing them as only cinematic smoke and mirrors.

"I'm talking about "Magic in the Moonlight," the latest sun-drenched romantic travelogue from that fitful cinematic genius and self-styled nihilist philosopher, Woody Allen. Fittingly enough for a story about professional magicians and wily con artists, the film unfolds against the French Riviera in 1928, a setting ripe with all manner of enchanting and seductive possibilities. But don't let that title fool you: Earnest as it may sound, it actually begs to be read sarcastically. Allen's stand-in this time around is Stanley (Colin Firth), a man of science and reason who seeks to expose a young woman, Sophie (Emma Stone), claiming to possess second sight — and, in the process, to reaffirm his Nietzschean view of the world as one where no supernatural powers exist and no deities hold sway.

[...]

Perhaps the most dispiriting thing about "Magic in the Moonlight" is the way Allen seems to reach these pessimistic conclusions as if he were doing so for the first time. The idea that there is no reigning order in the universe, no spiritual presence or benevolent being to guide us on this earthly plane, is laid bare with a grand "voila!" flourish, as if the director were himself a magician unveiling his latest, most spellbinding illusion.

[...]

In "Magic in the Moonlight," Allen seeks to reduce the very idea of God to the level of parlor trickery, all smoke and mirrors and invisible wirework."

(Chang)

Nietzsche's nihilism (metaphysicalist although it may be) opens up not only its own deconstruction but also that of the metaconverting nihilism behind the simulacrum of Zen. In this

regard hyperreal nihility as interlinked to deconstruction plays out Nishitani's ambition "[...] the overcoming of nihilism through nihilism."

"In *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari seem to be intentionally parodying the modernist obsessive and ongoing pursuit for "autonomy and purity or for timeless, representational truth" (Bertens, 2002, p.5) in earthly multiplicities, for they claim that Nature is itself a rhizome, where "roots are taproots with a more multiple, lateral, and circular system of ramification, rather than a dichotomous one. Thought lags behind nature" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1992, p.5). Detecting this postmodern impulse in rhizomatics, Best and Kellner reveal that *A Thousand Plateaus* is "mainly concerned with a positive application of postmodern thinking that analyzes the rhizomatic nature of natural, social, and personal reality" (Best & Kellner, 1991, p.98). Above all, Deleuze and Guattari set out to deconstruct in their second volume of collaboration "any binary oppositions left standing at the end of the first," namely, their "schizoanalytic „deconstruction" (if it can be called that) derives from the unconscious logic of non-global connection and inclusive disjunction, as specified in the *Anti-Oedipus*." (Holland 1). Their logic, as Deleuze and Guattari declare, is a logic of an open-ended series "the AND"—"and... and ... and"—whose conjunction "carries enough force to shake and uproot the verb „to be" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1992, p.25 ). On the other hand, according to Nāgārjuna, a momentary entity or impermanent dharma (way or reality) is a contradictory concept. He points out that "what is impermanent and momentary can be divided into non-enduring or non-abiding moments and has, analytically, no duration what(so)ever," for it disappears as soon as it appears. Hence, we cannot say it has "true existence" (Cheng, 1991, p.77). Consequently, attacking traditional ontology, Deleuze and Guattari not only echo this Buddhist view of voidness but also highlight the contingency and multiplicity of things in opposition to the metaphysical view of the existence of a permanent Ideal world beyond the transient and contingent everyday realities. That is, the central tenet of the Buddhist view of voidness corresponds to Deleuze and Guattari's empty logic—all things in the world, physical or psychical, are subject to change, or to put it more specifically, there is no intrinsic nature in them. In addition, Deleuze and Guattari also point out the uncertainty of realities by coining the concept of assemblage—"a multiplicity" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1992, p.4), by which they mean that all things in the world consist of lines and measurable speeds, but they also contain lines of flight/escape—"movements of deterritorialization and destratification"; the assembling and dissolution are subject to conditions or the law of relativity: "How could movements of deterritorialization and processes of reterritorialization not be relative (*italics added*), always connected, caught up in one another?" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1992, p.10). Moreover, they could connect or disconnect at any point with any lines (rhizomatic), as Deleuze and Guattari claim, the rhizome differs from a structure, because...the rhizome is made only of lines: lines of segmentarity/segmentation and stratification as its dimensions, and the line of flight or deterritorialization as the maximum dimension after which the multiplicity undergoes metamorphosis changes in nature [*italics added*]. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1992, p.21)

The above-mentioned view of reality as impermanent actually not only echoes the Buddhist view of causality but also continues Nietzsche's politics of will (to power), for all of them are based on the theory of relativity. In Buddhist terminology, it is called "Dependent Origination"—all things, inanimate or sentient, are interdependent/relativistic or conditioned, impermanent, and always in a flux of change. To be more specific, the law of causality is functioning according

to our volitional activities/willing (ignorance). On the other hand, this conception is also echoed in Deleuze's analysis of Nietzsche's ethics/ontology of power (will to power) as "a force which is related to another force: in this form force is called will. The will (will to power) is the differential element of force" (Deleuze, 1983, p.7). In terms of Deleuzian philosophy of desire/difference, the functioning of multiplicities is no more than a "network of plateaus" that are intersecting with one another and keep "deconstructing/multiplying a given set of terms until a point is reached at which they intersect with terms coming from deconstructions on other plateaus, without ever collapsing into or becoming identical with them. Such intersections will form a rhizome [emphasis added], something that develops „au milieu": in the middle, in between" (Holland, 1999, p.2). Viewed from the Buddhist perspective of the formation of things, material or mental, the rhizomatic conception assemblage is very similar to the Buddha's assertion that all things are comprised by the Five Aggregates (五蘊). Further, this Buddhist cosmological law also refers to the impermanence of all worldly things. Since all worldly things are impermanent, subject to change; impermanence, declares the Buddha, is dukkha (苦). It is generally admitted that the term dukkha in the First Noble Truth, the first principle of the Four Noble Truths (四聖諦)—one of the central tenets of Buddhism that is also expounded by Nāgārjuna—bears an apparent meaning of ordinary suffering. But in addition, it also includes "imperfection," "impermanence," "emptiness," or "insubstantiality" (Rahula, 1959, p.17). The Buddha argues in the First Noble Truth (Dukka-ariyasacca) that in our world, all physical and spiritual phenomena are no more than the conditioned "combination of ever-changing physical and mental forces or energies, which may be divided into five groups or aggregates"—the Five Aggregates—Aggregates of Matter(色蘊), Sensation(受蘊), Perceptions(想蘊), Mental Formations(行蘊), and Consciousness(識蘊). The Buddha insists that any being or an individual or "I" is only a "convenient name or a label given to the combination of these five groups" (Samyutta-nikaya 421). The five aggregates are impermanent. The Buddha thus claims, in his very first sermon, that "Whatever is impermanent is dukkha... In brief the five Aggregates of Attachment are dukkha... They are in a flux of momentary arising and disappearing" (Dhammacakkappavattana-sutta, 1922, p. 9). Moreover, in *A Thousand Plateaus* Deleuze and Guattari emphasize the collapse of the boundaries between the subject and the object, and that of beginning and end of any movement/action in nature. Nature is a rhizome full of contingent multiplicities that are not the representational copies of the immobile, unitary Platonic Ideal: It is not a multiplicity derived from the One, or to which One is added ( $n+1$ )... It has neither beginning nor end, but always a middle (milieu) from which it grows and which it overflows. It constitutes linear multiplicities with  $n$  dimensions having neither subject nor object... When a multiplicity of this kind changes dimensions, it necessarily changes in nature as well, undergoes a metamorphosis. (Deleuze and Guattari, 1992, p.12) This kind of deconstructive view of existence/reality happens to correspond to the Mādhyamika Middle View of reality—neither affirms nor denies the world, for "all things in the world are not as they appear to us," as the epigraph of this paper reveals." (Yang)

Intertextually Deleuze and Guattari schizoanalytic remains interlinked to the play of deconstruction with this hollowing out via the deterritorialization of organs-without-bodies/bodies-without-organs that, as Brassier touches on in "Nihil Unbound", deconstructs in a manner evoking a vectoral eliminativism of the Churchlands.

“In addition, in their dialectical manner of analyzing the nature of existence in *A Thousand Plateaus*, Deleuze and Guattari create a metaphysics (theories of nihilism) that is aimed at “creating a movement which mirrors the very texture of existence: perpetual becoming, without metaphysical essence; a becoming [...] eternally without aim, meaning, or goal” (Martin, 1991, p.). Their metaphysical view of reality also argues the null positions in both epistemology (skepticism: no truth) and ontology (nihilism: no being).“  
(Yang)

All of this gets tied up in the deconstruction of Cage and Cage’s reading of Duchamp. Cage’s works often get compared to Zen koans.

“John Cage was strongly influenced by Eastern Philosophy and Zen Buddhism, in particular. There is a Zen koan, a kind of paradoxical riddle, used in training students: What is the sound of one hand clapping? I have a feeling that maybe he's asking us that with *4'33*”. The composer has said that music is “a purposeless play,” [...] Call it conceptual art, performance art, or a musical trickster at work.”  
(Rittmeyer)

Perhaps *4'33*” hit different when *Nichts* performed it in the 80’s as Cramer mentions, but as we’ve seen it’s a watershed deconstructive gesture that opens up the paradoxes of silence and transmedia game events, with these *Gesamtkunstwerk* event texts that like with Kaprow’s ‘happenings’ and Brecht’s ‘events’ not only open up the ambiguity between the multimedia and the conceptual but also situates the Neoist APT Fests and the talk of Neoism’s rampant Fluxus influences.

“In 1952, Cage had explored the opening of the mind to other possibilities in a piece entitled *4'33*”, in which the pianist, David Tudor, sat at a piano and did nothing except indicate the beginning and end of each of the three movements by shutting and lifting the piano’s lid. During the piece itself, no sound is intentionally produced by the pianist on the instrument. Four minutes and thirty-three seconds of distinctly musical silence: Cage, a composer of music, has imposed as a framework a measure of time, and declared that whatever incidental sound occurs within this framework is a piece of music. With Cage came the notion that duration, sound and silence, rather than harmony, rhythm and melody, are the foundation blocks upon which musical experience is structured. With no melodic or harmonic passages to lead the listener through time, Cage’s music ceases to function as narrative, but rather places the listener in the vertically structured space of synchrony - this moment in time. And time, as we have come to know it in this century, is interdependent with space. It was the notion of opening to possibilities that Cage brought with him to the International Summer Course for New Music in Darmstadt (1958), and which he shared with his classes in “Experimental Composition” at the New School for Social Research (1956-1960). Numbered among the participants at Darmstadt were La Monte Young and Nam June Paik (Emmett Williams was also living in Darmstadt at this time). Among those who attended the New School classes, with varying degrees of regularity, were Dick Higgins, Al Hansen, Allan Kaprow, Toshi Ichiyanagi, George Brecht and Jackson Mac Low (Brecht and Mac Low had been invited to sit in by Cage), all of whom were to play pivotal roles in the development of intermedia. Cage’s students were introduced to his understanding of music as time-space, and formulated their own methods for exploring these uncharted waters. On the one

hand, students like Allan Kaprow and Al Hansen were impressed by the Cage/Dada notion of the "simultaneous presentation of unrelated events," and went on to create happenings, complex, multi-sensory constructions—what Fluxus artist Tomas Schmit called "the expressionistic, symbolistic, voluminous opera-type-of-thing" —such as Kaprow's 1959 18 Happenings in 6 Parts. George Brecht—for whom the Cage class was in part "a kind of confirmation" of "the thought of Suzuki that I'd already discovered on my own" - was not so inclined to construct as to notice: "Composers, performers and auditors of music permit sound-experiences by arranging situations having sound as an aspect. But the theater is well lit. I cough; the seat cracks, and I can feel the vibration. Since there is no distraction, why choose sound as a common aspect?" Brecht claimed to be "increasingly dissatisfied with an emphasis on the purely aural qualities of a situation," and so began to call his work, even his object-oriented work, "events." This word, he claims, "seemed closer to describing the total, multi-sensory experience I was interested in than any other..." Rather than examining the extravagance and multi-sensory barrage that constituted many happenings, Brecht's work was "very private, like little enlightenments I wanted to communicate to my friends who would know what to do with them."

(Doris)

Perhaps at this rate, Pata-No UN LTD's 'transmedia game events' seem slightly less cryptic with them at the crossroads of Fluxus 'event texts', the hyperreal 'species of events', and Neoism (with APT Fests as the mani-fest-stations of Neoism). Hence the interlinking between Fluxus event texts like 4'33" taken as koans or 'quasi-rituals' and Chuang-tzu's butcher as metonymic simultaneously of non-events and gestural deconstruction hyperrealistically.

"Yes and no. Chuang-tzu, one of the founders of philosophical Taoism, an important influence on the development of Zen in China, suggests that words be regarded as a net which is employed to catch fish; this net (known in Japanese as sengyo) is required to perform a task, but it is the fish themselves which are consumed: "Words," says Chuang-tzu, "are there to convey a profound meaning; we should keep the meaning and forget the words." [40] One must cast one's net if one is to catch any fish at all. One must also be wary of becoming entangled in the net. Language must by necessity be employed as a tool, but in such a way that it will create the conditions in which it is no longer useful, a void in which its own absence can be filled by unmediated perception and direct action. The principal tool used by Rinzai Zen (one of the two major schools of Zen) to accomplish this end is the technique of kanna Zen - literally "Zen of the contemplation of words." The form of this contemplation is embodied in the koan.

[...]

What do koans have to do with Fluxus? Victor Musgrave, whose Gallery One hosted the 1962 Festival of Misfits, notes: "some of the Fluxus artists have...produced significant equivalents" to "the bandaged, all-seeing ambiguities of [Zen's] marvelous koan." He asserts that this is "the most formidable task that Fluxus artists have attempted." I agree. But how do the artists of Fluxus engage this "formidable task"? How are Fluxus works the "significant equivalents" of koans? It is important to note that, according to Musgrave, an equivalence is seen not between Fluxus work and Zen painting or haiku verse, but between Fluxus work and koans. Rather than compare the work of Fluxus artists to the expressions of the specific sensibility that accompanies Zen practice, Musgrave likens Fluxus events to the principal pedagogical tool of

Zen, the koan. The Fluxus work is not an index of the performer's relationship with his or her materials, as the exquisite brushwork of a Zen painting traces the path of the scribe's hand and presence of "no-mind." Rather, the Fluxus work, like the koan, is the exposition of the path itself, the restructuring and presentation of a process of meaning-production. The form a work takes is the demonstration of the unfolding processes of its own presentation and reception. Like the circular, stimulus/response form of the koan, Fluxus "presentation," to quote Dick Higgins, "would always have to do somehow with the general principle that ideas could be displayed or demonstrated rather than argued for or against."<sup>4</sup>  
(Doris)

For those with Discordian linked interests to Zen like Pseudonovalis that's all well and fine but the deconstruction of its ontotheological/metaphysical/meontological as Lyotard mentions adds up to a lazy metaconverting nihilism. Kane's reading of the "poisonous snake" of emptiness overlooks the potential of this pharmakon unlike Derrida when the line mentioned above about Socrates' snake venom pharmakon of the pharmakos.

"What do big moons, lazy nihilists and rabbit holes have to do with Shunyata? Yesterday I read a feature on Space.com which became the inspiration of this feature: "The 'Big Moon' Illusion May All Be in Your Head," by Joe Rao. This led to rabbit holes and lazy nihilism. Bear with me, I come back to the big moon at the end, and I want to start with snakes.

[...]

Famously, the great Nagarjuna is credited with saying: "Emptiness wrongly grasped is like picking up a poisonous snake by the wrong end." However perilous, serious Buddhists students have to try to pick up that snake. No one wants to be bitten. Recently, one of my good friends went back to her birth religion, after years as a Buddhist, because she couldn't get past thinking she was practicing nihilism. She had picked up "the wrong end" of the snake. For most of the rest of us — who aspire to Buddhist realizations — it can be the most difficult of topics."

(Kane)

One must avoid a facile misreading of Zen like either Kane metaphysically/meontologically as ""inclusivism" or "substantialism"" or Hofstadter metaphilosophically/meta-logically as ""ism"". This would clearly go against any hermeneutics of Zen which remains part and parcel of the deconstruction of hermeneutics.

"In a separate teaching on Yamantaka — in his eloquent, direct teaching style — Gelek Rinpoche warned against nihilism: "So if some people say 'Everything is only the result of mind. In the end it is all zero, so it doesn't matter, it's all the same, it's all bullshit' ... that is the emptiness approach from the empty point of view and that gets you on the wrong track." The great Tibetan Yogini Machig explained emptiness as "the source and inseparable essence of all phenomena, it represents the totality of all that is and all that will come to be. For without emptiness, there would be no space for existence." This is the opposite of nihilism, and could be better described as "inclusivism" or "substantialism."

[...]

The problem with nihilism — substantialism's opposite — is Nagarjuna's venomous snake. Buddha taught "the middle way" which implies avoiding extreme views, such as substantialism and nihilism. Both concepts run contrary to the notion of emptiness.

[...]

It is easy for people to make incorrect assumptions from the terms “Emptiness” and “Voidness” — incomplete, even possibly misleading translations of the Sanskrit word Shunyata. The International Association of Buddhist Studies (IABS), in their Journal, warns practitioners to “transcend a lazy nihilism” — one of the perceptions that arise from the terms Emptiness and Voidness.“

(Kane)

Zen/Tao so easily remains trapped in a meontological metaphysics of presence that nihilism at least outpaces its poetic obliviousness while Neoism goes even further by playing into this deconstruction of the metaphysics of presence and also how one hyperrealistically would then drop the ‘-ism’ from nihilism to leave only the path of nihility.

“Answering the Nihilist Challenge: Is Emptiness Nothingness or Voidness? Even if the words of great teachers challenge us to our own understanding of Emptiness, there is always the risk of “lazy nihilism.” If we can’t understand such a profound concept, we often “lazily” associate Emptiness with Nihilism. The problem begins with the English translation of the original Sanskrit term Shunyata. This profound and complex concept is often translated into English as “voidness.” Voidness sounds a lot like “nothingness” and, in my many years of attending teachings, I’ve often heard teachers interchange the word Emptiness, Voidness and Nothingness, so this can be confusing from the get-go. In the same discussion, some teachers will warn against nihilism, but never-the-less use the word “nothingness.” “There is really no adequate word in English for Shunyata, as both ‘voidness’ and ‘emptiness’ have negative connotations, whereas, shunyata is a positive sort of emptiness transcending the duality of positive-negative,” writes Terry Clifford in Tibetan Buddhist Medicine and Psychiatry. [6] He adds: “The doctrine of void was propounded in the Madhyamika dialectic philosophy of Nagarjuna, the second-century Buddhist philosopher-saint. Nagarjuna said of shunyata, ‘It cannot be called void or not void, or both or neither, but in order to indicate it, it is called the Void.’” In Sanskrit, the word Shunyata has a very layered meaning, not easily translated into other languages. Translations of the Sanskrit noun Shunyata might be part of the issue. The Sanskrit noun Shunyata literally translates as “zero” or “nothing” — but like most Sanskrit words, a single-word translation is misleading. The Sanskrit adjective is actually Sunya, which means “empty” — according to translators who insist on single-word equivalents. In Buddhist concept, Shunyata is decidedly not nihilistic in tone — sometimes, it is translated as openness, oneness and spaciousness. No single-word translation is really helpful in describing the true essence of Shunyata.”

(Kane)

It’s no wonder then that the disassembly of the body much like the cannibalization of a car would come up in both Zen and in Baudrillard on deconstruction, but whereas Zen’s minimalist semiotics falls flat as mere metaphysical hand-waving, deconstruction deconstructs the structure for a semiotics.

“Mahayana teachers often focus more on the notion of “imputed labels” as an introduction to the very difficult subject of Emptiness. Imputing is a frequently repeated word in the teachings on Emptiness. In teachings on Mahamudra in Ontario last spring, Venerable Zasep Tulku Rinpoche



gave this example of labeling: "A good example is your car. If you take that car apart, and everything is just parts, there is no car. Just car parts. You put it back together, and then label it Hyundai, you have a Hyundai. But if you switch the labels [to Honda] is it now a Honda? It's all labels. There is no independent existence. That's only one way to look at emptiness.

[...]

During a "scanning meditation" guided practice in the same teaching session at Gaden Choling, Zasep Rinpoche asked students to find their body: "what is my body? ... do a scanning meditation and try to find your body. "When you scan your skin, you ask, is that my body? No, it's skin, not body. Then you look at your bones, and likewise every part of your body... To be body, it has to be the 'whole' body, all the parts. If you really look, you can't find one thing that is your body. What we call a body\* is just a 'label'. A name. Imputing a label."

(Kane) [\*cadaver, corpse, remains, refuse, vermin(ę), carcass, stiff]

Considering Cage again all of this seeming nuance gets quite pertinent considering the link of influence between Jarry to Duchamp to Cage.

"As Jarry was informed by Goethe's sentiments, Joyce, Duchamp and Cage were informed by Jarry's (Joyce and Duchamp, I believe, directly; Cage, according to my thesis, more by his love of Joyce and Duchamp). John Cage did not enjoy what he knew of Jarry. When I broached the subject, Cage said the following: I have an allergy, you might call it, against the kind of expression that was Jarry's, but it's clear that Duchamp did not. But I agree with the view that everyone was influenced by Jarry. I myself think that Duchamp and Joyce having used Jarry is far more interesting than anything Jarry himself did. I never learned exactly how much of Jarry that John Cage had read, but he admitted that he had read some. In 1989, at his suggestion, I loaned him my copy of the English translation of *The Supermale*. I had noted on the blank pages numerous passages which correspond with parts of Duchamp's notes and with sections of *Ulysses* and *Finnegans Wake*. After a few days Cage returned the book, saying that it was a novel and he couldn't read novels. A short time after this he volunteered that my interest in the subject had brought him back to Jarry. Cage gave no titles and never indicated that his "allergy" had left him. I believe that if he had read more of Jarry, Faustroll in particular, his feelings might have changed. After all, in addition to his love for Joyce and Duchamp, who he agreed were influenced by Jarry, he repeatedly commented that he followed Antonin Artaud's philosophy of theater. Artaud was, in fact, such a disciple of the writer that he named his theater "The Alfred Jarry." Ironically, John Cage had more similarities with Jarry than did either Joyce or Duchamp. His sexual orientation was much closer to Jarry's than to that of the other two, although he was as soft-spoken on the subject as Jarry was blaring. And Cage, like Jarry, was an avowed anarchist. Here, too, the difference was more in the manner of expression and emphasis than in the bottom line commitment. But perhaps the most significant parallel between the two reveals itself when we look at their respective interest in Chance. We know that Cage studied with the Zen teacher, Daisetz Suzuki, and that as a result he started to use chance operations in his compositions around 1950. Jarry was equally involved with Chance. His Pataphysics, an alternate hypothesis for the workings of the universe, assigns an important role to l'accident. The same holds true when he writes of matters à l'amour: "Men and women think they choose each other...as though the Earth should boast of revolving on purpose! It is in this passive inevitability, as of a falling stone, which men and women call love." This "falling stone" remark

may well have planted a seed in Duchamp which resulted in the Standard Stoppages, by which he hoped to create "a new image of the unit of length." The Jarry line which follows the "falling stone" reference runs: "The god and goddess are about to unite...in order to meet, they need a length of time which, according to human measurements, varies between a second and two hours." While this touches on the measurement of time, elsewhere (in *How to Build a Time Machine*) Jarry states bluntly that "space and time are commensurate." He goes on to share his reasoning: "To explore the universe by seeking knowledge of points in Space can be accomplished only through Time: and in order to measure Time quantitatively we refer to Space intervals on the dial of a chronometer." Tapping another Jarry source, I have written: Jarry's Dr. Faustroll has an almost obsessive fascination with standards of measure. He carries in his pocket a "centimeter, an authentic copy in brass of the traditional standard," and he also possesses a tuning fork, its period "carefully determined...in terms of mean seconds." These habits are a parody of traditional Western science, which Jarry anarchically undermined. Discussing science, he remarked, "Universal assent is...a quite miraculous and incomprehensible prejudice." Duchamp shared this attitude. The 3 Standard Stoppages, for example, in which the artist believed he had "trapped the mainstream of [his] future," reflects his mock-scientific intention "to create a new image of the unit of length," and to obtain a specimen of "canned chance." The very method of their making - "a thread one meter long [falling] straight from a height of one meter on to a horizontal plane twisting as it pleases" - recalls a line in Jarry: "When a piece of copper is dropped...it will float down slowly as though a viscous liquid occupied the space." There are many passages in each of his major works in which Jarry reveals strong feelings about chance. One description in *The Supermale* is particularly apt. The Supermale (Marcueil) wants to get into his disguise for the 82 ravishments of Ellen Elson within 24 hours. "It was ten o'clock, and André Marcueil was looking for an excuse to slip off to make way for the Indian. Chance - or perhaps some previously determined assistance brought about by chance - supplied him with one." In Duchamp's notes pertaining to his making of the 3 Standard Stoppages, he almost literally describes a previously determined assistance brought about by chance. André Breton maintained that "beginning with Jarry...the differentiation long considered necessary between art and life has been challenged to wind up annihilated as a principle." Duchamp presented manufactured products from life as art, a gesture surely in tune with this stance of Jarry's. And Cage's composition 4'33", in which the natural sounds occurring during that length of time constitute the piece, likewise demolishes this distinction. Cage often said that 4'33" was his favorite of his own works, and that he believed that the most beautiful music was the natural sounds around us."

(Anastasi)

Not only is the deconstruction of the life/art binary a parallel between an Jarry and Cage as well as the chain of intertextuality which links Cage to Duchamp to Jarry, but as we see in this quote there's perhaps almost an 'event score' for readymade 'sound sculptures' within Jarry's "Supermale" that could have, according to Anastasi, influenced Duchamp's 'musical sculpture' from the "Green Box" and if so would deconstruct inutiliously the use /mention distinction which kept Hugill from accrediting Jarry with 'imaginary musical technology' inventions of his own.

“Robert Rauschenberg has remarked that he likes to operate in the ever-narrowing gap between life and art. John Cage has responded that he’d rather collapse them both together. If we think of the radical freshness of the *Européras*, in effect built from the bits and pieces of the old — its debris you might say — Jarry’s introduction to *Ubu Enchaîné*, with which he greeted the last century in 1900, seems to be at least indicated, if not vindicated: *Pa Ubu*:

"Hornstrumpet! We shall not have succeeded in demolishing everything unless we demolish the ruins as well. But the only way I can see of doing that is to use them to put up a lot of fine, well-designed buildings.

[...]

A short time after John Cage learned that I was researching correspondences between Jarry’s writings and Duchamp’s notes and art works, he asked, "What have you found?" I listed some of the pieces by Duchamp, which seemed most clearly connected to certain passages or images in Jarry. This list included: *The Large Glass*, *Étant Donnés*, *Bicycle Wheel*, *Bottle Dryer*, *In Advance of the Broken Arm*, *Tu m’*, *To Be Looked At With One Eye...*, *Monte Carlo Bond*, *L.H.O.O.Q.*, *Why Not Sneeze Rose Sélavy?*, *Comb*, *With Hidden Noise*, *Apolinère Enameled*, *Traveler’s Folding Item*, *Fountain* and *With My Tongue In My Cheek*. When I paused, trying to remember additional items, he asked whether I had found anything in Jarry, which might have pointed toward Duchamp’s "musical sculpture" paragraph, which is in the *Green Box* notes.

["Musical sculpture. Sounds lasting and leaving from different places and forming a sounding sculpture which lasts."] I answered that I had found a possible link in *The Supermale*, which was perhaps a less literal and certainly a more complex connection than the links I had been finding for many of the art works. The images which make up this connection appear in a section of the novel in which suddenly a wide variety of sounds are being described for us at every turn. In some cases, sounds emanating from different places at different times are described as arriving intermingled at one place. Repeatedly we are given descriptions of three-dimensional objects giving off sounds — "sound sculptures," if you will. The sound images include "the clicking of heels," "a burst of laughter," "a crystalline chatter...like parakeets, deliciously out of tune, like the sound of love instruments tuning up," "a rustling sound," "a light and rapid step [is heard]," "the beating of [one girl’s] little fists" as she "drums" on an ironbound door, a voluminous quarter-hourly clock-chime, while "downstairs...violins were tuning up," etc. Making reference to the clock-chimes which punctuate the entire section, or rather the space of silence between them, he writes, "It was one o’clock, it was any time, then it was eleven o’clock in the evening, and the distant music struck through the silence as confusedly as nervous fingers straining after the eye of a needle." Since a church’s spire with quarter-hourly chimes pouring forth could very aptly be described as a "sounding sculpture," the following passage seems relevant: "...at irregular intervals the highest notes of the top strings rose like spires piercing through the fog." These high notes, we are told, are interspersed with the deafening chimes and other sounds, helping the reader to imagine a veritable concerto performed by three-dimensional objects: "...its booming filled the long room, the chandelier vibrated, the picture frames trembled, and near the ceiling, a pane of glass vibrated." Jarry, who Breton tells us annihilated the difference between life and art, often describes natural sounds in pointedly musical terms. For example, in a passage already partially quoted, Jarry describes the sound of seven harlots gossiping as "crystalline chatter, deliciously out of tune, like the sound of love instruments tuning up, one might imagine." Jarry is not only comparing their "chatter" to the sounds of musical instruments

– he is also telling us that as prostitutes, they themselves are "love instruments" to be played, obviously, by their customers. In Faustroll he describes "stones [which] are as cold as the cry of trumpets," contrasting them with others which have "the precipitated heat of the surface of kettledrums." I paused after having given John Cage a precis of the above, thinking there might be a response. When none came, I went on to describe a more direct connection between another passage in Jarry and a Duchamp note. It was not about a piece of Duchamp's, but rather about one of many component parts of a piece (The Large Glass). When Jarry first describes Doctor Faustroll's raiment, he pictures for us "tiny little gray boots, with even layers of dust carefully preserved on them, at great expense, for many months past..." Duchamp, in the Green Box notes, wrote, "For the sieves in the glass — allow dust to fall on this part a dust of 3 or 4 months..." I pointed out that the idea of "sieves" itself may well have come from the same book of Jarry's. Chapter six of Faustroll is titled Concerning the Doctor's Boat, Which is a Sieve. The Doctor describes in minute and obsessive detail the magnificent seagoing properties of this bark, then ends by informing the reader that "we shall not be navigating on water but on dry land." By coincidence or otherwise, Man Ray's photograph of Duchamp's Dust Raising, reproduced on the page facing the Duchamp note in Richard Hamilton's typographic version of the Green Box notes, which John Cage had by now opened in front of us, resembles, more than anything else, an aerial view of some extremely flat dry land. I was emboldened to say that these connections, and a hundred others like them, left me with the impression that Duchamp, perhaps consciously, had been playing a game in which he used hints from Jarry's writings in every major piece as well as in most of the lesser ones. Duchamp unfailingly left clues about the Jarry connection in the title, in the appearance, or in the accompanying notes of his work. At the same time, Duchamp unfailingly diverted attention elsewhere whenever an interview or conversation seemed headed in that direction."

(Anastasi)

We can see the Oulipolian patamechanisms/constraints of fatal strategies in various chance operation sonic compositions from both Cage and Duchamp, but this also extends itself into various media by Duchamp like the '3 Standard Stoppages' and the 'Large Glass'.

"I asked Dorothea Tanning if she would read a new and unpublished essay I had written titled Who Broke the Glass, which presents evidence to support the argument that The Large Glass was not broken accidentally, as the world has been told, but intentionally by, or at the behest of, the artist. Ms. Tanning, who with her late husband Max Ernst, knew Duchamp well, has been generous with her help and encouragement. Both she and Max Ernst were great lovers of Alfred Jarry, and since she and I also share a fondness for Joyce, we are never at a loss for conversation. When she had handed my essay back she said it had convinced her, and she showed me something she had written in the margin of the last page. It referred to Duchamp, and she said that I could use it in future writings with attribution, or without. It reads, "All is formulaic and calculated. This meticulous planning leaves nothing to chance, that force so often claimed by the artist." (Emphasis Dorothea Tanning's.) Reading this I found myself thinking once again about the parallels and differences between Marcel Duchamp and his friend John Cage. They both claimed Chance as an assistant. But in Duchamp's case, at least according to Ms. Tanning's view, nothing could be further from the truth. Years ago, wanting to test Duchamp's commitment to chance I had tried his thread-dropping experiment for the 3 Standard

Stoppages — canned chance, as he called it. Tirelessly, with a wide variety of thread materials and thickness, I followed his "instructions" as they appear in the Green Box notes. Not once did the results come close to those three gentle and elegant arcs that he permanentized as the stoppages. John Cage, honoring Duchamp, tried this same experiment in making some of his earliest etchings. His results were as far from Duchamp's as mine were, and not surprisingly, just about identical to my results. We talked this over a number of times, wondering what could account for the difference. I have by now come to the conclusion that when a man as intelligent as Duchamp, as elegantly articulate, civilized and gracious says, "Every word I tell you is stupid and false", and, "All in all I'm a pseudo, that's my characteristic" — when he gives us one self-portrait titled *With My Tongue In My Cheek*, another as a wanted felon, a third as an old whore, and a fourth as the very devil — the net effect on most observers is to cause them to believe his every word, perhaps more than they might have had he never brought up the subject. It seems as though Duchamp managed to hide very well behind these statements and shady personas. Maybe most of us have difficulty believing that a man of such genius and elegance would be capable of doing something so expected, so unimaginative, as to be telling the truth when he calls himself a liar. It is easier to believe that the disclaimers themselves were part of a game, a put-on, an act — that the real Duchamp was as straightforward as his famous profile."  
(Anastasi)

If all of this still seems obtuse we can look to Cage's own statements.

"P: Much of your earlier work developed through a disregard for the distinctions between art and life. Do you feel there has been progress made since first formulating those ideas?

JC: I think this is one of the familiar aspects of art, that it opens our eyes to things in what we call nature or the environment that has/d escaped our notice. In paying attention to art your observation of nature changes. There's a strong action in both directions, between our experience of the environment and our experience of making things, of doing things."

(Cage)

A nihilistic avoidance of rules/structure permeates Cage all of which interlinks his work to the development of indeterminate transfinite transmedia games.

"JC: Right. Carried away in paying attention to it. As we get involved in the work, in art so to speak, then things could be happening in nature around you which would escape your notice, because your attention is being placed on your work-so then the difference is striking. At the same time the use of the work will be to carry you back to the absence of work and just to the environment. It's very curious. It's actually a question of the movement of attention, so that your attention is placed on the work that you're doing and then once the work is done your attention moves, without any trouble, to not working, in other words, the environment. However, I don't think I would say the same things about what I'm doing now. I have the impression in my work that things that I was avoiding formerly, I now no longer avoid. One thing that remains of greatest importance to me is non-intention.

P: And structure?

JC: It needn't be structure(d), it can just be a process. I think of a structure as something having parts and I think of a process as something not having parts. You could now have something not having parts that nevertheless begins and ends. The thing I think of as being something I

used to avoid, and which I no longer do, is something like harmony. Now it seems to me that harmony happens no matter what we do. It's like melody; if you make a number of sounds you automatically have melody, and now if you have several sounds together they automatically produce harmony. Most of my life I thought that I had to find an alternative to harmony, but the harmony I was thinking about was the one that had been taught at school. Now I see that everything outside of school is also harmonious.

P: A wider definition of harmony?

JC: A changed definition of harmony; one that doesn't involve any rules or laws. You might call it an anarchic harmony. Just sounds being together."

(Cage)

Lotringer's inquiry with Cage allows him to frame the context of Zen in relation to nothing as well as the strange loop of infinite possibility involved in the uncertainty of his 'chance operation' based event text compositions.

"Charles: Must we dissociate the idea of life and the idea of the center?

Cage: Suzuki taught me that in fact we never stop establishing, outside the life of things, a means of measure and that we then continually try to (re)place each thing into the grid of our measure. We strive to posit relations between things, thanks to this grid. Thus, we lose the things; we forget them, or we disfigure them. Zen teaches us that we are really in a situation of decentering, relative to the grid. In this situation, everything is at the center. There is then a plurality and a multiplicity of centers. And they are all interpenetrating. And Zen adds: in non-obstruction. To live, for all things, is to be at the center. That entails interpenetration and non-obstruction.

Charles: How can those two terms not be contradictory? For two sounds not to mask nor to overshadow each other, they must be separate. How do they interpenetrate?

Cage: You say they must be separated. Well, don't put anything in the interval.

Charles: How so?

Cage: Between the things that you are separating to prevent their becoming an obstacle, there must be nothing. Well, this nothing is what allows all things to exist.

Charles: That is, to interpenetrate?

Cage: That they interpenetrate signifies that between them there is nothing. Thus nothing separates them. .

Charles: You speak of nothing. of "rien. " I'd like to raise a point of translation here. Would you prefer the English nothing to be translated as "rien "or as "le rien, " as "nothing" or as "the nothing"? Can we see the "nothing" of your thoughts as "the Nothing", the Nothingness, the Silence? In the inverse hypothesis, Lecture on Nothing would have to be translated as Discours sur rien. Which should be chosen?

Cage: The first, it seems to me.

Charles: That would be the "Occidental" solution: as with Eckhart—whom you cite often—where the Nothing, the Nothingness, "exists" as the Deity or the foundation of God, and, in that sense, there is no place for the absolute Nothing, for pure Nothingness. In Zen, isn't the Void a nothing with a "small n"? Which is to say nothing at all, and upon reflection not even a nothing? At least this is where certain Japanese philosophers seem to draw their argument for differentiating Zen (and all Oriental philosophy) from Western thought.

Cage: And what did my French translator do?

Charles: He hesitates, sometimes opting for the capital N, at other times using the small n. Sometimes for the West, others for the East!

Cage: I wonder which one should choose. But it's hard because we still remain mired within the intellectual categories. Of course, to say "the Nothing" is not to go all the way, for it says: the Nothing is still some-thing. It's not very satisfying.

Charles: Must we therefore reject the very solution you just finished suggesting as necessary?

Cage: As long as you oppose Some-thing to Nothing, you remain in the game of intellectual categories. What I wanted to say, when speaking of the "nothing in between," is that the Nothing is. . .neither Being nor Nothing.

Charles: It is outside the relationship between Being and Nothing.

Cage: Right. Each time we establish a relation, each time we connect two terms, we forget that we have to return to zero before moving to the next term. The same goes for Being and Nothing! We speak, we try to think about these notions—like musical sounds—and we forget what's really going on. We forget that each time, to pass from one word to the next, we must return to zero.

Charles: You once spoke of an "alternating current". . . Wouldn't the Nothing be *the*/the discontinuous?

Cage: It's the impossibility of remaining in a relative Nothing, in a relation. The relation follows.

Charles: Language compels you to return to "absolute" Nothing?

Cage: Yes, and thus I can stick to the first choice: "the Nothing." On the condition that we don't let the words take over, we can let it happen.

Charles: Koichi Tsujimura, a contemporary Japanese thinker, has dealt with this problem in particular. The title of his work, *Vom Nichts im Zen*, "Of Nothing in Zen," places him right alongside our own conversation. I think a few observations of his are pertinent to what you've been saying: "From this state of things, one could want to draw the conclusion that something like absolute Nothing is unthinkable and impossible; and even if it were thinkable, it would be a mere *ens rationis*, without a shred of reality. But the contradiction between an absolute Nothing and a relative nothing, on which is founded the aforementioned conclusion, is not in fact a contradiction. . . This contradiction exists only in the sphere of the relative, in the dimension of representational thought, in which the attempt is to represent both the absolute Nothing and the relative nothing as well as Being and their relationships as something existing.' Do you agree with Koichi Tsujimura's rejection of "the dimension of representational thought"?

Cage: If that corresponds with what Suzuki calls "the mental," we can't "reject" it any more than we can reject the world of relations. But we can cross and travel beyond it. Towards the "non-mental."

Charles: Your ideas come from Suzuki?

Cage: Yes, and also from a fascinating book, entitled *Neti, Neti*, that taught me, that in the world of created things, there is some-thing that is, so to speak, [NO!]-thing; and moreover: a nothing which has no-thing within it. That is the nothing in between! More recently, I re-encountered this idea in Buckminster Fuller: he describes the world as a movement of spheres among which there is a void, a necessary space. It is this space we tend to forget. . .We leap over it in order to establish our relations and connections. We think we can slide, in continuity, from one sound to the next, from one thought to the next. In reality, we fall and don't even know it! We live, but

to live means to cross the world of relations or representations. After all we never see ourselves crossing this world! And yet that's all we ever do!

Charles: It's all very simple. then?

Cage: I would say, inversely, that while our way of thinking is so simple, our experience is always, and in each instant, extreme and complex, we think, we continually return to the paired opposites, sound and silence, Being and Nothing. This is precisely in order to simplify experience, which is beyond amplification. Ultra-complicated and never reducible to the number two.

Charles: Aren't we in danger of returning to the number one? To a sort of monism?

Cage: Buckminster Fuller insists on the number three and feels there is hardly a useful idea that can proceed without taking at least three things into account simultaneously. And, as for me, the best way to escape the two is to perform a chance operation. Because then we allow an infinity of things to enter into a single, complex event. And by that, we avoid that simplification peculiar to our way of thinking.

Charles: Nevertheless I wonder how can you not be shocked by the mechanistic, automatic nature of the chance operations. To draw the sounds by lot, isn't that a facile solution?

Whatever the role of chance in daily life may be, doesn't chance frequently oversimplify things?

Cage: But how would we explain the fact that we are present here, that we are in the present but not in the same present as the fir-trees in the forest? We owe this complexity to chance. . .

Our life is an intense complexity on which new layers of chance are constantly imposed.

Chance allows this and excludes that.

Charles: Does it therefore oblige us to consider presence and absence as complements?

Cage: It obliges us to reject the exclusions, the radical alternatives between opposites."

(p.33-35, Lotringer et. al., 1977)

Adcock brings together what Baudrillard would call the zero degree at which Duchamp operates with Duchamp's interlinking of readymades to nth-dimensional, specifically the 4th dimension as shadow of the 3rd dimension. Thereby evoking what Baudrillard does by interlinking hyperreality of the double to Peter Schlemihl's lost shadow and the Student of Prague's lost mirror image.

"Begun in 1913, the Woolworth Building was still under construction when Duchamp wrote his note. When the building was completed in 1918, its height of 792 feet made it the world's tallest skyscraper. Duchamp's desire to use the neo-Gothic building as a ready-made is indicative of one of his most interesting strategies: he often conjoined the topical, even the trivial, with concepts that had far greater importance. The radicality of Duchamp's combinatorial approach becomes evident when the context of his reference to the Woolworth Building is taken into consideration—a context that locks the potential ready-made's meaning into the iconography of the Large Glass. The world's tallest building, when taken as a ready-made, becomes a humorous Dada object. But it can also stand for a mathematical situation. More specifically, the building can be used to symbolize certain characteristics of the fourth dimension—and this last is apparently what Duchamp had in mind. By 1916, he had already incorporated a great deal of speculative geometry into the iconographical program that he was working out for the Large Glass. Duchamp used several branches of advanced geometry to enrich and to complicate his art. At first glance, the reference to the Woolworth Building may seem nothing more than an offhand addendum, but it becomes significant when considered in relation to Duchamp's



architectural method of describing four-dimensional geometry—even more so when his purposes for using such a geometry are taken into consideration. During the nineteenth century, these kinds of mathematical systems had had profound impacts upon philosophy— and from there, they had had profound impacts upon Duchamp. That the Woolworth Building was implicated in his program of combining art and mathematics is supported by one of his notes from *l'Infinif*. Here, he explains that: the shadow cast by a four-dimensional figure on our space is a three-dimensional shadow (see Jouffret, "Geometry of Four Dimensions," page 186, last three lines). three-dimensional sections of four-dimensional figures by a space: by analogy with the method by which architects depict the plan of each story of a house, a four dimensional figure can be represented (in each one of its stories) by three-dimensional sections. These different stories will be bound to one another by the fourth dimension. Construct all the three-dimensional states of the four-dimensional figure the same way one determines all the planes or sides of a three-dimensional figure—in other words: A four-dimensional figure is perceived (?) through an infinity of three-dimensional sides which are the sections of this four-dimensional figure by the infinite number of spaces (in three dimensions) which envelope this figure. —In other words: one can move around the four-dimensional figure according to the four directions of the continuum. The number of positions of the perceiver is infinite but one can reduce to a finite number these different positions (as in the case of regular three-dimensional figures) and then each perception, in these different positions, is a three-dimensional figure. The set of these three-dimensional perceptions of the four-dimensional figure would be the foundation for a reconstruction of the four-dimensional figure. With the workings of this note in mind, the metaphorical potential of an appropriated piece of architecture becomes clear. The note refers to Esprit Pascal Jouffret, the mathematician who, along with Henri Poincaré, provided Duchamp with most of what he knew about mathematics. The book mentioned is Jouffret's *Elementary Treatise on Four-Dimensional Geometry*. In this general textbook, Jouffret explains the workings of  $n$ -dimensional geometry. At one important point, he says that although our world seems to have only three dimensions, and while it is thus perfectly understandable that we should think of three-space as the only space, more complex arrangements can be imagined: normal space can be thought of as a field of the third degree immersed in a field of higher degree, namely, a four-dimensional continuum, or an "étendue," as he calls it in French. Jouffret explains that, when conceptualized in such terms, "our space is only an elementary slice out of the four-dimensional continuum surrounding it on every side. From the point of view of the fourth dimension, space is infinitely thin and absolutely flat, and this is true for every entity it contains" (pp. 183-84). Duchamp uses a similar kind of argument, but adds his own architectural metaphors. He explains that an architectural plan, which amounts to a two dimensional plane, can be thought of as a "section," or "slice," through the three-dimensional space of a building. If the plan is displaced vertically, it generates the entire structure. The space can also be generated by displacing one of the sides of the building horizontally. In more general terms, this approach is, of course, still a standard way of constructing figures in elementary geometry: a point is displaced to generate a line, a line to generate a plane, a plane to generate a solid, etc. Duchamp applies this kind of constructive method to architecture. From his point of view, the three dimensional space of a building can be thought of as a stack of infinitely thin "plans" or planes. If, as a next logical step, the entire three-dimensional building is thought of as an "infinitely thin slice" contained within the "étendue," it becomes, in some sense, a "plan" for a

four-dimensional structure. In these terms, the ready-made Woolworth Building can serve as an embodiment of Duchamp's geometrical metaphors. When Duchamp extrapolates from his discussion of three-space to a discussion of four-space, he enters a speculative world. He argues that "a four dimensional figure is perceived (?) through an infinity of three-dimensional sides which are the sections of this four-dimensional figure by the infinite number of spaces (in three dimensions) which envelope this figure." In this analysis, Duchamp follows the word "perceived" with a question mark. Jouffret had also expressed a certain amount of skepticism about seeing four dimensional figures: he says that while it is perfectly possible to conceive of the fourth dimension, and of four-dimensional objects, it is impossible to perceive them. Duchamp, at this same juncture, again adds his own speculations: he suggests that through movement, through changing points of view, it might be possible, if not to see, at least to reconstruct four-dimensional figures. He suggests that if perceivers could get into the fourth dimension and move around, they would then be able to look back and perceive a series of three-dimensional "sections" of four-dimensional objects. As he puts it in the note, "the set of these three-dimensional perceptions would be the foundation for a reconstruction of the four-dimensional figure."

(Adcock)

Such projective aspects of n-dimensional geometry are highlighted by the Woolworth Building considered as a readymade. In a way the text Duchamp had planned for it would give an example of a 4D readymade transmedia strange loop that would simulate a transformer embellishing the readymades it would house as the 4D shadows they remain.

"Duchamp learned much of what he knew about multi-dimensional spaces from Jouffrees discussions of different n-dimensional "fields." Duchamp's mathematical notes examine the same kinds of mathematical structures. In general, he is concerned with establishing ways of conceptualizing a "field of the fourth degree" or a four-dimensional continuum. One approach that he uses involves going down one step in dimensionality. Because it is difficult to imagine a four-dimensional space, a space "superior" to ours, it might be helpful to imagine how beings living in a two-dimensional space, a space "inferior" to ours, might operate. For this analogy, Duchamp relies upon Jouffret. When we turn to the passage in the Jouffret book that Duchamp specifically mentions, we encounter the concept of a cast shadow. In the "last three lines of page 186," Jouffret suggests doing the following: "In this regard (imagining what the fourth dimension is like), consider the horizontal shadow that attaches itself to you as you walk along in the sun, and that, long or short, wide or narrow, repeats your movements as if it understood you, although it is only an empty semblance" (p. 186). Jouffret uses his example of the behavior of a two-dimensional cast shadow to introduce a discussion of the perceptual world of "flat-beings" and the more general problem of perceiving 11-dimensional configurations from n-dimensional points of view. He argues that "the things that are in [the horizontal plane on which we walk] are only the sections made through it by the three-dimensional bodies occupying the space in which it is immersed, or better the contact surfaces, the interfaces, of these same bodies with the plane." Solid, three-dimensional "figures" are, in their turn, "the intersections or the interfaces of space with four-dimensional bodies" (pp. x-xi). Jouffret and Duchamp following his lead use the analogy of the cast shadow in relation to these kinds of "intersections." If we could somehow get into the four-dimensional continuum, we would be able to see the three

dimensional "shadows" cast by four-dimensional objects. These "shadows" would be "at the superficies" of the fourth dimension and they would be perceptible only "for an eye that looked at space as we look at the plane which is under our feet" (pp. x-xi). The force of the analogy is this: if we were inside a given  $n$ -dimensional space, we would not be able to see any kind of projection made on that space. Two-dimensional beings cannot see the shadows that are cast on their surface world; they can only perceive them edge-on as infinitely thin lines. The same situation would obtain for three-dimensional beings (ourselves) in relation to projections made on our space from the fourth dimension: we would only be able to perceive such projections as shadows, "edge-on." Because four-dimensional objects cannot be observed, and also because the observation of "regular" three-dimensional solids is not really equivalent to the perception of projections from the fourth dimension, but rather to the perception of some strange kind of edge, Jouffret argues that they are "abstractions existing only in our thoughts." They are intellectual extrapolations built up from the geometrical components of the normal three-dimensional world. But even these kinds of mental reconstructions are very difficult to imagine: "certain brains are not easily accustomed to [thinking about the fourth dimension]" (pp. x-xi). Duchamp was also concerned with difficult abstractions. He was interested in manipulating the ways that "brains" conceived aesthetic "facts." In one of his notes from the Green Box, Duchamp suggests "losing the possibility of recognizing or identifying two similar things." He is concerned with "brain facts," or "cervellit  s," as he calls them in his French neologism. He arranges his discussion around categories of objects that are closely related to ready-mades—ones that seem particularly aligned with notions of fashion: "two colors, two laces, two hats, two forms whatsoever." In terms of such ready-mades, he wants to, "reach the impossibility of sufficient visual memory to transfer from one like object to another the memory imprint. Same possibility with sounds, with brain facts." From the point of view of the fourth dimension, any three-dimensional form can be thought of as "infinitely thin"; it can be conceptualized as a very complex kind of shadow. With these points in mind, it seems likely that Duchamp was interested in the fourth dimension as a "leveling" device. This interpretation is reinforced by a statement in another of Duchamp's notes: "Two forms cast in the same mold (?) differ from each other by an infra-thin separative amount." When the forms of Duchamp's ready-mades are cast as shadows, they become "infra-thin." In a certain sense, the projective characteristics of  $n$ -dimensional geometry, in general, act as Duchamp's "mold." It was through this process that he manipulated "brain facts." The "infra-thin" separation that he was concerned with had something to do with the "separation" between "works of art" and "ready-mades." As it worked out in the subsequent history of art, such separations were much thinner than anyone expected—shadows could be cast from any object whatsoever. In the first part of his Woolworth Building note, Duchamp is concerned with a kind of showcase with sliding glass panes—with a "glass-front highboy." The notion of a glass case suggests the way Duchamp thought about the Large Glass as being a kind of "container." In one of his early notes included in the Green Box, he suggests putting "the whole bride under a glass case, or into a transparent cage." Thus, when he suggests doing geometrical experiments with three-dimensional objects inside the space of the highboy in a way that would be similar to doing experiments with drawn figures on a plane,  $n$ -dimensional geometry immediately comes to mind. We know that Duchamp intended to carry out such geometrical experiments on the two dimensional glass panes of the Large Glass: on several occasions he says that the "bride" was supposed to be "four-dimensional." In his discussion of the highboy, Duchamp has gone up one

step from the two-dimensional surface of the Large Glass into the three-dimensional space of the glass showcase. Central to any interpretation of this situation is that the objects inside the showcase would, almost by necessity, be ready-mades; they would be everyday mass-produced objects placed on shelves for display. As such, they would be "fragile": the status of ready-mades is still debated. They teeter on some edge between art and nonart—and their continued existence within the world of aesthetics suggests that what we claim as knowledge about the makeup of art objects, in general, is still very much in doubt. This aspect of the iconography of the Large Glass can be related back to the "shadow" and "section" analogies that Duchamp uses in relation to the fourth dimension. If the glass case of the highboy were flattened by undergoing a collective transformation, the ready-made objects it contained would thusly be flattened; they would, essentially, become shadows. That Duchamp was interested in such transformations is strongly reinforced by the fact that he took photographs of shadows cast by ready-mades in his New York apartment in 1918 (see Fig. 2). What makes these shadows especially interesting in the present context is their close formal similarities to the flat shapes of the "Bride" in the upper panel of the Large Glass (compare Fig. 1). The flat forms of the "Bride" are very much like the flat forms of shadows cast from ready-mades. As we have already seen, the projective metaphor of a "shadow" can, in a sense, be "cast" on the superficies that may exist between different  $n$ -dimensional spaces. If the "glass case" of the Large Glass is taken to be a flattened highboy, then the "bride" becomes a "figure of a space"—namely, an "infinitely thin" layer containing ready-mades. It is in this same sense that Duchamp uses the concept of a "section" in his discussions of the "étages" of buildings. With the workings of  $n$  dimensional geometry in mind, the Woolworth Building can be thought of as a large-scale "glass case" or a very tall "highboy." This suggestion becomes more plausible when we remember that Duchamp proposed using size differences in the reconstruction of an image of the fourth dimension. In another note from *l'Infinitif*, he says that "two 'similar' objects, i.e. of different dimensions but one being the replica of the other (like two deck chairs [chaises 'transatlantiques']), one large and one doll size), could be used to establish a four-dimensional perspective—not by placing them in relative positions with respect to each other in three-dimensional space, but simply by considering the optical illusions produced by the difference in their size." Duchamp is here using the term dimension in its more mundane sense of "size" to get at the more complex notion of interdimensionality. In the Woolworth Building note, Duchamp appears to have something similar in mind. He is, if not directly comparing, at least juxtaposing a small scale glass case—the highboy—with a large-scale glass case—the world's tallest skyscraper. The French term that he uses for his "cases" provides additional credence for this idea: a vitrine is both a "showcase" and a "shop window." In ways that are analogous to what happens in showcases, the shop windows of the Woolworth Building, floor after floor, would have contained ready-mades; they would have contained commonplace, "five and dime" manufactured goods. Also, in some larger sense, the spaces of the building would have housed ready-made sections of the three-dimensional world. The "self-contained" components of the building were part of its contemporary appeal. It was advertised as a kind of microcosm of the city: it had its own generators, barber shops, stores, and restaurants. These could be taken as cross-sections, or slices of life. Given that the "Bride" in the Large Glass is four-dimensional and that the Woolworth Building is a kind of "plan" for a four-dimensional configuration, she might have been right at home within its spaces—flattened as she was by the exigencies of Duchamp's

speculative geometry. When considered as an inhabitant of a four-dimensional space, the "Bride" begins to resemble figures in Duchamp's earlier cubo-futurist paintings. Among the most important precursors to the "Bride" in the large Glass were the "nudes" in his two versions of *Nude Descending a Staircase*. These works can also be interpreted in terms of Duchamp's interest in n-dimensional geometry. In the present context of a discussion of the Woolworth Building being a metaphor for the fourth dimension, it is perhaps important to remember that the different stories of buildings are connected with staircases. At any rate, the geometrical implications of Duchamp's earlier paintings are related to the "translational" similarities that he finds between geometrical "sections" and the "étages" of multistoried buildings. Moreover, the moving nudes in the paintings can be used as illustrations for his suggested method of moving around the "interfaces" between the third and the fourth dimensions in order to accumulate a sufficient number of different views to "reconstruct" the four-dimensional figure."

(Adcock)

"Large Glass" taken as an assemblage or collage plays on even more links between Duchamp and Jarry which allows Nijs to list a smattering of the textual varieties Jarry plagiarized including the scientific, hermetically-symbolist and alchemical, etc.

"The Glass is a collage in the original sense of the word: a merging of forms that do not fit well together. Here lies another link with the work of Jarry. Jarry, although heavily influenced by the ideas of symbolism, is not a symbolist *pur-sang*. Like Duchamp's Glass, his works can be characterized as collages. Jarry drew his text material from a wide variety of sources: from the literature and art of his (Symbolist) contemporaries and the books he read in his childhood, to philosophy and the work of admired authors such as Rabelais. He browsed in alchemical or esoteric writings, in dictionaries and encyclopaedias as the *Grand Dictionnaire universel du XIX siècle* (Larousse) and in popular scientific journals such as the *Magasin pittoresque*. He even made a literary use of terminology derived from mathematics and natural science. In his work Jarry demonstrates an exceptional ability for travesty – for translation, retranslation and manipulation off the linguistic material he borrowed from literary predecessors and contemporaries. This is most obvious in *Gestes et opinions du docteur Faustroll*, *pataphysicien*. Faustroll has a chaotic structure and the content resembles an inverted desk drawer: Jarry interchanges hermetically-symbolist passages with official texts, philosophical (or quasi-philosophical) reflections, and seemingly correct mathematical equations and quotes from scientific treatises. The protagonist of the book, Doctor Faustroll is, judging by his name, himself a collage: his name refers both to the legendary Doctor Faustus and to the mythical figure of the troll. The second protagonist, a bailiff, is adorned with the significant name Panmuphle. The third main character is the baboon Bosse-de-Nage. His contribution to the story is limited to an at all times applicable and thus utterly meaningless exclamation: "Ha-ha""

(p.81-82, Nijs)

Confirmed again overtly by Duchamp in regards to the text '3 Standard Stoppages' mentioned prior.

"Duchamp incidentally refers directly to Jarry's pataphysics where he states that in his *Stoppages étalon* the meter 'was changed from from a straight line to a curved line without

actually losing its identity [as] the meter, and yet casting a pataphysical doubt on the concept of a straight line as being the shortest route from one point to another'."

(p.84, Nijs)

Duchamp explores the physics stick of Ubu's spinning bar of demarcation and antinomy.

"Duchamp's formulation is similar to one of Jarry's favourite images: that of the circle or the circular motion, which eventually 'dissolves' in a line stretching into infinity."

(p.86, Nijs)

The patamechanisms of these 'imaginary technologies' are expounded thusly...

"Moreover, the question remains whether Jarry's machines are to be seen as actually 'mechanistic'. They are, after all, imaginary machines, verbal machines, with one function only: to demonstrate (paraphrasing the thesis of André Marceuil) that the author's imagination is limitless. For Jarry the 'machinelike grinding' is an image for writing itself - a metaphor for the process which was designed to exhaust all possible significations and verbal relationships of words, bringing to the surface all suspected (or suggested) underlying significations and relations between them."

(p.89, Nijs)

'Pataphysics at the crossroads/vortex of all structures/contexts, amongst the chain of undecidables like deconstruction, deconstructing all structures.

"In 'Linteau', the preface to his first publication *Les Minutes de Sable Memorial* (1894), Jarry formulated his literary program as follows: 'Suggérer au lieu de dire, faire dans la route des phrases un carrefour de tous les mots' ('to suggest instead of saying, creating an intersection of all the words in the course of the sentences'). Jarry defines the word as 'a polyhedron of ideas'. In every word condensed multiple meanings can be found that resonate in the sentence and can be evoked by association in sound and meaning. Jarry interlinks sounds and words from one language through an apparently common root effortlessly with sounds and words from another language, without taking into account the common laws of language or language families. To enhance the many facets of the word he places verbs and attributes on an unusual position in the sentence, links incongruent images, and creates new words from completely distinct idioms or languages. He regularly reverts to the use of phonetic or graphical deformation of the word, to conversion of letters or words, using or suggesting (possible) relationships between words based on phonetic similarities or resemblances (rose/eros//héros; l'amour/la mort; rigor/amoris /rigor mortis), to anagrams and palindromes (UBU, ROMA/AMOR), to a particular spelling (phynance, muphle, merdre) and (quasi) etymological derivations (pal /phallus)/Phalès/palotin). Sometimes the distinction between different sign systems disappears completely: a letter can be interpreted both as a sound, a mathematical sign and as a religious or mystical symbol. The final chapters of *Faustroll* contain some explicit examples. Chapter 39 (subtitle: 'According to Ibikrates the mathematician') is both a paraphrase on and a parody of the dialogues of Plato. Ibikrates' name, says Jarry, is derived from Ybex and Ybex is the archetype of Ubu (Y = U). In heraldry the Y is called the fork (in French: *pairle*, also the name of one of Ubu's *palotins*). In Christian symbolism, the Y is the bifurcated cross known as the Ypsilon cross or *furca*: a cross with two arms angled diagonally upwards. Christ was supposed

to have died on such a cross (and not on the much more familiar cross with a horizontal crossbar). In Hebrew - as is known - the Y is the first letter of the name of God, YHVH. However, the Y is also a symbol for the androgyn, as the combination of two elements, the female (according to Jarry the letter V or U) and the male (the letter I), and thus of the homunculus or hermaphrodite, the end product of the unification of opposites. Jarry is eager to deplete all symbolism assigned to the Y. He even resorts to non-literary character systems. In the last chapter of *Faustroll* the graphic sign Y changes into a mathematical diagram (the triangle), which leads to a speculation about the Holy Trinity, and – in the last chapter – the starting point for a calculation of ‘the surface of God’.”  
(p.90-91, Nijs)

Duchamp's ‘inframince’ interlinks the space-time patamechanisms of the “infinitely thin” (of 4D “space”) in nth dimensional geometry to a “infra-thin” (of 4D [3+1] of “time” [Einstein]) transferral/passage of movement via readymades, but this passage remains both a transformation and passage through the abyssal archipelago of language games/differends/phrase regimes, a passage through the infra-thin demarcation of differences indifferently, a pataphysical antinomy of the physics stick spinning bar of demarcation an assemblage of pataphors “crossing the gap to other texts”, as with Cage's metaconverting Zero the Nothing passing through Nothing via the nothing/gaps between them, a hyperreal Zhuang-Zi butcher passing through the interstitial gaps via gestural deconstruction. This strange loop of transmedial ‘patatautology’ to shatter the simulacrum/non-site of the postmodern deconstructed “subject's” tautegorical strange loop of reflective judgement leaving only the spectral remains of a deconstructed binary, a strange loop vortex that crosses all levels, the subjectile [Artaud] / objective [tENT] (each merely a pataproxy). Such indifference is that of the patamechanical snobbism of le masse much like the hyperreal cosmopsis of Brummell.

“From 1913 on, Duchamp (as Herbert Molderings states) was looking for a way to create a body of work in which images and words are combined into a new kind of work, ‘ou un élément n'explique l'autre pas mais où les deux poursuivent un mouvement perpétuel sous forme d'unité des contraires.’ (Molderings 100) For those ‘two elements in perpetual motion in the form of a unity of opposites’ Duchamp finally coined the term *inframince*. That concept cannot be defined and may, according to Duchamp, best be illustrated by using examples: ‘La chaleur d'un siège (qui vient d'être quitté) est *infra-mince*’ (MDN # 4), or ‘Quand la fumée de tabac sent aussi de la bouche qui l'exhale les 2 odeurs s'épousent par *infra mince*.’ (MDN # 11v) *Inframince* means that certain properties or effects of a phenomenon (a word, an object) may be transferred or passed on to a second phenomenon (word or object). In MDN the first note reads: “Le possible est un *infra mince*. [...] Le possible impliquant le devenir –. Le passage de l'un à l'autre a lieu dans le *infra mince*’. *Inframince* is indicative of a transition (passage), and not of a (static) situation. Duchamp used the term *inframince* as an instrumental tool to get and keep moving what presents itself to our senses. Whether it is a urinal that can no longer be called a urinal because it has been named differently, or a cliché of beauty (the Mona Lisa) nobody ever devotes a deeper thought to because it has become a stereotype: he aimed at breaking fixation; not at a static but at a dynamic perception. For Duchamp, the concept *inframince* was directly linked to *indifférence* - a word best translated as indeterminacy, as an indication of an ongoing (freedom of) movement and change. In the words of Thierry de Duve: ‘The infra-thin separation

is working at its maximum when it distinguishes the same from the same, when it is an indifferent difference, or a differential identity.' (De Duve 160) Duchamp gave this 'indifferent difference' or 'differential identity' a sound basis when he took on the identity of R(r)ose Sélavy (in 1920). Rose is the personification of the principle of inframince. Rose is not a man, nor a woman, and certainly no transsexual. Rose is Marcel and Marcel is Rose. The identity of Marcel/Rose oscillates constantly: it is a – paradoxically – active status or condition with an 'identity' that depends on the perspective chosen. Duchamp's indifférence resembles the 'principe des contraires identiques' Jarry introduced as the basis of pataphysics in his curious play *César Antechrist*, and to which he explicitly referred to in the previously mentioned chapter of *Faustroll*, 'According to Ibikrates the mathematician'. Jarry defines this principle as a union of 'God and the Ant(i)e)christ, of Plus and Minus': 'Axiome et principe des contraires identiques, le pataphysicien [...] est par toi l'Antéchrist et Dieu aussi [...], Moins-et-Plus, Moins qui-es-Plus [...]' (OC I 290) In *César-Antechrist* Jarry noted in a highly condensed form what he strove for with his entire work: a condensation of the sign or word, occasioning the emergence of cross-references to texts from different disciplines and different times. Jarry's writing was focused on the deranging of words, shaking them out of their usual context, disassembling and reassembling them in a new order. Jarry rejected the usual way of reading and writing, based on the linearity of the text, in favour of a text that wheels out from a centre, or draws words centrifugally to a centre from where they can enrich themselves through association and then radially wheel out again. In this way the word transcends its unambiguous meaning: its meaning is kept in constant vibration, allowing it to transcend the continuity of the text, creating a time bridge and crossing the gap to other texts, enabling it to move freely in an area where it can denote different, even opposite concepts at the same time. [...] I propose the word "patatautology", which, after frequent repetition, will create the concept of what I am trying to explain in this letter by these execrable means: subject, verb, object, etc." (p.94-95, Nijs)

Luther Blissett offshoot the Wu Ming released 'unidentified narrative objects' (UNO) that's even considered a model for the contemporary media theory definition of a "transmedia narrative", and what the #Game23 may be considered a variant of 'unfiction'. Here's an overview of the Wu Ming's definition of UNOs.

"The seven characteristics identified by Wu Ming 1 are: Refusal of the detached and "coldly ironic tone" that predominates in the postmodern novel. This first characteristic is defined in the memorandum as a 'conditio sine qua non'. 'Oblique gaze' or 'unforeseeable point of view'. Experimentation with unusual and unexpected looks. A gaze that sometimes widens out vertiginously to span the non-human as an integral part of the narrative. Underlying these experiments, according to Wu Ming 1, is an ethical and political motivation. Narrative complexity united with a 'pop' attitude that often leads to popular success. Many of these novels, are, according to Wu Ming 1, structurally complex and complex in terms of their content, and yet they have become best-sellers. Some examples are *Q* by Luther Blissett, *Romanzo criminale* by Giancarlo de Cataldo, *L'ottava vibrazione* by Carlo Lucarelli and especially *Gomorra* by Roberto Saviano. Narratives of alternative histories and 'potential uchronias'. These narratives offer a different possible solution with regard to historical reality. Dissimulated linguistic experimentation aimed at subverting 'from within' the register of the prose. Unidentified narrative



objects (UNO). Not only do many of the texts of the body under examination not fall within any predefined literary genre, they widen the confines of the literary to include textual elements that produce 'disturbing' effects. Among the books quoted in the memorandum, *Asce di guerra* by Wu Ming, *Sappiano le mie parole di sangue* by Babsi Jones and the aforementioned *Gomorrah*. After *Gomorrah*'s international success, many reviewers cited such acronyms as NIE and UNO in an attempt at describing Saviano's book. Writing about *Gomorrah* on *Hindustan Times*, Indian author Indrajit Hazra observed that "unlike Truman Capote's "fact+fiction=faction" and its obsessive hankering for details, the UNO slithers about like a beast, sometimes trodding [sic] the path of hard reportage, sometimes flipping over into personal mutterings, sometimes tripping on philosophical ruminations, sometimes diving into novelistic "voices" and sometimes gearing into social theory. And unlike Hunter S. Thompson's 'gonzo journalism', it's dead serious. The UNO's only purpose is to get us reacting violently on a subject using all the tricks known in the narrating trade." Community and 'transmedia'. The texts of NIE have the characteristic that they often acts as basic texts for the creation of spin-offs by fan communities. These spin-offs are often present online, and involve various media (films, telefilms, television series, comics, video games, musical compositions, websites)."

(Wiki)

Before we get to the n/high "metamodern" facets of these descriptors that the UNNOs (Unidentified Non-Narrative Objects) of Pata-No UN LTD further deconstructs, let us notice the similarities between the UNO as a media theory transmedia narrative manifestation/archive and a potential kind of "book" as a hyperobject. Morton's hyperobjects with their hyperreal fractal facets evoke the 'nebulousity' deployed by Discordians like #TheGame23, where "'Nebulousity" refers to the intangible, transient, amorphous, non-separable, ambiguous nature of meaningness."

"In *The Ecological Thought*, Morton employed the term hyperobjects to describe objects that are so massively distributed in time and space as to transcend spatiotemporal specificity, such as global warming, styrofoam, and radioactive plutonium. He has subsequently enumerated five characteristics of hyperobjects: Viscous: Hyperobjects adhere to any other object they touch, no matter how hard an object tries to resist. In this way, hyperobjects overrule ironic distance, meaning that the more an object tries to resist a hyperobject, the more glued to the hyperobject it becomes. Molten: Hyperobjects are so massive that they refute the idea that spacetime is fixed, concrete, and consistent. Nonlocal: Hyperobjects are massively distributed in time and space to the extent that their totality cannot be realized in any particular local manifestation. For example, global warming is a hyperobject which impacts meteorological conditions, such as tornado formation. According to Morton, though, entities don't feel global warming, but instead experience tornadoes as they cause damage in specific places. Thus, nonlocality describes the manner in which a hyperobject becomes more substantial than the local manifestations it produces. Phased: Hyperobjects occupy a higher-dimensional space than other entities can normally perceive. Thus, hyperobjects appear to come and go in three-dimensional space, but would appear differently if an observer could have a higher multidimensional view. Interobjective: Hyperobjects are formed by relations between more than one object. Consequently, entities are only able to perceive the imprint, or "footprint," of a hyperobject upon other objects, revealed as information. For example, global warming is formed by interactions

between the sun, fossil fuels, and carbon dioxide, among other objects. Yet global warming is made apparent through emissions levels, temperature changes, and ocean levels, making it seem as if global warming is a product of scientific models, rather than an object that predates its own measurement. According to Morton, hyperobjects not only become visible during an age of ecological crisis, but alert humans to the ecological dilemmas defining the age in which they live. Additionally, the existential capacity of hyperobjects to outlast a turn toward less materialistic cultural values, coupled with the threat many such objects pose toward organic matter (what Morton calls a "demonic inversion of the sacred substances of religion"), gives them a potential spiritual quality, in which their treatment by future societies may become indistinguishable from reverential care. Although the concept of hyperobjects has been widely adopted by artists, literary critics, and some philosophers, it is not without its critics. Ecocritic Ursule Heise, for example, notes that in Morton's definition, everything can be considered a hyperobject, which seems to make the concept somewhat meaningless, not to mention seemingly impossible to define clearly. As a result, Heise argues that Morton makes "so many self-cancelling claims about hyperobjects that coherent argument vanishes like the octopi that disappear in several chapters in their clouds of ink, Morton's favorite metaphor for the withdrawal of objects from the grasp of human knowledge."

(Wiki)

Let's briefly consider for comparison Exman's metaphysical modular pluggable nano-ontologies attempt to define non-concepts.

"Concepts modified by a Non- prefix apparently denote a negation, an opposite of the concept without this prefix. But, generally the situation is rather subtle: non- implies only partial negation and the concept suggests preserved identity with some reduced quality or absent attribute. In this work tangible and intangible software subsystems based upon Non-concepts are defined and pluggable ontologies are proposed for their representation. Pluggable ontologies are a kind of nano-ontologies, which by their minimal size facilitate fast composition of new software subsystems. These ontologies are made pluggable by Design Sockets, a novel kind of class. These are abstract connectors for removed/added parts, functionalities or identities, and for subdued qualities. Design Sockets are the basis of a Design Pattern for dynamically modifiable software systems. Pragmatic implications of Non-concepts include manageable design of product lines with multiple models. Non-concepts are also relevant to the controversy whether composition is/isn't identity. The resolution is not sharp. Identity is entangled with composition, and is preserved to a certain extent, until further removal causes identity break-down."

(Exman)

We can see how Exman's nano-ontologies attempt to re-house the 'non-' into a metaphysics, look no further than the way he links this to non-events. Which we've already seen Baudrillard bring this to the nth degree of 'Pataphysics. In this way the 'non-' of Exman's analysis remains the second order simulacrum of the trompe l'oeil that simulates this negation at the ontic/nano-ontological level.

"According to dictionary definitions, there are two possible meanings for a Non-event. The first definition is a "much publicized event, which is disappointing". The corresponding pluggable ontology is seen in Fig. 15. Figure 15: Non-event pluggable ontology – It is a non-event since

positive and negative attributes have been plugged-in – both with cardinality value=1. The pos attribute is “much publicized”. The neg attribute is “disappointing”. A second definition is a much publicized event, which does not occur. The corresponding pluggable ontology is almost the same as in Fig. 15, in which the “disappointing” attribute is substituted by “not occurring”. (Exman)

Whereas Exman tries to again place the ‘non-conceptual’ as a facet of nano-ontologies (connecting Magritte to Duchamp [inframince as virtualization/non-ification]), we’ve already seen how Derrida contextualizes difference as non-conceptual through the deconstruction of ontology. This connects all the talk of non-carrots by pa(r/t)amathematics with Hofstadter’s fascination for Magritte as strange loops while Baudrillard emphasizes that *trompe l’oeil* as adding further orders of simulation, where deconstructively everything remains a non-conceptual nothing like Bertolt Brechts’ beer and cigar (as we mention in “Travels In Neolon”), “This beer isn’t proper beer, although that is perhaps compensated for by the fact that these cigars are not real cigars either [...]” All of this gets played out in regards the “question of the book” in *Jabes* by Derrida in “Writing and Difference” with Pata-No UN LTD’s “NOt A B00k” as an example of UNNOs like the eventual “Too Cool” (non-)series.

“There have been disputing philosophical positions concerning whether identity is composition of parts or essentially different. Non-concepts imply that one cannot achieve a sharp resolution of this dispute. The formulation of Non-concepts and sockets in this work and all the examples given lead us to the following position whether identity is/isn’t composition. Identity and composition are entangled. To a certain extent, composition changes by parts’ removal/addition do not affect identity. Beyond further removal/addition of parts, identity breaks down. This is not marked by a fixed quantitative limit; it depends on the part types and order of removal/addition. For instance, it is widely accepted from the conceptual point of view that a car turns into a non-car when the car engine is taken out of the car. Art objects can be transformed into non-objects by other means, such as de-contextualizing. A well-known example is the concrete fountain put by Marcel Duchamp in a museum. It created a scandal since its identity was immediately recognizable. The fountain was intact, but lost its intended functionality. Art objects, such as Magritte’s non-objects, trigger interesting discussions, allowing refinement of conceptualization issues. The question whether the non-pipe is a real object or just an image of an object, is not a real issue once one considers thought experiments like using Internet-Video which convert real objects into images. Terminology issues regarding the most suitable denomination of non-objects: say quasi-objects or partial-objects, do not seem of basic importance. Once the ideas are accepted a suitable term will be found.”

(Exman)

We can see how the pataphysical non-existence brought up by the Collège de ‘Pataphysique in regards to the open-handle pseudonyms of Neoism like Monty Cantsin et. al. transinitely exceeds Exman’s/Altman’s ‘non-person’ as pataphysical non-persons.

“Still another artwork example is the non-person idea, used by the film director Robert Altman in his *Gosford Park* movie from 2001 to describe social classes in an aristocratic mansion in Britain. Each of the aristocrat characters has a personal servant. The personal servants are not called by their proper names, but rather by the names of their respective owners, Mr. such and

such. The servants, obviously recognized as persons, are deprived of the most elementary right of being called by their own private names. The simultaneous recognition of their identity and lack of identity is a very effective means to stress social strata.”  
(Exman)

By invoking Yves Klein’s “Dimanche” which hovers between artist book, conceptual piece and happening/event text amongst many others and Samuel Beckett’s “Stories and Texts for Nothing” in regards the Borges maze paradox of the abyssal postmodern Sublime in “Nihilism and the Sublime Postmodern” by William Slocombe alongside a deconstruction of the sincerity proposed in the Wu-Ming UNOs with Morton’s hyperobjects (too much object) and Exman’s non-objects (too little object) Pata-No UN LTD’s UNNOs (Unidentified Non-Narrative Objects) plays on them as hypermade lost-object archives of transmedia games playing with the pataphysical void by the counterpath of gestural deconstruction, a hyperreal voidalization/hollowing out (hence the singular new editions of select open-text Neoist zines in each edition of the “Too Cool” series).

“Dimanche combines appropriation, performance, actionism, conceptual art, and photo-montage all in one, and hints at this range of art movements just then coming into existence. It takes the form of a one-day newspaper, designed as an alternative to the regular Sunday paper, and includes texts and visual works by Klein, including his manifesto, “Theatre du Vide” (Theater of the Void). The photograph, captioned “Un homme dans l’espace” (A man in open space) depicts the artist leaping from his dealer’s second-story window into the void. It inspired numerous artists to explore their bodies as a medium for art.’

[...]

According to Klein, the intention was to declare the entire 24-hour period an international theatrical happening, ‘a holiday, a veritable spectacle of the void, at the culminating point of my theories.’ Merging art and life seamlessly, Klein’s theatre would encapsulate each spectator’s life as they lived it on that day.

[...]

As well as declarations of intent, the book contains a series of theatre pieces, Théâtre du Vide (Theatre of the Void) that prefigure various Fluxus scores of a kind that would later come to be known as happenings. Pieces contained within the book include;

Sleep; The setting is a bedroom. The scene opens with a man asleep in a big bed. The actor must really be sleeping. Each performance lasts about 10 minutes and in silence. There is to be applause at the end.

Inversion; For one performance, any play will be presented upside down. All the actors will have their feet on the ceiling and their heads hanging down. This will be possible by trickery. All the furniture will also be on the ceiling, which will really be the floor. A chandelier will therefore levitate in space.

The Five Rooms; In order to promote the feeling and matter without the intermediary of energy, spectators pass through 5 rooms, their feet bound by ball and chain. 9 monochrome blue paintings of the same format are in the first room; the second room is empty and entirely white; nine monogold paintings of the same format are in the third room; the fourth room is empty and dark, almost black; 9 monopink paintings of the same format are in the fifth room.

From Dizziness to Prestige; Having practiced levitation and attempted a kind of purifying sublimation by which he would free himself from the exasperation of the ego, and having created or proposed various aerostatic sculptures that were free from the enslavement of pedestals, Klein presents himself on stage stretched out in space a few meters above the ground for 5 or 10 minutes. The performance takes place without commentary. These pieces hover between the possible and the imaginary, establishing that the pieces aren't meant to exist literally, but in the mind of the reader. This prefigures many of the concerns of conceptual art.

[...]

Joseph Kosuth hailed him as the father of conceptual art; the fluxus movement, happenings, performances, and body art, each in its own way, was structurally related to [Klein's] work.” (Wiki)

Much like the Theater of the Void, Fluxus events and happenings there's always the Situationist situations of psychogeography. Psychogeography has an array of predecessors as mentioned to some degree already and thusly has long embraced Jack The Rippers dérive across London.

“Jack the Ripper is probably psychogeographical in love.” (Debord)

And we can see the extent of occult psychogeographical figures like Jack The Ripper, Alan Moore, and Ian Sinclair on “occult postmodernism” writ large and its underlying hyperreality through the film “From Hell” (an adaptation of a graphic novel series by Moore that was already an adaptation of a text by Sinclair proliferating the connections made by Home in “Revenge of the Mirror People”) with its pataphorical bodies-without-organs ripped straight from an affective schizoanalytic of cinema (thereby interlinking via strange loops psychogeography with the schizoanalytic affect).

“The victims of Victorian serial killer Jack the Ripper were shockingly literal bodies without organs. From the first shot, the film *From Hell* (the Hughes Brothers 2001) also turns bodies inside out by cinematic means. Many sequences are insistently wet or damp, via tactile close-ups of juicy fruit, dripping rain and clinging mud. The Whitechapel sky is drenched with the blood of murdered women. Shades of red consistently saturate the *mise-en-scène* of this infernal vision of London, turning the city's labyrinths, their denizens and objects into bleeding wounds and eviscerated organs. For Deleuze and Guattari, though, a body-without-organs (BWO) is never used in its literal meaning of an eviscerated corpse. They clearly state that their own term focuses not on ‘organs without bodies, or the fragmented body,’ but intends a figurative body, which may or may not be of flesh, ‘animated by various intensive movements’ in the process of becoming. *From Hell* thus gives us a conundrum to launch this re-mapping of Gothic film theory. Despite the apparent contradictions encountered along the route, I want to argue that the film's bodies, both living and dead, mobilise a powerful series of intensive affects via extreme cinematic sensation. My exploration in this article is twofold and interstitial. Linking, but distinguishing literal and figural bodies, it moves across distinct but intersecting planes: place and time, history and philosophy, fact and fantasy. I write at the junction of Deleuzian affect and the psychogeography that overtly shapes the plot and locale of *From Hell*, a film

ostensibly based on popular crime culture and historical events in the slums of late Victorian London. Linking philosophical theories of duration and the virtual with the work of psychogeographic writers on recognisable historical events and actual locales, I set out to explore the affective geographies of Gothic horror film. So how might the concept of affect be defined in general usage? To affect as a verb is to 'lay hold of, impress, or act upon (in mind or feelings) or to 'influence, move, touch'. Affection as a noun is 'a mental state brought about by any influence; an emotion or feeling'. Although retaining shades of these broader meanings, Deleuze and Guattari use affect in a special sense that mixes body and mind via the 'logic of sensation'. For Guattari, the aesthetic event of a potent art work is viral in its action upon us, being known 'not through representation, but through affective contamination'. Affect permeates Deleuze's solo authored cinema books as well as the joint work with Guattari and both the movement-image and the time-image are distinct but congruent explorations of it. Via this work, studies of the horror film experience can extend beyond psychoanalytically inflected approaches, most notably those shaped by Laura Mulvey and Julia Kristeva. As I argue elsewhere, moving images on screen hook into us to literally 'get under our skin' to make a mental encounter through the viscera. On-screen images are, in one sense, non-material simulacra, yet the viewer encounters them both corporeally and conceptually at the same time. Stimulating neural networks, they produce biologically quantifiable events on our internal and surface organs. Filmmakers maximise the palette of sensation, using sight and sound along with the simulation of other senses to produce affective thoughts and ideas. By watching characters touch on-screen objects or by the use of close-ups with a tactile of quality such as images of blood we also 'touch' and respond to them haptically. We extend our medium-specific cinematic sensorium virtually to include a 'sense' of physically absent sensations. But cinematic affect does more than replicate sensory response in the corresponding organ, whether it is directly appealed to (a movie sequence can cause goose bumps of terror or genital sensations of erotic arousal) or in the more covert operations of haptics, which evokes touch through vision, sound and synaesthesia, the mingling of the senses. It moves beyond the organic body to stimulate the embodied mind on many levels, as, slumped in our cinema seat, or in front of the domestic screen, our customary body maps can become BWOs. Affect is produced by the formal grammar of film as it works through the medium of images moving in time. Impacting affectively on senses and brain, the virtual cinematic event reverberates intensively as thought and memory. From a Deleuzian perspective, and contentiously for some kinds of Film Studies such as socio-cultural approaches, much of the impact of images does not entirely depend on their overt representational content, despite their narrative meanings and socio-historical signification. What Deleuze calls affection-images express 'the event in its eternal aspect' by foregrounding affects over representational content as 'pure singular qualities or potentialities-as it were, pure "possibles"'. Emotions like terror and optical sensations like brightness, he argues, manifest 'power-qualities', which are virtual possibilities waiting to be actualised in particular conditions. Of course, the viewer's affective encounter with such images is inevitably shaped by plot mechanics and characterisation, which themselves build up the affective landscape of the film's narrative context. What Deleuze is suggesting is that we open ourselves up to the film's potential to stimulate thought beyond what the images show in terms of their obvious content or what the film is 'about' in common-sense terms. Deleuze himself uses the example of Jack the Ripper's knife, or rather, of its gleam intensified by close-up and ambient

darkness, to exemplify the limits of cinematic representation. Such affective qualities; brightness, terror and compassion in the case of his own citation from Pandora's Box (Georg Wilhelm Pabst, 1929); are 'pure singular qualities or potentialities-as it were, pure "possibles"' that constitute eternal aspect of the event. In a comparable shot from From Hell, too, the murderous glint of a knife as it stabs downwards is envisioned by Detective Fred Abberline (Johnny Depp). Surrounded by darkness, the gleaming blade becomes an autonomous tool acting without visible agent to emphasise the depersonalised violence of the stabbing. This does not replace, but is supplementary to, our horror at the narrated act of murder. It is an event of light, colour and sound moving in the special sense of time opened up the cinematic encounter."

(Powell)

With Deleuze's interplay between cinematic time, the schizoanalytic effect of potentialities, and the universe as metacinema comes the evoking of an abundance of transmedia game fatal strategies.

"E/Affect [NO!fx] in [Hyperreal] Time

Henri Bergson is the direct philosophical precursor of Deleuze's temporally based thinking on cinematic effect. Though Bergson accused early cinema of representing temporal flux as a series of static 'snapshots' strung together by mechanical movement, Deleuze nevertheless identifies a fundamentally 'cinematic' philosophy in Bergson's implication of 'the universe as cinema in itself, a metacinema'. Like Deleuze himself, Bergson regarded the world as 'flowing-matter', a material flux of images, with the human perceiver as a 'centre of indetermination' both within it and able to reflect on its intensive affect in duration."

(Powell)

Schizoanalytic and the hyperreal interlink via this virtualized stimulus-response feedback loop of the (a/e)ffective subjectile.

"Affects occupy, without filling, the interval between stimulus and response. Internal and self-reflexive in nature, affect operates by 'a co-incidence of subject and object, or the way in which the subject perceives itself, or rather experiences itself or feels itself "from the inside". A cinematic image's effect on the viewer's awareness occurs in this potent interval. For Claire Colebrook, commenting on Deleuze, cinematic a/effect 'short-circuits' our perceptual habit of selecting images that interest us only for potential action. She asserts that the power of a/effect is 'crucial to such violent forcing of thought out of accustomed patterns by shifting them from spatial extension to intensive temporality. Cinematic a/effect mobilises gaps and fissures in the image content itself (such as the out-of-frame) and breaks in linearity (such as non-continuity editing). I use the terms *affect* and *affection*, then, to suggest a self-reflexive pause, a temporal hiatus catalytic for potential change. The Deleuze-Guattarian a/effect is pivotal to my wider project to explore the forms of Gothic film sensation as they impact on the BWO to undermine spatial conventions of linear time and sensory-motor movements linked by action. So how is this kind of affect/effect exemplified further in the film of From Hell?"

(Powell)

Powell roughly outlines this web of the occult, the postmodern, psychogeography, and the schizoanalytic which brings us to follow the shadows of Jack The Ripper.

“Psychogeography sketches an occult landscape of atmospheres, histories, actions and characters impacting on actual environments, and has much insight to offer on the role of locale in Gothic studies. It developed from the same historical nexus as Deleuze and Guattari’s work and shares some earlier antecedents in avant-garde aesthetics. In France, psychogeography originates both in the Baudelairian figure of the flaneur, the perambulant urban dandy, and Walter Benjamin’s walks around the Paris streets of the 1920s. Emerging from Situationism it combines Marxism and the visionary techniques of Surrealism. In their own ways both psychogeography and Deleuze-Guattarian concepts manifest the same cultural currents which developed from post-war Paris into the events of May 1968 and their theoretical aftermath. Psychogeography is the hidden landscape of atmospheres, histories, actions and characters impacting on environments. After the Internationale Situationiste gathering in 1957, the term is used by Guy Debord to indicate the experiential study ‘of specific effects of the geographical environment, consciously organised or not, on the emotions and behaviour of individuals’ and like the Surrealists before him, he provocatively recruits Jack the Ripper to his pantheon...”  
(Powell)

Although we’ll not have the opportunity for it to a full extend with this text, a further strange loop vortex develops transmedially between schizoanalytic affect, psychogeography, and ‘psychopaleontology’ (thereby interlinking Sinclair to Truhlar) part of the vectoral eliminativism paradox that grind’s the research of the Churchlands to a halt (according to Brassier), unless they embrace such a hyperreal nihilistic abyss.

“On one level, Psychogeography moves extensively in specific places and historical events, whilst Deleuzian affect/effect, as we have seen, moves intensively on the abstract, mental plane of duration. Yet, on another level, their dynamics are congruent. Whilst undertaking physical walks in the city, the Situationists sought out ‘zones of distinct psychic atmospheres’. As well as actual walks, mental journeys such those of the Surrealists are also incorporated in the psychogeographic paradigm, though they usually involve the mental projection of actual sites. As well as ‘authentic’ locales and physical walks, early Gothic mental travellers such as Thomas De Quincey have psychogeographical currency as ‘founding fathers’. Abberline has considerable psychogeographical credence, particularly as characterised in Moore’s comic version. His opium addiction, detailed above, certainly qualifies him as a mental traveller across time and space. In Abberline’s actual, physical perambulations of the Whitechapel locale, too, he experiences the psychogeographical imprint of the murders on the very stones of streets and buildings. The movie adaptation of From Hell evolved from Sinclair’s novel White Chappell Scarlet Tracings (1988) as already adapted by Moore’s comic series. Given Sinclair’s long-term engagement with psychogeographical issues via his fiction and independent film and video making, it is hardly surprising that he would take issue with this lush multi-million dollar Hollywood version of the story. Sinclair’s own form of psychogeography meshes psychic states with layers of history in a specific geographical locale which exacerbate, or even cause, them. His schizophrenic character James Hinton sounds remarkably Deleuzian in his embrace of subjective dissolution, duration and becoming. Hinton seeks to be ‘disencumbered, no longer prey to the physical laws of the universe and the grinding tyranny of time [...] In erasing myself, I



should truly become'. Deleuze and Guattari's schizoid BWO is likewise an 'affective aggregate to dissolve subjective identity'. They deploy maps and terrains not to encompass spatial geography but to figure the intensive motion of the abstract 'plane of immanence' with its own metaphysical geography of 'poles, zones, thresholds and gradients'. This concept repudiates transcendence as 'other' to immanence. The plane of immanence flattens all binary divisions such as body and mind, spirit and matter in the shifting forces of 'a powerful, nonorganic vitality'."

(Powell)

A transmedial hauntological/psychogeographical/psychopaleontological/schizoanalytic-affectual map preceding the territory.

"Despite the obviously divergent routes of affect and psychogeography, I have suggested that their paths cross in recent Gothic horror film(s). Although memory 'imitates' perception as it returns from duration, elements of 'original virtuality' will always prevent complete actualisation. Shot through with fantasy, history can never be totally grasped. Yet, like the former sense impression manifested in the 'coloured and living image' of memory, cinema's virtual images touch sensational actuality, as Abberline touches the stones. As well as having distinct particularities, all bodies are interconnected with each other at an atomic level within a larger field of force. Aesthetic delirium feels the enduring past and accesses a terrain for new forms of thought. However virtual and in some ways corrupted the film's diegesis may be, From Hell's dead bodies still generate a living map of affect."

(Powell)

Textualization/textuality of the environment is what interlinks Sinclair's "occult" psychogeography to psychopaleontology.

"Textual Construction

Lights Out is a dense, intricate, overwhelming work; fractal, moving at breakneck speed. In this way it attempts to convey something of the phenomenology of the city as experienced during the flâneries of the author. Explaining his conception of flânerie, Sinclair states "the born again flâneur is a stubborn creature, less interested in texture and fabric, eavesdropping on philosophical conversational pieces, than in noticing everything...walking, moving across a retreating streetscape stitches it all together: the illicit cocktail of bodily exhaustion and a raging carbon monoxide high" (1998: 4). This neatly summarises the way in which flânerie is used as a principle for textual construction in Lights Out. The form Lights Out takes seems to follow Sinclair's scopic perception of London in that it concurrently presents to the reader both the textual city and London as a collection of legible signs. Thus, In Lights Out, the textual city is not secondary to the city-as-text. Through Sinclair's catholic interest in the capital, London consists of "layers of myths, episodes, histories, remembered impressions, stories, texts and pictorial superimpositions such as...paintings and films". The textual city is immanent to its physical counterpart for Sinclair and this is an important factor in his reading of the city. According to Mengham, Sinclair has spent most of his life and much of his shoe leather investigating the question of where London begins and ends (2001: 173). London functions as a sort of archive for Sinclair, storing data for the construction of his poetry and prose. As well as an indictment of London at the time of its composition, Lights Out functions as an anthology of Sinclair's poles of

interest in the metropolis. As Schlaeager argues “references to films and poems, to biographical and autobiographical episodes of city life, are never introduced as mere additions to or illustrations of a main text because there is no main text – only an assortment of subtexts barely held together by what Sinclair calls his quest”. This interest in the “question” of London functions as the magnetic north of Sinclair’s metropolitan navigations, and consequently also plays that role in *Lights Out*. This conjunction of the two ways in which the metropolis can be eligible for the flâneur indicates the overall form that Sinclair’s reading of the city takes. Watson declares “Sinclair stares at reality with the same attention as an art-critic of an artwork” (webpage consulted on 20/05/2003). Building on this insight, it can be said that Sinclair reads the city as a poem. His “compulsive associationism” has already been mentioned, and taken in conjunction with his psychogeographical attention to the mood created by place and other attendant concerns, such as the intertextuality of the metropolis, the case can be made for Sinclair as a poetical flâneur. Part of Sinclair’s textual strategy in *Lights Out* seems to be the construction of what one might term textual “situations”. For the Situationists, the situation is essentially the critical negation of the spectacle. As with all their theoretical constructs, this was a vague concept that could take many forms. Sadler, in an attempt to define the situation construite delineates its basic components as “some sort of performance” and the treatment of “all space and all people as performers” (1998: 119). We can see something of this idea colouring sections of *Lights Out*. For instance, in the excursion entitled “Archer’s Prospects”, Sinclair and Atkins inveigle an invitation to view the art collection in Lord Archer’s penthouse on the south bank of the Thames. Rather than focusing on Archer and his Mr Toad-like antics, Sinclair uses him as a benchmark to measure “the social temper of an era”. The river view his “Lambeth Gaff” affords leads Sinclair to reflect on the M16 Headquarters, which “along with the hollow boast of Canary Wharf and County Hall, the deposed GLC Ghost Barracks...taken together, give us a new definition of shame” (1998: 162). This is a prime example of the détournement of the built environment; Sinclair uses these three monuments to the temporal power of construction, destruction and surveillance as brickbats against the Establishment. The textual reproduction of his visit to Archer’s London residence also provides a good example of how Sinclair ‘détourns’ mythic and historical elements in order to comment on the actions and effects on London of Archer and people of his ilk. Sinclair links Archer and his contemporaries to the history of alchemy and Elias Ashmole, which have strong associations with the South Bank area. In Sinclair’s own words, Ashmole was “a careerist, a Tory, a royalist, and an occultist as a secondary activity, which is to do with collecting and controlling forms of energy” (Internet interview consulted on 20/05/2003). The evocation of this shadowy figure provides a dialectical response to the tireless self-promotion Sinclair sees as characteristic of Archer and his set, and of their use of the city. Even Ashmole’s alchemical dabblings find their parallel in the actions of the Tory peer and part time novelist. Sinclair explains, tongue firmly in cheek, “Archer, I feel sure, is not literally an alchemist, but the metaphor applies in that he turns his tawdry stuff into gold”. In his treatment of Lord Archer, we see Sinclair’s use of détournement and the dérive coinciding with another key, interrelated, Situationist gambit (i.e. the use of humour). Whilst making no further progress on the Situationists’ failed attempt to construct a better society, and indeed showing little interest in doing so, Sinclair effectively adopts their techniques to puncture the monolithic self-regard and self-image of the Establishment, and to re-introduce poetic play into their representations of the city.”

(p.25-28, Castro)

Meanwhile Moore's occult psychogeography seems more of that of a hauntological pharmakeus with its overt claims of magic/k, while like Beuys comparing art to a shamanistic act.

"I believe that magic is art, and that art, whether that be music, writing, sculpture, or any other form, is literally magic. Art is, like magic, the science of manipulating symbols, words or images, to achieve changes in consciousness... Indeed to cast a spell is simply to spell, to manipulate words, to change people's consciousness, and this is why I believe that an artist or writer is the closest thing in the contemporary world to a shaman."

(Moore)

With this Moore leads us into the pharmakeus' alchemical transformer strange loop of the (pataphysical) void, where the "material thing" remains merely a lost-object simulacrum.

"To me, all creativity is magic. Ideas start out in the empty void of your head - and they end up as a material thing, like a book you can hold in your hand. That is the magical process. It's an alchemical thing. Yes, we do get the gold out of it but that's not the most important thing. It's the work itself."

(Moore)

Moore's Jack the Ripper (like his Dr. Manhattan) gets entangled in a problem of the simulacrum of 4th Dimension and 4th person narration, but one which highlights the psychogeography and psychopaleontology of the inquiry in a way similar to Home traces the implosion of the individual and the universal via psychogeography (again similar to Daumal on the pataphysical).

"Psychogeography is a visionary, speculative way of knowing. From Hell (2006), I argue, is a work of psychogeography, whereby Alan Moore re-imagines Jack the Ripper in tandem with nineteenth-century London. Moore here portrays the Ripper as a psychogeographer who thinks and speaks in a mystical fashion: as psychogeographer, Gull the Ripper envisions a divine and as such sacrosanct Englishness, but Moore, assuming the Ripper's perspective, parodies and so subverts it. In the Ripper's voice, Moore emphasises that psychogeography is personal rather than universal; Moore needs only to foreground the Ripper's idiosyncrasies as an individual to disassemble the Grand Narrative of English heritage.

[...]

'Hyper-visual', 'hyper-descriptive'—'graphic', in a word, the graphic novel is a medium to overwhelm the senses (see Di Liddo 2009: 17). Alan Moore's *From Hell* confounds our sense of time, even, in that it conjures up a nineteenth-century London that has the cultural ambience of the eighteenth century. The author in question wants to include 'visual quotations' (Di Liddo 2009: 450) of eighteenth-century cultural artifacts such as William Hogarth's *The Reward of Cruelty* (see *From Hell*, Chapter Nine). His anti-hero, Jack the Ripper, is also one to flaunt his erudition in matters of the long eighteenth century, from its literati—William Blake, Alexander Pope, and Daniel Defoe—to its architectural ideal, which the works of Nicholas Hawksmoor supposedly exemplify."

(p.21, Tsol)

Tsol points out how Moore's ersatz Ripper rendition acts as a psychopaleontological/psychogeographical hauntological deconstruction of the auto-museumification of history and ethnic-regionality.

"What then is the Ripper's psychogeography, and how has its popularity shaped Heritage? Let us consider other definitions of psychogeography before we answer these questions. Elizabeth Ho has read *From Hell* as a psychogeographical narrative composed of the 'reverberations of the past and its percolations into the present' (Ho 2006:105). *From Hell* leaves Seamus O'Malley with a similar impression, namely that psychogeography means 'the exchangeability of time and space' (O'Malley 2012: 172) or 'historical resonances inherited from the past' (Julia Round qtd. in O'Malley 2012: 172). Jason B. Jones adds that psychogeography stifles all impressions of temporal passage to shed light on a 'monstrosity' of the human that is 'splayed across time' and "laid bare for all to see' (Jones 2010: 122), so that the past could be read as a critique of the present, or a reiteration of current social problems.

[...]

I will interpret psychogeography as the study of space where historical memories and the relevant timelines are re-aligned. Psychogeography causes memories of times past to assume new relational meanings within a confined space, and thus it gives meaning to apparent randomness or propagates an 'emphatic pedagogy of all-encompassing vision and randomness', to quote Ho (Ho 2006: 119).

[...]

But it is also possible that psychogeography undermines rather than supports such nationalistic narratives by calling attention to their logical lapses. *From Hell* foregrounds the Ripper because he is a problematic part of the Heritage narrative—indeed a compromising part that foretells the disintegration of the whole."

(p.24-25, Tsol)

Even in Moore's graphic novel the Ripper embodies a crossroads/vortex of psychogeography and schizoanalytic-affectation with his 'cartography of thinking' while simultaneously interlinks all this to an investigation into the 4th dimension (interlinking to Duchamp's *inframince* with its 4D passages).

"In *From Hell*, Gull is a cartographer of thinking, a pseudo-psychogeographer with a keen interest in one specific question: 'What is the fourth dimension?' (Moore 2006: Loc 29) The fourth dimension manifests the architectural layout of history, explains Gull to his fellow medical practitioner Hinton in Chapter Two, 'A State of Darkness'. The fourth dimension is the 'chamber of echoes' wherein past, present, and future 'co-exist in the stupendous whole of eternity' (Moore 2006: Loc 41).

[...]

The fourth dimension is in this respect a world of the same, or a hyperreality where time cannot be set against a linear plane and divided into distinct, comparable periods such as past, present, and future.

[...]

One can expect any graphic novel to present 'maddeningly vague' fragments of the depicted reality in order to 'trigger any number of images in the reader's imagination' (McCloud 1993: 86); in turn, every reader will construct 'whole images based on these fragments' (McCloud 1993:

87) and imagine the same narrative world differently: this freedom in interpretation—and the consequent supposition of ‘the existence off screen of an element that has become invisible’ (Groensteen 2007: 41)—we may call ‘closure’. The darkness of the fourth dimension as it appears in *From Hell* can likewise trigger the desire for closure, and yet the balloon therein foregrounded manipulates any such endeavour, for Gull’s voice pierces through the darkness as though it were the only source of light and meaning: indeed, the balloon is ‘a point of anchorage, an obligatory passage’ to ‘direct’ the practice of reading (Groensteen 2007: 79, 80). By raising the rhetorical question of what the fourth dimension is, Gull offers to be the reader’s guide in an otherwise non-navigable, un-readable space; he limits, by the same token, the reader’s role in imagining the narrative world which here is the fourth dimension[...]

(p.26-27, Tsol)

All of this gets even more syzygically intertextual when considering that much like the pataphorical passages of *inframince* and Zhuang Zi’s butchers voidal interstitial cuts, that the alchemy of non-sequiturs in “‘Hyper-visual’, ‘hyper-descriptive’—‘graphic’” narratives through the gaps/cuts between panels act also like all this and 4th person narration, by way of a passage through the interlinking abysses of pataphors much like assemblage/collage.

“As Scott McCloud explains, non-sequiturs in graphic narratives often legitimise such logical contrivances:

No matter how dissimilar one image may be to another, there is a kind of alchemy at work in the space between panels which can help us find meaning or resonance in even the most jarring combinations./ Such transitions may not make “sense” in any traditional way, but still a relationship of some sort will inevitable develop. (McCloud 1993: 73; italics in the original)

Any narrative meaning thus ‘developed’ is unnatural to say the least[...]

(p.28, Tsol)

Tsol evokes this pataphorical dismemberment when discussing the psychogeography of Moore’s *Ripper*. In this case Gull still clings (in a Victorian fashion like the name of the hand-crafted style of furniture he prefers) to the lost-object of the “real” through the simulacrum of Englishness while his more contemporary counterpart Ellis’ Patrick Bateman embraces the Warhol-esq seriality of simulacra with the simulacrum of his (non-)identity, similar to Altman’s non-person, as no one’s ever sure who he is/if he’s Patrick Bateman often getting mistaken for others especially business counterparts due to his pataphorical assemblage/collage of features and fashion signifiers.

“The fragments of reality presented in a graphic novel are not what Nietzsche would call metaphors; nevertheless, they are divine and Dionysian in the Nietzschean sense, since they do encourage the reader to embark on a Proustian search for whole and meaningful images. It follows that any true Dionysian architecture is predicated upon dualisms and Proustian associations, but certainly not one-dimensionality, continuity, or linearity. If truly a Dionysian exercise in creativity, psychogeography should reinforce the plurality of time. That is, psychogeography should encourage visions of alternate worlds while re-presenting history as that which provokes the most contradictory speculations; it should presuppose infinity rather than unity, the Dionysian rather than the Apollonian.”

(p.31, Tsol)

Here's the 4D inframince of pata-hinges between frames in a film and panels in a comic are evoked by Moore's Ripper. This hyperreal transmedial nth-dimensional disappearance into the void of the simulacrum of the 4th Dimension.

"[...] viewing a film about Jack the Ripper in the final sequence concerning Gull's ascension to the fourth dimension: a woman leans towards her romantic partner for a kiss, though the man in question only urges her to 'give it a rest' and leave him in peace to contemplate the 'handiwork of Jack the Ripper' (Moore 2006: Loc 475) portrayed on screen. This behaviour affirms Gull's assertion that he is a 'syndrome' [...] he has transcended his own time to achieve the vantage point.

[...]

The de facto fairy-tale landmark in what could only be called a propagandistic fantasy, St. Paul's also seems a chamber of eternity where the English present and the Ripper's optimistic reading of nineteenth-century England co-exist. Here St. Paul's is a symbol of the hyperreal, a sign that the fourth dimension has been attained indeed.

Moore reinvents the Ripper precisely to shatter these fantasies of the fourth dimension. From Hell constitutes no more than a conspiracy theory, a paranoid interpretation of the past, but, as such, it detracts from any narrative of one glorious England. Moore has turned the Ripper into an alternate world narrative in that his Ripper embodies an unofficial history, an envisioning of the past that is a critique of the present. In Monika Pietrazak-Franger's words: Jack the Ripper has been, over and over, associated with different signifiers. Julie Sanders recognises this changeability of myths and their adaptability [...] Thus while the archetypal Jack the Ripper as a serial killer serves to divulge stories of timeless evil, his specific anchoring in the nineteenth century opens a space where he can be given new relevant context, as illustrated by Thatcherite and Blairite engagements. (Pietrazak- Franger 2009:169, 170) So suspended between the past and the present, Gull, as the Ripper, is a malleable neither-nor, a mythical entity of service to the heritage industry. Yet Gull is something more: he is the fourth dimension, the myth-engendering agent through which anyone might speculate about the nineteenth century and its link to the present. This contrived connection is in and of itself a speculative fiction, which, in *From Hell*, shapes not only the character of Gull but also the panels for the retelling of English history. Barish Ali reminds us: 'The gap between comics panels is equivalent to, or a moment of, the Lacanian Real, which Judith Butler summarizes quite succinctly as "that which resists and compels symbolization"' (Ali 2005: 611). The Ripper is an unrepresentable fragment of Englishness, but for this precise reason, Moore speculates about him to speculate about Englishness and to stress, above all, that all such speculations are fabrications."

(p.35, Tsol)

And so the Ripper and his hyperreal disappearance into the unknown defies that of any taking Moore's occult postmodern postmortem autopsy of the mythic figure and his projected narrative onto the lost object of the Ripper's shining/glinting void of a blade as de facto. Thereby cutting through the aporia of the interstitial gaps between the simulacra of heritage.

"Insofar as his true identity remains a mystery, the Ripper is a conscious fabrication, thus an idiosyncratic reading of time that is far from common or universal. Moore's "conspiracy theory" about the Ripper may well be a redundant puzzle piece which has no place in official English

history. And yet in re-imagining history, *From Hell* also opens up the myth of the Ripper; that is to say, it mythicises the Ripper to encourage further speculations about the Ripper, for as Ryan Trimm puts it, ‘appeals to the unifying abilities of heritage and its own wholeness instead reveal its internal tensions and fissures, the gaps between all the exemplars it would purportedly being together’ (Trimm 2018: 14). Furthermore: the ‘fragmentation, mutilation, and cutting up witnessed in *From Hell*—not only manifested in the gaps between the panels, but also in the incisions of the murder victims represented—’ will always inspire speculations about the Ripper, since Moore created this “hybrid” alternate world narrative precisely to inflict ‘a mortal wound on history’ (Ali 2005: 611). Moore means to save his work from ‘becoming a teleological narrative with an underlying meaning’ (Ali 2005: 611), though, ironically enough, his tale about one obsessed with narrative completion offers no ending but rather inundates us with narrative possibilities. Moore needs only to spread rumours about Gull, the captor of time, to free time: conspiracy theories and alternate histories alike will reinvigorate the flow of time, or rather of divergent times.”

(p.36, Tsol)

Much like how Moore considers his graphic novel series “*Promethea*” as a magic spell, Grant Morrison’s coining of ‘hypersigils’ remains a similar kind of pharmakeus “magic”. These problematics converge when considering the intertextual feedback loop and virtual “godhood” achieved through a 4th dimensional/4th person narrative view of time (which allows them to experience every point in their lives simultaneously and where there is no past or future since each moment is “eternally real”) between Moore’s homage of Dr. Manhattan to the character Captain Atom upon which he is based then to Morrison’s later rendition of Captain Atom then mirrors Dr. Manhattan in affect. This then distinguishes the frame-by-frame reality of the screen for the ‘A Theory’ (Presentism) of time (McTaggart) of human perception from the ‘B Theory’ (Eternalism) of time (McTaggart) with no “objective tense” as if projecting all the frames of the film at once rather than one frame at a time (where Morrison considers time a hyper-sphere and shattering the illusion of time related to an initiation into magic) thereby acting more like the various panels/pages/issues of a comic book with Morrison explicitly stating (echoing the holographic principle in quantum physics) that, “Our universe... may even all be a hologram, projected onto a flat, mega-membrane, which is, in turn, embedded, along with many others like it, within a higher dimensional space.” Thereby the film reel as a model for the ‘A Theory’ of time and a comic book as a model for the ‘B Theory’ of time. The isomorphism between the comic book world and the world of the reader/writer is the crux of what interlinks Morrison’s metaphysics of “Super-Eternalism” to his interest in metafiction and the power implied in 4th/5th wall breaks. Considering that Baudrillard already mentioned hyperrealistically everything’s already a pataphysical hologram not only can we see the parallels 4th/5th walls breaks involved between Moore’s Ripper’s 4D occult magical psychogeography (that involve psychopaleontology/schizoanalytic-affectivity), Reed’s Jes Grew’s metatextual voodoo virus, and Morrison’s Captain Atom’s super-eternalist metafictionality hypersigils, but that these all deconstructed to the nth degree of the pataphysical they turn into fatal strategies for the inframince of transmedial passages between pataphorical strange loops via pata-hinges. “I’ve been thinking recently about Grant Morrison’s “hypersigil” concept, but considering it not as an occult/magical practice, but as a cybernetic phenomena.

[...]

The “hypersigil” or “supersigil” develops the sigil concept beyond the static image and incorporates elements such as characterization, drama, and plot. The hypersigil is a sigil extended through the fourth dimension. My own comic book series *The Invisibles* was a six-year long sigil in the form of an occult adventure story which consumed and recreated my life during the period of its composition and execution. The hypersigil is an immensely powerful and sometimes dangerous method for actually altering reality in accordance with intent. Results can be remarkable and shocking. Experiment: After becoming familiar with the traditional sigil method, see if you can create your own hypersigil. The hypersigil can take the form of a poem, a story, a song, a dance, or any other extended artistic activity you wish to try. This is a newly developed technology so the parameters remain to be explored. It is important to become utterly absorbed in the hypersigil as it unfolds; this requires a high degree of absorption and concentration (which can lead to obsession but so what? You can always banish at the end) like most works of art. The hypersigil is a dynamic miniature model of the magician’s universe, a hologram, microcosm, or “voodoo doll” which can be manipulated in real time to produce changes in the macrocosmic environment of “real” life.’

[...]

I think Morrison is clear that the hypersigil takes the form of a serial narrative – whether that be a comic series, a movie trilogy, a series of songs or albums, or what have you. But others have made a compelling argument that the definition needn’t be so limited. Nick Pell, in his essay “Beyond the Sigil: Creating YR own Mind Viruses” in *Magic on the Edge*, makes a compelling case for this, using Shepard Fairley’s “Andre the Giant has a Posse” and “Obey Giant” campaigns as examples of other types of extended, non-static sigils.

[...]

The number of ways that hypersigilism applies to the internet/cybernetics is kind of staggering when you think about it. Think about something as basic as a myspace/facebook profile, the choices we make defining the online persona which creates a manifest change in the offline world. The things we choose to place on the internet reflect and magnify the awareness of self to ourselves and those around us.

[...]

The way I see it, the online persona, fictional self, or avatar one creates can create feedback loops to reinforce behaviors and perceptions and create significant “real world” changes in a person’s life over time.“

(Finley)

This pataphysical implosion of life/art or fact/fiction (hypertextualization of the real) plays out in the expansion from the hypersigil into the hyperstition.

“From hypersigils to hyperstition or even Michael Moore’s claim that we’re living in fictitious times, the life as a fiction meme seems stronger than ever.

[...]

R.U. Sirius describes a rather easier method of achieving a “narrative lifestyle”: In terms of social engineering, I think that, you know, you think of yourself as being in a story, and life will start to have the kind of dynamics that you would have if you were in a story, rather than if you were part of some dire laborious mechanism, you know... ( Better Propaganda interview) And,



actually, Morrison sort of backs this up: I'd say to myself or whoever I was with, 'It'll look good in the biography.' and then I'd go ahead and do whatever daft thing it was - like taking acid on the sacred mesa or doing the bungee-jump, getting the haircut, dancing with the stranger, talking to the crowd - whatever I was 'scared' of mostly, or fancied doing, or never dared before, I'd try it on the basis that it would make for a more interesting read one day. (Pop Image interview) At the other extreme, hyperstition, a confusing theory getting a thorough discussion on the Hyperstition blog, is more work than hypersigilization. Although loosely defined as "fictions that make themselves real" hyperstitions have more complex characteristics than hypersigils."

But again, pataphysically, hyperstitions are to nihilistically problematize belief and thereby "produce" 'unbelief'.

"Hyperstition involves the production of unbelief. No-one believes in Middle Earth. But those who 'believe' in Sherlock Holmes do not bring us any closer to hyperstition. Hyperstition doesn't invite or solicit belief. It problematizes it."

(Trent, et. al)

At last we have picked up the trails of differends of the Discordian/Subgenius incommensurable (intertextual) "links" to Neoism by retracing The Fixer's steps from his entry for the Neoism 40 collection by way of nihilistically meaningless psychosis and heretical psychopaths.

"Explained I wanted to make an exhibit with works of tENT, Stewie and Istvan. She said everything was with Ms. Kunsch, and that they were not talking with one another anymore. That exhibit never took place, BUT MAYBE FOR THE BEST. Another thing that fascinated me, was how neoism had a good influence in brazilian art, even though that the neoist themselves don't know about it! there's a group of artists in BRASIL who since 2007 organizes Festivais de Apartamento. Apt. Festivals. Their last edition was in 2017, but that's ok I guess. I never went to one of those. In anyway, brazilian neoists: just a few, not much interested in doing anything, so whatever. My next big neoist obsession: is it, in some way, shape of form, related to discordianism? And oh boy, I did dug a lot of shit to get some answers to that. Some days, after the discoveries so poorly told in the beginning of this essay, I asked tENT: "Amir, do you know where I can read about the Neoist-Subgenii link?", since I was writing a discordian-subgenii-dudeist zine called "Tudismo" (Everything-ism/Todo-ismo). And to my naive surprise, tENT said: "I'm the Neoist-SubGenius link". So, let's us all, that are reading this take a time to PRAISE SAINT TENTATIVELY a cONVENIENCE THE DEAD DOG BEATER. tENT says he's kinda tired of explaining the "The Poop & Pee Dog Copyright Violation Ceremony", but come on, he made the Subgenius Church sound like a fucking cult full of maniacs. Uncool maniacs, if you will, since they're all maniacs. I've always wanted to talk with Rev. Ivan Stang about tENT, Subgenius and Discordianism, but I never did, perhaps someday – question mark. I gotta say, reading back those chats, I sound really naive. But I was fascinated to the idea of having a link between the two chaotic things in my life. However, tENT talked with Kerry Wendell Thornley, over mail, nonetheless. As he told me: "I don't remember how I 1st heard about Thornley &/or Discordianism. I read Robert Anton Wilson & Robert Shea's "The Illuminatus Trilogy" long ago but I think I knew about Discordians before then. I certainly knew about both by the early 1980s". ok, cool, so we have a link? Nah, it was a short correspondence between the two. "At

any rate, I would've initiated the correspondence since I was very outgoing to anyone that I thought might be of interest. At the time, he was considered to be one of the main Discordians. I think he called himself the 2nd suspect in the JFK assassination & claimed to be a friend of Lee Harvey Oswald". And that's true. Thornley was a paranoid man, who saw MiB around him, especially at the end of his life. Lee had a copy of the first edition of the Principia Discordia (which had only 5 printed), and that copy got held by the FBI after Lee killed JFK. The fact that he was considered one of the main discordians, is because he co-wrote the principia discordia with Greg Hill. Back to tENT: "I had no idea how 'true' any of that was. Some people claimed that Thornley 'lived under a bridge' - implying that he was homeless. Maybe he had been but when I wrote to him he had a street address in Atlanta. I sent him 4 or 5 mailings & he sent me 2. I don't recall the exchange being very interesting. [...] The 1st thing I sent him was a copy of the 2nd issue of my magazine "DDC#040.002". The 1st few pages of that are the minutes from a meeting of the "Men's Tie Foundation". They'd been sent to me by "Blaster" Al. "Blaster" probably sent them to me because he thought I'd find them funny. I did. [...] Thornley wrote back something that seems to express disgust that I was interested in the Men's Tie Foundation while he was interested in \_\_\_\_ (insert 'important' thing here). I didn't get the impression he had much of a sense of humor or that he'd actually read the whole issue. I never met him." Yeah, Thornley was a douche, and I mean it. I never wrote that article, and the zine never happened. I became less of a brat, and more dedicated to studying neoism. Firstly because tENT has a huge collection of writings on nEOISM, and that's what makes me really enjoy NEOISM: the artists involved in the movement are the ones to highly praise the ones involved in the movement. It's a way of supporting one another that I have never seen anywhere else. Funnily enough, the next year, I was listening to the KLF, after doing some research, specially about Bill Drummond and Jimmy Cauty, to get some information on them. In 2017, it was rumored that the K Foundation was bringing back the KLF, through the Festival 23, so there I went, looking for a fix of information. And while researching, I saw a series of articles of Home – in his web site – talking about Cauty and Drummond. The KLF was an english acid house band, who happened to be discordians and heavily influenced by the Illuminatus! Trilogy. And well, they were english. And Home knew them. In fact, Stewie was a friend of Bill Drummond and Jimmy Cauty, but I think he never had One Million pounds to burn, innit? Stewart had a god damn good documentation of the KLF, and I tried to talk with him, but he is not an easy person to talk to, innit? He told me that he was more of a friend of Cauty than Drummond, and told me to read some things he wrote about then. So, I got a link, right? Nah. At the time, Stewart had the Neoist Society, which wasn't neoist, just some way he got to cause some confusion. Pretty neat, eh? But I don't work on establishing a link between neoism and discordianism. tENT's link was more close, and it didn't mean shit. The end of this whole 'discordian-neoism' link was simple: there wasn't any link. In the end is just a like minded weirdos doing weird shit before the internet, and that's the beauty of it.

Well, besides that whole discordian-neoism fiasco, I got somewhat engaged in neoism. The thing I like the most are the multividauls, or the multi purposed identity, the shared identities, etc. The discordian network in Brasil has a shared identity called "Timóteo Pinto", used by people in the network as far as the 2k. It was inspired in the saint of our church: Luther Blissett." (Dias The Fixer)

The Discordian forums have their own spin on the situation.

"In the early 1980s, the Neoist Reinhard U. Sevol founded Anti-Neoism, which other Neoists adopted by declaring Neoism a pure fiction created by Anti-Neoists. The Dutch Neoist Arthur Berkoff operated as a one-person-movement "Neoism/Anti-Neoism/Pregroperativism". Similarly, Blaster Al Ackerman declared himself a "Salmineoist" after Sicilian-American actor Sal Mineo, and John Berndt was credited by Ackerman as having given Neoism the name "Spanish Art," circa 1983. In 1994, Stewart Home founded the Neoist Alliance as an occult order with himself as the magus. At the same time, Italian activists of the Luther Blissett project operated under the name "Alleanza Neoista".... Neoist plays like multiple names, plagiarism and pranks were adopted, frequently mistaken for Neoism proper and by mixing in situationist concepts, in other subcultures such as the Plagiarism and Art Strike 1990-1993 campaigns of the late 1980s (triggered largely by Stewart Home after he had left the Neoist network), Plunderphonics music, the refounded London Psychogeographical Association, the Association of Autonomous Astronauts, the Luther Blissett project, the Michael K Project, the German Communication Guerilla, and, since the late 1990s, by some net artists such as 0100101110101101.org. Other artists who explicitly if vaguely credit Neoism are The KLF, Luther Blissett, Alexander Brener/Barbara Schurz, spart and Luke Haines (of The Auteurs and Black Box Recorder)." (PD)

The Fixer in this same forum gives us the rawest of the raw linking back to the Post-Neoist activities of #TheGame23.

"We could say that neoism is linked with discordianism by the KLF. The KLF bois were friends of Stewart Home, who was a neoist. They became friends after Stewart Home tried to distance himself from neoism. BUT HE'LL NEVER DISTANCE HIMSELF OF NEOISM. As themanwhocreatedjazz said, he asked if Home's Neoist alliance had something to do with neoism. The Neoist Alliance came by the 1990's, after Home left neoism. He, being a trickster as every neoist, decided to use neoism as a way to confuse people. In his book, "Neoism, plagiarism, and praxis", Home talks a little about KLF. Even though he doesn't consider himself a neoist from that time, and his book is a little critical about, he's a neoist at heart, that lil basta/erd. <3 <3 Post-Neoism, and anti-neoism and neoism doesn't exist. AT ALL. The name was coined by Timóteo Pinto, but I think it's funny, that's how Home talks about his work, when he left neoism. But he doesn't talk as if "Post-neoism" is a movement in itself (which is not), he talks like "this shit is my post-neoism work". Two different things. Post-Neoism is Neoism with Discordian characteristics, which is different from Meta-Discordianism, which it's Discordianism with neoist characteristics. I identify myself as a Meta-Post-Discordian Grayface-ist Post-neoism. My sincere opinion on Post-Neoism: it's raw. It's not like neoism at all. While neoism has a raw energy of crazy dudes just doing their art, post-neoism goes beyond in rawness. Our recognition of memes as an art expression, and shitpost as a viral memetic practice, makes it look like we are a bunch of shit posters. Which is not true, we do glitch art... sometimes. While I do enjoy shit-post as a way of expressing myself, I think it could be more focused. We have created our own mythology, as many shitposting groups do. Also, the way Timóteo Pinto tries to co-opt 4chan mythos, like #thegame23 and cicada 3301, is something I don't like, 'cause it gets more raw, and more distant from what neoism was/is/will be." (Dias The Fixer)

In this same forum, in response to The Fixer, Pinto clarifies #TheGame23's relationship to the magic of the occult postmodern.

"But one thing is for sure: when someone decides to adopt the name LuLu, magic(k)al things in the figurative and literal sense could happen. Being a Lucretia Dalencourt is free and gives you the possibility of being yourself under another name, or everyone being one under a single name. LuLu knows no ethnicity, tastes or anything else. "Sie liebt mich, sie liebt uns und sie liebt dich" is one of the most classical concepts used to describe her. Lucretia Dalencourt is a non-existent existence who acknowledges anything and everyone, basically what gods were supposed to do or what we should be supposed to do with ourselves but no one knows how because everyone is lost."

(Pinto)

In "Countercultural 'Pataphysics' #TheGame23 gives us a context for the virus, memes, 'Pataphysics, the postmodern occult and Post-Neoism.

"A new kind of computer virus has been appearing on the networks that does not have anything to do with programming language or crashing systems. These viruses are meant to serve as memetic devices or meme-carriers, which express themselves in the way they mutate passing from system to system, node to node. They work like the kids' game "telephone," where a message is passed around and the joy is in discovering how the message changed from person to person. When the message is a virus, though, its contents are hoped to evoke a response.

[...]

(...) The virus served as publicity for a new meme-zine, Virus 23, which features interviews with and articles by science fiction, psychedelic, physics, GenX, mathematics, and computer experts. The zine is designed to promote viral initiatives. Following the philosophies of William Burroughs and cult hero Genesis P-Orridge, the editors see language and culture as a series of competing viruses and believe that an uncensored forum for sometimes shocking countercultural ideas will strengthen the ability of new memes to evolve humanity. They use the number 23, made famous by occultist Aleister Crowley in the early 1900's and, more currently, P-Orridge because ancient pagan faiths associate it with change and the Apocalypse. Self-conscious and overtly viral manifestos take us into an altogether new cultural territory, where the memes of ancient shamanism are spliced together with those of futuristic cyber-technologies. This is the frontier of virus construction, and though it occurs on a highly conceptual plane it often has very palpable results."

(Pinto)

It's unclear whether #TheGame23 (despite their pataphysical undercurrents) might like the GHx to fall into metamodernist tendencies with its claims as a metagame, merely playing into the metaconverting Zero.

"We're all playing The Game 23: THE metagame, the game of games. "The Game" is a conduit that can allow one to enter into the most bizarre strategic situation in the history of strategic situations. A sort of primer, if you will. To conceptualize this, you need to know the definition of "metagame": The Metagame, or game about the game, is any approach to a game that transcends or operates outside of the prescribed rules of the game, uses external factors to

affect the game, or goes beyond the supposed limits or environment set by the game. To beat “The Game” while still thinking about it requires one to go outside the prescribed rules and into the territory of metagame.”

(Omniquery)

While #TheGame23 as a metagame/ARG comes close to the hyperreal transmedia games we’ve been contextualizing through this text but it overlooks the deconstructive transliterates involved with its patagaming that plays with play/the rules of the game. In this way it’s “ultimate strategic situation” misses the fatal strategies of the hyperreal.

“What is THE metagame, as opposed to any particular metagame? It involves the ultimate strategic situation, the “end of history”, and THE metagame is the race to arrive at the end of history (the resolution of the ultimate human strategic situation). Now, let’s combine two premises: All the world’s a stage All the world’s a game of games. What you get is the notion of an “alternate reality game” or “an interactive networked narrative that uses the real world as a platform and employs transmedia storytelling to deliver a story that may be altered by players’ ideas or actions.” This is the format of The Game of Games: an ARG to end all ARG’s.”

(Omniquery)

#TheGame23 with its ARG/‘unfiction’ interlinks itself to a cryptosophical ‘dataplex’ of the infosphere, assumedly part of the cyber-psychogeographic megastructure of the “Stack” mentioned earlier.

““We transmit the virus through a flood of apparently i(N)CONherent information whose archetype it’s the “dataplex”

“The 00AG9603 Dataplex is a higher dimensional spider web that takes all of the information that surrounds it and spits it out in a torrent of waves as a cryptosophical entity, each wave being a flow of information that is flowing in a constant direction towards a unknown or/and hidden destiny”

The infection occurs when someone assimilates the information stored in the dataplex. Once infected, the apophenic nature of the virus permits an intuitive understanding of the meta-game and its manifestations.

We unite all the different permutations of virus23 infection through a meta-arg or/and meta-unfiction. (ARG and unfiction are defined as an immersive form of storytelling in which events take place in real life). To explore their essence inside a broader context and make them grow beyond their original purpose.”

(#TheGame23)

Their “memetic backtrac(k)ing” encounters the Russell paradox and Gödel’s incompleteness theorem but without jumping out of the system of the GEB framing into the pataphorical/pataphrasical/pataphysical potential of PNT.

“So just where did my Autonym Eris Omniquery originate from? By engaging in memetic backtracing, hopping from influence to influence, one will arrive at the work of famous 20th century mathematician and philosopher Alfred North Whitehead, and his speculative scheme of auto-evolutionary dreams. Whitehead worked with Bertrand Russell on the Principia

Mathematica, which had HUGE implications for the foundations of mathematics. This led to Gödel's incompleteness theorems and Wittgenstein [...]“  
(Omniquery)

In “Creating meta-narratives as a hypersigil within a larger ARG scenario, for personal and societal transformation” we can see #TheGame23 use of hypersigils as a part of this semi-mystic/occult activities.

“Cinematic technique was used in ancient times in temples, (often using autonomous mechanical devices to provide seemingly miraculous results) and played a major role in many of the ancient mystery traditions. Immersive and interactive narratives and participatory experience has been used to create altered states of consciousness and altered experience of reality as far back as history can be traced and arguably into the animal kingdom where young animals often use play to develop skills and develop behaviors that can serve them later within the narrative structure of their pursuit of survival and of life itself. Some para-psychologist suggest the state of mind entered into when one is provided with input that is beyond comprehension or that confounds a currently held belief or limit, is a key to manifesting further results that can only be described as paranormal or “beyond the scope of normal scientific understanding”. With this in mind we suggest that psychodrama dealing with the limits of understanding are both the controlling and creative forces that work on the population of humans as social creatures, and that understanding this mechanism of creation and control allows for the willful translation of reality.”

(Pinto)

Despite their espousment of disbelief #TheGame23's endorsement (no matter how farcical) of “creating meta-narratives” may remain obsequious to Meta-Narratives if they don't keep a (petite narrative based) postmodern disingenuousness towards them especially like those mentioned in the game 23 mission statement on on the “Good”, “True” or “Just” of meta reality hacking. Meanwhile Pinto gives us the cinematic special effects behind all of this talk of occult magic and (semi-)mysticism.

“Before their exposure to this new medium, no one had seen anything like this and the results seemed like some strange magic... Man has since increasingly learned to distinguish what is real as well as to create pseudo-realities that wade through “the uncanny valley” on the verge of seeming real; or at any rate are real enough to create a visceral reaction or to suspend disbelief. Real enough so that if one so chooses, they can in effect lose themselves in the content being played out in front of them.

For roughly the last century, cinema has represented what is arguably the most highly evolved medium for presenting narratives, but cinema seems to be giving up ground in the same way print media and broadcast media are giving way to the more interactive format of social media and collective content curation... in this way games as interactive narratives, are quickly evolving into a whole new medium that can encourage audiences to become authors and spectators to become participants. Closing the circle so to speak and creating a “hyper-meta narrative” whose hero is the protagonist that becomes the author, the player that becomes the game designer.”

(Pinto)

Juxtaposed with all this talk of meta- (and metacinema) we have a tautologically presumptive deployment of 'non-' (and non-cinema) in Laruelle's non-philosophy which in this instance influences various mediums. As with this example of 'non-cinema' pulled from Laruelle's writings on 'non-photography'.

"From the outset, I need to make clear that 'non-cinema' is of course, paradoxically, cinematic. Or, at least, the 'non-cinematic' films that I shall discuss here are audiovisual time-based works that do qualify for me as 'cinema' – even if I and the films' otherwise relatively small number of viewers have seen them on DVD or online (i.e. not in a theatrical context), and even if they were made without material, polyester film stock (they were shot digitally). That is, while the digital form and the (predominantly) non-theatrical life of these films might qualify them in a superficial but nonetheless important sense as 'non-cinema,' I am not interested in reducing cinema to film formats and/or to spatial locations. Instead, I want to propose a film-philosophical definition of non-cinema. Or, better, I want to propose that non-cinema is an intrinsic component, or quality, of cinema. My argument is that digital technology brings out this non-cinematic quality of cinema in a more crystalline, or recognisable, fashion than do the traditional, analogue tools used for filmmaking – but that this non-cinematic quality has (or these non-cinematic qualities have) been in or with cinema since its inception. In order to make clear how this is so, I shall be drawing upon the work of Latin American political philosopher Enrique Dussel, hitherto under-regarded by film studies, and, latterly, François Laruelle, whose concepts of non-philosophy and non-photography resonate with my concept of non-cinema.

[...]

As the peripheral, the barbarian and the wretched are consigned to 'non-being', so might such films be considered 'non-cinema'. If supercinema is the high end of movies in the digital era, then non-cinema is the low end of filmmaking: micro- to zero-budget movies, shot on digital video, and/or on other devices such as phones or tablets, and which thus do not have the same aesthetic values of the mainstream.

[...]

Looking at several key examples of non-cinema, we shall see that there are aesthetic tropes that persist across these films, in particular lo-fi images, location shooting, regularly amateur or amateur-ish acting, an emphasis on darkness, and, as I shall argue, a simultaneously self-conscious and realistic treatment of the role of work in cinema. Such tropes are not absent in (more?) mainstream cinema, suggesting that all cinema, mainstream and marginal, is always haunted by non-cinema. But it is in what I am terming non-cinema that these qualities are brought to the fore.

[...]

A cinema of liberation, however, comes from the periphery, and it is darkness to mainstream cinema's light, it is a non-cinema, a cinema about nothingness, about otherness, about no- or non-sense, a 'barbarian' cinema.

[...]

In other words, if non-cinema reveals the labour-time of film in such a way that the film is not detached from the world but (en)world(ed), entangled, then the spectator is also doing labour. 'Non-cinema', then, makes its own labour clear (shaky cameras, overt acting, a lack of continuity edits), as well as that of the viewer..."

(Brown)

In this regard non-cinema attempts via nonsense, nothing and non-being to display the gaps and cross them by the cinematic reversal of the distinction between time and space (as well as indexicality versus meta-framing) of analogue versus digital cinema.

“As Lev Manovich has pointed out, analogue cinema is the temporal depiction of space (one frame, then another; one shot, then another), while digital cinema is the spatial depiction of time (multiple pixels all on screen at the same time). We see in the digital the reversed relationship between time, space and cinema, since what was once temporally ‘between’ frames, and/or which was brought to the fore by long periods of black leader[...]

Brown makes the distinction between ‘non-’ in “non-philosophy” and a philosophical dialectical negation in regards to cinema.

“I shall end by considering briefly a philosopher who has recently turned his attention to ‘non’-ness in relation both to philosophy (non-philosophy) and to photography (non-photography), namely François Laruelle. Laruelle writes of non-philosophy that it is not necessarily non-philosophical (Laruelle 2013: 237), while attesting that non-photography similarly ‘does not signify some absurd negation of photography’ (Laruelle 2011: vii). In some senses, non-cinema is equally not a rejection of cinema, in that these are still films. But it is the rejection of cinema as capitalist, as per Beller’s formula, and it is a cinema of liberation, after Dussel. Laruelle argues that philosophy can only exist as a result of the non-philosophical realms from which it draws its being. Furthermore, philosophy is based upon separation – providing clear definitions for objects in contradistinction to other things – or what Laruelle would term the principle of ‘philosophy of’. This is to understand the philosophy of, say, cinema, which requires separating cinema from the rest of reality such that this philosophy can exist; perhaps implicitly this is why this journal reaches towards not the philosophy of film, but towards a more ‘holistic’ film-philosophy, a film-philosophy that is in many respects non-philosophy, hence its political distance somewhat from those who write about the philosophy of film. Non-philosophy, meanwhile, is that which sees connections between things, that which joins things; it is a ‘Vision-in-One’ in Laruelle’s terms (Laruelle 2012, especially 20–24) – or what in this essay we might term the ability and/or the attempt to see ‘whole.’ Non-philosophy has no a priori conceptions of the world, because it is a priori; philosophy, meanwhile, has a priori conceptions, not least the need for boundaries (‘philosophy of’), and it seeks in the world that which will reaffirm those boundaries, and which thus will also reaffirm it, philosophy, as a system. Laruelle tries to get away from philosophy and towards non-philosophy. In a similar fashion, then, non-cinema is not an a priori cinema (hence its ‘liveness,’ its documentary feel, even when scripted), but it is the a priori from which cinema and the cinematic emerges. It involves an attempt at ‘Vision-in-One’ – or an ability to see the (w)hole. And it is not a cinema of separations, but a cinema that endeavours to join the gaps, to make the gaps visible, to make connections. This Dusselian cinema of liberation liberates cinema from the hegemony of the mainstream, and the viewer from Beller’s understanding of the hegemonic ideology of cinema. It is a technologically enabled (non-)cinema, in that it is in part about new modes of production and distribution. But it is also a technologically enabled aesthetic with an emphasis – in *Kamias* and *In Our Garden* – on darkness, on slowness, on the overlooked of society, the sick, the old, the supposedly ugly.



This is a popular cinema, and whilst not necessarily a minor cinema in Deleuze's sense, it is a cinema of the multitude and a cinema for the multitude, in a democratic sense, in an entangled/enworlded sense. A cinema not necessarily made at the expense of the mainstream, but in addition to the mainstream. It is a non-cinema, upon which cinema – and by extension the wealthy, cinematic society that we inhabit – relies. We should view it with the due respect and love that it deserves.”

(Brown)

Although Laruelle's claims state that non-philosophy isn't a meta-philosophy since (as has been stated by various others) philosophy is already meta-philosophy, but there's metamodern examples to note which overtly link it to the 'new' in an end-run around deconstruction so as to dialecticize it within the oscillations of its recombinant modernist binary metaxy.

“Perhaps, then, we should consider afresh how the term 'new' might be read today.

Contemporary network culture facilitates the proliferation and transformation of imagery at an unprecedented and exponential rate. Our experience of the present has come to reflect the bewilderingly complex and diffuse temporal terrain in which we now operate. We no longer simply partake in a blinkered march towards the future, consigning the past to the scrapheap like some unloved beige-boxed bundle of obsolescence. We are nostalgists as much as we are futurists. We blissfully relive the 8-bit primitivism of a bygone age, preserved forever by the endless archival capacity of the internet, whilst utilising those same networks to shape the fantastical landscapes of tomorrow. We conflate the mechanical idiosyncrasies of disparate eras, basking in the hazy, saturated glow of Hipstamatic analogue simulations that render digital ugliness beautiful, whilst enjoying all the ease and immediacy of the modern cameraphone. Furthermore, we harbour nostalgia for a past-future, one that never came to pass; for the promise of flying cars, jetpacks and hoverboards that failed to materialise (but that we secretly hope still might). We are thus cynics, and yet eternal optimists, our technologies driving our melancholia and invention in equal measure. The emergent metamodern condition allows us to face all directions in time at once, oscillating between the promises and pitfalls of the past, present and future. What is 'new' today is thus empowering simultaneity as a position in and of itself, for which a potential new aesthetic might in part stand. Accordingly, conveying a spirit of irony and sincerity, as Bridle himself remarks in a sort of infinite bluff, The New Aesthetic “is a rubbish name.” In the same way it is, of course, also highly effective.”

(Turner)

Although Turner and Laruelle turn back towards the modernist problematic of the 'given' (in an albeit so-called 'non-philosophical' way) with immanence of the 'One' embodied by non-photography, it's the proposal of its contributions to “collapse the distinction between theory and action” (the clear postmodern chestnut of this model) that's of some interest to us in regards the 'new'.

“But metaphor alone can only lead us so far. After all, the niggling reins of common sense remind us that, at present, computers are concerned with writing manifestos no more than ants are interested in performing ballet. If a new aesthetic is to truly reflect an escape from the anthropocentric, correlationist trap, to unmask the being of beings, how else could it be born? Here, we might turn to the ideas of another speculative thinker, François Laruelle. “A

philosopher has never looked a man directly in the eyes”, he writes. “The philosopher is the man who turns his eyes away to look man in the eyes: he is a man with a distorted gaze.” Laruelle seeks to banish this philosophical divide by endorsing a non-philosophy, an alternative path that necessarily entails a performative mode of enquiry, an enactment of radical immanence that would collapse the distinction between theory and action. Applying these ideas to lens-based imagery in *The Concept of Non-Photography*, Laruelle asserts that “Photographic appearing is itself the immanent that-which-appears. The givenness is the thing itself in-its-image, rather than the image-of-the-thing.” The capacity of the disinterested lens to objectively represent things in the world is thus argued to be of secondary importance here to photography’s capacity to embody the immanent condition of the world, of existence, of “the One” itself. Though Laruelle insists that all photography is blessed in this respect, he neglects to offer examples of specific works that best exploit its full potential (referring instead, in a somewhat odd move, to the fractal paintings of New York artist, Edward Berko). Thus, there is certainly room here for artists to explore the further implications of Laruelle’s ideas, and in doing so, formulate some kind of radically new lens-based aesthetic. That Bridle’s humble Tumblr stream has led us to engage in such far-flung speculations as these is surely its greatest achievement. The New Aesthetic has certainly proved itself to be a thing, and a thing of considerable value at that. The notion of newness acts as a byword for action, a call to arms. Yet at the same time it is entirely unsure of itself, of its goals. It jitters around, collecting and discarding ideas as it sees fit, creating loose associations, unaware of the full implications of those connections. It is a truly metamodern phenomenon, embodying a newfound impetus to speculate, to remain unresolved. The internet has provided a platform in which everyone may have their say, enabling the emergence of open-source movements such as this, in which direction can be perpetually indeterminate.” (Turner)

Brassier meanwhile explores the inquiry of Laruelle’s non-philosophy to the problem of improvised musical composition/performance and genre.

“We take improvisation as an axiom, in the sense that one cannot really define when one is or is not improvising (since so many questions arise around individual free will, subjectivity, and ideology; questions which we do not think can ever be satisfactorily resolved). By adopting this axiomatic approach to improvisation as a domain to which one can bring ideas, decisions, and concepts as ways of narrowing down or focussing where the improvisation is going to happen, one can look closely into a specific area. In speaking of improvisation, we’re not just talking about the production of particular sounds or events but the production of social spaces as well. We invoke this as both a strategic term and a conceptual tool. Improvisation can therefore refer both to experimental music making as well as mundane everyday practices. But wherever it is applied, improvisation should bring about glimpses of instability. If it works, its elusive qualities should evade solidification and commodification – at least in the moment. The goal would be to apply to whatever discourse one is in the process of articulating those quibbles developed with regard to the world so as to always understand discourse in the exteriority of the world – though ‘world’ is not the right word here; perhaps it would be better to say “what one ‘is’ not”? Is it possible to have a non-representational relationship to reality in the context of art? If so, this would surely be achieved by acknowledging all the specificities of the room. One should try to activate the room as much as possible and disrupt previous habits and behaviours in order to

create different ones. In other words, one should strive to work against the normalization process. We have found improvisation to be a practice that requires taking into account everything happening in the room. It is not just the creation of something new that could be used later elsewhere, but a way of intensifying the moment by changing social relations. Improvisation can be an extreme form of site specificity as well as a radical, intimate and immanent self criticality. Since there is no need to defend or construct a position for future situations, improvisation always tends towards self- destruction. Thus, we could see improvisation as pure mediality with no outside; as a pure means with no end, countering every form of separation, fragmentation, or even individuality. When does this activation of the space take effect? When one has succeeded in generating a dense atmosphere capable of engendering the awareness that something important is at stake. Since there are no predetermined categories or words to describe this experience, what is at stake is very difficult to articulate. Because of the difficulties of assimilating it or immediately understanding it, this strangeness counters the normalization process. When this dense atmosphere is produced, the people involved become painfully aware of their social position and standardized behaviours. When the density of the atmosphere reaches a certain threshold, it can become physical, disturbing our senses and producing unfamiliar sensations in our bodies. Through a disruption in the appearance of neutrality, one gets the sense of being in a strange place – not really knowing where to stand. Every movement or word becomes significant. What is created is not a unified sense of space or time, but a heterotopia where one's location contains different spaces and temporalities. Previous hierarchies and established organizations of space are exposed. The traditional time of the performance and distribution of attention (the audience's respectful behaviour towards the performers, etc.) are left behind. If one goes far enough, these hierarchies could be diffused, not to give a false sense of equality, but to produce alternative social relations of time and space. We do not want to be misunderstood. We are not talking about any variant of 'relational aesthetics' where a little injection of audience interactivity adds cultural capital to bland artworks executed by very concrete artists with dubious ideologies. Rather, we want to interrogate the limitations of performing on stage: To what extent is it possible to use the parameters that define the spectacle (i.e. the divisions between audience, performer, stage, expectations) as material for improvisation?"

(Brassier et. al.)

Brassier leads up to this and explores the violence and involved in the 'cut' of improvisation, one that produces a feedback loop.

"What passes for violence in music too often consists of a series of shock gestures: dissonance, volume, noisiness; theatrical threats and imprecations... We wanted to try something else: to subject ourselves and the audience to an obscurely unsettling test; to force them and ourselves out of any recognizable comfort zone by withholding displays of improvisatory craft as well as of musical technique. 'Violence', but of a peculiarly studied kind. Obviously, it need not be physical (though this is not to say that it cannot or should not be physical). Often it is psychological and deals with expectations and projections. It is born of the refusal to satisfy the former while interrogating the motives of everyone involved until the level of self reflexivity is pushed to the point of positive feedback. Thus the type of violence we are interested in is not spontaneous. It is disciplined and calculated. It is purposefully motivated. In this sense, it bears a certain affinity

to what people refer to as 'political violence'. It comes from the core of our subjective engagement in our practice and when it hits home, it touches something very deep. It falls outside the reproduction of stereotypes or ready-made categorizations of expression. Who carries it out? It might well be the idiot trying to express him/herself, coming from a totally different angle, cutting through the warm shit, the familiar comfort zone. The idiot feels cornered by the non-idiot; there is an elastic band tying them to him/herself. This elastic band is the pressure exerted upon one's self by all the conservative properties of the context with which one is engaging. At some point, this elastic band is slightly too tight and there is always the risk it might snap but the idiot has a lot of time to reflect upon the nature of this pressure, and why s/he feels this way. In the middle, there are the accepted norms; anything that represents the status quo proper to the context one is working with. In the context of free improvisation these might be: craft, aesthetics/taste, certain preconceptions about what it means for performers to react to one another or to the audience, habits that condition and reproduce the concert situation. After one has been thinking through these issues for a long time; when at last what one wishes to cut or break with has become very clear; when one is no longer prepared to wait, one turns into a slingshot. Of course, this might entail shattering some of the foundations supporting the values that are taken to be constitutive of an improvised music concert. An incalculable risk has occurred and while this description might sound desperate, there is no desperation involved in such violence. Even when the pressure in question is that of the status quo, once this violence occurs it becomes indifferent to it; it supersedes it in the simplest way imaginable, as though nothing extraordinary were happening. One might feel as though one were in the dark, but when people are comfortable with the light and someone questions that light, then people become fearful and they perceive the threat of enforced obscurity as violence. This is the sense in which it is clinical violence. The precision involved is that of the sniper or surgeon cutting through the veneer of normality; some may experience this as an act of violence but for the idiot it is simply necessary. The scalpel cuts through the foundations that provide the unquestioned or unstated rules of improvisation holding the concert situation together. Unlike the surgeon however, the idiot has no clear goal, nor an identifiable cyst to excise. The importance is in the cut. From there we can all draw our own conclusions. The idiot looks upon reality from an unstructured or uncategorised point of view. His or her intervention is without a foundation: an-archic. There is no general consensus or general understanding: this is the sense in which we are idiots."

(Brassier et. al.)

Brassier gives us (like Klein) on how to explore an improvised Nothing this time in a "non-philosophically" nihilistic 'stance' with the examples of their 'non-concerts' again interlinking them to the Oulipolian patamechanisms ("constraints") of those like Cage's indeterminacy or John Zorn's game pieces.

"[...] either the super-idiomatic (playing with the multiplicity of idioms); or the non-idiomatic: taking the music 'in-One' [...]"

"ELEVEN WAYS OF SAYING NOTHING

1. From 'having nothing to say' to 'finding something to say' by shifting one's position with regard to that movement.

2. Around the question of the concert, music and philosophy met, without knowing why. In any case, we wanted to change something about it.
  3. We exchanged ideas about “what a concert is” in order to find an efficient practice, mainly by defining what we would not like to do in any given concert.
  4. The conventional frame of the concert was thereby displaced (which would have created possibilities for the opening of vision and for a renewed listening). Nevertheless, we did not know what we might do.
  5. By putting this in parenthesis, we performed a kind of concert, a non- concert. But in any case, what is the relation between A and non-A?
  6. The decision taken by thought and psychological tension were our sources of energy. This project also undermined the identity that makes us musicians or philosophers. One is a musician only when one succeeds in giving a presence, a life to music. The same holds for a philosopher. Let us be musical, philosophical, etc., at the same time... (In the word ‘collaboration’ one finds the word ‘labor’. It usually means a collaboration in which each finds him or herself in his or her habitual position, as a musician, philosopher, etc., without any subversion of identity or attempt to slip towards other identities, towards X.)
  7. By putting philosophy and music in parenthesis, by separating our profession from ourselves, we simply felt ourselves to be human beings who feel, react, and reflect: the experience of not feeling ‘ourselves’ anymore (don’t we feel too tied and sometimes even imprisoned by our professions?).
  8. The profound silence within us, filled with the immense energy that threatens to explode when blocked: this unnameable zone would be the basis of our experience with language. There we were.
  9. The audience was thereby invited to share this experience and some of them seemed to feel the direct impact of the tension that was flowing from us, forgetting their own expectations of the concert set-up
  10. Once the non-concert was finished, our work began again, and we had to try to put this unsayable experience into words. This text is part of that attempt.
  11. To dare to do each time without falling into routine, in order to renew, to stimulate, to dynamize the everyday.”
- (Brassier et. al.)

The “exteriority” of the ‘non-’ ““non-philosophically”” via the ‘nonidiomatic’, while also like Hofstadter only calling out the “meta-meta-philosophical” while falling silent on ‘Pataphysics (whether it’s of ignorance, lack of diligence, or merely just hubris remains pointless as does intentionalism since regardless with each option there’s only a more compounding strange loop of irony).

“NON

We think there is a particular relationship between the NON of Derek Bailey’s ‘NON-idiomatic’ and the NON of François Laruelle’s ‘NON- philosophy’. NON-philosophy is the theory or science of philosophy, treating philosophy as a material. NON-idiomatic playing is supposed to be able to treat all music as a material. Derek Bailey: “[T]he main difference I think between freely improvised music and [other music(s) & usic] is that they are idiomatic and freely improvised music isn’t. They are formed by an idiom, they are not formed by improvisation. They are formed

the same way that speech vernacular, a verbal accent, is formed. In freely improvised music, its roots are in occasion rather than place. Maybe improvisation takes the place of the idiom. But it doesn't have the grounding, the roots if you like, of those other musics. Its strengths lie elsewhere. There are plenty of styles – group styles and individual styles – found in free playing but they don't coalesce into an idiom. They just don't have that kind of social or regional purchase or allegiance. They are idiosyncratic.” Of course, one can understand Bailey's statement as one strategy among others to affirm an individual position in the music world. But although these kinds of strategies are usually simple (and sometimes stupid), the non- idiomatic one seems to us to be very dynamic and full of interesting questions and problems – even if Derek Bailey is not necessarily the best exemplar of his own idea (but isn't that the sign of a good idea? When one's idea or theory completely overtakes one's practice or subjectivity?).

There is a similarity between the trajectories of Laruelle and Bailey: they seem to be engaged in trying to free philosophical and musical practice respectively from their institutionalized idioms. Both have very similar relationships to their own historical background. 'NON' as a prefix means that you are not part of something but dealing with it from some kind of exteriority yet one which involves the immanence of practice rather than the transcendence of reflection. As a negative prefix, 'NON' also means that you are supposed to have some kind of immanent general point of view: not from above but from within the practice of music itself - the most immanent point of view possible. It entails that you add a layer of representation such that it either subtracts the previous layer or even unifies all the layers. Laruelle: "Philosophy is always at least philosophy of philosophy"; "non- philosophy is the science of philosophy". Why is non-philosophy as the science of philosophy not a metaphilosophy? Laruelle claims that philosophy is constitutively reflexive: every philosophical claim about X (whether X is an artwork, a scientific theory, or a historical event) is always at the same time a reflection on philosophy's relation to X. In other words, the philosopher is never just talking about this object, but also about how every other philosophy mediates her relationship to this object. Non-philosophy represents an attempt to ascend beyond this level of reflexive mediation while simultaneously descending beneath the level of irreflexive immediacy. It does this by operating in the medium of what Laruelle calls 'real immanence': this is an immediacy that is radically irreflexive, but one that generates a kind of pure practical transcendence (mediation through practice rather than theory). 'Real' as opposed to wholly idealised or conceptualised immanence boils down to the question of the use of theory: the real immanence evoked by Laruelle entails a strictly disciplined practice of philosophy. Instead of exacerbating reflexivity by ascending to a meta-metalevel, non-philosophy adds a third layer of auto-reflexivity that is also a minus (an a + that is a -) – a subtraction that allows us to view all philosophy from a vantage point that is at once singular and universal. Mediating abstraction is concretized and unified through a practice that, as Laruelle puts it, allows it to be 'seen in- One'. This is not some mystical rapture but a practical immersion in abstraction; a concretization of theory that precludes the sort of play 'with' different philosophical idioms indulged in by postmodern ironists. We brandish the NON as the marker for an incapacity that adds a layer of knowing and subtracts a layer of self consciousness from reflection in such a way as to eliminate complacent gestures of reflexivity: the player's knowing wink to the audience ("you know that I know that you know..."). NON rescinds the complacent reassurances of such ironic distancing by driving an inalienable wedge between the player's intellectual and affective capacities and his technical craft: it pits practice against craft in a

gesture of uncrafting. Non-idiomatic music exemplifies a similar agenda: it is informed by knowledge of music and musics, but adds a layer of non-knowledge that would allow the music to be taken 'in-One' (something like a phenomenological *epoché* applied to the whole of music), thereby forestalling the typically postmodern gesture of 'playing with' idioms. NON supposes the impossibility of any second order discourse 'on' music; it indexes the impossibility of interpretation: one may view all the music of the moment through the filter of electroacoustic music; one may also view the viewing through the window of improvisation. We postulate an equivalence between NON ('non-philosophy'/'non- idiomatic') and UN ('un-conscious'/'un-craft'). Both are about releasing the potency proper to impotence, the capacity proper to incapacity. The practice of uncrafting does not just imply the negation of technique, but the unleashing of a generic potency proper to incapacity, of which technical/practical capacity would be merely a restrictive instance. Our performance in Niort pitted uncrafting against the aestheticisation of improvisatory technique. The latter results from the tendency to abstract the sonic or auditory dimension of performance from its non aesthetic envelope, exemplified by the social framework and the concert set-up, and to grant pride of place to sound according to the aestheticism of the 'pure' listening experience. In doing so, free improvisation risks degenerating into an aestheticism of technique in which the skill exhibited by the free- improvisation virtuoso is fetishised just like that of the idiomatic virtuoso. The immanent critique of aestheticism will not be accomplished by collapsing music into ideology or injecting it with an extra layer of self-consciousness. It is rather a question of levelling the hierarchical difference between immanent practice and transcendent theory by re-implicating theory into practice but in such a way as to precipitate a crisis wherein convulsive conception interrupts complacent sensation. The goal would be to effectuate a critique that no longer would depend on the security of critical distance; a critique that would remain inside. This would no longer really be a critique but rather the discovery of an outside through the inside."

(Brassier et. al.)

Brassier gives us more context on the 'non-', 'un-' in regards to the zero degree of cognition. "NON is a layer added to the thousand layers, but one imparted from the vantage of a practical 'vision in One': it is the thousand and oneth. This is a new layer that is a function of unknown knowledge: the immanence of practice as an addition that is also a subtraction; a plus that is also a minus. So long as one thinks that to know always already implies a power of knowledge and that knowledge is a regression in those powers that bring us back hypothetically to mere knowing, without knowing that one knows – then one will continue to insist that it is not possible simply to know (= knowing) – yet it is precisely to this condition to that we accede through the NON...

[...]

To indicate representation is to frame the frame: a doubly redundant gesture.

[...]

The impossibility of a discourse 'on' ultimately entails that of a discourse 'with' or even 'in': all that remains is discourse's feedback, re-injected into itself (and what this cry renders possible relative to the cry/non/...): a discourse re-injecting itself into itself on the pretext of having to integrate its own conditions of possibility. In this sense, NON would be a *tabula rasa*: the degree

zero of cognition. It presumes knowing and at the same time the non-use of what is known as an object, as a material.

[...]

Of course, non-philosophy's claims with regard to its material is that such an immanent posture can be realized without exiting from the element of radical immanence that is constitutive for its thinking. Nevertheless – and it is our conviction that this is what art teaches us – the taking up of the material in immanence entails the end of the material: we exit from the semantic field concomitant with the name 'material'. There is something incompatible between the NON and the material.”

(Brassier et. al.)

While giving us more context on the non-philosophical 'non-', like Brown, he connects it to the 'super-' and the postmodern.

“Nevertheless, non-idiomatic means quite the opposite. Non-idiomatic presumes that in a modern or post-modern culture one can't inhabit an idiom without having a strong representation of it. This means: one can't play in an idiom without (somehow) having the feeling that one is representing that idiom (showing an image of it). Furthermore, one can't really inhabit one idiom alone; one also has to know more or less about many other idioms... This means that one has the possibility of an aerial point of view. An idiom presumes a simple knowledge that may be as profound as possible, but which is not supposed to engender knowledge of this knowledge. To have a representation of the idiom is to presume that one possesses knowledge of its knowledge (that one knows that one knows it). Popular culture is supposed to 'be', without representing itself (that's why, at the simplest level, pop art is not popular). But 'non-idiomatic' means: to play minus this second order knowledge about what one is playing. Thus, since all idioms are representations of themselves, the task of the non-idiomatic musician would be to escape from the representation of music in music.

[...]

Yet doesn't the fact that improvising musicians are supposed to be able to play with any musician in any context mean that their non-idiom is in fact a 'super-idiom' that includes all others? No: by adding a layer that is a 'minus one', NON precludes the idea of a super idiom. The immanent 'One' indexed by Laruelle's NON is precisely not-All. In the last instance, to be a non-idiomatic musician is actually to be a contemporary idiomatic musician.

[...]

In improvisation, the estrangement effect is doubled, for the condition of the performer is also disrupted. Since both the performer and audience find themselves in a condition that they could not have previously anticipated, the separation between them is no longer so clear.”

(Brassier et. al.)

Non-philosophy's “critique” which claims to not adhere to any philosopheme while affirming its terms “non-philosophically” has claims that clearly remain suspect deconstructively which Derrida indicated in person to Laruelle (while evoking the hauntology of this 'non-philosophical' 'One' with it's visor-effect).

“I should say that I often felt myself in agreement with you. For instance, with your initial description of the researcher, of research insofar as it seemed to follow a certain Heideggerian



logic, in the description you gave of the principle of reason, and what you said about programming and about non goal oriented research, which in fact reinstitutes a goal.... I was willing to subscribe to all this. Then you went on to oppose to this description this new science, which you distinguished from its political, social, etc., appropriations, and there, obviously, I had the impression you were reintroducing philosophemes—the transcendental being only one of them—into this description, this conception of the new science, the One, the real, etc. There, all of a sudden, I said to myself: he's trying to pull the trick of the transcendental on us again, the trick of auto-foundation, auto-legitimation, at the very moment when he claims to be making a radical break. So if, for example, the distinction 'real/possible' is pertinent independently of philosophies of the transcendental type, another hypothesis arises, which I immediately have to dismiss along with you: isn't this distinction already characteristic of a Marxist or neo-Marxist type program?"  
(p.77, Laruelle)

The following question on inverted commas is a question on the suspension of referentiality, specifically 'transcendentally' (which implies philosophemes with its claims, but Laruelle in response states that non-philosophy garners transcendence and philosophy from science/the real and not the other way around "starting from the One") rather than deconstructively.

"What is the status of inverted commas in your text?

For example, when you say, "This instance must be real rather than material; it must be of a cognitive order in order to measure up to philosophy and to research; finally, it must have its foundation and legitimation in itself, without requiring the mediation of philosophy, which is to say it must be transcendental in its own way"—my question, my perplexity, the point on which I am asking for illumination is: What is a transcendental project of auto-foundation and auto-legitimation when it is non-philosophical? And when you then go on to attribute this non-philosophical project of transcendental auto-foundation, auto-legitimation, to a science, to what you call science insofar as you distinguish it from all of its appropriations, and which you also call the force-of-thought (you yourself underline the definite article), my question is: What is it in this force, this science, that is not philosophical, etc.?"

(p.79, Laruelle)

While for Laruelle "a defining characteristic of philosophy to combine something like a position with something like a decision, and hence to deploy unity" which is challenged in the 'non-philosophical' "struggle against the principle of sufficient philosophy" with it's "problem of philosophical decision" that specifically conjoins "ontology and deconstruction" since there's "no principal of choice between" them non-philosophically, with hypothetically "no reason to choose one rather than the other" while overlooking the his own semantically shenanigans that distinguish a philosophical '*position*'/'*representation*' from a non-philosophical '*stance*'/'*description*' let alone the deconstructive 'position' which, as mentioned with Derrida's excerpt on differance, remains both non-philosophical (in a counter-path that Laruelle's doesn't follow) and non-conceptual. Thereby overlooking the limitlessness of gestural deconstruction. "What is the difference between this One and what others call 'difference,' since it is not identity?

Ultimately, all the questions I wanted to ask you come to this schema: Why do you reduce—and isn't there a violence here of the kind you denounce in philosophical society?—so many gestures which could accompany you along the path you wish to pursue? To take just one example among many: the gesture of proposing scientific approaches which would no longer conform to the conception of current practices, to philosophical concept of science; of interrogating certain discourses which claim to be scientific; of helping science make critical progress through movements which would no longer conform to what is understood in those appropriations which you talked about.

Why ignore the existence of this gesture in the various deconstructions which you evoked in passing?"

(p.80, Laruelle)

Once more all of this gidouillic retortion has re-turned us to the pataphysical antinomic spin of the spinning bar of demarcation (the libidinal band), the plus/minus of the physics stick of Pa Ubu, the 'Yes' 'No' that syzygically interlinks Post-Neoism, nihilism, 'Pataphysics and Deconstruction. But instead of meta hacking reality with all of its metanarrative baggage, we must recall the pataphysics behind the postmodern nihilistic kettle logic of incommensurability of differends by Gorgias' hacking as described by Cramer and Lyotard. By turning with this transformative pata-hinge we proceed to pata-hack hyperreality with transmedia games pata-gaming of the rules/play.

#TheGame23's Operation PSION (Pataphysician Surrealist Iqbal Operative Neoist) with its "The Secret is there is NO Secret... or maybe YES." The pataphysical antinomy of the secret of nothing.

"Virus23 variants are the virus of the mind which are the most virulent and easy to transmit to many victims at the same time. Synesthetic image floods are used in Meme warfare and have been found to have been effective in Electronic Warfare for Psychological Operations on the victim.

[...]

"We understand confusion, individual chaos and nonsense as the first moment of de-territorialization of the individual. Through this act, loaded with nonsense feeling, comes the initial impulse of a pretended reaction full of meaning, answering by itself."

— Timóteo Pinto, 'pataphysician meta-discordian post-neoist thinker

[...]

The idea is creating a successful mind virus to challenge the DARPA strong military artificial intelligence running quantum neural networks : many entries can be caused by many Meta Reality Hacking Engineers to contract a mind virus."

(Pinto)

Even though #TheGame23 is not the classical "paranoid political style" of conspiracy theories like the retro-fascists of QAnon, but their virus will still remain a facile component of the metaconverting Zero with its terrorism of the code if it cannot surpass its own metagame, it's own propensity for metaxy, into a transmedial game, a patatextual/transtextual pata-game where deconstruction/'Pataphysics remains the virus. This remains the interlinking through the Virtual/virtualization between the non-event and the rogue event's viral impossible revolution.

While the non-event may accelerate virtualization as a part of its strange loop, one shouldn't automatically conflate it for the impossible exchange of the impossible revolution of the rogue event either (as covered somewhat in the alternate version of "Preface: Of Impossible Revolution- Poppin-Off Mondo Neoism"). In this way the only conspiracies would turn out as hypersitional Trojan horses made up of absurdist anagrammatic cut-ups of dataplexes/memeplexes where like the other Russell paradox, it's as if everything just blinked into (non-)existence only seconds ago.

"They employ the memetic killing agent and use nodal networks to make their AI constructing of a network of secretly infected devices to make it bigger, more powerful, and to feed it as much data as possible. For memetic warfare to succeed, decision-makers of #Cicada3301 #CosmicWarriors, #KSTXI, #OpMiMIC and #TheGame23 needs to get into the right mindset and empower those who have it. Study what's worked and what hasn't. Network across civilian disciplines, particularly with Internet trolls, hackers, marketers, and PR pros. To the extent possible, experiment on social media yourself or through those closest to you. Try following and influencing an issue. Embrace memetic warfare as an essential capability in modern warfare, because it is! #TheGame23 is connected and disconnected with everything and nothing. The connections between Qanon and #TheGame23 have become more closer in some tweets since Cicada 3301 "new generation" sect was in for running the operation."  
(Pinto)

Elsewhere Pinto points out the interlink between #TheGame23, 'Pataphysics and post-thought (which opens up the deconstruction of the metataxy mentioned above by trying to suspend it in the pataphysical absurdity of a "joke" which it remains on a pata-ironic level regardless).

""Some people say that #thegame23 mod 42.5 is a complicated A.R.G. disguised as a simple interactive art, other people say that #thegame23 mod 42.5 is a complicated interactive art disguised as a simple A.R.G.. Some other people say that #thegame23 mod 42.5 is a complicated interactive joke disguised as a simple pataphysics, other people say that #thegame23 mod 42.5 is a simply complicated interactive disguised pataphysics disguised as a complicated pataphysical simple joke."

Timóteo Pinto, 'pataphysician post-thinker"  
(Pinto)

Such post-thought we can intertextually link to the play of the fatal strategy of 'non-thought' which hyperreal transmedia games play out the further deconstructive cosmopsic indifference of those like Brummell and the Dice Man's with their hyperreal indecision (which again undermines Laruelle's inclusion of deconstruction in philosophy (with its imperative of a philosophical decision).

"Baudrillard found in the failure to react positively to an inducement like winning a race – captured in that bizarre American football phrase appropriated as a handle by Ronald Reagan, «Win One for the Gipper!» – the principle of a radical counter-economy of needs. Losers come in all shades. But radical losers stand apart from the crowd in the virulence of their capacity to radiate loss that they throw down as a challenge. There are those who are irresistibly drawn to blowing it, and others who can taste failure and steal it from the jaws of victory. From the Beatles to Beck, the figure of the loser has fascinated lyricists and theorists alike as not merely

sympathetic but as a foundation for a deliberate weakness in the face of overwhelming odds and the false pretenses of victory. Here I revisit Jean Baudrillard's speculations about computer chess programs, specifically IBM's Deep and Deeper Blue, and how best to play against them. Drawing on Baudrillard's theory of loss in sports as an act of contempt for the fruits of victory, institutional accommodation, and the cheap inducements of prestige and glory, I examine how chess masters like Garry Kasparov have met the challenge of the brute force programs – some of which were congealed models of his own play – with appeals to a kind of unforced play and even 'non-thought'."

(Genosko)

Kasparov's non-thought (with its secret weapons of switching language games beyond mere calculation or simple intuitionism) with its pata-gaming, "playing with the rules of the game", interlinks to the hyperreal nihilistic meaningless terrorist space and transmediation of graffiti. And in chess the very spin of the pataphysical physics stick, the plus-minus, is at play since in chess, the plus-minus sign  $\pm$  indicates a clear advantage for the white player; the complementary minus-plus sign,  $\mp$ , indicates the same advantage for the black player. However, the more common chess notation would be only + and -. If a difference is made, the symbols + and - denote a larger advantage than  $\pm$  and  $\mp$ .

"Baudrillard seizes upon a remark of Kasparov's: «I play without thinking»

[...]

Baudrillard sought to radically interrogate the difference between human and machine over the chessboard by putting into play the factor of weakness. When Baudrillard revisits the Kasparov-Deep Blue matches in Impossible Exchange, he reiterates his view of the first match that Kasparov possessed a «secret weapon... intuition, emotion, the stratagem, playing a 'double game' – whereas Deep Blue had only powers of calculation». Only Kasparov is a player; the computer is only an automated operator, insists Baudrillard. Only a player has an opponent because a machine is confined to its program. Kasparov's advantage was that of «otherness», Baudrillard provocatively underlines, with all the nuances of weakness: decoys, calculation in an ironic mode, «technological incorrectness». There is nothing ironic in Deep Blue's calculations. At least at first.

[...]

Playing within the rules of a game is the stake of a Baudrillardian principle of weakness, and regaining language can take many forms, including the poetic recombination of anagrams, and the suddenness and non-meaning of graffiti tags. But consideration of rules is not enough in itself to get to non-thought as chess analogies are not invoked for the sake of making points about imperfection: neither the kind of use Wittgenstein had in mind nor the sort of 'external' influence upon internal logic that interested De Saussure."

(Genosko)

Again this non-thought remains the imaginary solution of the pata-hinge between the non-event of Deep Blue's computerized blindness to its opponents and the rogue event's viral seductive destabilization.

"Balthazar Gracian said that God's strategy is to keep man eternally in suspense. But the proposition is reversible and we too keep Him in suspense. It is the same in the confrontation

between natural and artificial intelligence: the rivalry is ultimately irresolvable, and the best thing is for the match to be eternally postponed. The possible victory of the computer poses no problem: we know it can be due only to calculating power. The interesting question is: what makes Kasparov win? The first answer is given by Kasparov himself when he says, 'I play without thinking. My hands move faster than my thinking.' Clearly, Deep Blue has no hands to move faster than its thinking. It can only think fast. Now, it is a feature of human beings that they move faster than their thinking, thanks to something relating to their bodies, their sex, and which, in a way, does not even pass through the black box of the brain. You can call it affect, intuition, strategy. You can call it 'psychology'. But it isn't so much a question of any 'psychical' faculties which man might possess in addition to his mental faculties of calculation. The basic difference is that, for Kasparov, there is an opponent, another party. For Deep Blue, there is nothing out there — no other, no opponent. It moves within the confines of its own programme. The same applies here, relatively speaking, as with 'Desert Storm': for the Gulf War computers, there were no others, no Iraqis, no enemies (not even any Americans, in the end); the whole thing was played out in a closed circuit on the basis of calculation. Now, it is precisely at this point, beyond the mental power of calculation, that the human being can expect to be definitively superior — in that relationship of otherness which is based on relinquishment of his own thought. This relinquishment, which Deep Blue will never know, is the subtle assumption of game-playing. It is here that the human being can impose himself through illusion, decoy, challenge, seduction and sacrifice. It is this strategy of not going the full hog, of playing within one's capabilities, that the computer understands least well, since it is condemned to play at the height of its capabilities. This syncopation or ellipsis of presence by which you provoke the emergence of the other — even in the form of the virtual ego of the computer — is real game-player's thinking. Kasparov himself has spoken (to ask that it be taken into account in the time on the clocks) of this 'dead time of the real during which he really thinks'. That is to say, during which he is mentally absent, while the other party, Deep Blue, is sunk in calculation. The human being takes this distraction of thought, this 'dead time', from his available time, whereas the computer does not divert a single second from its own calculating time. But, paradoxically, it is this which turns round against it. Kasparov insists on the fact that after his first defeat (but doubtless you have always known to lose the first game), he played against his own nature, 'within himself', to entrap his adversary (this is just like *The Diary of a Seducer*). He learns to play weak moves, to simplify or close up the game. Clearly, with a simulacrum, you have to play against nature, to simulate better than it does and catch it out, catch it out by simulation which, for it, is merely the simulation of calculation, whereas for human beings it is an ironic power. When up against the machine they have programmed themselves (let us not forget that it was men like Kasparov who programmed Deep Blue), human beings can only subtly de-programme themselves, become 'technically incorrect' to stay ahead of the game. They may even have to take over the machine's own place. Like the illusionist who had invented an automaton which imitated human beings so well that, on stage, he was himself forced to become mechanical and mimic the automaton to maintain the distinction. This is the only possible strategy: if you become technically correct, you are unfailingly beaten by the machine."

(p.162-163, Baudrillard 2000/2002)

The virtualization of 'intelligence' (just like with its film-reel [A Theory] like Turing machine where perhaps a comic book paneled [B Theory] Turing machine able to jump around its options of panels may have some bearing on the patadata simulation of 'creativity') leads to a "spectral body" an embodiment of the hauntological specters visor-effect.

"The IBM technicians had managed to inculcate a mental photocopy of the human into Deep Blue, in order to equip it to beat human beings on their own ground. By contrast, professional players dream of beating the machine as such, by becoming more of a machine than the machine. In this challenge, man is likely to be first to be knocked off his stroke. The fact that the computer has managed artificially to synthesize certain human qualities does not, however, mean that it has begun thinking. It is merely being signed up to the technocratic project of reinscribing all data in a three-dimensional virtual reality. There is nothing new in this: we have already seen the successful rehumanization of industrial work within Taylorism, without anything of the nature of exploitation being changed. The inhuman can mimic the human to perfection, without ceasing to be inhuman. Here everything rests on the distinction between intelligence and thought. The postulate, which was Turing's idea from the outset, is that intelligence can be separated from any physical substrate, from any sensible referent. Intelligence is not the intelligence of the whole human being, but a functional, cerebral version of ideation, and through it you can liberate an ideality of the human being restricted to the brain alone. Making a radical break between calculation and the body and, on that basis, inventing for yourself a definitive, spectral body, an exoteric body, free Of any fleshly, sexual uncertainty, a body without depth, reinvented from the screen as skin, as tactile film, far removed from any organic sensibility This is the perspective of the immaterial machine."

(p.117, Baudrillard 2001/1999)

Such a visor-effect leaves us transparent operators pataphysically non-existent like the Nonexistent Knight.

"The driver, for his part, is alone. In his cockpit he no longer is anyone. He merges with his double, with the car, and so no longer has an identity of his own. He is a bit like Italo Calvino's Non-existent Knight in his armour. And he does not see the others, the other tournament knights. 'You don't have to like them or respect them,' said Alain Prost, 'when the green light comes on, they don't exist. I know I'm going to do battle with a Williams, a Lotus or a Ferrari.'"

(p.167, Baudrillard 2000/2002)

A Trojan virus such as non-thought interplay's on radical uselessness, the pataphysical inutiliousness, to void/hollow/empty out structures, to deconstruct them. This play of poetic transference, much like that of graffiti, plays out the transmedia game events "totalization of the world" and "the disappearance of the event".\* Just as (Post-)Neoism as a transmedia game implodes the surrational/surreal nuance that Bök implies in regards 'Pataphysics hyperrealistically/deconstructively through a counterpath, the path of nihilism. And hence we evoke Noism (the Proto-Neoism) and surpass mere Post-Neoism, by cutting (through a furtherance of gestural deconstruction) instantly with a non-thought the '-Isim' in 'No-Isim' and escalate transfinitely to the nth (pataphysical) degree the 'Post-' in 'Post-Neoism' to get ('epi-meta-') a 'Pata-' to re-turn by way of a detour(ne) to 'Pata-No'. Since deconstruction deconstructs the structures that "it" "inhabits", the intertextuality and the framing of the

apparatus/medium can get deployed transfinitely as strange loop patamechanisms in transmedia games to deconstruct their demarcation.

“It all depends on the ground we choose to fight on. Measuring his/her powers against a reductive ideal of intelligence, they are beaten by their own creation; their own shadow. This is, sadly, a very common model: most often — and this applies also to social and political matters — we choose to fight on ground where we are beaten before we begin. We are forced, then, into a strategic redefinition of what is at stake in intelligence and thought respectively. Here Kasparov's defeat by Deeper Blue comes to our aid. Rather than fight on a ground where victory is never certain (that of technical intelligence), let us choose to fight on the terrain of thought, where the question of winning does not actually arise. This is the key: maintaining the radical uselessness of thought, its negative predestination for any use or purpose whatsoever. In this sense, the threat posed by the development of artificial intelligence is a piece of good fortune. Thought is thereby rid of the burden of knowledge and information, of all the informational and communicational excess which encumbered it. The computer, which handles these things so much better, relieves us of all that. Relieved of the real by the virtual itself thought can once again assume its place where 'the thinking is', where are thought. For the subject who claims to think without being thought in return is merely an organic tool, prefiguring the inorganic intellection of the machine. He is beaten on his own ground, and in the end it is the virtual which thinks him. On the other hand, the person who thinks 'in return', the one who thinks because he is thought, is liberated from the unilateral 'service' of thought by the operation of the machine itself.

[...]

Rendering unto utility that which is of the order of the useful, at the same time they render unto inutility that which is of the order of radical uselessness, and unto the void that which is of the order of emptiness.

[...]

Relieved of value, things are free to circulate without passing through exchange and the abstraction of exchange. Words and language are free to correspond without passing through meaning. Just as sexuality, freed from reproduction, becomes free to deploy itself in the erotic, without a concern for ends and means. This is how the poetic transference operates. Where we might deplore the disappearance of the real in the virtual, the disappearance of the event in information, the disappearance of thought in artificial intelligence, the disappearance of values and ideologies in the globalization of trade, we should instead rejoice in this totalization of the world which, by purging everything of its functions and technical goals, makes room for the singularity of thought, the singularity of the event, the singularity of language, the singularity of the object and the image. In the end, it is the very existence of single-track thinking [la pensée unique], of the totalitarian system of the economy, of information and artificial intelligence — and the automation and exponential development of these things — which leaves space for a world that is literally true. It is the final accomplishment of reality which leaves room for the radical illusion. Now, it is in this literal truth, this literal play of the world, that the ultimate freedom lies.” (p.119-121, Baudrillard 2001/1999)

\*This text/UNNO plays on this by not merely cyberflânerie for this assemblage but also plays out various transmedial Oulipolian patamechanisms, to retrace/erase as Bök brings up that the

Oulipo's "constraints" are very similar to computer code of computer programs, like using a app for blind reading (SeeingAI) to assemble analog textual lexia to play out this interlink between the non-event and non-thought.

### **File ([...]): Hypertexts and Hyperlinks**

"Semiotope: Vol. 3 NO. 1, 1978: Nietzsche's Return";

by Sylvère Lotringer, et. al.

"Screened Out", "Impossible Exchange";

by Jean Baudrillard

"The Non-Philosophy Project";

by Francois Laruelle

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“WHEN QUINED, THIS TEXT DOES NOTHING”  
WHEN QUINED, THIS TEXT DOES NOTHING.

"Print me out/cut the pages out, glue all the pages end-to-end, twist me, and glue me once more  
to form a Möbius strip, please"

The Gordian knot can at least be cut. The Möbius strip, if one divides it, results in a  
supplementary spiral without the reversibility of surfaces being resolved (here the reversible  
continuity of hypotheses).

(LICHTENBERG'S KNIFE INCLUDED FOR AN UNBELIEVABLE WAY OF ZHUANG-ZI  
CUTTING THROUGH ANY THING, CONCEPT, OR GOD!)

‘Lichtenberg's knife without a blade which has no handle’

“What I care about is the Way, which goes beyond skill. When I first began cutting up oxen, all I could see was the ox itself. After three years I no longer saw the whole ox. And now — now I go at it by spirit and don’t look with my eyes. Perception and understanding have come to a stop and spirit moves where it wants. I go along with the natural makeup, strike in the big hollows, guide the knife through the big openings, and follow things as they are. So I never touch the smallest ligament or tendon, much less a main joint.”

“A good cook changes his knife once a year — because he cuts. A mediocre cook changes his knife once a month — because he hacks. I’ve had this knife of mine for nineteen years and I’ve cut up thousands of oxen with it, and yet the blade is as good as though it had just come from the grindstone. There are spaces between the joints, and the blade of the knife has really no thickness. If you insert what has no thickness into such spaces, then there’s plenty of room — more than enough for the blade to play about it. That’s why after nineteen years the blade of my knife is still as good as when it first came from the grindstone.”

“However, whenever I come to a complicated place, I size up the difficulties, tell myself to watch out and be careful, keep my eyes on what I’m doing, work very slowly, and move the knife with the greatest subtlety, until — flop! the whole thing comes apart like a clod of earth crumbling to the ground. I stand there holding the knife and look all around me, completely satisfied and reluctant to move on, and then I wipe off the knife and put it away.”

## **Take My Appendix Please!**

### **Opening Emails**

Pata-No UN LTD to #TheGame23

Salutations,

We get English alongside a flurry of neologisms will make this collaboration perhaps difficult, but maybe Google translate and internet searches will be forgiving. Regardless from Gorgias to Baudrillard, either will tell you that communication is futile, otherwise Derrida and Lyotard might at least note the incommensurable exchange of translation. Moving on, an easy way to proceed on this collaboration might involve (if you were forwarded our awkwardly worded and rambling explanation/proposal from Instagram) explaining and giving examples of 'transmedia games',

and then how that interlinks to the “Too Cool” series as an archive and ‘non-book’ apart of the specific ‘transmedia game’ variant ‘Zero-Sum Game No Show’ (which is specifically a hyperreal non-event text). [So we’ll proceed to link a number of files here involving the above, some of which are alternate versions of texts we contributed to the soon to be released in the upcoming collection NEOISM: 40 Years of Pop-Up Revolution. We’ll also include both links to the “interview” between us and tENT your group already linked on one of your pages that covers all of the above as well as our soundclouds and YouTube for further examples. Including perhaps a functional link to a old pdf copy of Too Cool volume 0] After which, in the following email(s) we can compare notes on the “across-all-mediums” potentiality of contributions and how this involves the prior mentioned pataphysical deconstruction of magic via Hofstadter’s definition of ‘metamagical themas’ and performative linguistics/speech-act theory, etc. [In the following email where we’ll link additional texts we’ve come across might assist in navigating these problematics and towards putting together imaginary solutions for collaborative contributions.]

#TheGame23 to Pata-No UN LTD

Salutations!

We received happily your request for further clarifications about The Game 23 activities and its relationship with the many counter culture projects showed in our network.

We elaborated a text for that end which we hope can help you understand our actions and projects:

The Game 23 is a meta-arg created by means of infection of a analogical virus called "virus23", which we also call "Quantum Schizophrenia and "Divine Madness". The meta-arg works as an amalgamative memplex or informational black hole. Our aim is to agglutinate the previous results of infection as one thing through the use of a meta unfiction narrative in order to make a hyper reality , thus creating the means of widespread infection. The virus 23 is an analytical paradigm and state of mind, similar to the paranoiac-critical method proposed by Salvador Dali, applied as an exegetic tool.

We consider any form of methodical madness used as artistic and philosophical expressions beyond rationality as virus23 infections. That pseudo mental pathology can also be associated with a shaman-like gnostic state caused by contact with GaldruX, the ultimate source of acausal and beyond-logic ideas. Virus 23 is an "third eye " which discern the informations received from external world, pretty much like the no conclusive approach of reality proposed by David Chapman and Robert Anton Wilson:

“Nebulosity” means “cloud-like-ness.” Meaningness is cloud-like. It is real, but impossible to completely pin down.

Nebulosity is the key to understanding confusions about meaningness.

“Nebulosity” refers to the intangible, transient, amorphous, non-separable, ambiguous nature of meaningness.

From a distance, clouds can look solid; close-up they are mere fog, which can even be so thin it becomes invisible when you enter it.

If you watch a cloud for a few minutes, it may change shape and size, or evaporate into nothing. But it is impossible to find an exact moment at which it ceases to exist.

Clouds often have vague boundaries and no particular shape.

It can be impossible to say where one cloud ends and another begins; whether two bits of cloud are connected or not; or to count the number of clouds in a section of the sky.

It can be impossible to say even whether there is a cloud in a particular place, or not.”  
Meanings behave in these ways, too.”

-David Chapman

“I DO NOT BELIEVE ANYTHING. Most people, even the educated, think that everybody must “believe” something or other, that if one is not a theist, one must be a dogmatic atheist, and if one does not think capitalism is perfect, one must believe fervently in socialism, and if one does not have blind faith in X, one must alternatively have blind faith in not-X or the reverse of X. My own opinion is that belief is the death of intelligence”

-Robert Anton Wilson

“Is,” “is,” “is”—the idiocy of the word haunts me. If it were abolished, human thought might begin to make sense. I don’t know what anything “is”; I only know how it seems to me at this moment.” -Robert Anton Wilson

We transmit the virus through a flood of apparently iCONherent information whose archetype it’s the “dataplex”

“The 00AG9603 Dataplex is a higher dimensional spider web that takes all of the information that surrounds it and spits it out in a torrent of waves as a cryptosophical entity, each wave being a flow of information that is flowing in a constant direction towards a unknown or/and hidden destiny”

The infection occurs when someone assimilates the information stored in the dataplex. Once infected, the apophenic nature of the virus permits an intuitive understanding of the meta-game and its manifestations.

We unite all the different permutations of virus23 infection through a meta-arg or/and meta-unfiction. (ARG and unfiction are defined as an immersive form of storytelling in which events take place in real life). To explore their essence inside a broader context and make them grow beyond their original purpose.

"To keep up even a worthwhile tradition means vitiating the idea behind it which must necessarily be in a constant state of evolution: it is mad to try to express new feelings in a mummified form."

-Alfred Jarry

We don't merely use a immersive story with clear boundaries between reality and fiction (referred as "magic circle" by dutch historian Johan Huizinga in his book "Homo Ludens") instead, these boundaries don't exist, and the unfictional nature of the game isn't clear to outsiders, making them interact with the network in a different approach. The lack of a magic circle characterizes our network as a virtual hyper reality, we replace the inherent performativity of an ARG to a spontaneous form of interacting with the subtle narrative of the meta-arg.

The meta-arg also works as a hyper sigil because of its semi-mystical nature. That mysticism isn't of metaphysical order, instead, it's so defined because of the transcendence of causal and materialistic logic. With the ambiguous unfictional subtext of our works and the surrealistic nature of our projects, our players have to use an active form of imagination, which have parallels with pataphysics, to "play" correctly. isn't about art or a game, all the absurd and surrealistic facets of the game are faced as concrete objects in that hyper reality continuum. A sigil is a pictorial representation of an intent hidden as a simple doodle and activated when is inside the subconscious. Our intents are encrypted as a large network littered with obscure and confusing references that once grasped make the players act upon the ideas exposed as real life things then manifesting the intent of the hypersigil.

Expanding more in the parallels of our game with pataphysics, it's interesting to note that since our projects are of a transcendent imaginative order, play the meta-game involve finding solutions in the imaginative environment of the game 23, which is similar to the well known definition of pataphysics as the science of imaginary solutions.

The definition of the hyper sigil used in the game 23 as semi-mystic, could easily be replaced as pataphysical though, since both refers to a thing above metaphysics that have its base in the imagination as a analytical and exegetical tool to evaluate reality, ignoring esoterical canons that frequently limit the imagination as a mean instead of an end in a submissive and dogmatic exercise of manifestation of abstract thought into a objective and tangible phenomenon.

We are working on some new projects for the game 23 to systematize the ideas exposed above. We are working with a semi-occult god that we call Galdrux, which can be defined in a sense (since absolute definitions are the antithesis of Galdrux) as a pataphysical god. Galdrux "cult" was made as a means to mix occultism with the pataphysical tendencies of our works.

Galdrux represents the act of magic as a means to change reality (in that specific case, to undermine it) but magic as an unknowable thing without defined form that lacks moral and physical/metaphysical limitations, which conception comes from imaginative experimentation.

We will also create new mechanics to "play" the game, as a means to spread more effectively the virus to people that don't have the investigative instinct required to assimilate dataplex's data-points. These new mechanics will also ensure that our hyperreality reaches people far from our network, with elaborate hoaxes that will be created to insert our hyperreality in the consensus reality.

## Pata-No UN LTD Links

<http://idioideo.pleintekst.nl/InterviewPata.html>

<http://idioideo.pleintekst.nl/InterviewByPata.html>

<https://m.soundcloud.com/pataproxxy>

<https://m.soundcloud.com/whitecolors>

<https://m.soundcloud.com/t-c-43>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ueQGz9NOpO4>

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3gmgdciFlg0&t=1200s>

## Virtual Outline For A Ouvroir de Transmédia Potentielle (OuTrPo) Patamechanisms of 'Zero-Sum Game No Shows' & Hypermades\*

### *Nothingness Merch - Pataphorical Hypermades*

Lichtenberg's Knife <sup>(ω)</sup>

Virtual Bed <sup>(a)</sup>

Rabbit Holes <sup>(f---f)</sup>

Daumal's Kaleidoscope <sup>(±)</sup>

Blank Non-Books <sup>(f---f)</sup> (Signed- Monty Cantsin, etc.)

Brecht's Beer And Cigars <sup>(ω)</sup>

Harpo's Swordfish <sup>(ω)</sup>

Gorgias' Kettle <sup>(0)</sup>

Organs Without Bodies <sup>(f---f)</sup> (3D Printed, Grave-Robbed, etc.)

*Additional Nothingness Merch Hypermades*

Blank Pages <sup>(ω)</sup> (Signed- Monty Canstin, etc.)

Neolon Crypto-Bucks <sup>(ω)</sup>

Zero Hour Dollars <sup>(ω)</sup>

#100MIL4NOTHING <sup>(ω)</sup> (Certificates)

#BILLION4NOTHING <sup>(ω)</sup> (Certificates)

DECADENT <sup>(t)</sup> (Hyper-Shirt)

*'Zero-Sum Game No Shows'*

SUPER COOL / TOO COOL / COOL KILLER <sup>(ω)</sup> (Pataphysical Graffiti)

Non-Event Auction <sup>(ω)</sup> (Sell Everything/Nothing from/in a context [room, building, website, etc],  
by auctioning off *the* non-event)

Burn A Million Dollars <sup>(▲)</sup>

\*This page gives the synecdochal sigils for the files where each of these examples applicable for patamechanisms for (often (pataphorical) hypermades of) Zero-Sum Game No Shows and are either mentioned overtly in the text or the context for them gets outlined.